JOEL M. SANVICENTE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one
Dennis Wong y Chua. On June 11, 1995,
at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot the victim outside the Far East
Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter
allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just
withdrawn from the automatic teller machine.^[1]

Responding policemen found the lifeless body of the victim at the
parking space in front of the Far East Bank and Trust Company Branch along
Katipunan Road, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live
caliber .45 bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta Sanvicente.^[2]

On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioner’s car in
Barrio Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and took custody thereof.

Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to
Police Station 9 petitioner’s .45 caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No.
5504095. He also wrote a letter
addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC,
Anonas Road, Quezon City which reads as follows:

This is in connection with the alleged
death of one Dennis Wong that occurred in Katipunan Ave., Q.C., in the
afternoon of June 11, 1995.

According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on
said date, place and hour above he just withdrew from the Far East Bank and
Trust Co., Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked him
to grab the money he has just withdrew (sic).
My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired
a warning shot upwards. Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed his
gun. After a brief struggle, my client
was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his person and money. My client will submit a formal statement
during the proper preliminary investigation, if needed.

On June 13, 1995, my client’s car (Mercedes
Benz with plate no. TFU 736) was taken by your operatives led by Capt.
Alejandro Casanova and [is] now in your custody.

In view of the untoward incident, my client
suffered serious anxiety and depression and was advised to undergo medical
treatment and confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C.
My client would have no objection if you assigned police escort/guard under
your supervision pending his confinement.

For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary
surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client.^[3]

At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.^[4]

During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No.
B-046-95, stating that slugs recovered from the crime scene, on the one hand,
and cartridge cases fired from petitioner’s caliber .45 Mark IV pistol, on the
other hand, were fired from the same firearm.^[5] The
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased failed to appear
at the trial. In order to dispense with
her testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the
medico-legal report. After trial, the
prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits,^[6] which
included the above-quoted letter of petitioner’s counsel to P/Maj. Antonio
Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL. The trial
court admitted all the prosecution’s exhibits in its Order dated August 27,
1996.^[7]

Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence,
which was granted by the trial court.^[8] Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed
a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence),^[9] based
on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the
accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence
are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the guilt of the
accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing
the case together with the civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of evidence.^[10]

The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,^[11]
which was denied on the ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the
case double jeopardy had set in.^[12]

The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43697. In a Decision dated July 25, 1997,^[13] the
appellate court nullified the October 7, 1996 Order of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration^[14]
was likewise denied in a Resolution dated January 2, 1998.^[15]

Hence, the instant petition.

In reversing the trial court’s Order dismissing the criminal case
against petitioner, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the
due execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL which, it claimed, “positively
identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged.”^[16]

Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with
or without leave of court. In resolving
accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or
support a verdict of guilt.^[17]

The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.^[18]
Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.^[19] This
constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of
double jeopardy.^[20]
The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco:^[21]

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an
acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the “humanity of the laws and in
jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal
contest with the State xxx.”^[22] Thus
Green expressed the concern that
“(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent,
he may be found guilty.”^[23]

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and
justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is “part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction.”^[24]
The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for “repose”, a
desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability.^[25]
With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a
jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.^[26]

Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double
jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will
not lie.^[27]
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case,^[28] or
where the trial was a sham.^[29] However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.^[30]

In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its
evidence and rested its case. The trial
court subsequently dismissed the case after finding that the evidence presented
by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge against
petitioner. The prosecution, which
relied primarily on Exhibit LL as the basis for the indictment against
petitioner, however, contested the dismissal of the case allegedly because the
trial court prevented it from further identifying the genuineness and due
execution of said document “in the manner
that it wanted.”^[31]

The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due execution of a piece of documentary evidence vis-à-vis the truth of its contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma is the
fundamental distinction between an admission
and a confession. The prosecution maintains that the letter,
Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and argues thus: “What better evidence is
there to positively identify the perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the petitioner himself,
freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?”^[32]
According to the prosecution, this “extrajudicial confession constitutes the
strongest evidence of guilt.”^[33]

An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules
of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact. A confession, on the other hand,
under Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein.

More particularly, a confession “is a declaration made at any
time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of
a crime. The term admission, on the
other hand, is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the
accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged.”^[34]

In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in
an admission.^[35]
Only recently in People v. Licayan,^[36]
the Court distinguished “confession” and “admission” in this wise:

A confession is
an acknowledgment in express terms,
by a party in a criminal case, of
his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilt. In
other words, an admission is
something less than a confession, and
is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours) ^[37]

There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an
admission, not a confession, because
of the unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that –

For all intense (sic)
& purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without
admission of guilt on the part of
my client. . . (Emphasis and italics supplied).

With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court
correctly rejected the prosecution’s motion to have Exhibit LL further identified “in the manner that it wanted,”^[38] i.e., through the proposed testimony of
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject which squarely
falls within the scope of “privileged communication”, it would, more
importantly, be tantamount to converting
the admission into a confession.

It can not be denied that the contents
of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is
connected with the business for which petitioner retained the services of the
latter.^[39]
More specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty.
Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or assistance in relation to
the subject matter of the employment, or to explain something in connection
with it, so as to enable him to better advice his client or manage the
litigation.^[40]

Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. – The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

x x x                          x x x                             x
x x

(b)     An attorney cannot,
without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view
to, professional employment nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
x x x.

It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon
petitioner himself to testify although he too was a signatory of Exhibit
LL. Apparently, it was aware that
petitioner could well invoke his right against self-incrimination and refuse to
answer its questions. The prosecution
then attempted to draw out what it could not constitutionally extract from his
lawyer. Yet, and as stated previously,
said Exhibit LL had earlier been admitted in evidence by the trial court in its
Order dated August 27, 1996. What was
objectionable was the prosecution’s sole reliance
on the document without proof of other
facts to establish its case against petitioner because of its mistaken
assumption that the same was a confession.

Significantly, the prosecution was neither barred nor prevented
by the trial court from establishing the genuineness and due execution of the
document through other means. Rule 132,
Section 20of the Rules of Court provides the following means of authenticating
the document:

SEC. 20. Proof of private
document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a)     By anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or

(b)     By evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need
only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Thus, the due execution of a document can be proved through the
testimony of: (1) the person/s who executed it; (2) the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was present and saw it
executed and delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
recognized the signatures therein or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument previously confirmed the execution thereof.^[41]

Thus, respondent could have called to the witness stand P/Maj.
Antonio Diaz, the addressee of Exhibit LL, to identify the said document since
it was supposedly delivered to him personally. Samples of the signatures appearing on the document which can be readily
obtained or witnesses who are familiar with them could have also been
presented. The prosecution did
not. Neither did it subpoena P/Senior
Inspector Alejandro M. Casanova, who prepared the detailed Police Report of the
incident used as the basis of the inquest proceedings, nor were any
eyewitnesses presented, notwithstanding that there appeared to be at least two
eyewitnesses to the incident.

It must be borne in mind that in a criminal trial, it is the
prosecution that determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and
factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the
information.^[42]
Stated differently, the determination of what evidence to adduce to bolster a
successful prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive domain of
prosecutorial discretion. Indeed,
courts generally can not interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion as to
control over criminal prosecutions.^[43]
However, it is the court which ultimately determines whether such evidence is
sufficient to sustain an indictment, thus, the care with which the prosecution
must build up its case against the accused can not be gainsaid because, as has
been stated time and again, in any criminal prosecution, the State must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.^[44]

Viewed vis-a-vis the
foregoing lapses detailed above, the prosecution’s insistence to have Exhibit
LL admitted “in the manner it wanted” shows only too clearly a subtle but
shrewd scheme to cover up for the foregoing procedural missteps and to cut
evidentiary corners to build its case at the expense of the defense. This cannot be countenanced. An accused
should not be prejudiced for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its
burden of overcoming the constitutional presumption of innocence and to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.^[45]
Indeed, if the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only
the accused’s right to be freed, it is even more the court’s constitutional
duty to acquit him.^[46]

If at all, the foregoing acts of the prosecution underscores just
how careless and haphazard it had been in building up a case against the
petitioner. For such, it has nothing
but itself to blame if the trial court in assaying the proof it adduced found
the same wanting. It will neither be
allowed to sweep its procedural miscues under the rug, so to speak, on the
pretext that it was denied due process when the trial court supposedly
prevented it from presenting Exhibit LL. To be more precise, the trial court had admitted Exhibit LL in evidence but rejected the further admission of the document “in the manner that it wanted.” Verily, the prosecution can not have its
cake and eat it too.

Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the letter marked as
Exhibit LL is hearsay inasmuch as its probative force depends in whole or in
part on the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it.^[47] The
term as used in the law of evidence “signifies all evidence which is not
founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited,
and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon
the confidence which the court may have in him. Its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some
third persons not sworn as witnesses to that fact and consequently not subject
to cross-examination.”^[48] In
short, it is “the evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others.”^[49]
Thus, in one case we stated that “[w]hen evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same
is without any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay.”^[50]
In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that the statements in the letter were
made by petitioner’s counsel, who even began his narration of the events with
the phrase: “According to my client.”^[51]

In holding that petitioner was identified as the person who
committed the offense, the appellate court relied on the following
circumstances: (1) he admitted
responsibility therefor through Exhibit LL, which was signed by him and his
counsel; (2) he surrendered even before the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
(3) his gun was also surrendered to the police authorities by his counsel; (4)
empty shells recovered at the scene of the crime matched his gun; and (5) the
letter-referral of P/Senior Inspector Alejandro Casanova to Quezon City
Prosecutor indicated that petitioner was under the custody of the policeman on
detail supposedly to guard him at the hospital.^[52]

With regard to the first circumstance, suffice it to state that,
as has lengthily been discussed earlier, Exhibit LL is merely an admission and
not a confession. In fact, petitioner
specifically denied criminal intent therein. By and of itself it is insufficient to support a conviction unless it is
considered in connection with other proof to establish the ultimate fact of
guilt.

The second and third incidents actually support petitioner’s
innocence because were he indeed guilty of the felony, he would not likely have
surrendered even before the warrant was issued for his arrest. Courts go by the biblical truism that the
“the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion.”^[53]

The fourth event merely proves the fact that the empty shells
recovered from the crime scene were fired from the surrendered gun. It, however, does not answer the penultimate
question of who actually pulled the trigger of the firearm.

Lastly, the appellate court’s reading of the letter-referral,^[54]
mentioning that petitioner had been placed under the custody of a policeman,
was inaccurate. As explained by Atty.
Valmonte in Exhibit LL, the policeman was actually requested for petitioner’s personal
safety owing to the untoward incident which caused petitioner serious
anxiety and depression, and for which he had to undergo treatment and
confinement.^[55]

All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the trial court
in dismissing the charges against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, in view of
all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 25, 1997 and the Resolution dated January 2, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43697
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), on official leave.

---

^[1]
Record, p. 11.

^[2] Ibid., pp. 20 – 20-A.

^[3] Id., p. 21.

^[4] Id., p. 40.

^[5] Id., p. 228.

^[6] Id., pp. 217-259.

^[7] Id., p. 284.

^[8] Id., p. 292.

^[9] Id., pp. 286-291.

^[10] Id., pp. 308-310.

^[11] Id., pp. 311-332.

^[12] Id., pp. 361-362.

^[13] Rollo,
pp. 107-119.

^[14] Ibid., pp. 120-141.

^[15] Id., pp. 150-151.

^[16] Id., p. 183; Comment, p. 11.

^[17] Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 312
SCRA 365 [1999].

^[18] Te v. Court of Appeals, 346
SCRA 327 [2000].

^[19] Ong v. People, 342 SCRA 372,
387 [2000]; People v. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA 247 [1976].

^[20] Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 127772, March 22, 2001; People v. Bans, 239 SCRA 48, 55 [1994];
People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481 [1991]; People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA
516 (1988).

^[21] 340
SCRA 207, 242 [2000].

^[22]
Citing U.S. v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310.

^[23]
Citing 355 U.S. 1842, L Ed. 2d 199, 61 A.L.R. 2d 1119.

^[24]
Citing Stern, Government Appeals of Sentences: a Constitutional Response to
Arbitrary and Unreasonable Sentences, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 51, 69 [1980].

^[25]
Citing Paul Western, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on
Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1018, 1022
[1980].

^[26]
Comments, Tulane Law Review, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and the
Government’s Right to Appeal Sentences: After the Supreme Court’s Green Light
–Dare We Proceed? [Vol. 56, No. 2, Feb. 1982, at p. 702].

^[27] Palu-ay v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 358 [1998]; People v.
Velasco, supra.

^[28]
Gorion v. RTC of Cebu, Br. 17, 213 SCRA 138 [1992]; People v.
Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 [1985]; Portugal v. Reantaso, 167 SCRA 712 [1988];
People v. Albano, 163 SCRA 511 [1988]; Saldaña v. CA, 190 SCRA
396 [1990]; People v. CA, 101 SCRA 450 [1980].

^[29]
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 [1986].

^[30] People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No.
140633, February 4, 2002, citing People
v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 687 [1999].

^[31]
Comment, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 184-185.

^[32]
Comment, p. 20, Rollo, p. 192.

^[33] Ibid., p. 20; p. 194, citing People v.
Lachica, 132 SCRA 230 [1984].

^[34]
Francisco V.J., Revised Rules of Court, Vol.
VII, Part I, 1997 ed., p. 303, citing U.S. v. Corrales, 23 Phil. 362,
365-366 [1912].

^[35] People v. Sevilla, 339 SCRA 625, 652
[2000].

^[36] G.R.
No. 144422, February 28, 2002.

^[37]
Citing Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 337 (12^th ed. 1955).

^[38]
Comment, pp. 12-13, Rollo, pp. 184-185.

^[39]
Francisco V.J., Revised Rules of Court,
supra, p. 274.

^[40] Ibid., citing 58 Am. Jur. 270-271.

^[41]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 148, 158 [1976].

^[42] People v. Pajo, 348 SCRA
492, 522 [2000], citing People v.
Perez, 296 SCRA 17, 35 [1998].

^[43] Venus v. Desierto, 298 SCRA
196, 214 [1998], citing Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, 468 [1987].

^[44] People v. Clemente, 316 SCRA 789
[1999]; People v. Paloma, 279 SCRA 352 [1997].

^[45] People v. Comesario, 306 SCRA 400
[1999].

^[46] People v. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148
[1999].

^[47]
Francisco V.J., Revised Rules of Court,
supra, p. 513, citing 31 C.J.S. 919.

^[48] Ibid., citing Underhill Evidence, p. 68.

^[49] Id., citing Woodroffe’s Law on Evidence,
9^th ed. 512.

^[50]
People v. Villaran, 269 SCRA 630, 637 [1997], citing People v.
Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 [1994].

^[51]
Record, p. 21.

^[52]
CA-G.R. SP No. 43697 Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 115.

^[53] People v. Cañedo, 335 SCRA 81,
97 [2000].

^[54]
Record, pp. 5-9.

^[55] Ibid., p. 21.