G.R. No. 12341. February 07, 1917
JUAN JAVIER, PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO NADRES ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
TRENT, J.:
Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, requiring it to
forward to this court the proceedings had in a certain election contest
between the petitioner, Juan Javier, and the respondent, Ricardo
Nadres, to the end that the judgment of the court in such proceedings
may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioner alleges that at the general election held on June 6,
1916, Juan Javier, Ricardo Nadres, Nicolas Zamora, Dionisio Pumaan,
Segundo Samonte, and Juan Emon were candidates for the office of
president for the municipality of Candelaria, Province of Tayabas, and
that each of these candidates received votes at the election. Juan
Javier was proclaimed elected by the municipal board of canvassers.
Ricardo Nadres filed in the Court of First Instance on June 19, 1916, a
motion contesting the election. Juan Javier was the only candidate
notified of this motion. During the proceedings Juan Javier presented a
motion on August 10, 1916, praying the court to dismiss the case on the
ground that it had not acquired jurisdiction because of the failure to
notify all the candidates voted for. This motion was denied. Upon
the termination of the hearing the court declared that no one was
legally elected municipal president and so certified to the Executive
Secretary and the provincial board. It is further alleged that the
court failed to make a finding of facts with reference to whether or
not the irregularities which occurred during the election were due to
fraud or bad faith on the part of the election officers.
The respondents in their answer admitted all of the essential
allegations in the petition except that relating to the notice to all
candidates voted for, and as a special defense alleged that at the
commencement of the trial of the contest it was agreed in open court
that the only candidates at the election for the office of municipal
president were Juan Javier and Ricardo Nadres.
The decision of the trial court was made a part of the petition and
the first paragraph of this decision reads in part as follows: “The
petitioner (Ricardo Nadres) and the respondent (Juan Javier) were the
only candidates during the last election for the office of municipal
president held in Candelaria of this Province of Tayabas.” This finding
of fact was based upon the agreement of the parties to that effect.
It is now urged that the parties to an action cannot confer
jurisdiction upon the court by agreement. This is true, but the
agreement under consideration did not have that effect. It was simply
an agreement entered into by the parties to avoid the calling of
witnesses to prove that Nadres and Javier were the only candidates for
the office of municipal president. It therefore follows that the
contention of counsel upon this branch of the case is entirely without
foundation.
The mere fact that the court did not expressly find that the
irregularities, which invalidated the election, were the result of
fraud or bad faith on the part of the election officers, did not affect
the result nor deprive the court of jurisdiction. The filing of the
motion of contest, wherein all the jurisdictional facts were alleged,
and the notice thereof to the only other candidate, gave the court
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the persons of the necessary
parties. It then had the power to determine from the evidence presented
whether or not anyone was legally elected president, the parties having
been given ample opportunity to present their evidence, both
documentary and oral.
For the foregoing reasons judgment will be entered in favor of the
respondents dismissing the petition, with costs against the petitioner,
Juan Javier. So ordered.
Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
This case serves to show how far the court is led as a result of its decision in the cases1 of Santos vs.
Miranda and Clemente (35 Phil. Rep., 643) and Tamondong vs. Llorente
and Palisoc (35 Phil. Rep., 635), in which I dissented. The doctrine
there enunciated is that, although all persons who, according to the
proclamation of the municipal board of canvassers, received a vote or
votes for the office contested, are candidates, that is, necessary
parties to the contest, and a failure to make all of them parties
deprives the court of all power to proceed, nevertheless, any two of
such persons, in a contest in which they alone are actually parties, may, without notice to the other persons and without their knowledge,
determine whether such other persons are, in fact, candidates and
therefore necessary parties and that such determination will be
absolutely conclusive on such other persons, and that they will,
accordingly, be deprived of all opportunity to be effectively heard on
that question.
The present case carries such a theory to its logical conclusion—a
conclusion which is, as I view it, somewhat remarkable. In this case
the court holds that two persons may step into a quiet corner and, all
by themselves, “agree” or “stipulate” another person out of his rights.
Ricardo Nadres and Juan Javier got together and “agreed” or
“stipulated” that they were the only necessary parties to this
proceeding, and that the other persons who, according to the
proclamation of the municipal board of canvassers, received votes for
the office contested, need not be considered and that the rights which
this court has frequently held such fact gives them (see cases cited
above) should be disregarded. This court confirms that “agreement” or
“stipulation” and holds that they had the right to make it,
and that it is binding on every other person who received votes for the office contested.
Such a doctrine as this, of course, has its advantages. It permits
one to rid himself of a troublesome antagonist in the easiest possible
manner. It permits a plaintiff to avoid a controversy by agreeing with
a complacent defendant, whose interests are very small, that many other
persons not defendants are not necessary parties, and have no interest
in the result of the action. It allows him to select his antagonist; to pick out
one whom he can “agree with” easily; and one who will have no
hesitation in “agreeing” a third person out of all his rights without
his knowledge. This saves trouble, delay and expense; and it relieves
the courts of work also. From this point of view the decision is
defensible.
The court says in its opinion:
“The decision of the trial court was made a part of the petition and
the first paragraph of this decision reads in part as follows: ‘The
petitioner (Ricardo Nadres) and the respondent (Juan Javier) were the
only candidates during the last election for the office of municipal
president held in Candelaria of this Province of Tayabas.’ This finding
of fact was based upon the agreement of the parties to that effect.”
The court then discusses what it evidently considers the only point involved, as it discusses no other, as follows:
“It is now urged that the parties to an action cannot confer
jurisdiction upon the court by agreement. This is true, but the
agreement under consideration did not have that effect. It was simply
an agreement entered into by the parties to avoid the calling of
witnesses to prove that Nadres and Javier were the only candidates for
the office of municipal president. It therefore follows that the
contention of counsel upon this branch of the case is entirely without
foundation.”
It should be noted, in the first place, that the facts stipulated by
the parties as to who were candidates, that is, who were necessary
parties, are in direct conflict with the facts of record. The
proclamation of the municipal board of canvassers, in evidence in this
case, shows that the following persons received votes for the office
contested: Ricardo Nadres, Juan Javier, Nicolas Zamora, Dionisio
Pumaan, Segundo Samonte, and Juan Emon. The proclamation of the
municipal board of canvassers is a public record and this court has
held (see cases already cited) that the persons named therein are
presumptively candidates and necessary parties to a contest.
But, in the face of this public record and the decisions of this Court
touching its effects, Javier and Nadres calmly agree that they are the only candidates and the only necessary parties to the contest, and proceed to shut themselves in from everybody else and litigate alone.
It must be borne in mind that this court has held many times that all candidates
for the office contested must be made parties to an election contest;
and that, if all of them are not made parties, if one of them is
omitted and is not notified, the court fails of all authority to go
forward and must dismiss the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. It
must also be remembered that the court has held many times that, to
determine who are candidates, that is, necessary parties, we must look
to the proclamation of the municipal board of canvassers; and that
every person who, according to that proclamation, received a vote or
votes for the office contested is presumptively a candidate and a necessary party.
Whether these holdings are good law or not is not now open to question.
It is enough to know that the court has so held. This being so how can
it now be held that any two of the persons named in the proclamation
can validly and effectively agree that they are the only candidates and
the only necessary parties? And how can they bind all the others by such agreement? (See my dissenting opinion in the two cases cited).
In the second place, while the court says that this “agreement does
not have the effect to confer jurisdiction upon the court,” it,
nevertheless, has the effect of stipulating facts which, this court
holds, permit the court to proceed where otherwise it would have no
power or jurisdiction to do so. And the strange part of it is that the
facts stipulated do not not refer in the remotest way to the
jurisdiction of the court over the parties stipulating, or to their own
rights or interests. They stipulate solely as to the rights and interests of other persons.
Is it not very unusual to call such an agreement a stipulation? Parties
can legally stipulate only as to those facts which affect their own
rights and interests. They can not legally or effectively stipulate as
to the rights and interests of others.
It being admitted that not all the persons who, according to the
proclamation of the municipal board of canvassers, received votes for
the office contested, were made parties to this proceeding, the motion
to dismiss on that ground should have been granted in accordance with
the settled doctrine of this court. (Navarro vs. Jimenez, 23 Phil.
Rep., 557; Navarro vs. Veloso, 23 Phil. Rep., 625; Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. Rep., 238.) The court refusing to dismiss certiorari lies (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and Bantillo, 34 Phil. Rep., 157; In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344; Arzadon vs. Chanco, 14 PhiL Rep., 710; Napa vs. Weissenhagen, 29 Phil. Rep., 180; De Fiesta vs. Llorente, 25 Phil. Rep., 554; Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. Rep., 245; Gala vs. Cui, 25 Phil. Rep., 522; Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. Rep., 338) to review the void proceedings.
Apropos of the principles enunciated in the Santos and Tamondong
cases above, that the question whether or not a given person is a
candidate for the office contested and a necessary party to an election
contest can be finally and conclusively determined behind the back of
that person and wholly without his knowledge, I desire to add one more
suggestion to those found in my dissenting opinion in the Santos and
Tamondong cases, which is applicable to the present case also.
It is asserted by the court that the question whether a given person
is a candidate and necessary party can be determined in a proceeding in
which he is not an actual party and of which he has no notice, in a
motion made to the judge hearing the contest to dismiss the same on the
ground that not all candidates for that office have been made parties
(in fact the question has always been so raised); and that the parties,
without notice to him or opportunity to be heard, may go into every
fact showing that he is not a candidate or necessary party to the
extent of demonstrating his ineligibility for the office, such as non-
residence, foreign citizenship, not an elector, lack of age, and all
other grounds for ineligibility. (See the Santos and Tamondong cases.)
The present case holds, in effect, the same thing. Now, apart from the remarkable nature of the
proposition that the eligibility of a person for a particular office
can be determined without his knowing it and that he may be finally and
conclusively declared to be ineligible for that office without notice
or opportunity to be heard, I recall that the court has directly held
that the special tribunals created by section 27 (now section 578
Administrative Code) for the hearing of election contests have no jurisdiction over the eligibility of a candidate to hold office. (Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. Rep., 238.) In the case cited the court, Judge Trent writing the decision, dedicates pages to demonstrating that a Court of First Instance sitting in a contested election proceeding has no power whatever to determine the eligibility of a candidate; and terminates its exposition with these words: (p. 255) “Applying the familiar principle of ejusdem generis, we hold that jurisdiction under this section is limited to those matters which may be decided by an inspection of the registry list and of the ballots and their res gestae. (Sutherland, Sta. Const., par. 268 et seq;
Sedgwick, id., 360; 36 Cyc, 1119.)” But this holding is diametrically
opposed to that of the Santos and Tamondong cases and also to the
principle of the present case to the effect that the Court of First
Instance has power in an election contest, without notice to the person
affected, to determine whether a given person is in law a candidate.
These cases go upon the theory, which is logical if one concedes the
other doctrine set down therein to be correct, that, if a person is
ineligible for a given office he cannot legally be a candidate for that
office; that all votes cast for him would be void, thrown away; that
under no circumstances can he possibly be less a candidate than when he
is ineligible; that he is no more a candidate for a municipal office
than a person who is a registered candidate for a provincial office but
receives votes for the municipal office; or than one who receives only
one vote for the municipal office; that no one can possibly be less a
candidate than one who could not occupy the office even if he were
elected to it; that if a person who has received one hundred votes may
be deprived of all rights as a party without his knowledge and without
opportunity to be heard, why should a court hesitate to deprive another
person of those rights who is ineligible and who could not hold the
office even if the result of the contest showed that he received a
plurality of the votes cast?
Grotesque as it may seem, there is no question of the fact that the Tamondong case, supra,
lays down the proposition that the eligibility of a candidate for
municipal office may be determined behind his back on a motion
todismiss an election contest to which he is not a party on the ground
of failure or lack of jurisdiction of the court resulting from the fact
that not all persons who were candidates or necessary parties were duly
made parties and notified as required by law. Elaborating its argument
to the effect that such a question should be determined at that time and
in that manner the court said in that case:
“It frequently happens, as has been seen from the many election
contests which have been presented to the courts, that some persons
have been voted for who were not residents of the municipality; that they were not eligible
to the office for which they had been voted for; that they were
fictitious persons or were, in fact, dead. An interpretation of the law
that would require the protestant to show that he had notified all such persons before he could have a day in court, when he stands ready to prove that such persons,
even though voted for, were not, in fact, candidates, is an
interpretation which is repugnant to all sense of justice and fairness.”
This quotation shows clearly that it was squarely held by the court
that eligibility to municipal office could be tried out in a motion to
dismiss the contest for failure to notify a candidate and thereby make
him a necessary party to the proceeding—something which the court in
the Topacio case said could not be done as the Court of First Instance
in an election contest had no jurisdiction of the question of
eligibility but was confined strictly to “an inspection of the registry
list and of the ballots.”
The statement of the court in that case that the requirement that
the candidate or person whose eligibility is to be determined must have
notice and opportunity to be heard before he can be declared ineligible
“is repugnant to all sense of justice and fairness,” is a statement the
equal of which it would, in my judgment, be hard to find.
Of course, in the United States, it is necessary, as a rule, to make
party to the contest only the person elected. Generally there are only
two parties—the contestant and the respondent. But in the Philippine
Islands, the law requires all persons who, according to the
proclamation of the municipal board of canvassers, received a vote or
votes for the office contested to be made parties; and, interpreting
that law, this court has repeatedly held that that provision is
mandatory and that if those persons, and each and every one of them,
are not made parties and duly notified the court has no power to do more than dismiss the proceeding. The failure to make parties and duly notify all such persons results in depriving the court of all jurisdiction over the proceeding. The court, in so construing the statute, must have believed that the legislature regarded it of the very highest importance that every one
of those persons be made a party; for the failure to do so is visited
by this court with the highest penalty known to the law—that of
depriving the contestant of all remedy by depriving the court of
jurisdiction to act.
Now, if it is so tremendously important that every person receiving
votes be a party to the contest, why does this court permit the
question of whether he is a necessary party or not to be determined
without notice to him, or to anyone for him, and without an opportunity
to be heard? Why does it commit the absurdity of permitting two
complacent parties, as in the case before us, to “stipulate” or “agree”
behind his back in a proceeding in which he is not a party that he is
not a candidate or a necessary party and hold that such “agreement” or
“stipulation” binds him forever? And why does the court hold that to
require them to notify him of their purpose to exclude him from all
participation in the case would outrage “all sense of justice and
fairness?”
I can agree to no such reasoning as this case contains and I dissent.