MANUEL PANGAN AND JULIA GARCIA-PANGAN, AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF ANITA GARCIA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. THE EVENING NEWS PUBLISHING CO., INC., THE PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF…

In the Court of First Instance of Manila, Manuel Pangan and Julia
Garcia-Pangan, for themselves and the latter as judicial guardian, of minor
Anita Garcia, filed a complaint against the Evening News Publishing Co., Inc.,
the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc. (henceforth referred to as
Pepsi-Cola), and Calsam Printers, Inc. for damages totalling P90,000.00
allegedly resulting to them from defendants’ deliberate or negligent failure to
prevent frauds in the counting of votes in the “First Teenagers Personality
Contest” in which Anita Garcia was the strongest candidate, and which she should
have won if her closest rival, Teddy Reyes, had not used forged ballots printed
by Calsam Printers, Inc. Pepsi-Cola, in its answer, alleged that the complaint
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but did not ask
the court for preliminary hearing pursuant to Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court. During the trial, after three of plaintiffs’ witnesses had testified and
a fourth was on the stand, Pepsi-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint,
reiterating insufficiency of its allegations to constitute a valid cause of
action against it; and in a subsequent memorandum to support its motion, it
called attention to several issues of the Evening News (Annexes A, B and C)
wherein the latter assumed full responsibility for the contest. Plaintiffs
countered that anything extraneous to the complaint cannot be considered in
determining its sufficiency. Acting on. the motion, the court dismissed the
complaint as against Pepsi-Cola. Reconsideration of the dismissal having been
denied, plaintiffs appealed to this Court, raising the sole legal question of
the propriety of the dismissal.

The sufficiency of the complaint as against Pepsi-Cola cannot be seriously
questioned. The court could not have, as in fact it had not, based the dismissal
on the insufficiency thereof. It does not merely, as alleged by Pepsi-Cola, make
conclusions of law, but states ultimate facts constituting a cause of action. It
clearly charges that Pepsi-Cola—a sponsor of the aforementioned contest
conducted by the Evening News and in which plaintiffs allegedly spent
approximately P20,000.00 to make Anita Garcia win—either deliberately or
negligently failed to take precautions to prevent the use in the contest of fake
ballots which it knew were maliciously printed by Calsam Printers, Inc.; and
that fully aware that Teddy Reyes used the forged ballots, Pepsi-Cola, together
with co-defendant Evening News, declared him winner instead of Anita Garcia, the
rightful winner if the fake ballots had been nullified, thus depriving her of
various prizes and causing her and plaintiffs damages. The court could well have
granted the relief prayed for, based on these allegations.

Pepsi-Cola argues that in accordance with Section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, its motion to dismiss, filed during the trial, must be resolved in the
light of evidence already received. Apparently with this in mind, the lower
court grounded the dismissal on the evidence so far presented by plaintiffs,
particularly the testimony of Ramon Tagle, circulation and promotions manager of
the Evening News, to the effect that the newspaper assumed full control and
supervision over the contest; and the issues of the Evening News where it
declared its assumption of responsibility for the contest; and found that “the
lack of cause of action as against fhe Pepsi-Cola emerges with convincing
reality.” This is patent error. To determine the sufficiency of the complaint,
only the facts alleged therein should be considered (Dimayuga vs.
Dimayuga, 96 Phil., 859; 51 Off. Gaz. [5] 2397; Marabiles vs. Quito,
100 Phil., 64; 52 Off. Gaz., [15], 6507; De Jesus vs. Belarmino, 95
Phil., 365; 50 Off. Gaz., [7] 3064).

Though the allegations of the complaint are ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain, but a cause of action can, in any manner be made out therefrom, and
plaintiff would be entitled to recover in any aspect on the facts or any
combination of facts proven, then the motion to dismiss should be denied (71 C.
J. S. 932). The motion to dismiss shall be resolved in the light of evidence
already received only if it was presented during the trial, and the complaint
turns out to be defective (Section 10, Rule 9 in conjunction with Section 4,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court). If the evidence cures the defect of the
complaint, then it shall not be dismissed, but shall be amended to conform to
the evidence, although non-amendment thereof does not affect the result of the
trial of the issues raised by the evidence. On the other hand, the complaint
being sufficient in itself, dismissal cannot be based on but part of the
evidence so far presented by plaintiffs. If the complaint is to be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, plaintiffs must first be allowed to finish presenting
all their evidence. Before that time, the court cannot inquire into the truth of
the allegations of the complaint and conclude they are false, since a motion to
dismiss theoretically admits the truth of the allegations of fact of the
complaint (Palma vs. Garciano, 99 Phil., 72; 52 Off. Gaz., [9] 4244;
Carreon vs. Province of Pampanga, 99 Phil., 808; 52 Off. Gaz. [15]
6557). Just because the initial part of plaintiffs’ evidence tends to prove that
only one of three defendants shouldered full responsibility for the contest, the
court cannot predict the kind, the nature and the probative value of the rest of
their evidence which has not been presented. The plaintiffs are entitled to
present their whole case, and should be allowed to submit all their competent
and material evidence to substantiate their claims against each defendant
(Hamano vs. Zandueta, 62 Phil. 335; Tagaruma vs. Guzman, 60
Phil. 662).

Wherefore, the order of dismissal is set aside, and the case remanded to the
lower court for further .proceedings. No costs. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Order set aside.