RAFAEL C. DE YNCHAUSTI, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, THE GOVERNMENT OP THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF RI…

Early in the year 1912, the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company was
duly authorized by the Director of Public Works, acting on behalf of the
Government of the Philippine Islands and of the Province of Rizal, to construct
an electric railroad track upon the provincial highway running from the city of
Manila to the municipality of Parañaque. The precise location of the track was
designated by that official, who authorized and required the company to
construct its track along the side of the road. The track was completed toward
the end of the year 1912, and thereafter some question appears to have arisen as
to the width of the highway, the plaintiff in this action insisting that the
ancient highway was not as wide by 3 meters as was claimed by the Director of
Public Works; and further, that the railroad company had encroached on his land,
and is now occupying a strip thereof some 200 meters long and 3 meters broad.
The prayer of the complaint is for recovery of possession of this strip of land
and for damages for the alleged unlawful taking and detention, in the sum of
P1,000.

It is not necessary for us to consider any of the contentions of the parties
with regard to the width of the old highway, because for the purposes of this
appeal, it is substantially admitted that at the time when the railroad track
was laid down, the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest was the owner in fee of
the strip of land described in the information, over which the railroad track
was laid, he having had his title thereto duly registered under the provisions
of the Land Registration Act; and because, further, no evidence was submitted
which would sustain an affirmative finding as to the true width of the ancient
highway.

We may limit ourselves, therefore, to a consideration of the respective
rights of the parties, in a case wherein a railroad corporation, empowered by
law to have lands condemned for its use in appropriate expropriation
proceedings, and expressly authorized to lay its track along a public highway,
enters upon and occupies with its tracks lands belonging to private individuals,
without their express consent and without instituting expropriation proceedings,
it appearing that the entry was made in good faith, under the mistaken belief
that these lands were a part of a public highway on which the corporation was
duly authorized to lay its track, and further, it appearing that the owner, or
owners of the land thus taken, made no objection to the entry by the corporation
and the laying of the track until after the work had been completed.

If the railroad corporation were not clothed with any special or exceptional
rights under its charter, touching the condemnation of lands necessary for its
use, it is clear that under the general provisions of law, the plaintiff would
be entitled to elect, either to recover the value of the lands thus taken, or to
recover possession of these lands, upon condition that he first reimburse the
corporation for the expenditures made upon the land while in its possession.
This under the terms of article 361 of the Civil Code, which is as follows:

“The owner of the land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good
faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing, or
planting after the indemnity mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or, to oblige
the person who has built or planted, to pay to him the value of the land and to
force the person who sowed to pay the proper rent.”

But the railroad corporation being clothed with the right to take the land in
question in condemnation proceedings, it would be a manifestly vain and useless
formality to render judgment for the restoration of possession upon payment of
an indemnity to reimburse the railroad corporation for its expenditures on the
land—with the full knowledge that before such judgment could be executed the
railroad corporation could and would take possession of the land in condemnation
proceedings upon payment of compensation for the value of the land and the
improvements made upon it. It is clear, therefore, that with relation to lands
which a railroad corporation is authorized under its charter to have condemned
for its use, and which have been entered upon and occupied by the railroad
corporation, under a claim of right and in good faith, but without first
instituting the appropriate condemnation proceedings, the right of election
secured to the landowner in articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code has, in
substance and effect, been destroyed by the enactment of the legislation
conferring the power upon the railroad corporation to take possession in
condemnation proceedings. The only right secured to the landowner in such cases
is the right to compensation for the lands taken, and resultant damages to his
lands not taken, which right he may enforce in an ordinary action to compel the
corporation to pay the value of the land under the terms of article 361 of the
Code, or, if he so desires, by the institution of appropriate proceedings ta
compel the corporation to have the land condemned and to pay the compensation
and damages assessed in the course of the condemnation proceedings.

Substantially identical results have been secured in the United States by the
application of equitable principles to similar states of fact, as will appear
from the following citation from a few of the leading cases.

“The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public
railroad constructed over it; can not, after the road is completed, or large
expenditures have been made thereon upon the. faith of his apparent
acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In
such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.” (Goodin
vs. Cin. and Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St., 169.)

“One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct
its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it
free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence
in the company’s taking possession and constructing its works under
circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set
up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a
bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action
for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the
construction or operation of the road.” (St. Julien vs. Morgan etc.,
Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann., 924.)

The trial judge denied plaintiff’s prayer for possession, but being of
opinion that he is entitled to recover the value of the land, gave judgment for
an amount equal to its assessed value. From this judgment plaintiff appealed,
and insists upon his right to recover possession of the land occupied by the
railroad corporation and damages for its detention. In the light of what has
been said, it is clear that the trial judge correctly declined to give judgment
for possession; but we think that he erred in entering judgment for the
plaintiff and against the defendant in an amount equal to the assessed value of
the land.

No such relief was sought or prayed for by the plaintiff, and no evidence was
introduced into the record in support thereof. The trial judge appears to have
assumed, without proof, that the assessed value of the land might be taken as
its true market value; and however this may be, it is a fact that there is no
evidence in the record upon which to base a finding as to the true value of the
land, even if a judgment could properly be entered in favor of the plaintiff for
damages the amount of which he did not allege or make any attempt to prove at
the trial.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed
without costs in this instance, and that the complaint in this action praying
for possession and for damages for the alleged unlawful detention of the land in
question, should be dismissed with the costs in first instance against the
plaintiff; but that such dismissal of the complaint in this action should be
without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to institute the appropriate
proceedings to recover the value of the lands actually taken, or to compel the
railroad corporation to take the necessary steps to secure the condemnation of
the land and to pay the amount of the compensation and damages assessed in the
condemnation proceedings.

In view of our dismissal of the complaint in this action, and of what has
been said heretofore as to the rights of the plaintiff in the premises, there is
no need at this time for a pronouncement as to the relative rights and
liabilities of the defendant railroad corporation, and the Government of the
Philippine Islands and the provincial government of Rizal, who were brought into
this action at the instance of the railroad corporation, as codefendants, on the
ground, as it is alleged, that the corporation occupied the land in question by
authority of and under instructions from the duly authorized representative of
those government entities. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Araullo, Street, and Malcolm, JJ.,
concur.

Johnson, J., did not take part.