FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. NOEL RABI, AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 9, TACLOBAN CITY, RESPONDENTS.

On January 10, 1995, Noel Rabi was arrested without a warrant of
arrest and charged in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (possession of unlicensed
firearm). The matter was docketed as
I.S. No. 95-043. Public Prosecutor
Zenaida Camonical Isidro conducted an
inquest investigation of the case and issued a resolution on January 11, 1995,
recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause on her
findings that the material averments of the Joint Affidavit^[1]
executed by the arresting police officers were hearsay due to the absence of
any affidavit of the complainant Rodolfo Cabaluna; and that the knife, gun and
the live ammunitions referred to in said affidavit were not found under the
chair occupied by Rabi.

However, Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Aurillo, Jr. of
Region VIII decided to assume jurisdiction over the case and to order the
conduct of a new preliminary investigation thereof. On January 12, 1995, he issued a Regional Memorandum Order^[2] to
the City Prosecutor of Tacloban City directing him to elevate to his office the
complete records of I.S. No. 95-043 within 24 hours from receipt thereof,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1275 in relation to Department Order No.
318 of the Department of Justice. Aurillo designated the assistant regional
state prosecutor to conduct the new preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
95-043. On January 20, 1995, Aurillo
issued another Memorandum Order^[3]
to the City Prosecutor directing him to elevate the affidavit of Rodolfo
Cabaluna as well as the subject firearm and knife to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor with the information that it had taken over the preliminary
investigation of the said complaint pursuant to PD 1275 and existing rules.^[4] The City Prosecutor of Tacloban complied
with the order of Aurillo and on January 23, 1995, the Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor issued a subpoena notifying Noel Rabi and Margot Villanueva of the
preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 at 9:00 a.m. on February 2, 1995,
not only for violation of PD 1866 but also for the crimes of “Violation of
Comelec Resolution No. 2323 (gun banned) [sic], Batas Pambansa Bilang 9” (possession of deadly weapon) and
“Malicious Mischief.”^[5]

When served with the subpoena on January 27, 1995, Rabi was aghast
at the sudden turn of events. On the
same date and barely a week before the scheduled preliminary investigation, his
counsel forthwith filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City a
petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction. Rabi
alleged that under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code and PD 1275 as
implemented by Department Order No. 318 of the Department of Justice, a
regional state prosecutor was vested only with administrative supervision over
the city prosecutor and had no power to motu
proprio review, revise, or modify the resolution of the city prosecutor on
the latter’s conduct of a preliminary or inquest investigation of a criminal
complaint filed directly therewith. Rabi
contended that by taking over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043
and conducting a new preliminary investigation of said case, Aurillo acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction. Rabi thus prayed
that, pending resolution of his plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, a
temporary restraining order be issued to enjoin Aurillo from proceeding with
the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043.^[6]

Acting on the petition, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining
Order^[7] dated
January 30, 1995, enjoining and prohibiting Aurillo and all others acting for
and in his behalf from taking over and conducting a new preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 until the court shall have resolved the motion
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the other issues raised in
the petition. Aurillo received said
order on January 30, 1995.^[8]

In answer to the petition, Aurillo alleged that the same was
premature as Rabi failed to exhaust all administrative remedies from the
Secretary of Justice before filing the petition. He explained that he took over and ordered a new preliminary
investigation by virtue of his prosecutorial powers under PD 1275, in relation
to Department Order No. 318, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section
38(1), Chapter 7, Book No. IV of the Revised Administrative Code, vesting on
him supervision and control over field prosecution officers in the region. He averred that such powers included the
authority for him to take over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
95-043. Aurillo also claimed that he
was not liable for damages for performing an ordinary and routinary function,
the regularity of which is presumed.^[9]
He further argued that claims for damages and attorney’s fees under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court is proscribed.

During the February 15, 1995 hearing on Rabi’s motion for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the parties marked in evidence
their documentary evidence and orally argued their respective positions. Rabi did not testify to prove his claim for
damages and attorney’s fees. On the
same date, the RTC issued an order declaring that the issue of whether or not
the court will issue a writ of preliminary injunction was submitted for
resolution and that it will issue a resolution thereon in five days time. However, the RTC failed to do so. Instead, on March 29, 1995, the RTC issued
an order directing the parties to file their respective memoranda within five
days from receipt thereof after which the petition will be deemed submitted for
resolution.^[10]
The parties did not object to the order. Nevertheless, on March 24, 1995, the assistant regional state prosecutor
continued with his preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. Thereafter, with Aurillo’s approval, he filed
with the RTC on April 4, 1995 an Information against Rabi for violation of PD
1866.^[11]

On April 12, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Rabi.
The trial court nullified the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 by
the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor and the Information filed with the
RTC against Rabi. It also ordered
Aurillo to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00
as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.^[12]

The RTC declared that under Department Order No. 318 of the
Department of Justice, the power of a regional state prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation was confined solely to specific criminal cases and
only when the Secretary of Justice directs him to do so. The trial court further held that without
any order from the Secretary of Justice, Aurillo cannot motu proprio take over the preliminary investigation of a case
already investigated by the city prosecutor or conduct a new one.

The RTC awarded damages and attorney’s fees to Rabi for Aurillo’s
wanton disregard of the court’s authority as shown by his filing of an
Information against Rabi without authority from the Secretary of Justice. The trial court also nullified the
Information filed by Aurillo against Rodolfo Cabaluna, Jr. and held that the
filing thereof was made in utter disregard of simple demands of courtesy to the
RTC, thereby preempting said court’s resolution of the issues raised in the
petition.

Aurillo thereafter filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, on questions of law, against
Rabi and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City.

When required by the Court to file his comment on the petition,
Rabi failed to do so. The petition
shall thus be resolved by the Court on the basis of the petition and the
annexes thereof.

The issues posed in this case, as synthesized by the Court, are
whether or not (a) the petition filed by Rabi with the RTC was premature; (b)
Aurillo is empowered to motu proprio
take over and conduct a preliminary investigation of I.S No. 95-043, after the
inquest investigation thereof had already been terminated and approved by city
prosecutor; (c) the Information filed by Aurillo against Rabi with the RTC for
violation of PD 1866 may be nullified by said court, and (d) Aurillo is liable for damages and attorney’s fees to
Rabi.

On the first issue, the general rule is that an aggrieved party
is mandated to first exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a
judicial action for redress from acts of administrative bodies or offices in
the performance of their quasi–judicial functions; otherwise, said
action may be dismissed for prematurity.^[13]
However, the principle is not without exceptions. The aggrieved party may validly resort to immediate judicial
action where the (a) question raised is purely legal; (b) when the act
complained of is patently illegal; (c) when there is an urgent need for
judicial intervention;^[14]
(d) when the disputed act is performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction;
(e) the administrative remedy does not provide for a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; and (f) when due process is disregarded.^[15]

In this case, the Investigating Prosecutor terminated the inquest
investigation and came out with her resolution dismissing the case as approved
by the City Prosecutor. On January 11, 1995, barely a day thereafter, Aurillo
decided to take over the preliminary investigation of I.S. 95-043 and ordered
the City Prosecutor to elevate the records of said case to the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor. Rabi was
completely unaware of the takeover by Aurillo of the preliminary investigation
of the case or the reasons therefor. Rabi learned about Aurillo’s action for the first time when he received
the subpoena from the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor on January 27, 1995
setting the preliminary investigation of the case anew on February 2,
1995. Being a resident of Tacloban
City, Rabi did not have adequate time to seek redress from the Secretary of
Justice whose offices is located in Manila and request that the scheduled
investigation be forestalled.

Given this factual milieu, time was of the essence. Inaction was not an option; it was, in fact,
sheer folly. Judicial intervention was
imperative. There was no need for Rabi
to still wait for Aurillo to complete his preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
95-043, find probable cause against Rabi for violation of PD 1866 and file an
Information against him for said crime nor wait for the issuance by the trial
court of a warrant for his arrest. If
Rabi tarried, the acts sought to be assailed by him would by then have been a fait accompli to his gross prejudice,
and his prayer for a writ of prohibition and for injunctive relief, an exercise
in utter futility. Aurillo acted without
authority and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when he took over motu
proprio the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and ordered a new
preliminary investigation thereof; hence, his actuations were a nullity.

Aurillo’s reliance on Section 8, paragraph (b) of PD 1275 is
misplaced. Said law provides that a
regional state prosecutor exercises immediate administrative supervision over
all provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and
cities comprised within his region and prosecutes any case arising within his
region.^[16]

The “administrative supervision” which shall govern the
administration relationship between a department or its equivalent and an
agency under its jurisdiction is limited to the authority of such department to
generally oversee the operation of the agency under it to insure that the same
is managed effectively and economically, without interfering with its
day-to-day activities; and to take such action as may be necessary for the
proper performance of official functions, including the rectification of
violations, abuses or other forms of maladministration.^[17] It bears stressing that in administrative
law, administrative supervision is not synonymous with control. The Court distinguished supervision from
control in Jose Mondano vs. Francisco
Silvosa,^[18] thus:

“x x x In administrative
law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. x x x.”

“Supervision and control,” on the other hand, includes the
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; todirect the performance of duty; and to approve,
revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.^[19]

In Hon. Franklin Drilon, et
al. vs. Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, et al.,^[20]
the Court declared that an officer in control lays down the rules in the doing
of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinates or
he may even decide to do it himself. The Court, likewise, decreed in an avuncular case that “control” means
the power of an official to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.^[21]

In this case, when Aurillo motu
proprio took over the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 after
the same had already been dismissed by the city prosecutor and ordered the
assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation of
the case, he exercised not only administrative supervision but control over the
city prosecutor in the performance of the latter’s quasi-judicial functions

.. By doing so, Aurillo
nullified the resolution of the inquest prosecutor as approved by the city
prosecutor and deprived Rabi as the aggrieved party in I.S. 95-043 of his right
to file a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the inquest
prosecutor under Section 2 of Department Circular No. 7 of the Department of
Justice, as amended by Department Order No. 223,^[22]
and if said motion were denied to appeal therefrom to the Secretary of Justice.

Aurillo threw a monkey wrench to the appeal process and deprived
the Secretary of Justice of the authority to resolve any appeal by the losing
party from the resolution of the city prosecutor in I.S. No. 95-043. What is so palpable and condemnable is that,
Aurillo decided to conduct a preliminary investigation of the crimes for
malicious mischief, violation of the Omnibus Election Code and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 9 without any complaint for said cases filed directly with
the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.

There is no inconsistency between Department Order No. 318 of the
Secretary of Justice, PD 1275 and Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended; nor is Department Order No. 318 a
surplusage. Section 2, Rule 112
provides that regional state prosecutors are authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations of crimes committed in their territorial jurisdiction:^[23]

“SEC. 2. Officers
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.

The following may conduct a preliminary investigation:

x             x          x

(c)          National and
Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d)          Such other
officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include
all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial
jurisdiction.”

As a practical matter, however, criminal complaints are filed in
a proper case for preliminary investigation with the municipal trial court or
with the office of the city or provincial prosecutor which has territorial
jurisdiction over the offense complained of and not with the office of the
regional state prosecutor. Hence, the
office of the regional state prosecutor does not conduct any preliminary
investigation or prosecute any criminal case in court at all. The bulk of the work of the office of the
regional state prosecutor consists of administrative supervision over city or
provincial or city fiscals and their assistants. The Secretary of Justice thus opted to harness the services of
regional state prosecutors and help out in the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases not filed with their offices. Hence, pursuant to his power under Section 4, Chapter 1, Book IV of the
1987 Revised Administrative Code,^[24]
and of his power of supervision and control over regional state prosecutors and
provincial and city prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
Order No. 318 authorizing regional state prosecutors to investigate and/or prosecute,
upon his directives, special criminal cases within the region.^[25] In
fine, the duty of the regional state prosecutors to prosecute or investigate
specific criminal cases pursuant to Department Order No. 318 is not an
abridgment or curtailment of their duties or functions under Section 2, Rule
112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, but is an additional
duty specifically delegated to them by the Secretary of Justice to enhance the
administration of justice. Therefore,
petitioner’s contention that Department Order No. 318 is inconsistent with PD
1275 and that Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is
merely a surplusage has no legal basis.

We now resolve the third issue. Aurillo contends that the RTC erred when it nullified the Information
filed by him charging private respondent with violation of PD 1866 after the
requisite preliminary investigation by the office of regional state
prosecutor. He argues that although the
RTC had issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 30, 1995, the same had
lapsed without the court issuing any preliminary injunction. There was thus no legal bar for the Office
of the Regional State Prosecutor to proceed with and terminate the preliminary
investigation and thereafter to file the Information against private respondent
even while the petition for prohibition was still pending before the RTC. He further asserts that the remedy of Rabi
was to file with the trial court a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the office of the regional state prosecutor had no authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation and file the same.

The pendency of the special civil action for prohibition before
the trial court did not interrupt the investigation in I.S. No. 95-043.^[26] It goes without saying, however, that in
proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and
terminating the same, Aurillo did so subject to the outcome of the petition for
prohibition. In this case, the RTC
granted the petition of Rabi, declared Aurillo bereft of authority to take over
the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and nullified the preliminary
investigation conducted by Aurillo as well as the Information thereafter filed
by him. The RTC is possessed of
residual power to restore the parties to their status before Aurillo proceeded
with the preliminary investigation, and grant in favor of the aggrieved party
such other relief as may be proper.^[27]

Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give complete relief
not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been
done. The Court has authority to grant
any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings of the
parties:

Generally, the relief granted in a prohibition proceeding is
governed by the nature of the grievance proved and the situation at the time of
judgment. Although the general rule is
that a writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the commission of a future
act, and not to undo an act already performed, where anything remains to be
done by the court, prohibition will give complete relief, not only by
preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. Under some statutes, the court must grant
the appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts stating
ground for relief are pleaded. Although
prohibition is requested only as to a particular matter, the court has
authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the
pleadings. If the application for
prohibition is too broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as much
as is proper to be granted. In the
exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs, the court has, as a necessary
incident thereto, the power to make such incidental order as may be necessary
to maintain its jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The court may retain jurisdiction of the
cause to enable it to make an appropriate order in the future, even though the
petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed.^[28]

Hence, the RTC did not commit any error in nullifying not only
the preliminary investigation by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor in
I.S. No. 95-043 for want of authority but also the Information approved by
Aurillo and filed with the Regional Trial Court.

On the last issue, the RTC awarded moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00
by way of attorney’s fees to Rabi on its finding that Aurillo wantonly
disregarded the authority of the court by filing the information against Rabi
despite the pendency of the latter’s petition for prohibition with said court
and even without any authority from the Secretary of Justice. Aurillo asserts that the awards are bereft
of legal basis because the RTC did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining him from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
95-043 and filing the Information against Rabi. He insists that the pendency of the petition for prohibition was
no impediment for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation. He claims that he proceeded in good faith,
without malice. Hence, the RTC is not
allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules to award moral and exemplary damages to
Rabi.

We agree with Aurillo.

The awards by the RTC of damages and attorney’s fees are barren
of legal basis. The fact is that the
RTC did not issue any writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Aurillo from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 95-043. Although the RTC promised to resolve private
respondent’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on or before February
20, 1995, it did not. Aurillo’s act of proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of I.S. No. 95-043 and of filing the Information were not in
disregard of the authority of the RTC, but were done in the belief that, absent
any temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, he was
authorized to do so.

For Rabi to be entitled as a matter or law to moral damages, he
must adduce evidence that he suffered injury and establish that such injury
sprung from any of the instances listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New
Civil Code.^[29] He is burdened to show proof of physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.^[30] In this case, Rabi failed to discharge his
burden. The records show that he even
failed to testify before the RTC to prove his claim for moral damages. Hence, the RTC erred in awarding moral
damages to Rabi.

Neither is Rabi entitled to exemplary damages. In National
Steel Corporation vs. RTC, et al.,^[31]
the Court held that:

xxx (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to them has been
established; (2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done
in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Rabi did not claim in his petition with the RTC any compensatory
damages. Hence, he is not entitled to
exemplary damages.

Finally, since Rabi is not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages, he is not entitled to attorney’s fees.^[32]

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court granting the petition for prohibition of Rabi is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The awards for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are DELETED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Records, p. 7.

^[2]
Id.,at 9.

^[3]
Id.,at 8.

^[4]
Id., at 10.

^[5]
Id., at 47.

^[6]
Id., at 10.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 201.

^[8] Id.,
at 47.

^[9] Id.,
at 13-21.

^[10] Id., at 43.

^[11] Rollo, p. 22.

^[12]
Records, pp. 49-53.

^[13]
Bartolome Carale, et al. vs. Hon.
Panfilo Abarintos, et al., 269 SCRA 132 (1997).

^[14]
Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs.
Hon Alfonso Abad, et al., 206 SCRA 482 (1992).

^[15]
Eutiquiano Pagua, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 254 SCRA 606 (1996).

^[16] SECTION 8. The Regional State
Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. – The Regional
State Prosecutor shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the
following functions:

(a) Implement policies, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars
and rules and regulations of the Department of Justice relative to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.   

(b) Exercise
immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and
other prosecuting officers of the provinces and cities comprised within his
region.

(c) Prosecute any
case arising within the region.

(d) With
respect to his regional office and the
offices of the provincial and city fiscals within his region, he shall:

1) Appoint such
number of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve
transfer of subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional
office.

2) Investigate
administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting officers within
his region and submit his recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Justice
who shall, after review thereof, submit the appropriate recommendation to the
Office of the President: Provided, That where the Secretary of
Justice finds insufficient grounds for the filing of charges, he may render a
decision of dismissal thereof.

3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate
personnel of the region and submit his recommendations thereon to the Secretary
of Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon.

4) Approve requests
for sick, vacation and maternity leaves of absence with or without pay, for a
period not exceeding one year; for overtime services; for permission to
exercise their profession or to engage in business outside of office hours; for
official travel within the region for periods not exceeding thirty days; and for benefits under Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

5) Prepare the
budget for the region for approval of the Secretary of Justice and administer
the same.

6) Negotiate and
conclude contracts for services or for furnishing supplies, materials and
equipment for amounts not exceeding P50,000.00 for each quarter.

e) Coordinate with
regional offices of other departments with bureaus/agencies under the Department
of Justice, and with local governments and police units in the region.

^[17]
Section 38(2), Chapter 7, Book V, 1987 REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.

^[18] 97
Phil. 143 (1955), pp. 147-148.

^[19]
Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Book IV, 1987 REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.

^[20] 235
SCRA 135 (1994).

^[21] Haniel R. Castro vs. Hon. Juan Y. Reyes, et
al., 104 SCRA 650 (1981).

^[22]
SECTION 2. When to Appeal. – The
appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the questioned
resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution and shall
continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have been
received by the movant or his counsel.

^[23] Idem., supra.

^[24] Sec.
40. Delegation
of Authority. – The Secretary or the head of an agency shall have authority
over and responsibility for its operation. He shall delegate such authority to the bureau and regional directors as
may be necessary for them to implement plans and programs adequately. Delegated authority shall be to the extent
necessary for economical, efficient and effective implementation of national
and local programs in accordance with policies and standards developed by each
department or agency with the participation of the regional directors. The delegation shall be in writing; shall
indicate to which officer or class of officers or employees the delegation is
made; and shall vest sufficient authority to enable the delegate to discharge
his assigned responsibility.

^[25] 17.
Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law or further
delegated by the head of agency or other proper authorities concerned. (E.O.
292).

^[26]
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Conrado
M. Vasquez, et al., 217 SCRA 633
(1993).

^[27]
Wilfredo P. Verzosa, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 299 SCRA 113-114 (1998).

^[28] 73
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Prohibition, pp. 120-121. (Emphasis ours.)

^[29] Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Pablo Bondad, et al., 330 SCRA
706 (2000).

^[30] Gil Macalino vs. People of the Philippines, et al., 340 SCRA 11 (2000).

^[31] 304
SCRA 609 (1999).

^[32] Audion Electric Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., 308 SCRA 340
(1999).