DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO AND ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, PETITIONERS,VS. HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 62, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-C…

On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of
the State to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law, which can be
regulated, and the innate value of human liberty, which can hardly be weighed.

Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem
when former Senator Jovito R. Salonga invoked before this Court his “right
to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima
facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information
for subversion against him.”^[1] We
resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is now back before us, this time as counsel pleading the cause of
petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far worse than his
predicament twelve (12) years ago. He
postulates that no probable cause likewise exists in this case, and what is
worse is that no bail is
recommended.

This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and
implication of probable cause, the existence of which is necessary for the
prosecutor to have an accused held for trial and for a trial judge to issue a
warrant for his arrest. It is mandatory
therefore that there be probable cause before an information is filed and a
warrant of arrest issued. Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal case is filed, a warrant of
arrest issued and a person consequently incarcerated on unsubstantiated
allegations that only feign probable cause.

Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni
of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law
Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged
extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the
heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.

The focal source of the information against petitioners is the
sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a
dischargee of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the brains
behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a
German national.^[2]
In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were
met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the former
undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an international warrant of
arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June
1992, after placing him under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal,
Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio
Antonino abducted Van Twest. They
blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the Alabang overpass and forced him
into their car. They brought him to a
“safe house” just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their
quarry. After four (4) days, Gamatero,
Santiago and Antonino returned to the “safe house” together with
petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as “Batok.” SPO2
Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and then
made him sign certain documents. The
following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite, after
which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later
burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date when
the incident happened, but he was certain it was about a year ago.

A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the
operatives of the PACC, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A.
Barrios of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Br. 11,^[3]
separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7
Sangley Street, and the other, along Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights
Subdivision, Parañaque. The raiders
recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and
placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day were Antonino
and Bato who were found to have in their possession several firearms and
ammunition and Van Twest’s Cartier sunglasses.

After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC
operatives, Sr. Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat,
referred the case to the Department of Justice for the institution of criminal
proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino, SPO2
Roger Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners
herein, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with
murder, and usurpation of authority.^[4] In
his letter to the State Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson
charged that –

Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado Law Offices x x x planned and conspired with other suspects to abduct and kill the German national Alexander
Van Twest in order to eliminate him after forcing the victim to sign several
documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several
million pesos and caused the withdrawal of P5M deposit from the victim’s bank
account.

Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued
a subpoena to petitioners informing them that a complaint was filed against
them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on 30 September 1993 at the
Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of Justice and to submit their
counter-affidavits. Attached to the
subpoena were copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal and members of the
team who raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago.^[5]

Not satisfied merely with
the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the
production of other documents for examination and copying to enable him to
fully prepare for his defense and to submit an intelligible counter-affidavit.^[6] Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was
interested in (a) the “several documents transferring ownership of several
properties amounting to several million pesos and the withdrawal of P5M
deposits from the victim’s bank account,” as stated in the complaint; (b) the
complete records of the PACC’s investigation, including investigations on other
suspects and their disposition, PACC’s Order of Battle for 1992 and early 1993;
and, (c) such other written statements issued in the above-entitled case, and
all other documents intended to be used in this case.^[7] Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition
of the members of the panel of prosecutors, which was created to conduct the
preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were members of the legal
staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with impartiality.                   

In its Order of 11
October 1993,^[8] the new panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez as Chairman, with Rogelio
F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as Members, confirmed that the motion for
inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the appeal to the
Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993 resulting in the creation of a new panel. Thereafter, the new panel granted the prayer
of petitioner Mendoza for the production of additional documents used or
intended to be used against him. Meanwhile, Task Force Habagat, in compliance with the order, submitted
only copies of the request for verification of the firearms seized from the
accused, the result of the request for verification, and a Philippine Times Journal article on the case with a marginal
note of President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to the Chief of the Philippine
National Police directing the submission of a report and summary of actions
taken thereon.

Not having been provided with the requested documents,
petitioners nevertheless submitted their respective counter-affidavits denying
the accusations against them.^[9]

After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally
propounded, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. But before the new panel could resolve the
case, SPO2 Bato filed a manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the
earlier waiver of his right to file counter-affidavit,^[10]
and “in the greater interest
of truth, justice and fair play” moved for the admission of his
counter-affidavit^[11]
confessing participation in the abduction and slaying of Van Twest and
implicating petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however, before petitioners could refute Bato’s
counter-affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground that it was extracted
through intimidation and duress.

On 3 February 1994, with
the new panel failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners
heard over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against
them and that an information had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the Department of
Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet
ready for release, but later that afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the information for kidnapping with murder against them^[12] and the 15-page undated resolution under the
letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the
PACC Task Force recommending approval thereof.^[13] That same day, the information was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided
by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.

On 4 February 1994,
respondent judge, in response to petitioners’ request, gave them until 8
February 1994 to submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against all the accused.^[14] On 7 February 1994, petitioners complied
with the order of respondent judge.^[15] The following day, 8 February 1994,
petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review
and reversal of the undated resolution of the panel of prosecutors,^[16] which appeal was adopted by petitioner
Mendoza.^[17] On 11 February 1994, petitioner
Allado moved to defer the
proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of his appeal before the
Secretary of Justice.^[18] However, on even date, respondent judge
issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners.^[19] Hence, on 15 February 1994, petitioners
filed with us the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order.

On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the
petition and set the case for hearing on 28 February 1994. After the hearing, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and
respondent judge from conducting further proceedings on the case and, instead,
to elevate the records to us. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994, petitioners voluntarily surrendered at
the Headquarters of the Capital Command (CAPCOM), Philippine National Police
(PNP), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and on 29 February 1994, they
were released on the basis of our temporary restraining order.

Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes,
principally contend that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
and in excess of jurisdiction in “whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining
the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even stating
the basis of his findings,”^[20] and in “relying on the Resolution of
the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the
certification is flawed.”^[21] Petitioners maintain that the records of the
preliminary investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to
establish probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise
assail the prosecutors’ “clear sign of bias and impartiality (sic).”^[22]

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues
that the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge who is
merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the
accused probably committed the crime charged.

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the
requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest
shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.

As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,^[23]
this Court speaking through Associate Justice Sherman Moreland defined probable
cause as “the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted.” This definition is still relevant today as we continue to
cite it in recent cases.^[24]
Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.^[25] And
as a protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of
facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the
belief that he has lawful grounds for arresting the accused.^[26]

Pilapil v.
Sandiganbayan^[27] sets a standard for determining the
existence of probable cause. While it
appears in that case that we have granted the prosecutor and the trial judge
seemingly unlimited latitude in determining the existence or absence of
probable cause by affirming the long-standing procedure that they can base
their findings merely on their personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet,
this permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and
letting them loose in the determination of the existence of probable cause, a
delicate legal question which can result in the harassment and deprivation of
liberty of the person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said –

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter
is, or may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe,
or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual and
positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and
whether the same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can
only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the case has
already proceeded on sufficient proof.^[28]

Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof
that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty thereof. In the Order of
respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is expressly stated that
“[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes
and rules that probable cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should
be issued.” However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at
such ruling. We have painstakingly
examined the records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of
reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding
of probable cause against petitioners.

The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the
sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation
in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest’s reported death
since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his
remains been recovered. Umbal claims
that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and
rubber tires from around ten o’clock in the evening to six o’clock the next
morning.^[29]
This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the
use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse
is subjected to intense heat.^[30]
Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground
to dust.

In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that
earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of
the alleged cremation.^[31]
Could it be that the government investigators did go to the place of cremation
but could not find any? Or could it be
that they did not go at all because they knew that there would not be any as no
burning ever took place? To allege then
that the body of Van Twest was completely burned to ashes in an open field with
the use merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.

Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest’s reported abduction
on 16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel
continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in
his behalf a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
106253, and on 18 March 1993, a memorandum before the Securities and Exchange
Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On 26
November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of
prosecutors, counsel again manifested that “even then and even as of this
time, I stated in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of death is to be
established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to pursue my duties and
responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van Twest.”^[32]
Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest
doubted the latter’s death.^[33]
Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already
dead otherwise his obligation to his client would have ceased except to comply
with his duty “to inform the court promptly of such death x x x and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representative,”^[34] which
he did not.

Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners’ theory
that the supposed death of Van Twest who is reportedly an international
fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and never refuted by
PACC, is a likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In this regard, we are reminded of the
leading case of U.S. v. Samarin^[35] decided ninety-two years ago where
this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not
found, and there is but one, witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.

Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material
inconsistencies. In his sworn
statement, he said that he together with his cohorts was met by petitioners in
Silahis Hotel where they hatched the plan to abduct Van Twest.^[36]
However, during the preliminary investigation, he stated that he was not part
of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his companions
who supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel.^[37]

Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted
a mock interrogation of Van Twest who thereafter signed various documents upon
being compelled to do so.^[38]
During the clarificatory questioning, however, Umbal changed his story and said
that he was asked to go outside of the “safe house” at the time Van
Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed certain
documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out
of the “safe house,” no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the non-existence of these
documents be the reason why PACC was not able to comply with the order of the
prosecutors to produce them during the preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to the P2.5M that
was supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van
Twest? These and more remain
unanswered.

Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was
supposedly triggered off by Umbal’s confession of 16 September 1993, the
application of the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served in the two
(2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila on 15 September 1993, a day
before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In support of the application, the PACC agents claimed that Umbal had
been in their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly, although he was said to be already under their custody,
Umbal claims he was never interrogated until 16 September 1993 and only at the
security barracks of Valle Verde V, Pasig, where he was a security guard.^[39]

The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of
prosecutors also considered in filing the charges against petitioners, can
hardly be credited as its probative value has tremendously waned. The records show that the alleged
counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating, was filed after the panel had
considered the case submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this counter-affidavit, Bato moved
to suppress the same on the ground that it was extracted through duress and
intimidation.

For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the
State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify
sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who
applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated
petitioners. In fact they claimed that
according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the
whole affair.^[40]
While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners’ co-accused, i.e.,
referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the
least prove petitioners’ complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted
there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate
petitioners. For them to stand trial
and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately
exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest – facts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are
guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.

Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not
personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his
witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors
that probable cause existed. For,
otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was
utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate the procedure we
outlined in various cases we have already decided.

In Soliven v. Makasiar,^[41] we said that the judge (a) shall
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on
the existence of probable cause.

In People v. Inting,^[42] we emphasized the important features
of the constitutional mandate: (a) The
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the
provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The
preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination
of probable cause. The judge does not
have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material
in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges
and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should
be held for trial or released. Even if
the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding,
there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by
the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is a
function of the prosecutor.

In Lim v. Felix,^[43] where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said –

[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be a
report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and
its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory
or exhaustive the Judge’s examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To
be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer
the court’s probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.

Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing
that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his
action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the
test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be
“secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects” only in the fallible
discretion of the judge.^[44] On
the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that
there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would
warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is
guilty of the crime which has just been committed.^[45]
This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge,
after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that
no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the witnesses
themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him
to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.

But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors
have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners
were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with facts and
circumstances in support of that
belief; for mere belief is not enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to
demonstrate the existence of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer “is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor
– indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”^[46]

In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the
information and the inordinate interest of the government cannot be
ignored. From the gathering of evidence
until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the
state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for
the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal’s sworn statement is laden with
inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato’s counter-affidavit was considered without giving petitioners the
opportunity to refute the same. The
PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a hand in the
determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated
resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was also
recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in
securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them.

Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and
sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the future reform and be
productive members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of judges
and the prudence of prosecutors. And,
whether it is a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains
if the respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the
trial judge which determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline
is that there is a standard in the determination of the existence of probable
cause, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is
guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Judges and prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather
engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence.

In this instance, Salonga v. Paño^[47]
finds application –

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect
him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71
Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process (see People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in order to satisfy the due
process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted
in the sense of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with
impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only for the purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a part
of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live
in the country. It is therefore
imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the
accused from the pain of going thru a trial once it is ascertained that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused (underscoring supplied).

The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase
the seeming immensity of government power which when unchecked becomes
tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond which
lie unsanctioned state actions. But on
occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. In consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily
suffers. The case before us, if
uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government agents is not
reflective of responsible government. Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason of their high and
prestigious office, relieved of the
common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary injury.

The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and
its people from vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice;
hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the
law. This is essential for its self?preservation,
nay, its very existence. But this does
not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and disregard the
rights of its citizens under the Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to pay for
reckless and impulsive prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in this case the “multifactor balancing
test” which requires the officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the
interference on the right of the people, the gravity of the crime committed and
the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see probable cause to
order the detention of petitioners.^[48]

The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people
against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the
preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security
against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the
hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights
takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed
against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the
purported enforcement of criminal law
where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of justice, to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.^[49]

Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if
petitioners were ordinary people submissive to the dictates of government. They would have been illegally arrested and
detained without bail. Then we would
not have the opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of injustice are lawyers who are
vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom not otherwise
available to those who cower in fear and subjection.

Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and
other government agents tasked with the enforcement of the law that in the
performance of their duties they must act with circumspection, lest their
thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their office and
maim their countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution government agents,
particularly the law enforcers, to be more prudent in the prosecution of cases
and not to be oblivious of human rights protected by the fundamental law. While we greatly applaud their determined
efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous eagerness violate
constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a civilized
community.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we
issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado
and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is made
permanent. The warrant of arrest
issued against them is SET ASIDE and
respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED
from proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No.
94-1757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Salonga v. Paño, G.R. No. 59524, 18 February 1985, 134
SCRA 438, 443.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 52-54.

^[3]
Id., pp. 55-56.

^[4]
Id., pp. 40-42.

^[5]
Id., pp. 43-45.

^[6]
Id., pp. 60-63.

^[7]
Motion for Production of Documents,
alternatively, for Subpoena Duces Tecum, pp. 3-4.

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 64-65.

^[9]
Id., pp. 69-88; 166-181.

^[10]
Id., pp. 252-253.

^[11]
Id., pp. 254-261.

^[12]
Id., pp. 292-296.

^[13]
Id., pp. 276-291.

^[14] Id., pp. 297-299.

^[15]
Id., pp. 300-322.

^[16]
Id., pp. 323-325.

^[17]
Ibid.

^[18]
Id., pp. 326-330.

^[19]
Rollo, p. 333.

^[20]
Petition for Certiorari, p. 22; Rollo, p. 23.

^[21]
Ibid.

^[22]
Ibid.

^[23]
32 Phil. 363 (1915).

^[24]
Que v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 66865, 13 January 1989, 169 SCRA 1989; Ponce v. Legaspi, G.R.
No. 79184, 6 May 1992, 208 SCRA 377; and Albenson v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No.
88694, 11 January 1993, 217 SCRA 16.

^[25]
See Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. A Commentary. Vol. 1, First Ed., 1987, pp. 86-87.

^[26]
34 Words and Phrases 15, citing Mudge
v. State, 45 N.Y.S. 2d
296, 901.

^[27]
G.R. No. 101978, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 349.

^[28]
Id., pp. 360-361.

^[29]
TSN of the Preliminary Investigation conducted by the State Prosecutors, 26
November 1993, pp. 34-35; Rollo, pp. 218- 219.

^[30]
See Abbey Land v. County of
San Mateo, 167 Cal
434, 139 P 1068.

^[31]
TSN of the Hearing before the First Division, Supreme Court, 28 February 1994,
pp. 21-23.

^[32]
Rollo, pp. 189-190.

^[33]
TSN of the Hearing before the First Division, Supreme Court, 28 February 1994,
p. 18.

^[34]
Sec. 16, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of Court.

^[35]
1 Phil. 239 (1902).

^[36]
Sworn Statement of Escolastico Umbal, p. 1; Rollo, p. 52.

^[37]
TSN of Preliminary Investigation conducted by State Prosecutors, 26 November 1993, pp. 38-39; Rollo, pp. 222-223.

^[38]
Sworn Statement of Escolastico Umbal, p. 2; Rollo, p. 53.

^[39]
TSN of Preliminary Investigation conducted by State Prosecutors, 26 November
1993, pp. 48-49; Rollo, pp. 232-233.

^[40]
TSN of the Proceedings for the application of search warrant before Judge
Roberto Barrios, 15 September 1993, pp. 16, 21; Rollo, pp. 104, 109.

^[41]
G.R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393.

^[42]
G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 187 SCRA
788.

^[43]
G.R. Nos. 92466-69, 19 February 1991,
187 SCRA 292.

^[44]
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d. 142 (1964).

^[45]
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d. 889 (1968).

^[46]
Suarez v. Judge Platon, 69 Phil. 556, 564-565 (1940), citing Mr. Justice
Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States.

^[47]
See Note 1.

^[48]
See Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
227, 243-56 (1984); Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. Mich J.
L. Ref. 465, 501-06 (1984).

^[49]
Hernandez v. Albano, No. L-19272, 25 January 1967, 19 SCRA 95.