ALBERTO INESIN, EULOGIO TORNETO AND FELIX WAGA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE MATEO CANONOY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL S…

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition filed with
us to reverse an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Sur, Hon. Mateo Canonoy, presiding, setting aside a previous order of
the court dated December 29, 1956, dismissing an action instituted by
herein respondent Vicenta Benodin against the herein petitioners,
Alberto Inesin, Eulogio Torneto and Felix Waga, which is civil case No.
194 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian.

In said civil case No. 194 herein respondent Benodin brought action
against petitioners Inesin, Torneto and Waga to recover from them
damages for serious physical injuries suffered by plaintiff for having
been thrown out of a tartanilla in which she was riding,
which was struck from behind by a bus owned and operated by Alberto
Inesin and Eulogio Torneto, and driven recklessly by Felix Waga. Upon
receiving the summons counsel for defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint by reason of the fact that a final judgment had already been
previously rendered between the same parties for the same cause of
action and that Waga has not been shown to have any relation with his
other co-defendants. The motion was set for hearing on September 27,
1955. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action on the
ground that the driver of the bus had been prosecuted in the justice of
the peace court of Pagadian for negligence, and found guilty, and in
said case plaintiff Vicenta Benodin had not reserved the right to
institute an independent civil action.

The record shows that counsel for defendants received copy of the
order of dismissal on October 7, 1955 and on October 31, they presented
a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The motion
for reconsideration does not give notice of the day set for the hearing
thereof, but on December 6, 1956, such notice was presented asking the
clerk of court to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing on
December 22, 1956. The motion was opposed because it contained no
notice of hearing and it therefore, should be considered as a mere
scrap of paper which did not affect the running of the period for the
judgment to become final. On December 29, 1956, the court below granted
the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of dismissal.
Thereupon attorney for defendants presented a motion to reconsider the
order which is set forth above but the court denied this motion for
reconsideration on January 15, 1957.

In the case at bar it is the claim of the petitioners before us that
as the motion for reconsideration, submitted by the defendant in the
court below to set aside the judgment, was not accompanied, by a notice
of the date set for the hearing of the motion, said motion should be
considered as a mere scrap of paper and did not produce the effect of
suspending the period of appeal. So, it is claimed that the judge
below, in setting aside the order of dismissal, acted in excess of his
jurisdiction.

It is to be noted that the Court of First Instance holds its
sessions in Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, only once a year on the dates
to be fixed by the district judge (Sec. 161, Rev. Adm. Code, superseded
by Sec. 54 of Republic Act No. 296). As the sessions in Pagadian are
not continuous throughout the year, and since it is not shown that, at
the time respondents herein presented the motion to reconsider the
order of dismissal, the judge of the Court of First Instance had
already set a date for the next term, attorney for the movant,
respondent herein, could not set the motion for hearing, not knowing on
what date or in what month the next yearly session in Pagadian was to
take place. It is true that the attorney for the respondent could have
set the motion for hearing on the first day of the term, asking the
clerk of court to set it for hearing on that date, but the failure to
adopt such a step could not have meant negligence or neglect on the
part of attorney for the movants, for said attorney had the alternative
to set the motion for hearing as soon as the judge has fixed the
following term of the court in that municipality. Under the rules,
which we have enjoined to be interpreted liberally and under the
circumstances, we are not prepared to declare that the motion, which
was accepted by the clerk of court without the designation of the date
for its hearing, was a mere scrap of paper. Judging from the order of
the respondent court, the next sessions after the sessions in
September, 1955, must have taken place in October, 1956, when the
motion for reconsideration in question was set for hearing by counsel
for the movant-respondent. Perhaps it was only in December, 1956, that
the plaintiffs had been apprised that the court was going to hold its
term of court during the month of December, 1956 and it was on the
sixth day of that month that said attorney for the plaintiff,
respondent herein, promptly notified the clerk and the adverse party of
the date of said hearing. The judge, who should know this special
provision of the Judiciary Act on the holding of sessions in Pagadian,
denied the motion to strike out the motion for reconsideration for
failure to contain a notice of the date of hearing, and he must have
taken into account the fact that there is only one term of the court in
Pagadian.

Wherefore, the petition should be, as it is hereby denied, without costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.