TRINIDAD DE LOS REYES VDA. DE SANTIAGO, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, MAMERTO, LEONILA AND ANDREA, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. ANGELA S. REYES AND…

This is a petition to review the decision of the majority of the
members of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, denying a claim for
compensation of petitioners for the death of Victoriano Santiago,
driver of a jeepney operated by the respondent. The said deceased was
the driver of an autocalesa belonging to respondent and was last seen
operating said autocalesa at 9:00 in the evening of September 26, 1955.
In the morning of September 27, 1955, his dead body was found in
Tayabas, Quezon obviously a victim of murder by persons who were at
large and whose identities were not known. Apparently the driver must
have been attacked with blunt instrument or instruments as an
examination of his head disclosed that it was heavily fractured,
fragmenting it into many pieces, crushing and lacerating the brain.
(Stipulation of Facts). Other pertinent facts in the stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties are as follows:

“That there is a specific instruction given by the
respondent to the deceased to follow the route prescribed by the Public
Service Commission. In the case of jeep driven by the deceased, its
route is within Manila and suburbs;

That it has always been
the practice of the respondent that, whenever the driver is accepted,
specific instruction is given to him to follow faithfully the traffic
rules and regulations, especially speeding and overloading, and he is
requested also not to operate beyond the route given by the Public
Service Commission. In case the driver goes beyond the route prescribed
by the Public Service Commission, a fine of P50.00 is imposed which is
paid by the respondent. However, in case of the traffic violations,
especially speeding, it is the driver who pays.” (p. 2, Annex “E”).

Two of the members of the Commission made the following finding on
the question as to whether or not the death of Victoriano Santiago
arose out of and was occasioned in the course of his employment.

“There is nothing in the record which justified the
assumption that he was forcibly taken away, at the point of a gun or a
knife from his regular orbit of employment. The most that may be
conceded, however remote it seems, is the possibility that, to use the
referee’s own word, “he, the driver, might have been lured,” by his
assassins to get away from his regular route, only to be robbed of his
earnings, the jeep, and, which is the most important, his life. But
this only demonstrates the voluntariness of his act of going out to the
ordinary way of fulfilling his assigned job. It only adds to the
inevitable conclusion that he went with his attackers in disregard not
only of the instructions or orders of his employer but also of the
rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission, which rules
undeniably should be regarded as having the force of law, having been
set by authorities for the observance of those to whom they are
addressed, this deceased driver not excluded. If there is any material
finding that is to be made out in this case, it is that the drivers act
in deviating from the route prescribed for his observance constituted a
positive factor in bringing about his own demise. His departure from
the route where his employment only required him to be, in fact,
brought him to an area fraught with extra risks or hazards not
forseably and ordinary attached to the employment for which he was
hired.

This Commission finds that the deceased willfully
violated public service rules and regulations and the instructions of
his employer in undertaking a trip too far beyond the limits of the
line in which his jeepney was authorized to operate. And with this as
the basis, the correct determination of the second issue can be reached
upon consideration of the following precedents: * * *.” (pp. 5-6. Annex
“E”).

Associate Commissioner Nieves Baens del Rosario dissented from the opinion of the majority. She says in part:

“In connection with the ‘arising out of and in the
course of employment’ requirement in relation to the presumptions in
favor of the employee, Larson makes this comment:

‘The
burden of proving his cases beyond speculation and conjecture is on the
claimant. He is aided in some jurisdiction by presumptions that help to
supply the minimum evidence necessary to support an award, and which
shift the burden to the defendant when some connection of the injury
with the work has been prove.’ (p. 232, W/O.S. by Larson, Vol. 2)

And
in this jurisdiction where such presumptions in favor of the employee
are provided in our Workmen’s Compensation Act, our Supreme Court in
the aforecited Batangas Transportation case ruled:

‘Our position is that once it is proved that the employee died in the course
of the employment, the legal presumption in the contrary, is that the
claim comes within the provisions of the compensation law (Sec. 44). In
other words, that accident arose out of the workmen’s employment (2—A).’

Another
presumption created in favor of the employee and which is more specific
than the all embracing presumption’ that the claim comes within the
provisions of the Act’ is that one provided in subsection 3 of Section
44. It reads: ‘3. That the injury was not occasioned by the willful
intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of
himself or of another.’ This presumption arises from the natural rule,
against suicides and once the presumption is established, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer. He is, under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, required to present ‘substantial evidence’ to overcome such
presumption.

In the case of Travellers Insurance Company vs. Cardillo, 140 F-2d 10 (1943) the court stated:

‘The
evidence necessary to overcome the presumption then must do more than
create doubt or set up non-compensable alternative explanations of the
accident. It must be ‘evidence such as a reasonable mind must accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’

No such evidence was presented by the herein respondent.

In explanation of this policy, the Court held in the same Batangas Transportation case;

‘It
is not unfair; the employer has the means and the facilities to know
the cause; and should not be allowed to profit concealing it. Nay, he
should take active steps to ascertain the cause of the murder; not just
continue its operations unmolested.’

And in the case of Travellers Insurance Co. cited above the following reason was given:

‘The
death of the employee usually deprives the dependent of his best
witness—the employee himself—and, especially where the accident is
unwitnessed, some latitude should be given the claimant. Hence,
presumptions or inference that an unwitnessed death arose out of the
employment are allowed in some jurisdictions, where the employer provides no contrary proof, and when last seen deceased was working or had properly recessed.’

Here,
the respondent employer has not provided any contrary proof, and
Santiago when he was last seen was doing his regular work of driving *
* *” (pp: 14-16, Annex “G”).

Section 43 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended by Section
24 of Republic Act 772, establishes the following presumptions:

“In any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim
for compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary—

1. That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act;
2. That sufficient notice thereof was given;
3. That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the
   injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of
   another;

4. That the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; and
5. That the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct.”

The decision of the majority of the members of the Commission
reasons out that the deceased had received specific instructions not to
operate beyond the route given by the Public Service Commission (only
within the city of Manila), and his act in getting outside of the city
was his free and voluntary act, because he disregarded the orders of
his employer as well as the rules and regulations of the Public Service
Commission. The majority concludes that the deceased willfully violated
Public, Service Commission, rules and regulations and, therefore, death
did not arise out of or by reason of his employment.

The flaw in the above reasoning of the majority is that it violates
the presumption expressly laid down by the following provision of
Section 69, par. (q), rule 123, Rules of Court:

“The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;

* * * * * *

There is no question that immediately before leaving Manila the
deceased was engaged in his employment. The presumption is that he
performed his duties legally and in accordance with the rules and
regulations, because that was his regular obligation.

Inasmuch as the law establishes the presumption that the deceased
followed the law and regulations, it was incumbent upon respondent to
prove that he did otherwise, or that he failed to comply with the
regulations. In other words it was incumbent upon the respondent herein
to prove that the deceased voluntarily went out of his route
and drove his jeepney towards the province of Quezon, not that the
deceased voluntarily went to that province thereby going beyond the
route provided for the vehicle that he was driving.

Petitioners claim that the deceased voluntarily went out of his
ordinary route. Petitioners also have the obligation to prove this
fact, this being an affirmative allegation. They failed to do so.

There being no such evidence submitted by the respondent, i. e.,
that the going of the deceased to Quezon province was made voluntarily
by him, we must conclude, pursuant to the presumption that every person
performs his duty or obligation, that he was forced by circumstances
beyond his will to go outside his ordinary route; in other words that
while driving in the city he must have been forced to go out and drive
to the province of Quezon on the threats of the malefactors guilty of
assaulting and killing him against his (deceased) will.

In the case of Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Josefina de
Rivera, et al., G. R. No. L-7658, prom. May 8, 1956, decided by this
Court, in which a driver of a bus, while so driving was suddenly
attacked by his assailant who boarded the bus and thereafter stabbed
him, the majority of this Court held that the driver died in the course
of his employment even if there were indications (not sufficient to
prove) that there was personal animosity between the assailant and the
victim, which may have caused the assault. In said case the reason for
the decision of this Court was that circumstances or indications show
that the deceased died while driving the bus, thus that his death must
have been due to his employment.

The present case is stronger than the above-cited case of Batangas Transportation Co. vs.
de Rivera, for while in said previous case there were indications which
showed personal animosities which may have been the root cause of the
assault, in the case at bar, there are no such indications. On the
other hand, there is a presumption that the deceased died while in the
course of his employment, and therefore his death must be presumed to
have arisen out of said employment.

We, therefore, find that the decision of the majority which has been
appealed from is not in consonance with the law and the express
provision of Section 43 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law; and that by
reason of such express provision of the law, we must hold that
Victoriano Santiago died by reason of and in the course of his
employment and consequently his heirs are entitled to receive the
compensation provided for by law in such cases.

Decision rendered by the court below is hereby set aside, and
respondent is hereby ordered to pay the compensation due the heirs
under the law. Without costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J. Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, J., reserves his vote.