G.R. No. 115576. August 04, 1994

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS CABANGUNAY. CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, COMM. SAMUEL M. SORIANO, COMM. HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, COM…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions August 4, 1994 EN BANC CRUZ, J.:
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CRUZ, J.:


Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?

These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the
military commissions during the period of martial law. Both were originally condemned to die by
musketry, but their sentence was commuted by the new Constitution to reclusion perpetua.

Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the
case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,[1] where
we held that the military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when
the courts of justice were functioning.

Accordingly, in the case of Cruz v. Ponce Enrile,[2]
this Court directed the Department of Justice to file the corresponding
informations in the civil courts against the petitioners within 180 days from
notice of the decision.

No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and
Cabangunay, but they have remained under detention.

On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and
Paquinto, wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)
complaining that their continued detention violated their rights under Articles
6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.[3]

In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their
communication as admissible and requested the Republic of the Philippines to
submit a written explanation of their complaint within six months from the date
of transmittal.[4]

The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on
Human Rights with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission, through its Chairman Sedfrey A. Ordoñez,
wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the release of the
complainants unless criminal charges had already been filed against them.[5]

On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the
Commission that Abaloc had been released on September 29, 1992, and that
Paquinto and Cabangunay were still detained at the National Penitentiary. There was the intimation that it would not
object to a petition for habeas
corpus
that the Commission might choose to file for Paquinto and
Cabangunay.[6]
This assurance was later confirmed in a letter from the Department dated May
31, 1994.[7]

The present petition for habeas
corpus
was filed with this Court on June 13, 1994. The writ was immediately issued, returnable
on or before June 22, 1994, on which date a hearing was also scheduled.

At the hearing, Chairman Ordoñez argued for the prisoners and
pleaded for their immediate release in view of the failure of the Department of
Justice to file charges against them within the period specified in the Cruz
case. He stressed that their continued
detention despite the nullification of their convictions was a clear violation
of their human rights.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for
the respondent Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling in Tan v.
Barrios,[8]
the Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the
military tribunals that have already become final or to persons who were
already serving their sentence. It
suggested that, under the circumstances, the only recourse of the prisoners was
to reiterate and pursue their applications for executive clemency.

It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the
convictions of Paquinto and Cabangunay by the military commissions was
promulgated. It has been six years
since our decision in the Cruz case directed the Secretary of Justice to file
the appropriate informations against the civilians still detained under
convictions rendered by the military tribunals. The prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity of their
convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.

The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives
for its failure to file the corresponding charges against the two detainees
before the civil courts. It is
unacceptable, of course. It is not the
fault of the prisoners that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot
be the prisoners, who were not the custodian of those records. It is illogical and even absurd to suggest
that because the government cannot prosecute them, the prisoners’ detention
must continue.

The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During the hearing, the Office of the
Solicitor General contended that the prisoners had themselves opted to serve
their sentences rather than undergo another trial. Their ultimate objective, so it was maintained, was to secure
their release by applying for executive clemency. To prove this, counsel submitted a letter from one Atty. Anselmo
B. Mabuti to the Secretary of Justice manifesting that Leonardo B. Paquinto
“chooses to complete the service of his sentence so that the Board of
Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction over his case.”[9] No
mention was made of Jesus Cabangunay.

Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both
Paquinto and Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their counsel and said they
had never seen nor talked to him before. Paquinto denied ever having authorized him to write the letter. Instead, the two prisoners reiterated their
plea to be released on the strength of the Olaguer decision.

The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a re­examination
of the ruling in Cruz v. Enrile[10] in
relation to the case of Tan v. Barrios,[11] is
necessary in view of certain supervening events. These are the failure of the Department of Justice to file the
informations against the prisoners; the decision of the UNHRC declaring
admissible the communication No. 503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay
and thus suggesting the violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the assurance of the
Department of Justice that it would have no objection to the filing of a
petition for habeas corpus by the Commission on behalf of Paquinto and
Cabangunay.

The Court stresses that in its en banc resolution dated
February 26, 1991, it declared, citing the Tan case, that “those civilians
who were convicted by military courts and who have been serving (but not yet
completed) their sentences of imprisonment for the past many years ” . . .
“may be given the option either to complete the service of their
sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction, they should be credited in the service of their
sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they should be set
free.”

Accordingly, it directed “the Department of Justice to
forthwith comply with the directive in the ‘Cruz Cases’ for the
filing of the necessary informations against them in the courts having
jurisdiction over the offenses involved, without prejudice to said petitioners’
exercise of the option granted to them by this Court’s ruling in G.R. Nos.
85481-82, William Tan, et al. v. Hernani T. Barrios, etc., et al.,
supra.”

The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum
after its second motion for extension was denied, in view of the necessity to
decide this petition without further delay.[12] The
memorandum was admitted just the same, but we find it adds nothing to the
respondent’s original arguments.

There is absolutely no question that the prisoners’ plea should
be heeded. The government has failed to
show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by
the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them
because the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who should be made
to suffer. In the eyes of the law,
Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be guilty of any crime for
which they may be validly held. Hence,
they are entitled to be set free.

Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the
governed. Every person is free, save
only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he
affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance
of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself,
which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the
human family. When a person is deprived
of this right, all of us are diminished and debased for liberty is total and
indivisible.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo Paquinto
should not be detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered released IMMEDIATELY.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


[1]
150 SCRA 144.

[2]
160 SCRA 700.

[3]
Rollo, p. 17.

[4]
Rollo, p. 18.

[5]
Annex “B” to the Petition; rollo, p. 11.

[6]
Annex “C” to the Petition; rollo, p. 12.

[7]
Annex “A” to the Memorandum of Petitioners; rollo, p. 86.

[8]
190 SCRA 686.

[9]
Rollo, p. 70.

[10]
Supra.

[11]
Supra.

[12]
Supreme Court, First Division, Resolution, July 20, 1994.