ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, BR. 11, DAVAO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the
Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City,
was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted
murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
informations for murder^[1] and
attempted murder^[2]
were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September
16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known
as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:

SEC. 47. Preventive
Suspension Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for
grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment of the accused. (Underscoring ours).

On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order
for his suspension,^[3]
relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso
v. Sandiganbayan,^[4] and
Layno v. Sandiganbayan.^[5]
In his order dated December 14, 1993^[6]
respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is
terminated. The motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied.^[7]
Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner’s preventive
suspension.

We find the
petition devoid of merit.

There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged
with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely
under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision
limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first
sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be
suspended from office “until the case is terminated”, the second
sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to
continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of
the accused.

Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National
Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:

SEC. 91. The Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of
the Department.,

he is covered by the Civil Service Law,
particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the
Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety
(90) days, thus:

SEC. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending
Administrative Investigation.- When the administrative case against the
officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That
when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.

He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and
would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of
laws. He further asserts that the
requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that “the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated” and the
succeeding sentence, “Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused” are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if
the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension
must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment.

We disagree.

First. The language of
the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning
than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with
grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last
until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each
other. The first refers to the period
of suspension. The second deals with
the time frame within which the trial should be finished.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word
“shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90)
days”, there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within
that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who
fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be
subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts
so warrant, to criminal^[8] or
civil liability.^[9]
If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he
is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the
case. Should the court refuse to
dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus.^[10]

Second. Petitioner
misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A
meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting
of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in
criminal cases, as here. What is more,
Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90)
days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states
that “The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all
personnel of the Department” simply means that the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to
members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and
regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits
the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the
PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the
case is terminated.

Third. Petitioner’s
reliance on Layno and Deloso is
misplaced. These cases all stemmed from
charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the
preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A.
3019 reads as follows:

Suspension and loss of benefits.- Any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information was filed
against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt
Practices Act. He had been suspended
for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive
suspension. We held that his indefinite
preventive suspension violated the “equal protection clause” and
shortened his term of office. Thus:

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor
of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of
office does not expire until 1986. Were
it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan
according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all
this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable
to. It is a basic assumption of the
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are
entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this
instance, criminally. In either case,
his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A preventive
suspension may be justified. Its
continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question. For even if thereafter he
were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been
nullified. Clearly, there would be in
such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There
is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the
man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance
of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in
sheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is
to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension
should be lifted.

3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural
due process that is apparent. There is
likewise an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character
the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation
on the duration thereof: “In all
cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start
of said suspension.” It may be recalled that the principle against
indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia
v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According
to the opinion of Justice Barrera: “To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by
the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended
indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive
suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt
after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the
Civil Service law.” Further: “In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could
be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause
duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated
by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that
petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection
guarantee.^[11]

The case of Deloso, likewise,
involved another elective official who was preventively suspended as provincial
governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case “in relation to the
principles of due process and equal protection.”

It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which
the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was
based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such
that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable
length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is
undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R. A. 6995 which
categorically states that his suspension
shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding
sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous
trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused. As previously emphasized,
nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for
trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the
trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.^[12]

Fourth. From the
deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense
relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A.
6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more
clear. We quote:

So other than that in that particular
section, ano ba itong ‘Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?’ What is this all about?

REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is
administrative, no. Now, if it is
charged with a crime, regular courts.

SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.

REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay.
‘Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member
of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and
one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from the
office until the case is terminated.’

REP.
ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies
ito e. Six years and one day or more.

SEN.
SAGUISAG. Kung five years and
litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . . ?

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary
iyon e.

SEN.
PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 –
Preventive Suspension.

REP.
GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at
may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang
natatakot iyong mga witnesses.

SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.

REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. x x
x

x x x                             x x x

SEN.
PIMENTEL. Dito sa ‘Preventive
Suspension Pending Criminal Case.’ Okay ito but I think we should also mandate
the early termination of the case. Ibig
sabihin, okay, hindi ba ‘the suspension of the accused from office until the
case is terminated?’ Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa
e.

REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.

SEN.
PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin,
let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene pointed out, can run to six years bago ma-terminate,
sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but
maybe we should mandate…

REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.

SEN.
PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case
must be terminated within a period.

REP.
ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme
Court the trial.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?

REP.
ALBANO. The trial must be done within
ninety days,

SEN.
PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung
maaari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be terminated in one year
from the time … aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.

REP.
ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal
case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even if you put it in the
law?

SEN.
PIMENTEL. I know, but,
iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a particular situation.

SEN.
ANGARA. Let’s have continuous hearing
and be terminated not later than ninety days.

REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that’s really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the same
thing.

SEN.
ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten
it up in a case like this. We are
really keen on having it quick, swift.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.

REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.

REP.
ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in
Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the preventive suspension is only
ninety days. In no case shall it go
beyond ninety days which can also be applicable here because this is a
preventive suspension.

SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.

SEN.
SAGUISAG. But then the case may be
anti-graft ha. The case filed against a
policeman may be anti-graft in nature…

SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?

REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because
this particular provision is for criminal cases. I know anti-graft is
a criminal case but here we are talking, let’s say, of murder, rape, treason,
robbery. That’s why it is in that
context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six years and one day or more, so it must be
already a grave felony.

x x x

REP. ALBANO. . . .

What
I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the Veloso case.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that’s too short, that’s what I am
saying. The feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal
case.

What
Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated,
but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language could
be done along that line. So just on the
National Police Commission …

SEN.
ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that
may reflect …

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN MACEDA). Okay, please.

SEN.
ANGARA. ‘Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and be terminated not
later than …’ whatever we agree.

THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let’s
study that.

So
if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission …….^[13]

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place
on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which
suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule
on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the
badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and
armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the
suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or
privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the
equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.^[14]
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications,
such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial
differences;^[15]
is germane to the purpose of the law;^[16]
applies to all members of the same class;^[17] and
applies to current as well as future conditions,^[18] the
classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution’s equal
protection guarantee. A distinction
based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative
purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor
unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J.,
Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano,
Padilla, and Bidin, JJ., on leave.

^[1]
Criminal Case No. 27, 148-92, Rollo,
p. 30.

^[2]
Criminal Case No. 27,147-92, Rollo, p.
29.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 32-33.

^[4]
173 SCRA 409 (1989).

^[5]
136 SCRA 536 (1985).

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 24-26.

^[7]
Id. at pp. 27-28.

^[8]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 207. The
penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in
the administration of justice.

^[9]
CIVIL CODE, Articles 27 and 32 provide:

ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

x x x

(16) The right of
the accused . . . to have a speedy and public trial, … .

^[10]
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Esguerra v. de la Costa, 66
Phil. 134; Kalaw v. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852.

^[11]
See note 5, supra, pp. 541-542.

^[12]
Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 567.

^[13]
Senate and House Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense, May 15,
1990, pp. 1-7.

^[14]
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 824-825.

^[15]
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270, 275 (1978).

^[16]
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).

^[17]
Id., at p. 1176.

^[18]
Id.