MIGUEL FLORENDO, CELEDONIO FLORENDO, TRINIDAD FLORENDO, ESPERANZA F. VDA. DE ITCHON, AND FELIX VERZOSA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS SUR AND JUAN S. FLOREN…

On August 17, 1955, the now respondent Juan S. Florentino filed a petition in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur for the probate of the will of
Concepcion Ontanon and for his appointment as administrator of her estate. The
petition alleged that the testatrix died on the 8th of that same month, leaving
properties worth not less than P37,450.00; that she was survived by no forced
heirs; and that, according to information, her nearest relatives were Miguel,
Celedonio, Trinidad and Esperanza, all surnamed Florendo.

Probate of the will was opposed by several sets of alleged relatives, who, on
the basis of their respective claims, may be grouped into two categories: third
degree relatives (alleged nephews and nieces of the testatrix) and fourth degree
relatives (her alleged first cousins). However, at the instance of the proponent
of the will, the court ordered the opposition of the first cousins discarded on
the theory that, in case of intestacy and absence of forced heirs, the nearest
relatives exclude the more distant ones and that, as held in Paras vs.
Narciso (39 Phil. 244), “strangers should not be permitted, over the objections
of the real parties in interest, to embarrass the proceedings by meddling or
intruding themselves in matters with which they have no concern.”

Reconsideration of this order was asked by the Florendos, four of the alleged
first cousins, on the ground that though their relationship to the testatrix was
more remote than that of her alleged nephews and nieces, the latter were, on the
other hand, illegitimate relatives and hence not entitled to inherit from her.
But the court, after hearing evidence, found no reason to alter its ruling and
resolved to maintain the order sought to be reconsidered.

Some five months after this resolution, the Florendos, now joined by Felix
Verzosa, another alleged first cousin of the deceased, filed a second motion for
reconsideration. At first, the court, at that time already presided by another
judge, resolved “to give the movants opportunity to present their evidence in
support of their motion”; but it later desisted from doing so upon becoming
aware that the order whose reconsideration was being sought for the second time
and which had already become final, “was not interlocutory hut a final order in
so far as they (the movants) were concerned because it effectively excluded them
from participating in the proceedings (Angel Ortiz vs. Grant Trent, 13
Phil. 131)” and no appeal was taken therefrom within the reglementary period.
The court, therefore, rejected the second motion for reconsideration by
reaffirming the order sought to be reconsidered.

Two months after the denial of their second motion for reconsideration, the
Florendos, later joined by Felix Verzosa, came to this Court with the present
petition for certiorari and mandamus, asking that the order discarding their
opposition to the probate of the will and whose reconsideration had already been
denied twice be set aside and the lower court compelled to allow them to
prosecute the said opposition.

Answering the petition, the respondents called attention to the fact that the
order complained of had long become final and could, for that reason, no longer
be disturbed.

The petition must, in our opinion, be denied. As pointed out by the learned
trial judge, the order discarding petitioners’ opposition to the probate of the
will was a final one in so far as they were concerned and, therefore,
appealable. This view is in accord with the opinion of this Court in the
above-cited case of Angel Ortiz vs. Grant Trent. (See, also, section 1[e]
of Rule 105.) Petitioners could, therefore, have appealed the order to cure any
defect or infirmity therein. But they neglected to do so and allowed the order
to become final. Having thus lost their remedy by appeal due to their own
neglect, they cannot now seek redress by certiorari and mandamus, it not
appearing that the lower court has acted without jurisdiction. (Profeta et al.
vs. Gutierrez David et al., 71 Phil, 582.) Certiorari and mandamus will
not lie as a substitute for an appeal. Especialty would this be true where, as
in the present case, the factual basis of the order complained of is challenged
so that there is need of going into the sufficiency of the evidence presented.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is denied, with costs
against the petitioners.

Paras C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.