G.R. No. 110637. October 07, 1994
RAMON RASE AND ROSITA RASE, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G & M (PHILS.), INC., AND RIYADH MEDICAL CENTER, RESPONDENTS.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The petitioners urge this Court to set aside for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR-CA No. 001585,[1] which
reversed the decision of the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration
(POEA) in POEA Case No. (L) 89-03-241.[2] The
POEA had ordered private respondents G & M (Phils.), Inc. and Riyadh
Medical Center to pay the salary differential and death and burial benefits of Marilyn Rase, an overseas contract worker.
The petitioners are the parents of Marilyn. She was recruited by private respondent G
& M (Phils.), Inc. (hereinafter G & M) and was subsequently deployed to
respondent Riyadh Medical Center in Saudi Arabia. She was to work as a nursing aide with a salary of US$400.00
monthly.[3]
On 2 July 1987, Marilyn left for Saudi Arabia.
On 6 March 1989, Marilyn died of acute viral encephalitis. At the time of her death, Marilyn was not
working with the Riyadh Medical Center but with Sheik Fahad Al Owaidah as a
domestic helper to the Sheik’s fourth wife.
On 20 March 1989, the petitioners filed a complaint before the
POEA for recovery of salary differential, for death and burial benefits, and
for reimbursement of the P50,000.00 which they had spent for the recovery of the
remains of Marilyn and for her burial. The petitioners alleged therein that a few days after she had arrived in
Saudi Arabia, Marilyn was made to work as a domestic helper in violation of the
contract she signed and which was approved by the POEA. In its answer, G & M admitted the
factual allegations except that on Marilyn’s change of employment from nursing
aide to domestic helper and the expenditure of P50,000.00 which it denied for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to its
truth. G & M alleged that Marilyn
had never complained of any contract violation, that her parents never reported
that Marilyn was not working as a nursing aide, and that Marilyn’s death was
not work-connected.[4]
To substantiate their complaint,[5] the
petitioners submitted among other pieces of evidence Marilyn’s letter dated 24
July 1987 wherein she stated:
“Siya nga pala ang bait ng amo naming
lalaki yung may-ari ng buong palasyo binigyan niya ako ng 2.00 riyall para
pangastos malaki-laki rin yon P1,000 na yun kung phil. money. Ang suweldo ko nga pala dito ay 1.50 riyall
kasi umangal ako ang hirap-hirap ng trabaho. Kapag nahirapan ako uli padadagdagan ko ayos ba!!
Ang ‘kapal’ ko ano
kala mo kung sino pero ganon pa man ay wala akong masabi sa dalawa kung amo
mababait sila.”[6]
and the affidavit of Imelda Enciong, a
domestic helper who worked with Marilyn in the household of Al Owaidah. Imelda stated therein that Marilyn had been
working as a domestic helper for not less than one year and six months with a
monthly salary of SR150.00 for the first six months and SR350.00 thereafter
until her death in 1989.[7]
On 29 June 1989, respondent G & M requested
ten days from the said date to file its position paper, after which the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. On 10 July 1989, it
submitted its position paper. However,
on 26 October 1989, it requested that it be allowed
to present additional evidence on or before 27 November 1989.[8] Then on 12 February 1990, it
filed a motion for extension of time to adduce additional evidence, wherein it
admitted that its principal had transmitted to it documents “consisting of
the certification as to the deceased’s cause of death, her contract of
employment as nursing aide and other
documents showing that the foreign principal had shouldered all expenses for
hospitalization and repatriation,” but that it still requested for other
documents to support its defense.[9] It was only on 8 March
1990 when it finally submitted its documentary
exhibits, the most important of which is the alleged acceptance by the Riyadh
Medical Center of Marilyn’s resignation effective 15 August 1987 (Exhibit “4”). The document reads:
“August 18, 1987
Dear Miss Rase,
Your resignation
effective August 15 of this month is accepted. All your salaries during your employment with us have been paid. The hospital is no more liable in your
desire to transfer to any other employer in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Very truly yours,
(sgd) AHMED ABDULRAHMAN ABU-HAIMID
General Manager
With my conformity
(sgd) MARILYN RASE
(typed) MARILYN RASE”[10]
In its decision of 19 February 1991,[11]
POEA Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento
upheld the claims of the petitioners. He defined the issues as follows:
1. Whether or not respondent is liable for
death benefits; and
2. Whether or not respondent is liable for
salary differential.
and resolved them thus:
“Anent the first issue, we find the claim for death benefits
meritorious. The deceased died during
the period of her employment. As such,
there is a presumption that her illness or cause of death arose out of and in
the course of her employment because when the deceased was hired and employed
overseas, she underwent the required pre-employment physical examination and
was declared physically fit. Furthermore, this office is inclined to believe that the conditions of
employment of the deceased, being a domestic helper exposed herself to
deleterious elements which was the cause, if not the direct cause of the death,
which as per medical report by the Riyadh Central Hospital was acute viral
encephalitis. It must be noted that the
deceased worked not as a nurse aide … but as a domestic helper as shown by
the report of the Riyadh Police Station entitled Form for Transfer of Human
Remain….
Moreover, the letter of the deceased to her parents dated July 24,
1987 or twenty-two (22) days upon arrival in Saudi Arabia made mention of her
‘amo’ and their palace and her salary is SR150.00 which established the fact
that the deceased indeed worked as a domestic helper. This piece of evidence renders incredible the alleged resignation
letter of the deceased and the acceptance thereof by the employer (Exh.
“3” & “4”) submitted by respondent G & M on March
8, 1990 to substantiate its defense that the deceased worked as a nursing aide
at Riyadh Medical Center.
…
We also find the claim for salary differential meritorious. As per Affidavit of Imelda Inciong, a
co-worker of the deceased, Marilyn Rase was only being paid SR150/month for the
first six (6) months and thereafter the salary was raised to SR350/month. It must be noted that in a claim for an
underpayment of salary, the burden of proof that the worker has been fully paid
lies on the employer since they have in their possession the documents evidencing
payment. However, respondent failed to
submit any evidence to controvert the said claim. As such, respondent is liable to pay the salary differential of
the deceased computed as follows:
Period of employment — 1 yr. and eight months
Deployed — July 2, 1987
Date of death — March 6, 1989
Salary for the first 6 months — SR150.00/month
Salary as per TEP — US$400.00/month
(A) Salary Differential — for
six months
1 SR =
0.26 US$
SR150 x .26 SR/US$ = US$39.00
US$39/mo. x 6 mos. = US$234.00 — salary received for 6 mos.
US$400/mo. x 6 mos. = US$2,400 — salary as per TEP for 6
mos.
Less: Salary actually
received = US$234
———–
US$2,166 — salary
differential for 6 mos.
(B) Salary
Differential — for the remaining 1 yr. and 2 mos.
Salary after 6 mos. — SR350.00/mo.
SR250 x .26 SR/US$ = US$1,274
— salary received for 1 yr. and 2 mos.
US$400 x 14 mos. = US$5,600 — salary as per TEP for 1 yr. and 2 mos.
Less:
Salary actually
received (for
(1 yr. & 2 mos.) = US$1,274
————-
US$4,326 — salary differential
for 1 yr. and 2 mos.
(C) Total
Salary
Differential — 1 yr. and 8 mos.
US$4,326
— salary
differential for 1 yr. and 2 mos.
US$2,166
— salary
differential for 6 mos.
————-
US$6,492 — TOTAL SALARY DIFFERENTIAL”[12]
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent G & M to
pay the complainant the following or in Philippine Currency at the current
exchange rate at the time of payment:
1. FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) as death
benefits and THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as burial benefits;
2. SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO (US$6,492.00) as salary
differential.
SO ORDERED.”[13]
G & M appealed the decision to the NLRC. In its decision of 30 April 1993,[14]
the NLRC, by a 2-1 vote of its Second Division,[15]
reversed the appealed decision. The
NLRC held:
“We agree with respondent. The complainants have not sufficiently shown, through evidence that
their daughter was forced to seek employment elsewhere upon arrival in
Riyadh. The evidence on record, and
unrebutted at that, shows that about a few days upon her arrival, she resigned
(p. 21, record) from respondent’s principal, the Riyadh Medical Center, to join
her friends at Sheik Fahd [sic] Abdullah Al Owaidah as a domestic helper. Since the deceased worked only for a few
days with respondent’s principal and worked for about one (1) year and four (4)
months with Sheik Fahad Abdullah Al Owaidah and that she violated the POEA
Approved Contract, she is not entitled to the salary differential, death
benefits and burial allowance from respondent. As gesture of help however the respondent is urged to make a grant to
the complainant’s [sic] any amount on a voluntary and ex gratia basis.”[16]
Hence, this special civil action. The petitioners allege that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the decision of the POEA Administrator by totally
disregarding the latter’s findings that (a) Marilyn Rase’s death was work-connected;
(b) there was in fact underpayment of salaries; and (c) the award for death and
burial benefits was proper.
In their separate Comments, respondent G & M and public
respondent NLRC (represented by the Office of the Solicitor General) maintain
otherwise and pray for the dismissal of the petition. After due deliberation on the allegations, issues, and arguments
of the parties in their initiatory pleadings, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition.
There is merit on the issue of salary differential. The disagreement thereon between the POEA
and the NLRC revolves upon a question of fact. The former gave full faith and credit to the 24 July 1987 letter of
Marilyn and the affidavit of Imelda Enciong to prove the fact that Marilyn was
made to work as a domestic helper upon her arrival in Riyadh with a salary of SR150.00 for the first six months and SR350.00 a month
thereafter until she died. On the other
hand, the latter agreed with private respondent G & M that, as evidenced by
the letter of the Riyadh Medical Center of 18 August 1987 (Exhibit “4”), Marilyn voluntarily resigned as a nursing
aide in the said Center effective 15 August 1987 and concluded that the
petitioners herein “have not sufficiently shown, through evidence
that their daughter was forced to seek employment elsewhere upon arrival in
Riyadh.”
Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in overruling the
POEA? The resolution depends on whether
the decision of the POEA is in fact supported by substantial evidence.
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases
filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA) a fact may
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. In Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. Factoran,[17]
this Court stated:
“it is sufficient
that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively
stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported
by evidence. Substantial evidence is
all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and
substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 762
[1984]).”
The POEA is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and
evidence. Under its Rules and
Regulations in force at the time the petitioners filed their complaint (1989),
adjudication proceedings before it were summary in nature and judgment may be
rendered on the basis of position papers and memoranda. Thus Sections 4 to 8, Rule III, Book VI
thereof provided as follows:
“Section 4. Summary
Judgment. — If on the basis of the
pleadings/evidence on record, the Hearing Officer finds that there is
sufficient ground to render judgment, he shall consider the case submitted for
decision.
Section 5. Judgment Based
on Position Paper. — Whenever summary
judgment is not appropriate, the Hearing Officer shall direct the parties to
the case to simultaneously submit their position papers and/or memoranda within
fifteen (15) calendar days from notice after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision.
Section 6. Investigation
Procedure. — Where the Hearing Officer
finds that there are complicated factual issues involved which cannot be
resolved through position papers and/or memoranda, he shall conduct
investigation by requiring the parties to submit affidavits. He may, if necessary, direct the parties to
appear before him to answer clarificatory questions. For this purpose, he may allow the parties to submit suggested
written clarificatory questions which he may propound to the parties concerned.
Section 7. Resolution of
the Case. — The Hearing Officer after
evaluation of the evidences submitted by the parties, shall submit his
recommendation together with the records of the case to the Director, WAAO; who
shall in turn submit his recommendation to the Administrator for appropriate
action.
Section 8. Service of
Order/Decision. — Once the
order/decision is issued by the Administration, a copy of it shall be served
upon the parties. The order/decision
shall become final after the lapse of ten (10) calendar days from receipt of a
copy thereof if no motion for reconsideration/appeal is perfected.”
Rule III, Book VII of the 1991 Rules and Regulations of the POEA
has substantially reproduced the aforesaid Sections 4, 5, and 6; specified the
scope of position papers; and explicitly declared that such proceedings are
non-litigious in nature and that the technicalities of law and procedure and
the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not apply thereto. Thus:
“Section 4. Judgment
Based on Position Paper. — When the
parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement and summary judgment is not
appropriate, the Hearing Officer shall direct the parties to the case to submit
their verified position papers and/or memoranda within fifteen (15) calendar
days from notice.
The verified position papers shall cover only those claims and
causes of action raised in the complaint, excluding those which may have been
amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by supporting documents. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed
to allege facts or present evidence to prove facts not referred to and any
cause/s of action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits
and other documents.
x x x
Section 6. Nature of Proceedings. — The proceedings before the Hearing
Officer shall be non-litigious in nature, subject to the requirements of due
process. The technicalities of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law shall not strictly apply
thereto.
The Hearing Officer may avail himself of all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of the case, including ocular inspection, where
appropriate, and examination of informed persons.”
In other words, the POEA is not, among
other things, strictly bound by the technical rules of evidence.
In the instant case, the POEA resolved the petitioners’ complaint
on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted by the parties which,
insofar as the petitioners are concerned, included the assailed letter of
Marilyn and the affidavit of Imelda Enciong. The procedure it adopted strictly conformed with its Rules and
Regulations. Thus, it was not necessary
for the affiants to appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel
for the adverse party. To require otherwise
would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
administrative proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the
application of the technical rules of evidence. The challenge then against the use of affidavits without the
presentation of the affiants for cross-examination is futile. In Rabago vs. National Labor Relations
Commission,[18]
which also involved a challenge on a similar proceeding, this Court stated
that:
“The argument that
the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for
cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not
strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC,
where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.”
Confronted with the affidavit of Enciong and aware of the Rules
and Regulations of the POEA on the submission of a case for decision on the
basis of position papers and affidavits, private respondent G & M should
have submitted a counter-affidavit, instead of merely objecting to Enciong’s
affidavit on the ground that it was hearsay (unless Enciong was presented to be
cross-examined). More than anything
else, G & M should not be heard to demand strict compliance with the strict
rules of evidence applicable in the courts of justice when at the same time it
submitted its evidence in consonance with the Rules and Regulations of the
POEA. If the rules on evidence were to
be strictly construed, then its Exhibits “1,” “2,”
“3,” and “4,” and more specifically the last, which is the
letter of the General Manager of the Riyadh Medical Center allegedly accepting
the resignation of Marilyn effective 15 August 1987, should also be rejected
for being hearsay. Yet, it insists that
it be given unquestioned faith and credit. This obvious duplicity is condemnable and merits no reward.
Regarding the salary differential, the Court finds the evaluation
of the evidence by the POEA to be more logical and persuasive than that of the
NLRC. The latter’s conclusion that the
petitioners failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn “was forced to seek
employment elsewhere upon arrival in Riyadh” and that, on the contrary,
the “evidence on record, and unrebutted at that, shows that about a few days upon her arrival she resigned
… from respondent’s principal, the Riyadh Medical Center, to join her friends
at Sheik Fahd Abdullah Al Owaidah as a domestic helper,” is
unacceptable. Firstly, there is
absolutely no evidence that she joined her friends as a domestic helper. Secondly, as correctly observed by the POEA,
Marilyn’s alleged resignation from the Riyadh Medical Center effective 15
August 1987 is incredible since in her letter of 24 July 1987, she already
informed her parents that she was a domestic helper,[19]
a fact corroborated by Imelda Enciong. Thirdly, it would have been foolish for Marilyn to voluntarily abandon
her contract as a nursing aide with a monthly salary of US$400.00 in favor of a
contract as a domestic helper at a salary of only SR150.00. The exchange rate then per the challenged
decision of the POEA was 1 SR =
0.26 US$.[20]
A person is presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns.[21]
It would have been contrary to the ordinary habits of men and of reason for
one, like Marilyn, who goes to a foreign country to earn a few dollars at great
personal sacrifice (and even at the risk of honor, life, and limb in view of
the reported rape and maltreatment of Filipina domestic helpers in the Middle
East) and to save every cent of it for a hungry family back home, to
voluntarily incur considerable loss of income.
Moreover, there was an attempt to mislead the POEA that Exhibit
“4” is the resignation letter of Marilyn. It is in fact the letter of the general manager of the Riyadh
Medical Center purporting to inform Marilyn of the acceptance of her
resignation. No letter of resignation
was presented and this Court finds the alleged “conformity” of
Marilyn appearing at the lower left corner thereof to be rather dubious. An acceptance of a resignation does not
require the conformity of the resigning employee. Such entry only indicates that Marilyn was forced to resign, for
which reason her “conformity” was obtained to make it appear as
voluntary or legal. Finally, the Rules
and Regulations of the POEA imposes upon an overseas contract worker the
obligation to abide by the terms and conditions of his employment contract, to
behave in the best manner and tradition of a Filipino, and to observe and
respect the laws, customs, morals, traditions, and practices of the country
where he is working.[22]
Compliance therewith by Marilyn must be presumed and any claim to the contrary
must be proved by satisfactory evidence. None was presented by respondent G & M.
There is strong reason to believe that Marilyn was forced to
accept the job of a domestic helper. Our overseas workers are mostly ordinary laborers not conversant with
legal niceties and with the manner they can assert and protect their
rights. In foreign lands, they have no
compatriot-lawyers to seek advice from and no labor unions to support
them. Some of them have complained that
even the staffs of Philippine embassies and consulates are indifferent to their
plight. Denied the protection they
need, they are easy prey to exploitation by foreign employers, who are usually
able to get away with their abuses because they are in their own territory.[23]
The tribute paid by government leaders to Philippine overseas workers as the country’s modern heroes and
heroines would only be a hollow gesture if the government cannot provide them
with adequate protection against exploitation and abuse.
As to the claim for death benefits, we are constrained to deny
the same.
Encephalitis is the inflammation of the brain and its coverings
(the meninges)[24]
which produce disturbances of sensorium, seizures,[25]
drowsiness, delirium, and, rarely, coma. There are several different forms of encephalitis, a few of which are
occasionally epidemic.
The epidemic forms are caused by a virus transmitted to man by
the bite of mosquitoes and ticks (arboviruses encephalitides). The condition can also occur as a rare
complication of some other viral diseases, such as herpes-viruses and
accompanying exanthematous diseases of childhood, such as measles and
varicella.[26]
Occasionally, it may be produced by contact with a toxic substance, such as
lead.[27]
In other words, acute viral encephalitis may be due to a number of causes, or
even due to a complication of other illnesses. The virus has an incubation period from as short as three to four days
to as long as twenty years.
In a letter addressed to Marilyn’s parents, it was revealed that
her illness started as a severe headache. Prior to her confinement at the hospital, she had hallucinations and
would fail to recognize the people around her. She also became violent, which prompted her employer to have her
admitted to a hospital. While confined,
her condition deteriorated until she died.[28]
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the symptoms leading to
encephalitis are manifest. Viral
encephalitis is debilitating and is also known as a sleeping sickness. There are no specific drugs for this
condition. Treatment and nursing care
are aimed at relief of the symptoms and prevention of complications.[29]
The POEA Administrator attributed the cause of Marilyn’s death to
the deleterious elements to which she had been exposed. Indeed, there is a possibility that she
acquired viral encephalitis at her work environment. Unfortunately, there is not
enough evidence to even make a reasonable presumption that her work environment
caused her to contract encephalitis. Even her letters are devoid of any hint that as a domestic helper she
was exposed to any unhealthy or injurious conditions. Hence, we do not agree with the POEA Administrator that the claim
for death benefits should be allowed. Consequently the claim for burial allowance should likewise be denied.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administrator in POEA
Case No. (L) 89-03-241 is REINSTATED; however, the award of death benefits and
burial allowance is SET ASIDE.
Costs against
private respondent G & M (Phils.), Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, 13-22.
[2]
Id., 57-62.
[3]
Original Records (OR), 7.
[4]
Id., 86.
[5]
Id., 72.
[6]
OR, 106; Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo, 11. Reading the context of the letter, the
writer must have meant, SR200.00 instead of SR2.00 and SR150.00 instead of
SR1.50.
[7]
Rollo, 64-65.
[8]
Id., 66-67.
[9]
Annex “E” of G & M’s Comment; Id., 68-69.
[10]
Rollo, 42.
[11]
Id., 56-62.
[12]
Rollo, 59-62.
[13]
Id., 62.
[14]
Annex “C” of Petition; Id.,
13-23.
[15]
Per Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, with the concurrence of Commissioner
Rogelio I. Rayala. Presiding
Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez dissented.
[16]
Rollo, 22.
[17]
154 SCRA 49, 54 [1987]. See also Manalo vs.
Roldan-Confesor, 215 SCRA 808 [1992], and on a motion for reconsideration, 220
SCRA 606 [1993].
[18]
200 SCRA 158, 164-165 [1991].
[19]
She told them of her “amo” and of the latter’s palace.
[20]
Rollo, 61.
[21]
Section 3(d), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[22]
Section 1, Rule III, Book VII, 1985 Rules and Regulations; Section 1,
Rule VI, Book VIII, 1991 Rules and Regulations.
[23]
Cuadra vs. NLRC, 207 SCRA 279 [1992].
[24]
Dorland’s Medical Dictionary, 24th Ed. [1965], 483.
[25]
Medical Diagnosis and Treatment, 33rd Int’l Ed. [1994], 1059.
[26]
Id., 1113.
[27]
Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, [1972],
315.
[28]
OR, 17-22.
[29]
Supra note 27.