JOSE ROBLES, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

On
November 28, 1956, the Zambales Chromite Mining Company filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Jose Robles in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Sta. Cruz, Zambalea, alleging among other things
that Robles and the Company entered into a contract whereby the latter
delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had
control to Robles who was to extract, mine and sell ores from said
properties upon payment of certain royalties; that Robles had violated
the terms of the contract; that the Company thereupon served notice on
Robles to vacate the premises; and that Robles failed to comply with
said demand.

Robles filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the Justice of the Peace did not have
jurisdiction, but the latter denied said motion. Robles thereafter
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, alleging that the Justice of the Peace was without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer
involving mineral land. The Court of First Instance ruled against
Robles, holding that the provisions of Section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules
of Court, are sufficiently broad to cover any kind of land, including
mineral land. Robles has appealed.

The appeal is
clearly without basis. Section 1, of Rule 72 provides that, “a
landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.” Any land spoken
of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land, whether
agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well known maxim in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed with costs against the appellant, Jose Robles. So ordered.

Bengzon,
Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.