NOEL ADVINCULA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, HON. EDELWINA PASTORAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC – BR. 91, BACOOR, CAVITE, HON. HERMINIO P. GERVACIO, …

BELLOSILLO, J.:

NOEL ADVINCULA, in this petition for review, assails the
Decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice ordering the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file an Information
for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents Amando Ocampo and
Isagani Ocampo.

As found by the Court of Appeals, on 1 October 1993 at around
three o’clock in the afternoon, private respondent Isagani Ocampo was on his way
home when petitioner Noel Advincula and two (2) of his drinking companions
started shouting invectives at him and challenging him to a fight. Petitioner,
armed with a bolo, ran after Isagani who was able to reach home and elude his
attackers. Petitioner kept cursing Isagani who eventually left. A certain
Enrique Rosas told private respondent Amando Ocampo, father of Isagani, that
petitioner had chased his son with a bolo. Amando then got his .22 caliber gun,
which he claimed was licensed, and confronted petitioner who continued drinking
with his friends. But petitioner threatened to attack Amando with his bolo, thus
prompting the latter to aim his gun upwards and fire a warning shot. Cooler
heads intervened and Amando was pacified. He left to check on his son. Later,
however, he saw petitioner’s drinking companions firing at petitioner’s
house.^[1]

Petitioner however has a different version. According to him,
on 1 October 1993 he and his friends were having a conversation outside his
house when Isagani passed by and shouted at them. This led to a heated argument
between him and Isagani. Then Isagani left but returned with his father Amando
and brother Jerry. Isagani and Amando were each armed with a gun and started
firing at petitioner who ran home to avoid harm but private respondents Isagani
and Amando continued shooting, hitting petitioner’s residence in the
process.^[2]

A series of criminal complaints were filed by petitioner on one
hand and private respondents on the other. But the controversy in this petition
arose from the complaint filed by petitioner on 5 April 1994 for Illegal
Possession of Firearms against private respondents before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite. Petitioner’s complaint was supported by his
complaint-affidavit, the affidavit of one Federico San Miguel, photocopies of
photographs showing bullet holes on petitioner’s residence, and certification of
the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that private
respondents had no records in that office.

After private respondents submitted their counter-affidavits,
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with the approval of the Provincial
Prosecutor, dismissed on 26 May 1994 petitioner’s complaint against private
respondents for Illegal Possession of Firearms for lack of evidence. According
to the Provincial Prosecutor –

After a close and careful study of the records of the instant
case, undersigned finds and so holds that the evidence presented by the
complainant is not sufficient to engender a well founded belief that the crime
for Illegal Possession of Firearms has been committed and the respondents are
probably guilty thereof. While it is true that respondent Amando Ocampo was
possessing a gun on the date of the incident per the allegations in his
counter-affidavit that he fired a gun upwards to prevent complainant from
further assaulting him yet the possession of said firearm cannot be considered
illegal or unlawful as the same is covered by a firearm license duly issued by
the chief of the Firearm and Explosives Office.

With respect to respondent Isagani Ocampo, no convincing
evidence has been presented by the complainant except the allegations appearing
in his affidavit and that of his witness which is not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case for charging the former with Illegal Possession of Firearms.
Even the slug depicted in the xeroxed photo copies marked as Annex “E” of the
complaint do not show that said slugs were fired from different firearms hence
it can be presumed that the same were fired from the gun of respondent Amando
Ocampo an indication that during the incident, only the latter was in possession
of a firearm.^[3] On 21 October 1994
petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice insisting
that the pieces of evidence he presented before the Provincial Prosecutor were
sufficient to make a prima facie case against private respondents and
prayed that the dismissal of his complaint be set aside. Private respondents
filed their opposition thereto stating in essence that Amando’s gun was licensed
and that there was no proof other than petitioner’s self-serving statement that
Isagani had carried a firearm.

In his Resolution of 6 June 1996 the Secretary of Justice
granted petitioner’s appeal and ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to
file the corresponding charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private
respondents. As the Secretary of Justice held – There is no dispute as to the
fact that respondent Amando Ocampo, by his own admission, was in possession of a
firearm. His defense that it was duly licensed, however, by the records of the
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO). Granting, however, that said firearm was
duly licensed by the Philippine National Police, no evidence was submitted to
prove that he is possessed of the necessary permit to carry the firearm outside
of his residence. In other words, his possession of the firearm, while valid at
first, became illegal the moment he carried it out of his place of abode.

With regard to respondent Isagani Ocampo, his bare denial
cannot overcome his positive identification by complainant and his witnesses.
Physical evidence, such as the bullet marks on the walls of complainant’s
residence, indeed strengthen the latter’s allegation that respondents actually
fired at him. The case was nevertheless dismissed on the ground of lack of
evidence. This is erroneous. In cases falling under violations of PD 1866, it is
not indispensable that the firearm used be presented in evidence as long as the
possession and use thereof have been duly established by the testimony of
several witnesses. (People v. Jumanoy, 221 SCRA 333).^[4]

On 25 June 1996, pursuant to the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed two (2) separate Informations
against Amando and Isagani Ocampo for Illegal Possession of Firearms before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Crim. Case No. B-96-141 and
B-96-142, respectively. On 17 December 1996, private respondents filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the
Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

In giving due course to private respondents’ petition, the
Court of Appeals agreed with the position of the Solicitor General –

A judicious examination of the records will show that there is
no probable cause to hail petitioners for trial for illegal possession of
firearms.

The weakness of the case against petitioners is highlighted by
the failure of the Information to allege the identity of the firearms allegedly
possessed by petitioners at the time of the incident. No guns were seized or
recovered from them. There is no corpus delicti. It could not therefore be
ascertained with verisimilitude that petitioners did not have the license to
possess or carry guns. Given the mutual recriminations which were generated by
the incident, it would have been facile for any of the protagonists to concoct a
charge of illegal possession of firearms against their adversary x x x x In
crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden
of proving the elements thereof, viz.: The existence of the subject firearm and
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same. Negative allegation of the
lack of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense which the
prosecution must prove. How could the people prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms when the
firearms are not even identified with certainty x x x x^[5]

On the basis of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals
granted private respondents’ petition and set aside the disputed Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice. Hence, this petition.

The main issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in granting private respondents’ petition and in setting aside the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In determining this question, we need to
address these questions: (a) Was there sufficient evidence to warrant the filing
of charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents; and
(b) May the Court of Appeals set aside the Decision of the Secretary of Justice
when the corresponding Information has already been filed with the trial
court?

The Court of Appeals found that no charges for Illegal
Possession of Firearms could be filed against private respondents for two (2)
reasons: First, as to private respondent Amando Ocampo, he had the requisite
license to possess the firearm, which was established by sufficient evidence on
record. Second, as to private respondent Isagani Ocampo, there was no convincing
evidence that he was in possession of a gun during the incident involving him,
his father and petitioner, except for the eyewitness account of petitioner and
one Federico San Miguel.

Indeed, the rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal
Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence
of the firearm, and (b) the fact that it is not licensed.^[6] However, it should be noted that in
People v. Ramos,^[7] citing
People v. Gy Gesiong,^[8] this Court
ruled: ” x x x x Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the firearm outside
his residence without legal authority therefor.”

This ruling is obviously a reiteration of the last paragraph of
Sec. 1 of PD 1866 –

Sec. 1. – Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition x x x x The penalty of
prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority
therefor.

The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus
made the following findings: Even if Amando had the requisite license, there was
no proof that he had the necessary permit to carry it outside his residence; and
Isagani’s plain denial could not overcome his positive identification by
petitioner that he carried a firearm in assaulting him. These are findings of
fact supported by evidence which cannot be disturbed by this Court.

Besides, the rulings relied upon by the Court of Appeals and
private respondents deal with the quantum of evidence needed to convict persons
for Illegal Possession of Firearms. This petition arose from a case which was
still in its preliminary stages, the issue being whether there was probable
cause to hold private respondents for trial. And probable cause, for purposes of
filing criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The determination of its existence lies
within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary
investigation upon complaint of an offended party.^[9] Their decisions are reviewable by the
Secretary of Justice who may direct the filing of the corresponding information
or to move for the dismissal of the case.^[10] The procedure is in no wise in the nature
of a trial that will finally adjudicate the guilt or innocence of private
respondents. The requisite evidence for convicting a person of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms is not needed at this point. It is enough that
the Secretary of Justice found that the facts, as presented by both petitioner
and private respondents, would constitute a violation of PD 1866. Hence, the
Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the
filing of criminal Informations against private respondents, and clearly, it was
error for the Court of Appeals to grant private respondents’ petition for
certiorari.

The Court of Appeals also took note of the fact that
petitioner’s appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed out of time. Per DOJ
Circular No. 7 dated 25 January 1990, the aggrieved party has fifteen (15) days
to appeal resolutions of, among others, the Provincial Prosecutor dismissing a
criminal complaint. Petitioner filed his appeal four (4) months after receiving
the Provincial Prosecutor’s decision dismissing his complaint. This
notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice gave due course to the appeal. It can
be surmised then that DOJ Circular No. 7, while aimed at facilitating the
expeditious resolution of preliminary investigations, does not tie the hands of
the Secretary of Justice if he thinks that injustice will result from the
dismissal of the criminal complaint when there is a good ground to file it.

Assuming arguendo that the Secretary of Justice was
not able to establish probable cause to direct the Provincial Prosecutor to file
the charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents, the
filing of the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals was not the
proper remedy for private respondents. It should be noted that when the Petition
was filed, the Information was already filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with
the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. The criminal case commenced from
that time at its course would now be under the direction of the trial court. As
we held in Crespo v. Mogul – ^[11]

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in
the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets
in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court x x x x While it is
true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had
already been brought to court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused, or the right of the People to due process
of law.

Whatever irregularity in the proceedings the private parties
may raise should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court which
has already acquired jurisdiction over the case. Certiorari, being an
extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when there are other remedies
available. Private respondents could file a Motion to Quash the
Information under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, or let the trial proceed where
they can either file a demurrer to evidence or present their evidence to
disprove the charges against them. It is well settled that criminal prosecutions
may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final, subject to
certain exceptions, e.g., when the determination of probable cause is done with
grave abuse of discretion,^[12] or where a
sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted,^[13] or where it is necessary for the courts
to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.^[14] None of these exceptions is present in
the instant case. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in granting private
respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and, worse, setting aside the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The
Resolution dated 6 June 1996 of the Secretary of Justice is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Buena, J.,
no part, concurred in CA decision.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 6-7.

^[3] CA Rollo, pp.
79-80.

^[4] Rollo, pp.
63-64.

^[5] Rollo, pp.
35-36.

^[6] People v. Ramos,
G.R. Nos. 101804-07, 25 May 1993, 222 SCRA 557; People v. Arce, G.R. Nos.
101833-34, 26 October 1993, 227 SCRA 406; People v. Luwalhati, G.R. Nos.
105289-90, 21 July 1994, 234 SCRA 327, cited by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision, Rollo, pp. 38-39.

^[7] See Note
6.

^[8] 60 Phil. 614
(1934).

^[9] Sec. 1, and Sec.
4, par. 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court.

^[10] Sec. 4, last
par., Rule 112, Rules of Court.

^[11] G.R. No. 53373,
30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462.

^[12] Roberts, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113930, 5 March 1996, 254 SCRA 307.

^[13] Brocka v.
Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 183; Allado v. Diokno,
G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192.

^[14] See Note 11.
But see also Allado v. Diokno, Note 13.