RAMON HONTIVEROS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE ALTAVAS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

The question involved in this particular appeal as considered by this court
in its first decision was, whether or not the items of costs allowed by the
lower court were proper items to be taxed as costs, under the facts of the
record and the law. In our former decision we held that some of such items were
proper items to be taxed as costs and some were not. We held that under the
provisions of section 492 of Act No. 190, no costs could be allowed except those
specified in that section. The lower court was evidently misled by the Spanish
translation of said section. The English of said section reads: “In an action
pending in a Court of First Instance, the prevailing party may recover the
following costs, ‘and no others;’ ” * * * The Spanish translation of said
section omits the phrase “and no others.” That section has been interpreted
various times and it has been uniformly held that “no other items” of costs
could be allowed by virtue of the clause “and no others,” in that section.
(Mendiola vs. Villa, 15 Phil. Rep., 131; Vargas vs. Ross, 15 Phil. Rep., 665;
Osorio vs. Trias, 16 Phil. Rep., 511.)

An “election protest” is an action in the court of first instance and said
article (492) is applicable in the taxation of costs in such cases. Costs not
permitted by the statute cannot be taxed. (Mendiola vs. Villa, 15 Phil. Rep.,
131.)

Costs are statutory allowances to a party to an action for his expenses
incurred in the action and have reference only to the parties and the amounts
paid by them. The costs are the sums prescribed by law; in the absence of a
statute permitting the taxation of costs, they cannot be allowed. In the absence
of a statutory provision, each party must pay his own costs. In order to compel
one party litigant to pay the costs of the other, some statutory authority
authorizing it must be found. (Hart vs. Skinner, 16 Vt., 138 [42 Am. Dec, 500];
Noyes vs. State, 46 Wis., 250 [32 Am. Rep., 710]; 7 Ruling Case Law, 780;
Northern vs. Hanners, 121 Ala., 587.)

The courts have no inherent power to tax costs. Costs can only be allowed
when the statute permits it. Each party, in the absence of a statute, must pay
his own costs. (Northern vs. Hanners, 121 Ala., 587; Williams vs. Atchinson,
etc., Railway Co., 156 Cal., 140 [134 Am. State Rep., 117]; Two Rivers Mfg. Co
vs. Beyer, 74 Wis., 210.)

All of the questions raised by the motion for a reconsideration were
considered and decided in the former decision except the one, whether or not an
appeal lies against the judgment for costs. In answer to that question, it may
be said that this court has recognized the right to appeal from a judgment for
costs, when the exception were duly and properly made, in a number of cases.
(Mendiola vs. Villa, 15 Phil. Rep., 131; Vargas vs. Ross, 15 Phil. Rep., 665;
Osorio vs. Trias, 16 Phil. Rep., 511.)

Notwithstanding said decisions, the appellee now insists that the right to
appeal in such cases does not exist.

While the authorities are not in exact harmony upon that general question, we
think that they all agree that the right to appeal, from a judgment for costs,
lies, in cases where the law, as in this jurisdiction, fixes the only items of
costs as well as the amount of the same, which can be taxed. In this
jurisdiction the court has no authority or right to tax costs against either
party litigant not allowed by statute. If the court allows items of costs not
permitted by the law, or disallows items of costs which the law permits, it
violates the law, and the right to appeal from said judgment, if exceptions are
properly noted, exists. This, of course, is true only in cases where the right
to appeal is given in a case in which the costs are taxed. If the lower court is
given final jurisdiction and the right to appeal does not exist, then, of
course, a judgment must be final as to every branch of the case, including the.
costs. In the present case, an exception was duly made to the order allowing the
costs, and a bill of exceptions was duly presented. (Empire Co. vs. Bonanza Co.,
67 Cal., 406; Muir vs. Meredith, 82 Cal., 19; Yorba vs. Dobner, 90 Cal., 337;
Crane vs. Forth, 95 Cal., 88; Williams vs. Atchinson, etc., Railway Co., 156
Cal., 140.)

Costs should be taxed as a part of the judgment appealed from. The objection
to the costs as taxed should be presented with the appeal and not left for a
subsequent or separate appeal, so as not to prolong unnecessarily the litigation
and final conclusion of the action.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for a reconsideration is hereby denied.
So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo, Street, and Avanceña,
JJ., concur.

---

CONCURRING OPINION

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

I agree with so much of the decision as relates to the right to an appeal
from a judgment for costs in an election case, Since I did not intervene in the
original decision of this court, concerning the “expenses and costs” which
should be allowed the successful party in election contests, I reserve my
opinion on this question.