NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On February 14, 1957, Cesar Cabrera and seventy-one (71) other
employees of the former Metropolitan Water District, filed with the
Court of Industrial Relations a motion praying for the execution of an
award contained in a resolution issued by said Court on November 25,
1950 in Case No. 349-V granting an increase of P0.50 per day to all
employees of the Metropolitan Water District and alleging that pursuant
to said award the Metropolitan Water District paid to said employees
the salary increase granted therein, but that in November, 1953 the
Metropolitan Water District stopped paying the salary increase for
which reason they prayed that an order be issued directing the said
district to pay them the salary increase from the time that it was
stopped designating an examiner of the court to make a computation of
the amounts to which they are entitled.

On March 11, 1957, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA,)
which succeeded the Metropolitan Water District, filed an opposition to
the motion contending that there is no award to he executed because the
same has already been terminated pursuant to the provisions of Section
17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. The NAWASA
alleged that, the award made by the Court of Industrial Relations on
November 25, 1950 not having specified the time during which it should
be valid and effective, it gave notice of its termination on December
29, 1953 to said court in Case No. 359-V furnishing a copy thereof to
the union with which the movants were affiliated.

On July 19, 1957, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order
stating that the award contained in its resolution of November 25, 1950
could not have been terminated by merely serving a notice of
termination on the part of the NAWASA even if the same does
not specify the time during which it shall he effective because the
approval of the court was still necessary for its validity, and since
no approval has been obtained, the award is still valid and effective.
Wherefore, the court directed its examiner to compute the amounts to
which the movants were entitled by way of salary increase. The NAWASA
filed a motion for reconsideration, and when the same was denied, it
interposed the present petition for review.

The background which gave rise to the incident subject of the
present petition for review may be stated as follows: The Metropolitan
Water District Workers’ Union filed with the predecessor of the NAWASA
(Metropolitan Water District) a set of demands one of which was the
reallocation and arrangement of the salaries and wages of its employees
and laborers in accordance with the standardized plan prepared by the
union. The parties tried to reach an amicable settlement but failed,
whereupon the members of the union went on strike on October 18, 1949.
Without delay, the Court of Industrial Relations intervened summoning
the representatives of both employer and employees to a conference
during which it was agreed to grant a general increase of P0.50 a day
effective October 21, 1949 to all laborers on the daily basis and to
those employees who are on the monthly basis but are on strike. This
agreement was reduced to writing and was approved on October 20, 1949.
It was expressly stated therein that the agreement was temporary in
nature and would only remain in force until the court fixes the
reasonable and just compensation to which the strikers were entitled.
Immediately after the execution of said agreement, the court proceeded
to receive evidence on the strength of which it handed down an order on
June 13, 1950 adopting a new scale for wages. Neither of the parties
was satisfied and both moved for a reconsideration. The result was the
order issued on November 25, 1950, which amends the previous order in a
manner more favorable and acceptable to the employees.

It would therefore appear that the award contained in the order of November 25, 1950 which grants to the employees of the NAWASA
the salary increase of P0.50 a day was not the result of a compromise
arrived at between the parties but rather it was fixed by the Court of
Industrial Relations as the reasonable increase to which the employees
and laborers were entitled after a mature study and consideration of
the evidence submitted by the parties at the hearing set by the court
for the purpose. The question that now arises is: Can the NAWASA
terminate the effectivity of the award by simply giving notice thereof
to the court and to the union under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No.
103?

Said Section 17 provides:

“An award, order or decision of the Court shall be
valid and effective during the time therein specified. In the absence
of such specification, any party or parties to a controversy may
terminate the effectiveness of an award, order or decision after three
years have elapsed from the date of said award, order or decision by
giving notice to that effect to the Court.”

Since the award did not specify the time during which it shall be
valid and effective, considering that it was not the result of a
compromise arrived at between the parties, it is the theory of
petitioner that it can terminate the same by giving notice to the court
after the lapse of three years from the date of the award. Here this
period has already elapsed, and so petitioner contends that the notice
given by it of its termination was in accordance with law. The Court of
Industrial Relations disagrees with this theory, for it is of the
opinion that before said notice of termination could have any validity,
it first needs the sanction of the court. On this point, it made the
following comment: “The Court maintains the policy that Section 17 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, could not he mechanically invoked
nor availed of by the party by refusing to comply with such award
through the sending of a notice of termination. In the interest of
justice and equity, the Court maintains the policy that all cases of
termination of award, order, or decision, it must be properly heard in
order that the laborers or the parties could not be deprived
arbitrarily of their lawful earning.”

The foregoing interpretation of the law is correct. Since an award
is made as a result of a controversy and is binding upon both parties,
it would appear logical that its effectivity cannot be terminated ex parte
unless the period of its duration is specified therein. The reason is
obvious: since the award is made in favor of the employee, it is but
fair and just that he be heard before his right thereto is terminated,
otherwise the employer might act arbitrarily or to his prejudice. That
is why the law requires that notice of termination be given to the
court. This requirement is not merely pro forma. This is to give the court the right to intervene in order that the interest of labor may not be jeopardized.

Wherefore, petition is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., took no part.