THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LIPA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF TAAL, OBJECTOR AND APPELLANT, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTO TOMAS AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OBJ…

This was a proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Batangas had in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The court below
refused to register two of the parcels of land included in the petition, and
from that part of the decision petitioner has appealed to this court. The
municipality of Taal unsuccessfully opposed the registration of one of the
parcels of land included in the petition, and has appealed from that part of the
decision by which it was decreed that petitioner was the owner of the tract
claimed by the municipality.

The appeal of the petitioner relates to two tracts of land, one of which is
described in the petition as parcel 74, the registration of which was opposed by
the municipality of Santo Tomas, and the other is described in the petition as
parcel 71, lot 9, the registration of which was opposed by the Director of
Forestry.

Parcel 74.—This is a tract of land containing 544 square meters,
situated between the front wall of the atrium of the church and the public
highway in the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Concerning
this tract of land the trial court said:

“The church applies for the registration of a tract of land containing an
area of 12,995 square meters, as described in the plan Exhibit A-2, to which the
acting provincial fiscal and Attorney Modesto Castillo, in representation of the
municipality, opposed. The objector maintains that the land applied for, known
as Plaza Malvar and situated in front of the church walls, is a public square
under the control of the municipality of Santo Tomas.

“Counsel for the petitioner informed the court that he amended the
application for registration so as to exclude from the land applied for that
part thereof included within the walls of the church, inasmuch as it had already
been registered formerly in accordance with a notice in the Official Gazette of
April 10, 1912, p. 809, parcel 13, and the court agreed to such amendment and
exclusion of the land already registered, included within the walls, the
application being based on the land designated as Plaza Malvar; in other words,
on the area included within numbers 1, 7, 8, and 9, marked in the plan with
letter (a).

“The petitioner presented three witnesses to support its application, and the
opposing party, i. e., the municipality, presented also three witnesses who
testified in its favor, and introduced as evidence p. 809 of the Official
Gazette of April 10, 1912, referring to parcel 13, lot 1, of the application for
registration by the Catholic Church of a tract of land where the convent and
the. church with its courtyard are located.

“After a careful study of the testimony of the witnesses of both parties,
inasmuch as none of them has presented documents of ownership, we believe
that—considering the location of the land, which is said to be Plaza Malvar and
which according to the municipality constitutes a public square and according to
the church is its own property— the yard of the church being surrounded by
walls, we cannot understand why if the tract of land in question really belonged
to it, the church allowed it to remain outside its walls. It must be taken into
account that it is prevalent custom, as seem in several towns, to have the yards
of churches readily recognized by their surrounding fences of stone or other
materials. In the case at bar, the church inclosed its yard with walls, and the
land in litigation is outside the said walls, forming a square at the side of a
public street. Furthermore, if the portion constituting the subject matter of
the controversy known as Plaza Malvar really belonged to the church, we cannot
understand why the church in applying for the inspection of its title to parcel
13, lot 1, p. 809 of the Official Gazette of April 10, 1912, had particularly
described as its boundary on the northeast the Plaza Malvar which it now claims
as its own. This amounts to an admission by the church itself that the parcel of
land which it now claims was a public square which, according to law, comes
under the control of the municipality. These facts and the very act of the
church itself militate against its claim.

“The oral evidence of both parties contradict each other. The witnesses of
the church state that formerly the parish priests exercised certain acts of
ownership over this portion of the land, such as for example, prohibiting the
tying of animals there to avoid filth in the place; while those of the
municipality have shown that this parcel of land was formerly used as a market
place during certain days of the week, and these facts have not been
contradicted by the petitioner. The mere fact that a certain priest had really
prohibited the tying of animals in this parcel of land does not, according to
our opinion, constitute an act whereby the church can be considered as the owner
of the land, for, considering that the land in question lies in front of a
sacred place, as the church, it seems rather disrespectful that one should tie
animals there, not to say anything of the fact that such practice would pollute
the very place where the public which attends the religious ceremonies would
pass. Hence, it is but natural that the parish priests should prohibit it, their
authority at that time under our former Government being absolute in the towns
where all obeyed them either out of respect or of fear, and for this reason, the
said prohibitions and the acts testified to by the witnesses of the petitioner
are insufficient to give the latter a title of ownership. On the other hand, the
acts performed by the municipality and by the church itself, which in its
application has admitted that the land in litigation belonged to the
municipality or Plaza Malvar—the parish priests of the towns of the Philippines
took particular pains to fence the yards or plazas of the churches, as
in this case, for here the yard of the church was fenced with the
walls—constitute clear and sufficient evidence of ownership performed by the
municipality.

“Wherefore, the court denies the petitioner’s application for registration,
as amended, of that portion of the land comprised within numbers 1, 7, 8, and 9
of the plan Exhibit A-2, that is, the land in litigation known as Plaza Malvar,
which is outside of the walls and according to the evidence, a public
square.”

We have examined the evidence relative to this parcel of land, and are of the
opinion that the court below did not err in refusing to decree its registration
as the property of the petitioner. The so-called acts of dominion mentioned in
the decision of the court, and which are invoked by petitioner in its brief as
the sole ground upon which it relies to show its ownership of the land in
dispute, are wholly insufficient for that purpose. The decision must be affirmed
as regards the denial of the petition of applicant for the registration of
parcel 74.

Parcel 71.—This is a tract of land in the municipality of Rosario,
Province of Batangas. The petition of the applicant for the registration of this
tract was opposed by Benedicto de Villa, with respect to 78,473 square meters,
and by the Director of Forestry, with respect to 71 hectares which he contends
are public forest land. The petitioner withdrew its application as regards the
land claimed by Benedicto de Villa, and the trial court excluded from the decree
of registration the 71 hectares claimed by the Director of Forestry as being
public forest land. The decision of the trial court, regarding parcel 71, lot 9,
is as follows:

“Respecting parcel 71, lot 9, of which the Bureau of Forestry and the
municipality of Rosario were the objectors, both being represented by the acting
provincial fiscal, the evidence has shown that the land applied for by the
church should be considered as a forest, for there are no signs of cultivation
therein, but on the other hand, there are trees of much importance and some
trees of the first group. This piece of land is approximately 71 hectares, as
shown in the plan Exhibit A-l, marked therein with the letter (a), and Exhibit 2
of the objectors, and is situated in the southeastern part of the land applied
for. Hence, there should be adjudged to the church that part of the whole area
described in the plan Exhibit F-2 after deducting the 71 hectares claimed by the
Bureau of Forestry and the area of 78,473 square meters marked as lot 9 in the
name of Benedicto de Villa and should therefore be considered as the property of
the latter—all in accordance with the cession or dismissal prayed for by the
petitioner during the trial.”

We have carefully examined the evidence adduced by the petitioner regarding
that part of parcel 71, lot 9, excluded by the court below upon the opposition
of the Bureau of Forestry, but are unable to find the remotest indication that
it was the property of the petitioner. There is no suggestion that there has
ever been a grant of this land from the Government, and there is no such proof
of possession as to warrant us in decreeing title in accordance with section 54,
paragraph 6, of Act No. 926, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1908, which
reads as follows:

“All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and. two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as
against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the
twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by
war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.”

The only proof of cultivation of the land in question is that at times part
of it has been cultivated by the caiñgin system. The evidence does not
show how long this has been done or what portion of the land was so cultivated.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the caingin system of cultivation is
essentially temporary in character. Apart from evidence regarding the occasional
cultivation of the property by the caiñgin system, the only proof of
possession is that cattle were occasionally pastured on part of the land, and
that some trees were cut on it under the direction of persons ostensibly acting
on behalf of the petitioner. Obviously, none of these acts constituted
compliance with the requirements of the statute as above quoted. We are of the
opinion that the decision of the lower court concerning this tract must be
affirmed.

Parcel 30, Lot No. 13.—This parcel of land is described in the
petition as follows:

“Parcel 30 (lot No. 13).—Situated in the barrio of
Balibago, municipality of Taal. Bounded on the NE. by the property of Matilde
Martinez; on the SE. by the property of Matilde Martinez and Juan Cabrera; on
the SW. by the road; on the NW. by the properties of Andres Collantes and
Hilariona Collantes. Area: 1,706 square meters.”

The registration of this parcel of land as the property of the petitioner was
opposed by the municipality of Taal, but the opposition was overruled, and the
registration of the land on behalf of the petitioner was decreed by the trial
court. From this part of the decision, the municipality of Taal has appealed.
The decision of the trial court regarding lot 13, parcel 30, is as follows:

“On parcel 30, lot 13, to the inscription whereof the municipality of Taal
objects, there is a chapel of mixed materials.

“The preponderance of evidence has shown that the land came from one Maria
Caibigan, alias Apong, who then gave it to the Roman Catholic Church,
and no one has presented any claim against the church, according to witness
Sebastian Lontok, 86 years of age, who was gobernadorcillo in 1862 and
1867. He stated that as gobernadorcillo he knew that the land was
donated to the Catholic church and that the chapel had been administered by the
parish priests of Taal; but these proofs refer only to the land occupied by the
chapel, and there should be excluded from the plan Exhibit X-1 that which
appears to be claimed by Juan Cabrera, as was agreed upon by the petitioner and
the objector in the hearing of September 8, 1915, and the petitioner stated that
the petition be considered as thus amended, excluding said part claimed, that
is, the part where the stone walls stand, which should be considered as
belonging to the municipality of Taal.”

It is contended in the brief filed on behalf of the municipality of Taal, as
appellant, with regard to the registration of lot 13, parcel 30, that the
evidence shows that the land in dispute is the property of the municipality,
but, as there was no application by the municipality for the registration of
this land, our inquiry must be limited to determining whether the evidence does
or does not show that it is the property of the applicant.

With respect to this tract of land, we hold that the clear preponderance of
the evidence establishes the facts that the land in question was originally the
property of Juan Collantes and his wife Maria Kaibigan; that in 1862 or 1863
they gave the land to the people of the town of San Luis, now a barrio of Taal,
so that a building might be erected upon it to serve as a meeting place or
tribunal for the transaction of the public business of the town; that a
building was constructed there for that purpose and so used for many years; that
it was also used as a place of public worship; that about the year 1879 the
first building erected on the land was destroyed by fire; that the people of the
town, with the assistance of the parish priest, then built the present chapel or
visita on the land in which the patron saint of the town is housed;
that the cost of maintaining the building is defrayed by the contributions of
the people composing the congregation of the chapel, who elect a person to take
charge of the chapel and act as custodian of the funds collected for its upkeep;
that the Catholic parish priest of Taal goes to the chapel to say mass whenever
he is called upon to do so by the congregation of the chapel and is paid for so
doing out of the chapel funds.

The petitioner in this case is the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa, a
corporation sole. We are of the opinion that the title of this corporation to
the land in question is not established by the showing that the Catholic priest
of Taal has from time to time said mass in the chapel existing on that land.
Even if we were to assume that the Catholic parish priest of Taal is the agent
of the applicant corporation, there is nothing incompatible with the ownership
by its congregation of the chapel and of the lot occupied by it, in the
celebration of mass in the chapel by the priest of the parish.

It is not necessary for us to determine whether the chapel and the lot in
dispute are the property of the municipality of Taal, or of some other entity or
person. The only applicant for the registration of title is the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa described in the petition as a “unipersonal corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Philippine Islands.” We are not
justified in permitting the registration of the title to the land in question in
favor of this applicant merely because the proof does not show that the land
belongs to the opponent

“One of the primary and fundamental purposes of the registration of land
under the Torrens system is to secure to the owner an absolute, indefeasible
title, free from all encumbrances and claims whatsoever, except those mentioned
in the certificate of title, and/so far as it is possible, to make the
certificate issued to the owner by the court, absolute proof of such title./H^,
order, however, that the petitioner for registration orliis land under the
Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same registered and to have the
benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued, the burden is
upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner,
in fee simple, of the lands which he is attempting to have registered.
The petitioner is not entitled to have his lands registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of his lands. In order that land may be registered under the
Torrens system, the petitioner must show, even though there is no opposition,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple, of the same. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system in the name of the
petitioner simply because there is no opposition offered. In view of the fact
that the entire revenues of the state under certain conditions are made subject
to the payment of damages for errors in the wrongful registration of property,
courts should insist upon unquestionable proof of absolute ownership in fee
simple on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner may be the owner, as a
matter of fact, of the land and yet be unable to furnish satisfactory proof of
the kind required for registration under the Torrens system at the time of the
presentation of his petition for registration. The denial of the petition for
registration is not conclusive proof that the petitioner is not the owner. The
denial of a petition for registration simply indicates that he has not furnished
that kind of proof showing an absolute title in fee simple which is required
under the Torrens system.. It is the duty of the courts, even in the absence of
any opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that
he is the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to have
registered. (Maloles vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. Rep., 548.)

As the evidence does not show that lot 13 of parcel 30 is the property of the
applicant corporation, the decision of the lower court concerning this parcel
must be reversed.

Costs.—The petition for the registration of the property described
therein was [filed before the pasage of Act No. 2556, and the costs denraadable
under the law then in force were paid by the petitioner. Act No. 2556 provides
for the payment of higher costs in land registration proceedings. By the terms
of the Act its provisions are made applicable to land registration proceedings
pending at the time it took effect. The lower court made an order requiring the
petitioner to pay the difference between the costs paid under the former law, in
force when the proceeding was commenced, and the amount due as costs under Act
No. 2556. Petitioner appeals from this order and contends that the application
of Act No. 2556 to pending proceedings for the registration of title is void as
being ex post facto, as impairing the obligation of a contract, and as
depriving petitioner of property without due process of law. None of these
contentions can be upheld. The Act in question is not an ex post facto
law, as it is not penal in its nature.

“It has long been settled that the phrase ‘ex post facto laws’ is
not applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws which punish a
party for acts antecedently done which were not punishable at all, or not
punishable to the extent or in the manner prescribed. In short ex post
facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings, which impose
punishment or forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private
rights retrospectively.” (Encyc. of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, vol. 4, page
517^ and cases cited in Note 29.)

There was no contract between the petitioner and the Government that no
change would be made in the law regarding the costs to be charged in land
registration proceedings. Petitioner’s property is not being taken without due
process of law. The commencement and continuance of the proceeding for the
registration of its lands is a purely voluntary act on petitioner’s part, and if
it had deemed the costs demandable under Act No. 2556 as being higher than it
was warranted in paying for the benefit to be derived from the registration of
its title, it might have withdrawn its application. There is no vested right to
the maintenance of any given tariff of court costs. If the Legislature were to
repeal in toto the Land Registration Act and thereby make it impossible
for petitioner and other similar applicants to obtain a registered title to
land, no vested right would be impaired. If the Legislature may validly repeal
the statute in toto clearly it has power to amend it in any particular
it may deem essential.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with regard to parcel 71, lot 9,
and as to parcel 74, and is reversed as regards lot 13 of parcel 30, as to which
petition will be dismissed. The order of April 1, 1916, regarding costs is
affirmed. No costs will be allowed on this appeal. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, Street, and Malcolm, JJ.,
concur.