G.R. No. 131280. October 18, 2000
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 131280. October 18, 2000] PEPE CATACUTAN and AURELIANA CATACUTAN, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF NORMAN KADUSALE, HEIRS OF LITO AMANCIO and GIL B. IZON, resp…
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue raised in this petition for review on
certiorari is whether or not a subsidiary writ of execution may issue
against the employers of an accused, against whom a judgment of conviction had
been entered, even when said employers never took part in the criminal
proceedings where the accused was charged, tried and convicted.
Assailed in the instant petition is the August 12, 1997
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 43617, directing the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution
against petitioners, as well as its October 9, 1997 Resolution,[2] denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts relevant to the issue before us may be
summarized, as follows –
Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan is the registered owner and
operator of a jeepney, driven by the accused Porferio Vendiola, which bumped a
tricycle on April 11, 1991, in Banilad, Bacong, Negros Oriental, thereby causing
the death of its driver, Norman Kadusale, and its passenger, Lito Amancio, and
serious physical injuries to another passenger, respondent Gil B. Izon.
Respondents thus filed a criminal case against Porferio
Vendiola, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Double Homicide with Physical
Injuries and Damages to Property on July 26, 1991, before the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental.
On December 1, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment,[3] the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
Wherefore, foregoing considered, this court is convinced beyond
doubt that accused is guilty of negligence and imprudence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code in the collision which occurred in Banilad, Bacong,
Negros Oriental on April 11, 1991 which claimed the lives of Norman Kadusale,
the driver of the motortricycle, and Lito Amancio, a passenger of the
motortricycle, and caused injury to Gil B. Izon.He is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional medium and maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the accused is sentenced to one year eight months and one day of prision
correccional as minimum to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional as maximum for each death to be served successively, and for
the physical injuries suffered by Gil B. Izon, accused is ordered to suffer the
penalty of thirty days of arresto mayor straight. He is likewise ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Norman Kadusale and Lito Amancio in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos each victim; and to pay actual damages to:
- Norman Kadusale or his heirs the amount of P170,543.24;
- Lito Amancio or his heirs the amount of P38,394.35; and
- Gil B. Izon, the amount of P23,454.00.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Accused Vendiola did not appeal the judgment of conviction.
Instead, he applied for probation. Meanwhile, when the judgment became final and
executory, respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution and the
corresponding writ was issued by the trial court on April 24, 1996. However, per
the Sheriff’s Return of Service,[5] dated
July 3, 1996, the writ was unsatisfied as the accused had “nothing to pay off
the damages in the decision.”
On August 28, 1996, respondents filed a Motion for Subsidiary
Writ of Execution[6] before the trial
court, praying that such writ be issued against petitioner Aureliana Catacutan
as registered owner and operator of the jeepney driven by the accused when the
collision occurred. Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan filed her Opposition[7] thereto, arguing that she was never a
party to the case and that to proceed against her would be in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also argued that the
subsidiary liability of the employer is not determined in the criminal case
against the employee.
On October 3, 1996, the trial court issued an Order[8] denying the said Motion for lack of merit.
According to the trial court, it never acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
Aureliana Catacutan since she was never impleaded as party to the case, and
respondents’ remedy was to file a separate case for damages. Respondents’ Motion
for Reconsideration was also denied on December 3, 1996.[9]
Undaunted, respondents went on certiorari to the Court
of Appeals. On August 12, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision.
The issue raised in the instant petition is not new. It has
been passed upon in the case of Yusay v. Adil,[10] where this Court held –
Petitioners contend that they were not informed of Criminal
Case No. 11828 nor heard therein, in the matter of their alleged subsidiary
liability and that they were thus denied their day in court, and that the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over them.We hold otherwise.Petitioners were given ample opportunity to
present their side. The respondent judge admitted their “Urgent Ex Parte Motion
for Time to File Necessary Pleadings.” The respondent judge also issued an order
suspending the execution of the writ dated 24 October 1980 and granting
petitioners until 5 November 1980 within which to file their comment and/or
opposition to the Motion for Issuance of the Writ of Subsidiary Execution. On 4
November 1980, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the order
of 24 October 1980 and To Set Aside Subsidiary Writ of Execution. This was
opposed by private respondent. On 21 November 1980, an order of denial of the
Motion dated 4 November 1980 was issued. A second motion for reconsideration was
filed by petitioners which was again opposed by private respondent. Petitioners
filed their reply thereto. Acting on the pleadings, respondent judge issued a
resolution denying petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration.As stated in Martinez v. Barredo:
“The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day
in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is
sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in
which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent upon his driver’s criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be
tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver’s conviction and
upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out
not only the employee’s primary liability but also his employer’s subsidiary
liability for such criminal negligence (81 Phil. 1, 3, G.R. No. L-49308, May 13,
1948, citing Almeida et al., vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476;
54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco vs.
Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56
Phil., 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403).”The employer is, in substance and in effect, a party to the
criminal case against his employee, considering the subsidiary liability imposed
upon him by law. Thus:“It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party
to the criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and in
effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is
his concern, as well as his employee, to see to it that his interest be
protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of
his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also
his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted
and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if
brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was
not given his day in court. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded
the following stern warning:“It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care
in selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their welfare;
intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason or as a result
of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them benefit of
counsel; and consequently doing away with the practice of leaving them to their
fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the
employer shall have been satisfied (Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc.,
99 Phil. 670, 675, citing Martinez vs. Barredo, supra).”
More recently, in the case of Basilio v. Court of
Appeals,[11] the issuance of a
subsidiary writ of execution against the employer of the accused therein was
once more upheld, notwithstanding the non-participation of such employer in the
criminal case against the accused. Instructive as it is on the issue at hand, we
are reproducing hereunder this Court’s pronouncement in said case, to wit –
The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is
found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This liability is enforceable in
the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. (Rules of Court, Rule 111,
Sec. 1) However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an
employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found
to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily
any offense he commits “while” in the discharge of such duties); and 4) that
said employee is insolvent. (Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397, 402 [1996].)In Vda. De Paman vs. Señeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the
Court observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
in the same criminal proceeding is that the alleged employer is not afforded due
process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is
indeed the employer. Hence, we held:To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the
alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Señeris
(supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of
the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein
that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case
in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all
proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. (Vda. De Paman vs.
Señeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 [1982].)There are two instances when the existence of an
employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle
owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other,
during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances,
petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of
due process. (National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations
Commissions, 283 SCRA 275, 284 [1997].)Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against
accused because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it
was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the
counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.
Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge,
through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee
relationship. With the convict’s application for probation, the trial court’s
judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower
court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He
had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he
was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the
appropriate time.Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the
proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he was not
properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of subsidiary
liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which
he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was
not discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the
incident. In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on
December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying
for the grant of the motion for execution. This was set for hearing on December
13, 1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the
court ordered in open court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was
only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioner’s counsel filed a
counter-manifestation that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the
private prosecutor for the execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7,
1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the
subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with
petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we
fault respondent appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the
trial court.
In the instant case, we find no reason why the subsidiary writ
of execution issued against petitioner Aurelianana Catacutan should be set
aside. To begin with, as in Yusay and Basilio, supra, petitioners
cannot complain of having been deprived of their day in court. They were duly
furnished a copy of respondents’ Motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution to
which they filed their Opposition.
So, too, we find no good ground to order a separate hearing to
determine the subsidiary liability of petitioner Aureliana Catacutan, as was
ordered in the case of Pajarito v. Señeris, supra. To do so would
entail a waste of both time and resources of the trial court as the requisites
for the attachment of the subsidiary liability of the employer have already been
established, to wit: First, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.[12] Second, the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry, land transportation industry in
this case as the jeep driven by accused was admittedly a passenger jeep.[13] Third, the employee has already
been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties.[14]
Finally, said employee is insolvent.[15]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and
Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and
Ramon U. Mabutas, Jr.; Petition, Annex “E”; Rollo, pp. 46-51.
[2] Petition, Annex “F”; Rollo,
p. 53.
[3] See Decision, Criminal Case No.
9858, of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 44, penned by Judge
Alvin L. Tan; Petition, Annex “A”; Rollo, pp. 14-41.
[4] Id., at pp. 27-28;
Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[5] Record, CA-G.R. SP No. 43617, p.
16.
[6] Id., pp. 45-47.
[7] Id., pp. 48-49.
[8] Petition, Annex “B”; Rollo,
p. 42.
[9] See Petition, Annex C”;
Rollo, p. 43.
[10] G.R. No. 56612, 164 SCRA 494
[1988].
[11] G.R. No. 113433, 17 March
2000.
[12] In their Statement of Facts in
their Petition, petitioners categorically hold out the accused as “the
driver of herein petitioner-operator Aurelianana Catacutan”. See
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 6.
[13] Petitioners also hold out in
their Statement of Facts that “petitioner-operator Aurelianana Catacutan
is the registered owner of the passenger jeepney”. See Petition, p. 3;
Rollo, p. 6.
[14] See Decision, Criminal Case No.
9858; Rollo, pp. 14-41.
[15] The Sheriff’s Return of Service
manifests that the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court against the
accused was served upon the latter but that “no cash money or personal property
was taken” by the sheriff and the Writ of Execution was not satisfied because
the accused “has nothing to pay off the damages in the decision”. See Note 5.