G.R. No. 12256. February 06, 1917
JUAN DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. PERCY M. MOIR, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, MELENCIO M. TRINIDAD, FULGENCIO JAYME AND LEOCADIO BLANCO, RESPONDENTS.
MORELAND, J.:
First Instance of Pampanga requiring him to remit to this court all the records
and papers relating to a certain election contest pending therein instituted by
Juan de la Cruz against Melecio M. Trinidad, that the proceeding had in said
contest may be revised by this court and certain of the steps taken therein be
declared null and void on the ground that they were taken by the court without
or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The petition shows that on the 20th of June, 1916, Juan de la Cruz filed a
protest in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Melecio M. Trinidad
and others challenging the validity of the election of said Trinidad to the
office of municipal president of Macabebe, Pampanga. The contest was duly
brought on for hearing. After hearing and the presentation of evidence the court
dismissed the proceedings on the merits. The particular acts of the court of
which complaint is made are set out in the petition in this case as follows:
“That in trying and dismissing the said election protest filed by the
petitioner, the said respondent the Hon. Percy M. Moir, as judge of first
instance of Pampanga, has exceeded his jurisdiction in that although the said
respondent judge admits that there were 193 electors of Macabebe who voted as
illiterates and most of whom took no oath regarding their illiteracy before
voting and who were aided only by one inspector of election and not by two as
required by the election law, yet the said respondent judge has entirely and
voluntarily failed, omitted and refused to separate the votes of the said
illiterates and to declare the same as null and void, an act which is not only
in excess of his jurisdiction but is manifestly against the law, for the votes
of illiterates who have not taken the the necessary oath regarding their
illiteracy before voting and who were aided only by one inspector of election
are null and void.“That in trying to indentify these votes of the illiterates, the petitioner
moved the court below to put the election inspectors of Macabebe on the witness
stand requiring them to select and separate the ballots prepared by each of
them, with a view to separate and annul the said voes of the supposed
illiterates, but he respondent judge refused to grant said motion of the
petitioner, thereby exceeding his jurisdiction and abusing his judicial
discretion.“That during the trial of the protest the petitioner has offered to prove
that of the 193 voters who voted as illiterates a great majority could write and
could personally prepare their own ballots without the necessity of the aid of
the inspectors, and that this mode of voting was adopted by the inspectors of
the election only to perpetrate fraud on the voters; but all the evidence
offered to this point by the petitioner, to wit, (1) Exhibit D (in the court
below) which is a collection of the certificates of oaths of all the electors of
Macabebe wherein can be seen who can write and who cannot; (2) Exhibit E (court
below) which is the list of the 193 voters who voted as illiterates and (3)
witness Cornelio Bustos who knew the majority of these voters as he has been an
election inspector too in the said municipality of Macabebe in one of the last
elections, was rejected by the respondent judge notwithstanding this evidence is
material, competent and relevant to the allegations of the petitioner in the
protest. This rejection of evidence constitutes on the part of the respondent
judge a violation of his duty and an abuse of his judicial discretion the
correction of which law and justice demand.“That by separating and annulling the voes of the illiterates who voted in
violation of the law the result of the election at the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga, will be changed in that the petitioner herein will have the majority
of the legal votes cast at that election and will therefore have to be declared
elected instead of respondent Melecio M. Trinidad.“That the said respondent judge, the Hon. Percy M. Moir, has also exceeded
his jurisdiction and abused his discretion in that upon opening the ballot box
he has refused, to the prejudice of the petitioner, to annul 62 ballots for the
respondent Melecio M. Trinidad in spite of the fact that these 62 ballots were
marked with certain initials, said initials having not been proven to have been
put without the knowledge and consent of the voters. On the other hand, the
petitioner has conclusively proven that the voters themselves made those marks
while preparing their ballots, that the ballot boxes were carefully and duly
cared for by the municipal secretary until said ballot boxes were delivered to
the court.“That the said respondent judge has also abused his discretion and thus
exceeded his jurisdiction in finding and concluding after the ballot box was
opened that the said ballot box has been tampered with while in the custody of
the municipal secretary, when in fact there was no evidence produced by the
respondents proving the tampering of the ballot box.“That by annulling these 62 marked ballots for respondet Melecio M. Trinidad,
the result of the election at the municipality of Macabebe will be changed in
that the petitioner Juan de la Cruz will have the majority of the legal votes as
municipal president instead of said respondent Melecio M. Trinidad.“That the respondent the Hon. Percy M. Moir, as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, has also exceeded his jurisdiction and abused his
discretion in not annulling the election had on June 6, 1916, at the
municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, in spite of the fact that the evidence
establishes (1) that while the inspectors were preparing the ballots of the
alleged illiterates, there were present around them in the voting booths several
other voters watching how the ballots were being filled by the inspectors
thereby violating the secrecy of the election; (2) that the inspectors of
respondent Melecio M. Trinidad in preparing the ballots for the illiterate
voters did not at all ascertain the wishes of said illiterates but filled their
ballots as said inspectors wished; (3) that the inspectors of respondent Melecio
M. Trinidad were guilty of electioneering in the voting booths; (4) that the
voting booths were not constructed in the manner provided for by the election
law and were without doors; (5) that those who were waiting to vote near them
could well see the ballots filled by the voters in their respective booths and
could read such ballots if they wanted it; (6) that the voting booths were
constructed outside of the guard rail; (7) that the public were prohibited by
the inspectors to approach and observe the election within the distance of 30
meters with the exception of 10 voters at a time who were called to vote; (8)
that the entrance of the voters to the electoral college was regulated in groups
of 10 by 10 from each party, a mode adopted to discover before hand the force of
each party, but a mode contrary to law. These facts have been proven although
the respondent judge has failed to make findings of them, and these fats are
sufficient to annul an election.”
Another ground upon which the petition was based was added by an amendment to
the petition which says:
“Not less than 40 marked and countersigned ballots were counted in favor of
Melecio M. Trinidad and legal and valid ballots cast in favor of the petitioner
were rejected by the court and not counted in his favor.”
An answer was duly filed by which, while certain allegations of the petition
are denied, the main facts are admitted. The denials referred chiefly not to
facts alleged in the petition but to conclusions which the petitioner draws from
facts.
We are of the opinion that the petition does not state facts sufficient to
warrant the relief prayed for. We have held in a long line of decisions that
certiorari will not lie under the law of the Philippine Islands except in cases
where the court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and the acts
thus performed are void (In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; Springer
vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344; Arzadon vs. Chanco, 14 Phil.
Rep., 710; De Fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila Railroad Co., 25 Phil.
Rep., 245; Gala vs. Cui, and Rodriguez, 25 Phil. Rep., 522; Province of
Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. Rep., 338; Napa vs. Weissenhagen, 29
Phil. Rep., 180; Government of the P. I. vs. Judge of First Instance of
Iloilo and Bantillo, 34 Phil. Rep., 157). Certiorari, as a necessary
consequence, will not lie to correct errors. In the case of Herrera vs. Barretto
and Joaquin (25 Phil. Rep., 245) we said:
“It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not
be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It will not be issued to cure errors
in the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or of fact. If the
court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person, decisions upon
all questions pertaining to the cause are decisions they may be, cannot be
corrected by certiorari” (p. 249).“Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause—the right to act
in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend
either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause
at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.
Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, as we have said
before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of that jurisdiction.” (p. 251).“A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court
touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully supports the
proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person, its decision of any
question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous, cannot be reviewed by
certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal” (p. 271).
None of the acts set out in the petition affect the jurisdiction of the
court. They are acts performed in the exercise or jurisdiction; and,
even though the decision of the court upon each one of the questions presented
by the allegations of the petition was wrong in fact and in law, his
jurisdiction would remain unaffected. As we have said so many times, it is
always necessary to bear in mind the difference between jurisdiction and the
exercise of jurisdiction. When a court exercises its jurisdiction an
error committed while engaged in that exercise does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction which it is exercising when the error is committed. If it did,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This, of course, is not possible.
The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. The decision of the
trial court in the case before us holding that certain ballots cast by
illiterates which had been prepared for them by the inspectors of election were
legal and valid although the illiterates did not, previous to the preparation of
their ballots by the inspectors, take the oath required by law showing that they
could not cast their ballots without assistance, is a decision entirely within
the jurisdiction of the court, even if we concede for the sake of argument that
the court was wrong in that decision. The same could be said if he had held the
precise contrary and had excluded all of the ballots cast by illiterates; and,
of course, it necessarily follows that his failure to separate those which the
petitioner claims were illegal from those he claims were legal does not alter
the situation. The court has power and authority to conduct the case as he
believes law and justice require and whatever he does is within his jurisdiction
so long as he does not violate the principle of due process of law or transcend
the limits of the case before him.
We reach the same result in discussing the other alleged errors. The denial
of the motion to separate the illegal from the legal ballots, the rejection of
the offer to prove that the majority of the illiterate voters could read and
write, the refusal to annul 62 ballots in favor of Melecio M. Trinidad in spite
of the fact that they were marked with certain letters, the finding that a
certain ballot box had been tampered with after the ballots have been counted
and the box sealed by the inspectors, the refusal to annul the election in the
municipality of Macababa on account of certain irregularities and violations of
law which took place in the conduct thereof, and the counting of more than 40
marked ballots in favor of Trinidad and the refusal to count legal ballots in
favor of Juan de la Cruz, do not touch the jurisdiction of the court in any way.
They are all decisions made in the exercise of its jurisdiction and however
erroneous they may be, if they or any of them are erroneous at all, it had power
and authority to make them and they cannot be attacked on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
On the oral argument it was said by counsel for the petitioner that some of
the findings of the trial court were without evidence to support them. There is
no allegation to this effect in the petition and no question of that sort is
presented by the pleadings. We might say, however, that, even if the question
were presented and it were admitted that certain findings were without evidence
to support them, that would not mean necessarily that the judgment on the whole
case was rendered without jurisdiction and was void. If the judgment was utterly
without a purely arbitrary act of the court, then a different question might be
presented. The is not the case here and we have no reason to consider or decide
such a question.
The petition is dismissed on the merits, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Trent, J., concurs in the result.