LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND ALEJANDRO T. LIM, R…

Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
to enjoin the respondent Hon. Higinio B. Macadaeg, in his capacity as
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from enforcing his
order of December 20, 1957 in Civil Case No. 34453.

On December 9, 1957, respondent Alejandro Lim filed a complaint with
injunction against the petitioners herein, before the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The complaint alleges substantially that the
plaintiff was the lessee of two parcels of riceland, known as “Hacienda
de Leon”, situated in the Municipality of Talavera, Nueva Ecija, with
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. NT-21932 and NT-21866. Sometime in
August, 1957, the owners of the said Hacienda sold it to the Land
Tenure Administration for purposes of subdivision and resale to
tenants, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1400. Plaintiff, however, claims
that he has planted rice in the land in dispute with consequent
ownership of 30% of the harvest for the agricultural year 1957-58, and
prayed that the defendant Land Tenure Administration (petitioner
herein) be restrained from preventing the plaintiff’s entry in the land
for the purpose of gathering the standing crops therein and to enjoin
the other defendants, officials of the Land Tenure Administration, from
taking and appropriating the same for the benefit of the
Administration.

The defendants made a special appearance before the court seeking
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue. The
respondent Judge denied the motion, and in the same order of denial,
issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiff.
Hence this petition.

In a resolution of this Court, dated the 27th of December 1957, the
Clerk of Court was authorized to issue, without bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the lower court’s
order of December 20, 1957 until further notice from this Supreme Court.

The question of venue is the sole issue here. The petitioners argue
that the standing crops referred to in the complaint are real or
immovable property under Article 415 (2) of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, and, therefore, the action should have been instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where the property is
situated. Respondent Lim, on the other hand, contends (and the lower
court so held) that standing crops, when owned by one other than the
owner of the land in which they grow, are considered personality, and
thus the suit may be filed in any court of proper jurisdiction where
either of the parties reside or may be found at the election of the
plaintiff.

In our opinion, the problem was incorrectly posed. Analysis of the
complaint filed in the Court below reveals that respondent Alejandro T.
Lim’s basic stand, and which he sought to vindicate, was the
continuation of his leasehold rights notwithstanding the sale of the
Hacienda de Leon to the Land Tenure Administration by the original
owners and lessors. The claim of ownership of 30% of the crop is
accessory to the leasehold, and but a consequence thereof. This is
apparent from the following allegations (Annex A, petition):

4

“At the time, however, that the said Hacienda was
sold to the Land Tenure Administration as mentioned above, plaintiff
was still the lessee of the same and had already planted the property
to palay for the agricultural year 1957-58, through his tenants, and
which crops now existing on the said Hacienda are now partly being
harvested and will be totally harvested by the months of December,
1957, and January, 1958;”

7

“After the sale of the said Hacienda de Leon to the
Land Tenure Administration, defendants refused to recognized the
leasehold rights of the plaintiff over the said property, and now
maintain that said property was purchase (sic) by the said government
entity from the former owners, free from all liens and encumbrances,
and now also refuse to allow plaintiff to enter into possession of the
property, and to gather the standing crops, notwithstanding the fact
that both the former owners (lessors) and the present owner, the Land
Tenure Administration, had nothing to do with the preparation,
cultivation and planting of the crops;”

8

“As there were already standing crops on the said
Hacienda at the time it was sold by the former owners to the Land
Tenure Administration, and as said property was then still under lease
to plaintiff who made the planting’s, the said lease, being one on
rural land, was not and cannot be terminated by the defendants who had
knowledge of the existence of the lease, until after the harvest. Even
assuming that defendants had no knowledge of the said lease, which is
not the fact, and that the buyer made use of its right to terminate the
same, the plaintiff nevertheless has the right to enter the premises to
gather the crops for the current agricultural year (Article 1676, Civil
Code).

In other words, the respondent Lim sought to establish an interest
in the Hacienda de Leon that ran with the land and one that must be
respected by the purchaser”, even if the latter was not a party to the
original lease contract. That being the case, whether the standing crop
is or is not immovable property is not relevant, for venue is
determined by the nature of the principal claim. It is apparent that
the plaintiff is primarily interested in establishing his right to
recover possession of the land for the purpose of enabling him to
gather his share of the crops. Hence, his action is real and must be
brought in the locality where the land is situated. Section 3, Rule 5
of the Rules of Court, provides:

“SEC. 3. Real action.—Actions affecting
title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
thereof lies.”

In De la Cruz vs. Seminary of the Archdiocese of Manila (18 Phil., 330), this Court, quoting from Neill vs. Owen, 3 Tex. 145, laid the rule on venue to be as follows:

“If the action is founded on privity of contract between the parties, then the action, whether debt or conversant, is transitory. But if there is no privity of contract, and the action is founded on privity of estate only, such as a covenant that runs with the land in the hands of the remote grantees, then the action is local and must be brought in the country wherein the land lies.” (Italics supplied)

The action brought by respondent Lim falls squarely under the second
rule given in the quoted paragraph. It is uncontested that the Land
Tenure Administration was neither a party to the lease contract nor an
assignee thereof. The Land Tenure Administration is sued on the theory
that it is duty bound to recognize and respect Lim’s rights as lessee,
the implied premise being that, the lease operates against the new
owner of the land leased even if the lease is not recorded, because the
Land Tenure Administration’s knowledge of the existence of the lease
supplies the want of registration. Hence, petitioners correctly contend
that Lim’s action must be brought in the Court of First, Instance of
Nueva Ecija, the province where the land lies, and not in the courts of
the City of Manila.

Wherefore, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The
order of December 20, 1957, appealed from, is set aside and the action
instituted by Alejandro T. Lim in the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Civil Case No. 34453) is ordered dismissed, but without prejudice to
its renewal in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The
preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. Costs against respondent Lim. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.