PRUDENTIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY AND SIXTO L. OROSA, JR., PETITIONERS VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, NATIONAL LABOR UNION AND JOSE M. SEÑIR, RESPONDENTS.

In this original action, petitioners Prudential Bank & Trust
Company—hereafter referred to as the Bank—and Sixto L. Orosa, Jr., pray for: (1)
a writ of certiorari “annulling and/or setting aside the decision” of the Court
of Industrial Relations, in Case No. 1106-ULP thereof, entitled “National Labor
Union and Jose M. Señir vs. Prudential Bank & Trust Co., and Sixto
Orosa, Jr.,” the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainants and
against the respondents, finding the latter guilty of the unfair labor practice
complained of. Consequently, respondents are ordered to cease and desist from
further committing said unfair labor practice and they are likewise ordered to
reinstate complainant Jose M. Senir to his former position with back salary, at
the rate of P215.00 a month, from October 31, 1956 up to the time of his actual
reinstatement and under the same terms and conditions prior to his separation
from the service.”

“as without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or abuse of discretion”; and (2)
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining said court, as well as the National
Labor Union and Jose M. Señir, from executing the aforementioned decision. Upon
the filing of a bond in the sum of P500.00, the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for was issued.

Jose M. Señir, the main respondent herein, was acting chief of the security
guard section of the Bank up to October 31, 1956, when he was dismissed from the
service. Soon thereafter, at the instance of Señir and the National Labor Union,
of which Señir is a member, an acting prosecutor of the Court of Industrial
Relations filed therewith a complaint for unfair labor practice—which was
docketed as Case No. 1106-ULP—against said Bank and its Vice-President and
General Manager, Sixto Orosa, Jr., who had allegedly dismissed Señir because of
his union activities. The Bank and Orosa filed an answer denying the charge of
unfair labor practice and alleging that Senir had been dismissed, not owing to
his union activities, but for cause, as found by a special committee that had
investigated some charges preferred against him by one Pablo M. Ignacio.
Replying thereto Señir alleged, in turn, that said committee had been
irregularly created by the management and had deprived him of the right to be
represented by counsel, as well as of the opportunity to prove his defense.

When the case was heard in the Court of Industrial Relations, Señir testified
that he was a member of the National Labor Union and, up to October 31, 1956,
acting chief of the security guards of the Bank, which dismissed him for no
other cause than his union activities, inasmuch as, prior to said date, he had
initiated the formation of a labor union other than that already existing among
the employees of the Bank, and was working for better terms and conditions of
employment for its security guards, as indicated by the fact that, during a
conference he had, in relation thereto, with the general manager of the Bank,
Mr. Sixto Orosa, Jr., the latter said: “I was informed that you were the one
agitating for the formation of a labor union here.”

Upon the other hand, testifying for the respondents therein—petitioners
herein—said Mr. Orosa stated that the dismissal of Senir had been due, not to
his alleged union activities, which were unknown to him (Orosa), but to a just
cause, as found by the committee above referred to. In support of this
testimony, the Bank and Mr. Orosa introduced, also, as part of their evidence:
an undated complaint of Pablo M. Ignacio, a security guard of the Bank, charging
Señir with dereliction of duty, disrespect to superior officers, inciting
discontent and unbecoming conduct; Señir’s answer thereto; the record of the
investigation conducted by said committee; its original report recommending
either Señir’s demotion or his resignation; and a subsequent communication of
the committee recommending his dismissal.

In due course, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered the decision
complained of, finding that respondent Señir was a member of the Prudential Bank
& Trust Co. Employees Association, which had a collective bargaining
agreement with the Bank, effective for a period of three (3) years, from
December 20, 1954; that paragraph (9) of said agreement provides:

“That there shall be created a Personnel Committee composed of
representatives of the Bank and the Association which shall be in charge of
settling any dispute, controversy or problem that may arise between the Bank and
the members of the Association. Any dispute or controversy which cannot be
settled by the Personnel Committee shall be referred to an impartial arbitrator
to be chosen by both the Bank and the Association. The decision of the
Arbitrator shall be final between the parties.”

that the special committee—created by the Bank and consisting of four (4)
Representatives of the management and one (1) representative of the
Association—that investigated the charges of Ignacio against Señir, was not
constituted in conformity with the provisions of said paragraph (9) of the
aforementioned collective bargaining agreement, which was in force at that time;
that Señir had asked that he be allowed to be represented by counsel in the
investigation conducted by said committee, but the same denied said request;
that upon the filing of Senir’s written answer to the charges of Ignacio, the
committee considered the investigation concluded and then rendered its report
and recommendation, without giving Señir an opportunity to introduce evidence in
support of his aforesaid answer. Then the decision of respondent court goes on
to say:

“After having carefully considered the respective contentions of both parties
in this case on the collateral question at issue, together with its impressions
on the investigations conducted by the Special Investigating Committee on the
charges filed against complainant Señir (after painstaking review of its
proceedings as recorded in Exhibit ‘9’), the Court is more inclined to give
credit to the contention of the complainants and, therefore, believes that the
proceedings end recommendations conducted and arrived at by said committee,
respectively, on the charges in question should be, as they are hereby
considered null arfd void. Consequently, all the actions by respondents taken
thereafter and pursuant thereto are likewise invalidated.

“While efficient and productive operations of any establishment requires that
management be in a position to take reasonable disciplinary action against
erring employees, care should be taken ” to make it clear that it (management)
does not disregard its obligations and commitments under a contract it has
entered into with the representatives of its employees. Toward that end, it is
well to agree with said representatives upon the common reasons for discharge of
employees. For to disregard such procedure has the effect of throwing into
discard the basic purposes of the contract and to a large extent reduces to
futility the painstaking and time-consuming effort to establish orderly
procedures through collective bargaining negotiations. It is the duty of both
management and labor to see that the relief demanded does not violate or
undermine these basic standards for ‘administration of the grievance procedure
involves matters which afffect the daily lives of employees in relation to their
job.’

‘* * * An adequate and proper functioning grievance procedure can serve as a
means of becoming aware of employee complaints which require attention and
elimination of their causes. Thereby, better labor relations may be attained and
the companies’ policies and rules guard to more efficient operation to the
extent that they may be accommodated to employee needs.’ (pages 327 and 348— The
Law of Labor Relations—Werne.)

“On the other hand, and coming to complainant Señir’s claim that his
dismissal was due to his union activities and to his determined efforts to see
the working conditions of the security guards under him improved, the Court has
noted that although his testimony to that effect has never been corroborated by
any other witness—he being the only witness for the complainants— said
contention found support from Pablo M. Ignacio himself. In paragraph 4 of the
charge (Exhibit ‘4’) he (Ignacio) filed against Señir, it was alleged:

‘A week later, he called for a meeting and his statement was this: I’ll see
to it that you all guards be given an extra pay for Sundays, and 25 percent to
50 percent for those guards working in the night shift. Our answer was this:
That we are given an increase yearly, including the Christmas bonus and profit
sharing. It is embarrassing for us to take other privileges, because it is given
to us without asking for it. He insisted that we have to fight for our
privileges, but our answer was still no. We will not do that because we don’t
want to be possessive. After we were not convinced at the meeting it was
adjourned and within two minutes we were called again, he said, suppose that the
management will cut off the one day off in every week, and uniforms and shoes.
Our answer was this: That we are much higher than those guards of the agencies.’
The several witnesses presented during the investigation of said charges by the
Special Investigating Committee have likewise made reference, in the course of
their testimony (Exhibit ‘9’), to the efforts made by complainant Senir to the
end that their working conditions would improve.

“In the light of the foregoing facts and observations, the Court is of the
opinion that complainant Jose M. Senir’s contention that the only reason why he
was dismissed by respondent on October 31, 1956 was his union activities is more
tenable.”

Thus, the question for determination by respondent court was whether or not
Señir’s dismissal had been due to his union activities. Señir maintained the
affirmative and testified to this effect. Upon the other hand, petitioners
herein—respondents in the unfair labor practice case—introduced Orosa’s
testimony in support of the negative view, and presented, by way of
corroboration, the records of the proceedings in the special committee above
referred to. The Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations held, in
the decision complained of, not only, that the committee had been irregularly
constituted by the Bank, in violation of its collective bargaining agreement
with the labor organization of which Señir was a member, but, also, that the
proceedings in said committee were fatally defective, for lack of due process.
What is more, respondent court found that Senir’s testimony, concerning his
activities to improve the conditions of employment of the security guards had
been borne out by the evidence introduced before said committee, and by the very
complaint filed against him by security guard Ignacio—who appears to harbor
ill-feelings toward Señir and was administratively convicted of, and punished
for, insubordination to him, as his superior officer. For these reasons, said
court, thru its Presiding Judge, rendered its decision adopting the version of
Señir and giving no credence to the theory of petitioners herein. Subsequently,
the court en banc unanimously affirmed said decision (although two [2]
members of the court concurred merely in the result).

It is interesting to note, at this juncture, that petitioners herein have not
denied the irregularity in the organization of the special committee above
mentioned, or even tried to justify it. Neither have they attempted to justify
the denial of said committee of Señir’s request to be represented by counsel, or
its failure to give an opportunity to introduce evidence in his own behalf.
Thus, the issue before us narrows down to whether or not respondent court
exceeded its jurisdiction, or so gravely abused its discretion as to have
exceeded its jurisdiction, in concluding, under the circumstances already
adverted to, that the testimony of Jose M. Señir deserves more credence than
that of Sixto L. Orosa, Jr. It is obvious that this question must be decided in
the negative, regardless of the alleged demerits of said conclusion, which was
made in the valid exercise of the jurisdiction of respondent court (Herrera vs.
Barretto, et al., 25 Phil., 245-251) and constituted, at most, a mere error of
judgment, which cannot be reviewed or set aside by writ of certiorari (So Chu
vs. Nepomuceno, 29 Phil., 208; De los Santos vs. Mapa, 46
Phil., 791; Gonzales vs. Salas, 49 Phil., 1; Ello vs. Judge of
First Instance, 49 Phil., 152; Santos vs. Court of First Instance, 49
Phil., 398; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 78 Phil., 785; Castro vs.
Peña, 80 Phil., 488; Gil vs. Gil, 80 Phil., 791).

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, the writ of certiorari therein prayed
for is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofor issued hereby
dissolved, with costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed.