G.R. No. 113375. May 05, 1994
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN,…
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the “Contract
of Lease” executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and
the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the
on-line lottery system, also known as “lotto.”
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is
a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors,
priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth,
justice, and national renewal. The rest
of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and
Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the
Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative
Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers
and concerned citizens of the Philippines.
The pleadings of the parties disclose the factual antecedents
which triggered off the filing of this petition.
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169,
as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct
“charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,”
the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning
that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the
Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational company and one of the ten largest
public companies in Malaysia,” long “engaged in, among others,
successful lottery operations in Asia, running both Lotto and Digit games, thru
its subsidiary, Sports Toto Malaysia,” with its “affiliate, the
International Totalizator Systems, Inc., … an American public company engaged
in the international sale or provision of computer systems, softwares,
terminals, training and other technical services to the gaming industry,”
“became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As
an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees)
organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation
known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was
intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services
required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”[1]
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the
PCSO.[2]
Relevant provisions of the RFP are the following:
“1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
x x x
1.2. PCSO is seeking
a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities
(‘Facilities’) needed to operate and maintain a nationwide on-line lottery
system. PCSO shall lease the Facilities
for a fixed percentage of quarterly gross receipts. All receipts from ticket sales shall be turned over directly to
PCSO. All capital, operating expenses
and expansion expenses and risks shall be for the exclusive account of the
Lessor.
x x x
1.4. The lease shall be for a period not exceeding fifteen (15)
years.
1.5. The Lessor is
expected to submit a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan
(‘Development Plan’) which will include the game, the marketing of the games,
and the logistics to introduce the games to all the cities and municipalities
of the country within five (5) years.
x x x
1.7. The Lessor
shall he selected based on its technical expertise, hardware and software
capability, maintenance support, and financial resources. The Development Plan shall have a
substantial bearing on the choice of the Lessor. The Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least sixty
percent (60%) of its shares owned by Filipino shareholders. x x x
The Office of the
President, the National Disaster Control Coordinating Council, the Philippine
National Police, and the National Bureau of Investigation shall be authorized
to use the nationwide telecommunications system of the Facilities Free of
Charge.
1.8. Upon expiration of the lease, the Facilities
shall be owned by PCSO without any additional consideration.[3]
x x x
2.2. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of PCSO
in leasing the Facilities from a private entity are as follows:
x x x
2.2.2. Enable PCSO to operate a nationwide on-line
lottery system at no expense or risk to the government.
x x x
2.4. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE LESSOR
x x x
2.4.2. THE LESSOR
The Proponent is
expected to furnish and maintain the Facilities, including the personnel needed
to operate the computers, the communications network and sales offices under a
build-lease basis. The printing of
tickets shall be undertaken under the supervision and control of PCSO. The Facilities shall enable PCSO to
computerize the entire gaming system.
The Proponent is
expected to formulate and design consumer-oriented Master Games Plan suited to
the marketplace, especially geared to Filipino gaming habits and
preferences. In addition, the Master
Games Plan is expected to include a Product Plan for each game and explain how
each will be introduced into the market. This will be an integral part of the Development Plan which PCSO will
require from the Proponent.
x x x
The Proponent is
expected to provide upgrades to modernize the entire gaming system over the
life of the lease contract.
The Proponent is
expected to provide technology transfer to PCSO technical personnel.[4]
x x x
7. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR
PROPONENTS
x x x
Finally, the Proponent
must be able to stand the acid test of proving that it is an entity able to
take on the role of responsible maintainer of the on-line lottery system, and
able to achieve PCSO’s goal of formalizing an on-line lottery system to achieve
its mandated objective.[5]
x x x
16. DEFINITION OF
TERMS
Facilities: All
capital equipment, computers, terminals, software, nationwide telecommunication
network, ticket sales offices, furnishings, and fixtures; printing costs; cost
of salaries and wages; advertising and promotion expenses; maintenance costs;
expansion and replacement costs; security and insurance, and all other related
expenses needed to operate nationwide on-line lottery system.”[6]
Considering the above citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims
that the Berjaya Group “undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to
40%,” by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to
local investors.
On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO.[7]
The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was
thereafter submitted to the Office of the President.[8]
The submission was preceded by complaints by the Committee’s Chairperson, Dr.
Mita Pardo de Tavera.[9]
On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it
had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line
lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be
submitted not later than 8 November 1993 “for final clearance and approval
by the Chief Executive.”[10]
This announcement was published in the Manila Standard, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, and the Manila Times on 29 October 1993.[11]
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President
Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system
on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations.[12]
At the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the
Senate on 12 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to
the on-line lottery on account of its immorality and illegality.[13]
On 19 November 1993, the media reported that despite the
opposition, “Malacañang will push through with the operation of an on-line
lottery system nationwide and that it is actually the respondent PCSO which
will operate the lottery while the winning corporate bidders are merely
“lessors.”[14]
On 1 December 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents
pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. In his answer of 17 December 1993,
the Executive Secretary informed KILOSBAYAN that the requested documents would
be duly transmitted before the end of the month.[15] However, on that same date, an agreement
denominated as “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by respondent
PCSO and respondent PGMC.[16]
The President, per the press statement issued by the Office of the President,
approved it on 20 December 1993.[17]
In view of their materiality and relevance, we quote the
following salient provisions of the Contract of Lease:
“1. DEFINITIONS
The following words and terms shall have the following respective
meanings:
1.1 Rental Fee — Amount to be paid by PCSO to
the LESSOR as compensation for the fulfillment of the obligations of the LESSOR
under this Contract, including, but not limited to the lease of the Facilities.
x x x
1.3 Facilities — All capital equipment,
computers, terminals, software (including source codes for the On-Line Lottery
application software for the terminals, telecommunications and central
systems), technology, intellectual property rights, telecommunications network,
and furnishings and fixtures.
1.4 Maintenance and Other Costs — All costs
and expenses relating to printing, manpower, salaries and wages, advertising
and promotion, maintenance, expansion and replacement, security and insurance,
and all other related expenses needed to operate an On-Line Lottery System,
which shall be for the account of the LESSOR. All expenses relating to the setting-up, operation and maintenance of
ticket sales offices of dealers and retailers shall be borne by PCSO’s dealers
and retailers.
1.5 Development Plan — The detailed plan of
all games, the marketing thereof, number of players, value of winnings and the
logistics required to introduce the games, including the Master Games Plan as
approved by PCSO, attached hereto as Annex “A”, modified as necessary
by the provisions’ of this Contract.
x x x
1.8 Escrow Deposit — The proposal deposit in
the sum of Three Hundred Million Pesos (P300,000,000.00) submitted by the
LESSOR to PCSO pursuant to the requirements of the Request for Proposals.
2. SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LEASE
The LESSOR shall build,
furnish and maintain at its own expense and risk the Facilities for the On-Line
Lottery System of PCSO in the Territory on an exclusive basis. The LESSOR shall bear all Maintenance and
Other Costs as defined herein.
x x x
3. RENTAL FEE
For and in consideration
of the performance by the LESSOR of its obligations herein, PCSO shall pay
LESSOR a fixed Rental Fee equal to four point nine percent (4.9%) of gross
receipts from ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be
withheld, on a semi-monthly basis. Goodwill, franchise and similar fees shall belong to PCSO.
4. LEASE PERIOD
The period of the lease
shall commence ninety (90) days from the date of effectivity of this Contract
and shall run for a period of eight (8) years thereafter, unless sooner
terminated in accordance with this Contract.
5. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PCSO AS OPERATOR OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY SYSTEM
PCSO shall be the sole and individual operator of the On-Line
Lottery System. Consequently:
5.1 PCSO shall have sole responsibility to
decide whether to implement, fully or partially, the Master Games Plan of the
LESSOR. PCSO shall have the sole
responsibility to determine the time for introducing new games to the
market. The Master Games Plan included
in Annex “A” hereof is hereby approved by PCSO.
5.2 PCSO shall have control over revenues
and receipts of whatever nature from the On-Line Lottery System. After paying the Rental Fee to the LESSOR,
PCSO shall have exclusive responsibility to determine the Revenue Allocation
Plan; Provided, that the same shall be consistent with the requirement of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended, which fixes a prize fund of fifty five percent (55%) on
the average.
5.3 PCSO shall have exclusive control over
the printing of tickets, including but not limited to the design, text, and
contents thereof.
5.4 PCSO shall have sole responsibility
over the appointment of dealers or retailers throughout the country. PCSO shall appoint the dealers and retailers
in a timely manner with due regard to the implementation timetable of the
On-Line Lottery System. Nothing herein
shall preclude the LESSOR from recommending dealers or retailers for
appointment by PCSO, which shall act on said recommendation within forty-eight
(48) hours.
5.5 PCSO shall designate the necessary
personnel to monitor and audit the daily performance of the On-Line Lottery
System. For this purpose, PCSO
designees shall be given, free of charge, suitable and adequate space, furniture
and fixtures, in all offices of the LESSOR, including but not limited to its
headquarters, alternate site, regional and area offices.
5.6 PCSO
shall have the responsibility to resolve, and exclusive jurisdiction
over, all matters involving the operation of the On-Line Lottery System not otherwise
provided in this Contract.
5.7 PCSO shall promulgate procedural and
coordinating rules governing all activities relating to the On-Line Lottery
System.
5.8 PCSO will be responsible for the
payment of prize monies, commissions to agents and dealers, and taxes and
levies (if any) chargeable to the operator of the On-Line Lottery System. The LESSOR will bear all other Maintenance
and Other Costs, except as provided in Section 1.4.
5.9 PCSO shall assist the LESSOR in the
following:
5.9.1 Work permits for the LESSOR’s staff;
5.9.2 Approvals for importation of the
Facilities;
5.9.3 Approvals and consents for the On-Line
Lottery System; and
5.9.4 Business and premises licenses for all
offices of the LESSOR and licenses for the telecommunications network.
5.10 In the event that PCSO shall pre-terminate
this Contract or suspend the operation of the On-Line Lottery System, in breach
of this Contract and through no fault of the LESSOR, PCSO shall promptly, and
in any event not later than sixty (60) days, reimburse the LESSOR the amount of
its total investment cost associated with the On-Line Lottery System, including
but not limited to the cost of the Facilities, and further compensate the
LESSOR for loss of expected net profit after tax, computed over the unexpired
term of the lease.
6. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LESSOR
The LESSOR is one of not
more than three (3) lessors of similar facilities for the nationwide On-Line
Lottery System of PCSO. It is
understood that the rights of the LESSOR are primarily those of a lessor of the
Facilities, and consequently, all rights involving the business aspects of the
use of the Facilities are within the jurisdiction of PCSO. During the term of the lease, the LESSOR
shall:
6.1 Maintain and preserve its corporate existence,
rights and privileges, and conduct its business in an orderly, efficient, and
customary manner.
6.2 Maintain insurance coverage with
insurers acceptable to PCSO on all Facilities.
6.3 Comply with all laws, statues, rules
and regulations, orders and directives, obligations and duties by which it is
legally bound.
6.4 Duly pay and discharge all taxes,
assessments and government charges now and hereafter imposed of whatever nature
that may be legally levied upon it.
6.5 Keep all the Facilities in fail safe
condition and, if necessary, upgrade, replace and improve the Facilities from
time to time as new technology develops, in order to make the On-Line Lottery
System more cost-effective and/or competitive, and as may be required by PCSO. PCSO shall not impose such requirements
unreasonably nor arbitrarily.
6.6 Provide PCSO with management terminals
which will allow real-time monitoring of the On-Line Lottery System.
6.7 Upon effectivity of this Contract,
commence the training of PCSO and other local personnel and the transfer of
technology and expertise, such that at the end of the term of this Contract,
PCSO will be able to effectively take-over the Facilities and efficiently
operate the On-Line Lottery System.
6.8 Undertake a positive advertising and
promotions campaign for both institutional and product lines without engaging
in negative advertising against other lessors.
6.9 Bear all expenses and risks relating to
the Facilities including, but not limited to, Maintenance and Other Costs and:
x x x
6.10 Bear all risks if the revenues from ticket
sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize money.
6.11 Be, and is hereby, authorized to collect and
retain for its own account, a security deposit from dealers and retailers, in
an amount determined with the approval of PCSO, in respect of equipment
supplied by the LESSOR. PCSO’s approval
shall not be unreasonably withheld. x x
x
6.12 Comply with procedural and coordinating
rules issued by PCSO.
7. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
The LESSOR represents and warrants that:
7.1 The LESSOR is a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, at least sixty
percent (60%) of the outstanding capital stock of which is owned by Filipino
shareholders. The minimum required
Filipino equity participation shall not be impaired through voluntary or
involuntary transfer, disposition, or sale of shares of stock by the present
stockholders.
7.2 The LESSOR and its Affiliates have the full
corporate and legal power and authority to own and operate their properties and
to carry on their business in the place where such properties are now or may be
conducted. x x x
7.3 The LESSOR has or has access to all the
financing and funding requirements to promptly and effectively carry out the
terms of this Contract. x x x
7.4 The LESSOR has or has access to all the
managerial and technical expertise to promptly and effectively carry out the
terms of this Contract. x x x
x x x
10. TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
The LESSOR shall
establish a telecommunications network that will connect all municipalities and
cities in the Territory in accordance with, at the LESSOR’s option, either of
the LESSOR’s proposals (or a combinations of both such proposals) attached
hereto as Annex “B,” and under the following PCSO schedule:
x x x
PCSO may, at its option,
require the LESSOR to establish the telecommunications network in accordance
with the above Timetable in provinces where the LESSOR has not yet installed
terminals. Provided, that such
provinces have existing nodes. Once a
municipality or city is serviced by land lines of a licensed public telephone
company, and such lines are connected to Metro Manila, then the obligation of
the LESSOR to connect such municipality or city through a telecommunications
network shall cease with respect to such municipality or city.
The voice facility will
cover the four offices of the Office of the President, National Disaster
Control Coordinating Council, Philippine National Police and the National
Bureau of Investigation, and each city and municipality in the Territory except
Metro Manila, and those cities and municipalities which have easy telephone
access from these four offices. Voice calls
from the four offices shall be transmitted via radio or VSAT to the remote
municipalities which will be connected to this voice facility through wired
network or by radio. The facility shall
be designed to handle four private conversations at any one time.
x x x
13. STOCK DISPERSAL PLAN
Within two (2) years from
the effectivity of this Contract, the LESSOR shall cause itself to be listed in
the local stock exchange and offer at least twenty five percent (25%) of its
equity to the public.
14. NON-COMPETITION
The LESSOR shall not, directly
or indirectly, undertake any activity or business in competition with or
adverse to the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO unless it obtains the latter’s
prior written consent thereto.
15. HOLD HARMLESS CLAUSE
15.1 The LESSOR shall
at all times protect and defend, at its cost and expense, PCSO from and against
any and all liabilities and claims for damages and/or suits for or by reason of
any deaths of, or any injury or injuries to any person or persons, or damages
to property of any kind whatsoever, caused by the LESSOR, its subcontractors,
its authorized agents or employees, from any cause or causes whatsoever.
15.2 The LESSOR
hereby covenants and agrees to indemnify and hold PCSO harmless from all
liabilities, charges, expenses (including reasonable counsel fees) and costs on
account of or by reason of any such death or deaths, injury or injuries,
liabilities, claims, suits or losses caused by the LESSOR’S fault or
negligence.
15.3 The LESSOR shall
at all times protect and defend, at its own cost and expense, its title to the
facilities and PCSO’s interest therein from and against any and all claims for
the duration of the Contract until transfer to PCSO of ownership of the
serviceable Facilities.
16. SECURITY
16.1 To ensure
faithful compliance by the LESSOR with the terms of the Contract, the LESSOR
shall secure a Performance Bond from a reputable insurance company or companies
acceptable to PCSO.
16.2 The Performance
Bond shall be in the initial amount of Three Hundred Million Pesos
(P300,000,000.00), to its U.S. dollar equivalent, and shall be renewed to cover
the duration of the Contract. However,
the Performance Bond shall be reduced proportionately to the percentage of
unencumbered terminals installed; Provided, that the Performance Bond shall in
no case be less than One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00).
16.3 The LESSOR may at its option maintain its
Escrow Deposit as the Performance Bond. x x x
17. PENALTIES
17.1 Except as may be provided in Section 17.2,
should the LESSOR fail to take remedial measures within seven (7) days, and
rectify the breach within thirty (30) days, from written notice by PCSO of any
wilfull or grossly negligent violation of the material terms and conditions of
this Contract, all unencumbered Facilities shall automatically become the
property of PCSO without consideration and without need for further notice or
demand by PCSO. The Performance Bond
Shall likewise be forfeited in favor of PCSO.
17.2 Should the LESSOR fail to comply with the
terms of the Timetables provided in Section 9 and 10, it shall be subject to an
initial Penalty of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), per city or municipality
per every month of delay; Provided, that the Penalty shall increase, every
ninety (90) days, by the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) per city
or municipality per month, whilst shall failure to comply persists. The penalty shall be deducted by PCSO from
the rental fee.
x x x
20. OWNERSHIP OF THE FACILITIES
After expiration of the
term of the lease as provided in Section 4, the Facilities directly required
for the On-Line Lottery System mentioned in Section 1.3 shall automatically
belong in full ownership to PCSO without any further consideration other than
the Rental Fees already paid during the effectivity of the lease.
21. TERMINATION OF THE LEASE
PCSO may terminate this Contract for any breach of the material
provisions of this Contract, including the following:
21.1 The LESSOR is
insolvent or bankrupt or unable to pay its debts, stops or suspends or
threatens to stop or suspend payment of all or a material part of its debts, or
proposes or makes a general assignment or an arrangement or compositions with
or for the benefit of its creditors; or
21.2 An order is made
or an effective resolution passed for the winding up or dissolution of the
LESSOR or when it ceases or threatens to cease to carry on all or a material
part of its operations or business; or
21.3 Any material
statement, representation or warranty made or furnished by the LESSOR proved to
be materially false or misleading;
said termination to take
effect upon receipt of written notice of termination by the LESSOR and failure
to take remedial action within seven (7) days and cure or remedy the same
within thirty (30) days from notice.
Any suspension,
cancellation or termination of this Contract shall not relieve the LESSOR of
any liability that may have already accrued hereunder.”
x x x
Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its
protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that
“only a court injunction can stop Malacañang,” and the imminent
implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its
co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that:
“X X X THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH RESPONDENTS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR ASSISTANT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, AND THE PCSO GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEIR
DISCRETION AND/OR FUNCTIONS TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR AUTHORITY
IN RESPECTIVELY: (A) APPROVING THE
AWARD OF THE CONTRACT TO, AND (B) ENTERING INTO THE SO-CALLED ‘CONTRACT OF
LEASE’ WITH, RESPONDENT PGMC FOR THE INSTALLATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION
OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED AND/OR AUTHORIZED
UNDER THE SAID CONTRACT, CONSIDERING THAT:
a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO,
the PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries ‘in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity’;
b) Under Act No. 3846 and established
jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required before any person may be
allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation,
like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the said
telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its
charter and under the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install,
establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.”[18]
Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the
assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein
the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in
“collaboration” or “association” with the PGMC, in violation
of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits
the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and
other similar activities “in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic.”
Even granting arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the
contemplation of “collaboration” or “association,” an
analysis, however, of the Contract of Lease clearly shows that there is a
“collaboration, association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and
PGMC in the holding of the On-Line Lottery System,” and that there are
terms and conditions of the Contract “showing that respondent PGMC is the
actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO.”[19]
The petitioners also point out that paragraph 10 of the Contract
of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications network
that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has
no franchise from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the
network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or
controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that
purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, since “the subscribed
foreign capital” of the PGMC “comes to about 75%, as shown by
paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation,” it cannot lawfully
enter into the contract in question because all forms of gambling — and
lottery is one of them — are included in the so-called foreign investments
negative list under the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up
to 40% foreign capital is allowed.[20]
Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of
Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line
lottery and telecommunications systems.[21]
Accordingly, the petitioners pray that we issue a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction commanding the
respondents or any person acting in their places or upon their instructions to
cease and desist from implementing the challenged Contract of Lease and, after
hearing the merits of the petition, that we render judgment declaring the Contract
of Lease void and without effect and making the injunction permanent.[22]
We required the respondents to comment on the petition.
In its Comment filed on 1 March 1994, private respondent PGMC
asserts that “(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a piece of
work, (i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used
by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise); and (2) as such independent
contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor
is PCSO sharing its franchise, ‘in collaboration, association or joint venture’
with PGMC — as such statutory limitation is viewed from the context, intent,
and spirit of Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa 42.” It
further claims that as an independent contractor for a piece of work, it is
neither engaged in “gambling” nor in “public service”
relative to the telecommunications network, which the petitioners even consider
as an “indispensable requirement” of an on-line lottery system. Finally, it states that the execution and
implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws;
that the issue on the “morality” of the lottery franchise granted to
the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in
another forum; and that the “petitioners do not appear to have the legal
standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs
sought.”[23]
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
public respondents Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of
lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioners’ interpretation of the phrase “in
collaboration, association or joint venture” in Section 1 is “much
too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic” for it “ignores the
reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and
essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as
may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives.” What
the PCSO charter “seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a ‘joint
venture’ or partnership where there is ‘community of interest in the business,
sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of control,’ a characteristic
which does not obtain in a contract of lease.” With respect to the
challenged Contract of Lease, the “role of PGMC is limited to that of a
lessor of the facilities” for the on-line lottery system; in “strict
technical and legal sense,” said contract “can be categorized as a
contract for a piece of work as defined in Articles 1467, 1713 and 1644 of the
Civil Code.”
They further claim that the establishment of the telecommunications
system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a congressional
franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility; moreover, PGMC’s
“establishment of a telecommunications system is not intended to establish
a telecommunications business,” and it has been held that where the
facilities are operated “not for business purposes but for its own
use,” a legislative franchise is not required before a certificate of
public convenience can be granted.[24]
Even granting arguendo that PGMC is a public utility, pursuant to Albano
S. Reyes,[25]
“it can establish a telecommunications system even without a legislative
franchise because not every public utility is required to secure a legislative
franchise before it could establish, maintain, and operate the service”;
and, in any case, “PGMC’s establishment of the telecommunications system
stipulated in its contract of lease with PCSO falls within the exceptions under
Section 1 of Act No. 3846 where a legislative franchise is not necessary for
the establishment of radio stations.”
They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it
to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that the issues of “wisdom,
morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit
of judicial review.”
Finally, the public respondents allege that the petitioners have
no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing our resolution in Valmonte
vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.[26]
Several parties filed motions to intervene as petitioners in this
case,[27]
but only the motion of Senators Alberto Romulo, Arturo Tolentino, Francisco
Tatad, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vicente Sotto III, John Osmeña, Ramon Revilla,
and Jose Lina[28]
was granted, and the respondents were required to comment on their petition in
intervention, which the public respondents and PGMC did.
In the meantime, the petitioners filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on 29 March 1994 a petition against PGMC for the
nullification of the latter’s General Information Sheets. That case, however, has no bearing in this
petition.
On 11 April 1994, we heard the parties in oral arguments. Thereafter, we resolved to consider the
matter submitted for resolution and pending resolution of the major issues in
this case, to issue a temporary restraining order commanding the respondents or
any person acting in their place or upon their instructions to cease and desist
from implementing the challenged Contract of Lease.
In the deliberation on this case on 26 April 1994, we resolved to
consider only these issues: (a) the locus
standi of the petitioners, and (b) the legality and validity of the
Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries
“in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” On the first
issue, seven Justices voted to sustain the locus standi of the
petitioners, while six voted not to. On
the second issue, the seven Justices were of the opinion that the Contract of
Lease violates the exception to Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid and contrary to law. The six Justices stated that they wished to
express no opinion thereon in view of their stand on the first issue. The Chief Justice took no part because one
of the Directors of the PCSO is his brother-in-law.
This case was then assigned to this ponente for the
writing of the opinion of the Court.
The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the
petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party’s standing before this Court is a
procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set
aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases,[29]
this Court brushed aside this technicality because “the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-2821).” Insofar as taxpayers’ suits are concerned, this Court had declared
that it “is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained,”[30]
or that it “enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not.”[31]
In De La Llana vs. Alba,[32]
this Court declared:
“1. The
argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he
certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel’s opinion in
People vs. Vera [65 Phil. 56 (1937)]. Thus: ‘The unchallenged rule is
that the person who impugns the validity of a statue must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement [Ibid, 89].’ The other petitioners
as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid
of ‘any personal and substantial interest’ on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a
separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections [L-40004, January
31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275]: ‘Then there is
the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they
consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public
right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials
staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: “The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of
public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private
and public interests are, both in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects
of the totality of the legal order.” Moreover, petitioners have
convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue
has been amply demonstrated. There
would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary
of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the
doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that
step. Respondents, however, would hark
back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham, with
their claim that what petitioners possess “is an interest which is shared
in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to
afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.”
That is to speak in the language of a bygone era, even in the United
States. For as Chief Justice Warren
clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set
up if not breached has definitely been lowered.”
In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,[33]
reiterated in Basco vs. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation,[34]
this Court stated:
“Objections to taxpayers’ suits for lack of sufficient
personality standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural
matters. Considering the importance to
the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them, this Court has brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.”
and in Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[35]
it declared:
“With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as
applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger
of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. [Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US
633]. And even if,
strictly speaking, they are not covered
by the definition, it is still within
the wide discretion of the Court to
waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objective that they
were not proper parties and ruled that the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied this exception in
many other cases.” (Emphasis supplied)
In Daza vs. Singson,[36]
this Court once more said:
“x x x For another, we have early as in the Emergency Powers
Cases that where serious constitutional questions are involved, ‘the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.’ The same policy has since then been consistently followed by the
Court, as in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [21 SCRA 774] x x x.”
The Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America has
also expressed its discretionary power to liberalize the rule on locus
standi. In United States vs.
Federal Power Commission and Virginia Rea Association vs. Federal Power
Commission,[37]
it held:
“We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences of view, however, preclude a
single opinion of the Court as to both petitioners. It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty
of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or
less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set
out the divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases.”
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi,
ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions
before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts,
decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities. Among such cases
were those assailing the constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of
Congress;[38]
(b) Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July
1987, which allowed members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions;[39]
(c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations
Act;[40]
(d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections;[41]
(e) P.D. No. 1869 (the charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary to morals, public policy, and
order;[42]
and (f) R.A. No. 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police.[43]
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus
standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order
allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by
R.A. No. 3452;[44]
(b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the
Constitution and P.D. No. 1031 insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the referendum?plebiscite on 16 October 1976;[45]
(c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi,
Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan;[46]
(d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments of the amended
application of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its
plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift
of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;[47]
(e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of
Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National Power Corporation
from indirect tax and duties;[48]
(f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the
ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil
prices did not allow the petitioner substantial cross-examination;[49]
(g) Executive Order No. 478 which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil
products;[50]
(h) resolutions of the Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by
district, of the number of elective members of Sanggunians;[51]
and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of Police of
Pasay City.[52]
In the 1975 case of Aquino vs. Commission on Elections,[53]
this Court, despite its unequivocal ruling that the petitioners therein had no
personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless to pass upon the issues
raised because of the far-reaching implications of the petition. We did no less in De Guia vs. COMELEC[54]
where, although we declared that De Guia “does not appear to have locus
standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest,” we
brushed aside the procedural infirmity “considering the importance of the
issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified
voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of
discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent.”
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance
to the public. The issues it raised are
of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved
in many of the aforecited cases. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country
and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line
lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to
raise. The legal standing then of the
petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents
tried to take advantage of.
And now on the substantive issue.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits
the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign.” Section 1 provides:
“Sec. 1. The
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter
designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and
providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and
charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers
conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred
fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as
shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be
promulgated by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of
Human Settlements, to engage in health and welfare-related investments,
programs, projects and activities which may be profit-oriented,
by itself or in collaboration, association
or joint venture with any person, association, company or
entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities
mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A),
for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for
health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance
and services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investments will not compete with the private sector
in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority.” (emphasis supplied)
The language of the section is indisputably clear that with
respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot
exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any
other party. This is the unequivocal
meaning and import of the phrase “except for the activities mentioned in
the preceding paragraph (A),” namely, “charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities.”
B.P. Blg. 42 originated from Parliamentary Bill No. 622, which
was covered by Committee Report No. 103 as reported out by the Committee on Socio-Economic
Planning and Development of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The original text of paragraph B, Section 1
of Parliamentary Bill No. 622 reads as follows:
“To engage in any and all investments and related
profit-oriented projects or programs and activities by itself or in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, for the main purpose of raising
funds for health and medical assistance and services and charitable grants.”[55]
During the period of committee amendments, the Committee on
Socio-Economic Planning and Development, through Assemblyman Ronaldo B. Zamora,
introduced an amendment by substitution to the said paragraph B such that, as amended,
it should read as follows:
“Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements,
to engage in health-oriented investments, programs, projects and activities
which may be profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association, or
joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic
or foreign, for the purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources
of funds for health programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical
assistance and services and/or charitable grants.”[56]
Before the motion of Assemblyman Zamora for the approval of the
amendment could be acted upon, Assemblyman Davide introduced an amendment to
the amendment:
“MR. DAVIDE.
Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
The gentleman from Cebu
is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
May I introduce an
amendment to the committee amendment? The amendment would be to insert after ‘foreign’ in the amendment just
read the following: EXCEPT FOR THE
ACTIVITY IN LETTER (A) ABOVE.
When it is
a joint venture or in collaboration with
any entity such collaboration or joint
venture must not include activity letter
(a) which is the holding and conducting
of sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
similar acts.
MR. ZAMORA.
We accept the amendment,
Mr. Speaker.
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER.
Is there any objection
to the amendment? (Silence) The
amendment, as amended, is approved.”[57]
Further amendments to paragraph B were introduced and
approved. When Assemblyman Zamora read
the final text of paragraph B as further amended, the earlier approved
amendment of Assemblyman Davide became “EXCEPT FOR THE ACTIVITIES
MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH (A)”; and by virtue of the amendment introduced by
Assemblyman Emmanuel Pelaez, the word PRECEDING was inserted before PARAGRAPH. Assemblyman Pelaez introduced other
amendments. Thereafter, the new
paragraph B was approved.[58]
This is now paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg.
42.
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent
the prohibition can be allowed since the privilege to hold or conduct charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is a franchise
granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a settled rule that “in all grants by the government to
individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are
to be taken most strongly against the grantee …. [o]ne who claims a franchise
or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his
title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he
cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable
inferences. Whatever is not
unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.”[59]
In short then, by the exception explicitly made in paragraph B,
Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by
way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. It has been said that “the rights and
privileges conferred under a franchise may, without doubt, be assigned or
transferred when the grant is to the grantee and assigns, or is authorized by
statute. On the other hand, the right
of transfer or assignment may be restricted by statute or the constitution, or
be made subject to the approval of the grantor or a governmental agency, such
as a public utilities commission, except that an existing right of assignment
cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation.”[60]
It may also be pointed out that the franchise granted to the PCSO
to hold and conduct lotteries allows it to hold and conduct a species of
gambling. It is settled that “a
statute which authorizes the carrying on of a gambling activity or business
should be strictly construed and every reasonable doubt so resolved as to limit
the powers and rights claimed under its authority.”[61]
Does the challenged Contract of Lease violate or contravene the
exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in
collaboration, association or joint venture with” another?
We agree with the petitioners that it does, notwithstanding its
denomination or designation as a Contract of Lease. We are neither convinced nor moved or fazed by
the insistence and forceful arguments of the PGMC that it does not because in
reality it is only an independent contractor for a piece of work, i.e.,
the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by the PCSO in the
operation of its lottery franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is
merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the
title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which
may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of
the instrument. In order to give life
or effect to an instrument, it is essential to look to the intention of the
individual who executed it.[62]
And; pursuant to Article 1371 of the Civil Code, “to determine the
intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered.” To put it more bluntly, no one should be
deceived by the title or designation of a contract.
A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the
contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC
indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease
under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work,
but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association,
in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the
contracting parties. Collaboration
is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project.[63]
Association means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for
some special purpose or business.[64]
Joint venture is defined as an association of persons or
companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all
contribute assets and share risks. It
requires a community of interest in the performance of the subject matter, a
right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith, and duty, which
may be altered by agreement to share both in profit and losses.[65]
The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the
PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an
on-line lottery system, and that although it wished to have the system, it
would have it “at no expense or risks to the government.” Because of
these serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks,
the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for “a
suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities
needed to operate and maintain” the system; exclusively bear “all
capital, operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks”; and submit
“a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan … which will
include the game, the marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce
the game to all the cities and municipalities of the country within five (5)
years”; and that the operation of the on-line lottery system should be
“at no expense or risk to the government” — meaning itself,
since it is a government-owned and controlled agency. The facilities referred to means “all capital
equipment, computers, terminals, software, nationwide telecommunications
network, ticket sales offices, furnishings and fixtures, printing costs, costs
of salaries and wages, advertising and promotions expenses, maintenance costs,
expansion and replacement costs, security and insurance, and all other related
expenses needed to operate a nationwide on-line lottery system.”
In short, the only contribution the PCSO would have is its
franchise or authority to operate the on-line lottery system; with the rest,
including the risks of the business, being borne by the proponent or
bidder. It could be for this reason
that it warned that “the proponent must be able to stand to the acid test
of proving that it is an entity able to take on the
role of responsible maintainer of the
on-line lottery system.” The PCSO, however, makes it
clear in its RFP that the proponent can propose a period of the contract which
shall not exceed fifteen years, during which time it is assured of a
“rental” which shall not exceed 12% of gross receipts. As admitted by the PGMC, upon learning of
the PCSO’s decision, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliates, wanted to
offer its services and resources to the PCSO. Forthwith, it organized the PGMC as “a
medium through which the technical and management services
required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”[66]
Undoubtedly, then, the Berjaya Group Berhad knew all along that
in connection with an on-line lottery system, the PCSO had nothing but its
franchise, which it solemnly guaranteed it had in the General Information of
the RFP.[67]
Howsoever viewed then, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually
understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the
PGMC the technical, operations, and management
aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PCSO would, primarily, provide
the franchise. The words Gaming
and Management in the corporate name of respondent Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation could not have been conceived just for euphemistic
purposes. Of course, the RFP cannot
substitute for the Contract of Lease which was subsequently executed by the
PCSO and the PGMC. Nevertheless, the
Contract of Lease incorporates their intention and understanding.
The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it
purports to be. Its denomination as
such is a crafty device, carefully conceived, to provide a built-in defense in
the event that the agreement is questioned as violative of the exception in
Section 1(B) of the PCSO’s charter. The
acuity or skill of its draftsmen to accomplish that purpose easily manifests
itself in the Contract of Lease. It is
outstanding for its careful and meticulous drafting designed to give an
immediate impression that it is a contract of lease. Yet, woven therein are provisions which negate its title and
betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture
for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line
lottery system.
Consistent with the above observations on the RFP, the PCSO has
only its franchise to offer, while the PGMC represents and warrants that it has
access to all managerial and technical expertise
to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of the contract. And, for a period of eight years, the PGMC
is under obligation to keep all the Facilities in safe condition and if
necessary, upgrade, replace, and improve them from time to time as new
technology develops to make the on-line lottery system more cost-effective and
competitive; exclusively bear all costs and expenses relating to the printing,
manpower, salaries and wages, advertising and promotion, maintenance, expansion
and replacement, security and insurance, and all other related expenses needed
to operate the on-line lottery system; undertake a positive advertising and
promotions campaign for both institutional and product lines without engaging
in negative advertising against other lessors; bear the salaries and related
costs of skilled and qualified personnel for administrative and technical
operations; comply with procedural and coordinating rules
issued by the PCSO; and to train PCSO and other local personnel and to effect
the transfer of technology and other expertise, such that at the end of the
term of the contract, the PCSO will be able to effectively take over the
Facilities and efficiently operate the on-line lottery system. The latter simply means that, indeed, the
managers, technicians or employees who shall operate the on-line lottery system
are not managers, technicians or employees of the PCSO, but of the PGMC and
that it is only after the expiration of the contract that the PCSO will operate
the system. After eight years, the PCSO
would automatically become the owner of the Facilities without any other
further consideration.
For these reasons, too, the PGMC has the initial prerogative to
prepare the detailed plan of all games and the marketing thereof, and determine
the number of players, value of winnings, and the logistics required to
introduce the games, including the Master Games Plan. Of course, the PCSO has the reserved authority to disapprove them.[68]
And, while the PCSO has the sole responsibility over the appointment of dealers
and retailers throughout the country, the PGMC may, nevertheless, recommend for
appointment dealers and retailers which shall be acted upon by the PCSO within
forty-eight hours and collect and retain, for its own account, a security
deposit from dealers and retailers in respect of equipment supplied by it.
This joint venture is further established
by the following:
(a)
Rent is defined in the lease contract as the amount to be paid
to the PGMC as compensation for the fulfillment of its obligations under the
contract, including, but not limited to the lease
of the Facilities. However, this rent
is not actually a fixed amount. Although it is stated to be 4.9% of gross receipts from ticket sales,
payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, it may be drastically
reduced or, in extreme cases, nothing may be due or demandable at all because
the PGMC binds itself to “bear all risks if the revenue from the ticket
sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay the entire prize
money.” This risk-bearing provision is unusual in a lessor-lessee
relationship, but inherent in a joint venture.
(b)
In the event of pre-termination of the contract by the PCSO,
or its suspension of operation of the on-line lottery system in breach of the
contract and through no fault of the PGMC, the PCSO binds itself “to
promptly, and in any event not later than sixty (60) days, reimburse the LESSOR
the amount of its total investment cost associated with the On?Line
Lottery System, including but not limited to the cost of the Facilities, and
further compensate the LESSOR for loss of expected net profit after tax,
computed over the unexpired term of the lease.” If the contract were
indeed one of lease, the payment of the expected profits or rentals for the
unexpired portion of the term of the contract would be enough.
(c)
The PGMC cannot “directly or indirectly undertake any
activity or business in competition with or adverse to the On-Line Lottery
System of PCSO unless it obtains the latter’s prior written consent.” If
the PGMC is engaged in the business of leasing equipment and technology for an
on-line lottery system, we fail to see any acceptable reason why it should
allow a restriction on the pursuit of such business.
(d)The
PGMC shall provide the PCSO the audited Annual Report sent to its stockholders,
and within two years from the effectivity of the contract, cause itself to be
listed in the local stock exchange and offer at least 25% of its equity to the
public. If the PGMC is merely a lessor,
this imposition is unreasonable and whimsical, and could only be tied up to the
fact that the PGMC will actually operate and manage the system; hence,
increasing public participation in the corporation would enhance public
interest.
(e)
The PGMC shall put up an Escrow Deposit of P300,000,000.00
pursuant to the requirements of the RFP, which it may, at its option, maintain
as its initial performance bond required to ensure its faithful compliance with
the terms of the contract.
(f)
The PCSO shall designate the necessary personnel to monitor
and audit the daily performance of the on-line lottery system; and promulgate procedural
and coordinating rules governing all activities relating
to the on-line lottery system. The
first further confirms that it is the PGMC which will operate the system and
the PCSO may, for the protection of its interest, monitor and audit the daily
performance of the system. The second
admits the coordinating and cooperative powers and function of
the parties.
(g)
The PCSO may validly terminate the contract if the PGMC
becomes insolvent or bankrupt or is unable to pay its debts, or if it stops or
suspends or threatens to stop or suspend payment of all or a material part of
its debts.
All of the foregoing unmistakably confirm
the indispensable role of the PGMC in the pursuit, operation, conduct, and
management of the On-Line Lottery System. They exhibit and demonstrate the parties’ indivisible community of
interest in the conception, birth and growth of the on-line lottery, and, above
all, in its profits, with each having a right in the formulation and
implementation of policies related to the business and sharing, as well, in the
losses — with the PGMC bearing the greatest burden because of its assumption
of expenses and risks, and the PCSO the least, because of its confessed
unwillingness to bear expenses and risks. In a manner of speaking, each is wed to the other for better or for
worse. In the final analysis, however,
in the light of the PCSO’s RFP and the above highlighted provisions, as well as
the “Hold Harmless Clause” of the Contract of Lease, it is even safe to
conclude that the actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject
matter thereof is Its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in
reality, the PGMC which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a
period of eight years.
We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates
the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to
law. This conclusion renders
unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the
challenged Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 11 April 1994 is hereby
MADE PERMANENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Cruz, Feliciano, and,
Padilla, JJ., separate concurring opinion.
Bidin, J., joins J.
Melo, J. Quiason, J. Puno, and J.
Kapunan, in their dissenting opinions.
Vitug, J., separate opinion.
Narvasa, C.J., no part.
[1]
PGMC’s Comment, 3-4; Rollo,
181-182.
[2]
Annex “A,” Id.; Id.,
207-220.
[3]
Rollo, 210-211.
[4]
Rollo, 213.
[5]
Id., 215.
[6]
Id., 220.
[7]
PGMC’s Comment, 7; Rollo, 184.
[8]
Annex “P” of Petition.
[9]
Annexes “L” and “N”
of Petition.
[10]
Petition, 9; Rollo, 10. The announcement also stated that G-Tech
Philippines, Inc. and the Tanjong Public Limited Company had likewise been
authorized to operate separate lotto systems.
[11]
Id.; Id.
[12]
Annex “C” of Petition.
[13]
Petition, 10; Rollo, 11. The meeting was called to deliberate on the
proposed nationwide on-line lottery program.
[14]
Id.; Id.
[15]
Id.; Id.
[16]
Annex “J” of Petition.
[17]
Annex “H” of Petition.
[18]
Rollo, 13-14.
[19]
Rollo, 16-19.
[20]
Id., 27-28; 30-32.
[21]
Id., 27.
[22]
Rollo, 35.
[23]
Id., 180-181.
[24]
Citing Teresa Electric & Power Co.,
Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 21 SCRA 198 [1967].
[25]
175 SCRA 262 [1989].
[26]
G.R. No. 78716, 22 September 1987.
[27]
Philippine Christian Lawyers
Fellowship, Inc., Gamaliel G. Bongco, Oscar Karaan, and Jedideoh Sincero (Rollo,
147); Catholic Lawyer’s Guild of the Philippines, Inc., Enrique Syquia, and
Pacifico Ma. Castro (Id., 154).
[28]
Rollo, 249 et seq.
[29]
G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta vs.
Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756 (Araneta vs. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054
(Rodriguez vs. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero vs.
Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo vs. Commission on
Elections), 84 Phil. 368 [1949].
[30]
Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677,
680 [1972].
[31]
Sanidad vs. Commission on
Elections, 73 SCRA 333 [1976].
[32]
112 SCRA 294, 314-315 [1982].
[33]
163 SCRA 371, 378 [1988].
[34]
197 SCRA 52, 60 [1991].
[35]
175 SCRA 343, 364-365 [1989] (emphasis
supplied).
[36]
180 SCRA 496, 502 [1988].
[37]
345 US 153, L ed 918, 735 Ct 609.
[38]
Philippine Constitution Association,
Inc. vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965].
[39]
Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991].
[40]
Guingona vs. Carague, 196 SCRA
221 [1991].
[41]
Osmeña vs. Commission on
Elections, 199 SCRA 750 [1991].
[42]
Basco vs. Philippine Gaming and
Amusement Corp., 197 SCRA 52 [1991].
[43]
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary,
206 SCRA 290 [1992].
[44]
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965].
[45]
Sanidad vs. Commission on
Elections, supra.
[46]
Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797
[1990].
[47]
Garcia vs. Board of Investments,
177 SCRA 374 [1989]; Garcia vs. Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288
[1990].
[48]
Maceda vs. Macaraig, 197 SCRA
771 [1991].
[49]
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory
Board, 199 SCRA 454 [1991].
[50]
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary,
211 SCRA 219 [1992].
[51]
De Guia vs. Commission on
Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992].
[52]
Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs.
Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 [1980].
[53]
62 SCRA 275 [1975].
[54]
Supra.
[55]
Record of the Batasan, vol. Two, 993.
[56]
Id., 1006-1007.
[57]
Record of the Batasan, vol. Two, 1007
(emphasis supplied).
[58]
Id.
[59]
36 AM. JUR. 2d Franchises § 26 (1968).
[60]
36 AM. JUR. 2d Franchises § 63 (1968).
[61]
38 AM. JUR. 2d Gambling § 18 (1968).
[62]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., 88.
[63]
Id., 261.
[64]
Id., 121.
[65]
Id., 839.
[66]
PGMC’s Comment; Rollo, 181-182.
[67]
It declares therein that it “has
the legal authority under R.A. 1169, as amended, to hold and conduct
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities.”
[68] Attached to the Contract of Lease as Annex
“A” is the Master Games Plan prepared by the PGMC and approved by the
PCSO.
104
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
concurring OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
I am happy to join Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his
excellent ponencia. I
will add the following personal observations only for emphasis as it is not
necessary to supplement his thorough exposition.
The respondents take great pains to cite specific provisions of
the contract to show that it is PCSO that is actually operating the on-line
lottery, but they have not succeeded in disproving the obvious, to wit, that
the document was intentionally so crafted to make it appear that the operation
is not a joint undertaking of PCSO and PGMC but a mere lease of services. It is a clever instrument, to be sure, but
we are, gratifyingly, not deluded. Lawyers have a special talent to disguise the real intention of the
parties in a contract to make it come ostensibly within the provisions of a law
although the real if furtive purpose is to violate it. That talent has been exercised in this case,
but not convincingly enough.
It should be quite clear, from the adroit way the contract has
been drafted, that the primary objective was to avoid the conclusion that PCSO
will be operating a lottery “in association, collaboration or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity,” which is prohibited
by Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. Citing the self-serving provisions of the contract, the respondents
would have us believe that the contract is perfectly lawful because all it does
is provide for the lease to PCSO of the technical know-how and equipment of
PGMC, with PCSO acting as “the sole and individual operator” of the
lottery. I am glad we are not
succumbing to this sophistry.
Despite the artfulness of the contract (authorship of which was
pointedly denied by both counsel for the government and the private respondent
during the oral argument on this case), a careful study will reveal telling
stipulations that it is PGMC and not PCSO that will actually be operating the
lottery. Thus, it is provided inter
alia that PGMC shall furnish all capital equipment and other facilities
needed for the operation; bear all expenses relating to the operation,
including those for the salaries and wages of the administrative and technical
personnel; undertake a positive advertising and promotion campaign for public
support of the lottery; establish a radio communications network throughout the
country as part of the operation; and assume all risks if the revenues from
ticket sales are insufficient to pay the entire prize money. Most significantly, to show that it is only
after eight years from the effectivity of the contract that PCSO will actually
operate the lottery, Par. 6.7 of the agreement provides that PGMC shall:
6.7. Upon
effectivity of this Contract, commence the training of PCSO and other local
personnel and the transfer of technology and expertise, such that at the end
of the term of this Contract, PCSO will be able to effectively take-over the
Facilities and efficiently operate the On-Line Lottery System. (Emphasis supplied).
In the meantime, that is to say during the entire 8-year term of
the contract, it will be PGMC that will be operating the lottery. Only “at the end of the term of this
Contract” will PCSO “be able to effectively take-over the Facilities
and efficiently operate the On-Line Lottery System.”
Even on the assumption that it is PCSO that will be operating the
lottery at the very start, the authority granted to PGMC by the agreement will
readily show that PCSO will not be acting alone, as the respondents
pretend. In fact, it cannot. PGMC is an indispensable co-worker because it has the equipment and the
technology and the management skills that PCSO does not have at this time for
the operation of the lottery. PCSO
cannot deny that it needs the assistance of PGMC for this purpose, which was
its reason for entering into the contract in the first place.
And when PCSO does avail itself of such assistance, how will it
be operating the lottery? Undoubtedly,
it will be doing so “in collaboration, association or joint venture”
with PGMC, which, let it be added, will not be serving as a mere “hired
help” of PCSO subject to its control. PGMC will be functioning independently in the discharge of its own
assigned role as stipulated in detail under the contract. PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in
violation of law, no matter how PGMC’s assistance is called or the contract is
denominated.
Even if it be conceded that the assistance partakes of a lease of
services, the undeniable fact is that PCSO would still be collaborating or
cooperating with PGMC in the operation of the lottery. What is even worse is that PCSO and PGMC may
be actually engaged in a joint venture, considering that PGMC does not collect
the usual fixed rentals due an ordinary lessor but is entitled to a special
“Rental Fee,” as the contract calls it,
“equal to four point nine percent (4.9%) of gross receipts from ticket
sales.”
The flexibility of this amount is significant. As may be expected, it will induce in PGMC
an active interest and participation in the success of PCSO that is not
expected of an ordinary detached lessor who gets to be paid his rentals – not a
rental fee – whether the lessee’s business
prospers or not. PGMC’s share in the
operation depends on its own performance and the effectiveness of its collaboration
with PCSO. Although the contract
pretends otherwise, PGMC is a co-investor with PCSO in what is practically, if
not in a strictly legal sense, a joint venture.
Concerning the doctrine of locus standi, I
cannot agrees that out of the sixty million Filipinos affected by the proposed
lottery, not a single solitary citizen can question the agreement. Locus
standi is not such an
absolute rule that it cannot admit of exceptions under certain conditions or
circumstances like those attending this transaction. As I remarked in my dissent in Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623,
“It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right to call
the firemen. Every one has the right
and responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading
even if he lives in the other block.”
What is especially galling is that the transaction in question
would foist upon our people an essentially immoral activity through the
instrumentality of a foreign corporation, which naturally does not have the
same concern for our interests as we ourselves have. I am distressed that foreigners should be allowed to exploit the
weakness of some of us for instant gain without work, and with the active
collaboration and encouragement of our own government at that.
200
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
Concurring OPINION
Feliciano,
J.:
I agree with the conclusions reached by my distinguished brother
in the Court Davide, Jr., J., both in respect of the question of locus
standi and in respect of the merits of this case, that is, the issues of
legality and constitutionality of the Contract of Lease entered into between
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC).
In this separate opinion, I propose to address only the question
of locus standi. It is
with some hesitation that I do so, considering the extensive separate opinions
on this question written by my learned brothers Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ. I agree with the great deal of what my
brothers Melo, Puno and Vitug say about locus standi in their
separate opinions and there is no need to go over the ground that I share with
them. Because, however, I reach a
different conclusion in respect of the presence or absence of locus standi
on the part of the petitioners in the case before the Court, there is an
internal need (a need internal to myself) to articulate the considerations
which led me to that conclusion.
There is no dispute that
the doctrine of locus standi reflects an important constitutional principle, that is,
the principle of separation of powers which, among other things, mandates that
each of the great Departments of government is responsible for performance of
its constitutionally allotted tasks. Insofar as the Judicial Department is concerned, the exercise of
judicial power and carrying out of judicial functions commonly take place
within the context of actual cases or controversies. This, in turn, reflects the basic notion of judicial power as
the power to resolve actual disputes
and of the traditional business of courts as the hearing and deciding of
specific controversies brought before them. In our own jurisdiction, and at least since the turn of the present
century, judicial power has always included the power of judicial review,
understood as the authority of courts (more specifically the Supreme Court) to
assay contested legislative and executive acts in terms of their constitutionality
or legality. Thus, the general
proposition has been that a petitioner who assails the legal or constitutional
quality of an executive or legislative act must be able to show that he has locus
standi. Otherwise, the petition
becomes vulnerable to prompt dismissal by the court.
There is, upon the other
hand, little substantive dispute that the possession of locus standi[1] is not, in each and every case, a
rigid and absolute requirement for access to the courts. Certainly that is the case where great
issues of public law are at stake, issues which cannot be approached in the
same way that a court approaches a suit for the collection of a sum of money or
a complaint for the recovery of possession of a particular piece of land. The broad question is when, or in what types
of cases, the court should insist on a clear showing of locus standi
understood as a direct and personal interest in the subject matter of the case
at bar, and when the court may or should relax that apparently stringent
requirement and proceed to deal with the legal or constitutional issues at
stake in a particular case.
I submit, with respect, that it is not enough for the Court simply
to invoke “public interest” or even “paramount considerations of
national interest,” and to say that the specific requirements of such
public interest can only be ascertained on a “case to case” basis. For one thing, such an approach is not
intellectually satisfying. For another,
such an answer appears to come too close to saying that locus standi
exists whenever at least a majority of the Members of this Court participating
in a case feel that an appropriate case for judicial intervention has arisen.
This is not, however, to say that there is somewhere an
over-arching juridical principle or theory, waiting to be discovered, that
permits a ready answer to the question of when, or in what types of cases, the
need to show locus standi may be relaxed in greater or lesser
degree. To My knowledge, no
satisfactory principle or theory has been discovered and none has been crafted,
whether in our jurisdiction or in the United States.[2] I
have neither the competence nor the opportunity to try to craft such principle or formula. It might, however, be useful to attempt to indicate the
considerations of principle which, in the present case, appear to me to require
an affirmative answer to the question of whether or not petitioners are
properly regarded as imbued with the standing necessary to bring and maintain
the present petition.
Firstly, the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case is of major importance. In the case presently before the Court, the
funds involved are clearly public in nature. The funds to be generated by the proposed lottery are to be raised from
the population at large. Should the
proposed operation be as successful as its proponents project, those funds will
come from well-nigh every town and barrio of Luzon. The funds here involved are public in another very real
sense: they will belong to the PCSO, a
government owned or controlled corporation and an instrumentality of the
government and are destined for utilization in social development projects
which, at least in principle, are designed to benefit the general public. My learned brothers Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ.
concede that taxpayers’ suits have been recognized as an exception to the
traditional requirement of recognized as an exception to the traditional
requirement of locus standi. They insist, however, that because the funds here involved will not have
been generated by the exercise of the taxing power of the Government, the
present petition cannot be regarded as a taxpayer’s suit and therefore, must be
dismissed by the Court. It is my
respectful submission that that constitutes much too narrow a conception of the
taxpayer’s suit and of the public policy that it embodies. It is also to overlook the fact that tax
monies, strictly so called, constitute only one (1) of the major categories of
funds today raised and used for public purposes. It is widely known that the principal sources of funding for
government operations today include, not just taxes and customs duties, but also
revenues derived from activities of the Philippine Amusement Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), as well as the proceeds of privatization of government owned or
controlled corporations and other government owned assets. The interest of a private citizen in seeing
to it that public funds, from whatever source they may have been derived, go
only to the uses directed and permitted by law is as real and personal and
substantial as the interest of a private taxpayer in seeing to it that tax
monies are not intercepted on their
way to the public treasury or otherwise diverted from uses prescribed or
allowed by law. It is also pertinent to
note that the more successful the government is in raising revenues by nontraditional
methods such as PAGCOR operations and privatization measures, the lesser will
be the pressure upon the traditional sources of public revenues, i.e., the
pocket books of individual taxpayers and importers.
A second factor of high
relevance is the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government. A showing that a
constitutional or legal provision is patently being disregarded by the agency
or instrumentality whose act is being assailed, can scarcely be disregarded by
court. The concept of locus standi
— which is part and parcel of the broader notion of ripeness of the case —
“does not operate independently and is not alone decisive. x x x [I]t is in substantial part a function
of a judge’s estimate of the merits of the constitutional [or legal]
issue.”[3] The notion of locus standi and
the judge’s conclusions about the merits of the case, in other words, interact
with each other. Where the Court
perceives a serious issue of violation of some constitutional or statutory
limitation, it will be much less difficult for the Court to find locus standi
in the petitioner and to confront the legal or constitutional issue. In the present case, the majority of the
Court considers that a very substantial showing has been made that the Contract
of Lease between the PCSO and the PGMC flies in the face of legal limitations.
A third consideration of
importance in the present case is the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions here being raised. Though a public bidding was held, no losing
or dissatisfied bidder has come before the Court. The Office of the Ombudsman has not, to the
knowledge of the Court, raised questions about the legality or
constitutionality of the Contract of Lease here involved. The National Government itself, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, is defending the PCSO Contract (though it had
not participated in the drafting thereof). In a situation like that here obtaining, the submission may be made that
the institution, so well known in corporation law and practice, of the
corporate stockholders’ derivative suit furnishes an appropriate analogy and
that on the basis of such an analogy, a taxpayer’s derivative suit should be
recognized as available.
The wide range of impact of the Contract of Lease here assailed
and of its implementation, constitutes still another consideration of
significance. In the case at bar, the
agreement if implemented will be practically nationwide in its scope and reach
(the PCSO-PGMC Contract is limited in its application to the Island of Luzon;
but if the PCSO Contracts with the other two [2] private “gaming
management” corporations in respect of the Visayas and Mindanao are
substantially similar to PCSO’s Contract with PGMC, then the Contract before us
may be said to be national indeed in its implications and consequences). Necessarily, the amounts of money expected
to be raised by the proposed activities of the PCSO and PGMC will be very
substantial, probably in the hundreds of millions of pesos. It is not easy to conceive of a contract
with greater and more far-reaching consequences, literally speaking, for the
country than the Contract of Lease here involved. Thus, the subject matter of the petition is not something that
the Court may casually pass over as unimportant and as not warranting the
expenditure of significant judicial resources.
In the examination of the various features of this, case, the
above considerations have appeared to me to be important and as pressing for
acceptance and exercise of jurisdiction on the part of this Court. It is with these considerations in mind that
I vote to grant due course to the Petition and to hold that the Contract of
Lease between the PCSO and PGMC in its present form and content, and given the present state of the law, is fatally
defective.
[1]
The requirement of locus standi
forms part of the “application of ordinary law technique to the
Constitution” which historically, in the United States, promoted and
reinforced the “legalization” or acceptance of the power of judicial
review; S. Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution, p.
197 (1990).
[2]
A stimulating effort is offered by
Prof. Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985), Chap. 8, where
he examined certain trends in, and circumstances relating to, the case law of
the Supreme Court of the United States which “make a satisfactory theory
of standing specially elusive” (p. 100).
[3]
A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 169 (1962); brackets supplied.
200
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
dissenting OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
I regret that I am unable to join my colleagues in the majority
in spite of my own personal distaste for gambling and other gaming
operations. Such considerations aside,
I feel there are compelling reasons why the instant petition should be
dismissed. I shall forthwith state the
reasons why.
Petitioners anchor their principal objections against the
contract entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
and the PGMC on the ground that the contract entered into by the PCSO with the
PGMC violates the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg 427,
specifically section 1 thereof which bars the said body from holding conducting
lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person
association, company or entity.”). However, a perusal of the petition reveals that the compelling reasons
behind it, while based on apparently legal questions involving the contract
between the PCSO and the PGMC, are prompted by the petitioners’ moral
objections against the whole idea of gambling operations operated by the
government through the PCSO. The whole
point of the petition, in essence, is a fight between good and evil, between
the morality or amorality of lottery operations conducted on a wide scale
involving millions of individuals and affecting millions of lives. Their media of opposition are the above
stated defects in the said contract which they assail to be fatally
defective. They come to this Court, as
taxpayers and civic spirted citizens, asserting a right of standing on a
transcendental issue which they assert to be of paramount public interest.
Moral or legal questions aside, I believe that there are
unfortunately certain standards[1] that
have to be followed in the exercise of this Court’s awesome power of review
before this Court could even begin to assay the validity of the contract
between the PCSO and the PGMC. This, in
spite of the apparent expansion of judicial power granted by Section 1 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. It is fundamental that such standards be complied with before this Court
could even begin to explore the substantive issues raised by any controversy
brought before it, for no issue brought before this court could possibly be so
fundamental and paramount as to warrant a relaxation of the requisite rules for
judicial review developed by settled jurisprudence in order to avoid entangling
this court in controversies which properly belong to the legislative or
executive branches of our government. The potential harm to our system of government, premised on the concept
of separation of powers, by the Court eager to exercise its powers and
prerogatives at every turn, cannot be gainsaid. The Constitution does not mandate this Court to wield the power
of judicial review with excessive vigor and alacrity in every area or at every
turn, except in appropriate cases and controversies which meet established requirements for
constitutional adjudication. Article
VIII Sec. 1 of the Constitution notwithstanding, there are questions which I
believe are still beyond the pale of judicial power. Moreover, it is my considered opinion that the instant petition
does not meet the requirements set by this court for a valid exercise of
judicial review.
Our Constitution expressly defines
judicial power as including “the duty to settle actual cases and controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”[2]
This constitutional requirement for an actual case and controversy limits this
Court’s power of review to precisely those suits between adversary litigants
with real interests at stake thus preventing it from making all sorts of
hypothetical pronouncements on abstract, contingent and amorphous issues. The Court will therefore not pass upon the
validity of an act of government or a statute passed by a legislative body
without a requisite showing of injury.[3] A
personal stake is essential, which absence renders our pronouncements
gratuitous and certainly violative of the constitutional requirement for actual
cases and controversies.
The requirement for standing based on personal injury may of
course be bypassed, as the petitioners in this case attempt to do, by
considering the case as a “taxpayer suit” which would thereby clothe
them with the personality they would lack under ordinary circumstances. However, the act assailed by the petitioners
on the whole involves the generation
rather than disbursement of
public funds. In a line of cases
starting from Pascual v. Secretary
of Public Works[4] “taxpayer suits” have
been understood to refer only to those cases where the act or statute assailed
involves the illegal or unconstitutional disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. The main premise behind
the “taxpayer suit” is that the pecuniary interest of the taxpayer is
involved whenever there is an illegal or wasteful use of public funds which
grants them the right to question the appropriation or disbursement on the
basis of their contribution to government funds.[5] Since
it has not been alleged that an illegal appropriation or disbursement of a fund
derived from taxation would be made in the instant case, I fail to see how the petitioners in this case
would be able to satisfy the locus
standi requirement on
the basis of a “taxpayer’s suit”. This alone should inhibit this Court from proceeding with the case at
bench. The interest alleged and the
potential injury asserted are far too general and hypothetical for us to rush
into a judicial determination of what to me appears to be judgment better left
to executive branch of our government.
This brings me to one more important point: The idea that a norm of constitutional
adjudication could be lightly brushed aside on the mere supposition that an
issue before the Court is of paramount public concern does great harm to a democratic system which espouses a
delicate balance between three separate but co-equal branches of
government. It is equally of paramount
public concern, certainly paramount to
the survival of our democracy, that acts of the other branches of
government are accorded due respect by this Court. Such acts, done within their sphere of competence, have been- and
should always be- accorded with a presumption of regularity. When such acts are assailed as illegal or
unconstitutional, the burden falls upon those who assail these acts to prove
that they satisfy the essential norms of constitutional adjudication, because
when we finally proceed to declare an act of the executive or legislative
branch of our government unconstitutional or illegal, what we actually
accomplish is the thwarting of the will of the elected representatives of the
people in the executive or legislative branches government.[6]
Notwithstanding Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, since the exercise
of the power of judicial review by this Court is inherently antidemocratic,
this Court should exercise a becoming modesty in acting as a revisor of an act of the executive or legislative branch. The tendency of a frequent and easy resort
to the function of judicial review, particularly in areas of economic policy
has become lamentably too common as to dwarf the political capacity of the
people expressed through their representatives in the policy making branches of
government and to deaden their sense of moral responsibility.[7]
This court has been accused, of late, of an officious tendency to
delve into areas better left to the political branches of government.[8]
This tendency, if exercised by a court running riot over the other coequal
branches of government, poses a greater danger to our democratic system than
the perceived danger – real or imagined – of an executive branch espousing
economic or social policies of doubtful moral worth. Moreover economic policy decisions in the current milieu –
including the act challenged in the instant case-involve complex factors
requiring flexibility and a wide range of discretion on the part of our
economic managers which this Court should respect because our power of review,
under the constitution, is a power to check, not to supplant those acts or
decisions of the elected representatives of the people.
Finally, the instant petition was brought to this Court on the
assumption that the issue at bench raises primarily constitutional issues. As it has ultimately turned out, the core
foundation of the petitioners’ objections to the LOTTO operations was based on
the validity of the contract between the PCSO and the PGMC in the light of
Section 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 427. It might have been much more appropriate for the issue to have
taken its normal course in the courts below.
I vote to deny the petition.
[1]
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937)
[2]
JACKSON, The Supreme Court in
the American System of Government in McKay, An American
Constitutional Law Reader 30 (1958).
[3]
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 US
288, at 346-348 (1936).
[4]
110 Phil. 331 (1960). See also Lozada v. COMELEC 120 SCRA 337 (1983); Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771, (1991)
).
[5]
Appeal of Sears, Roebuck and Co., 123 Ind., App.; 109 NE 2d., 620 (1952).
[6]
See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962).
[7]
Id., citing J.B. Thayer, JOHN MARSHALL, 106-107 (1901).
[8]
See Romulo, The Supreme Court and Economic Policy: A Plea for Judicial
Abstinence 67 Phil. L.J. 348-353 (1993). See also Fernandez,
Judicial Overreaching in
Selected Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Economic Policy, 67 Phil. L.J. 332-347 (1993) and Castro & Pison, The
Economic Policy Determining Function of the Supreme Court in Times of National
Crisis, 67 Phil. L.J.
354-411 (1993).
230
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3
Dissenting opinion
MELO, J.:
I submit that the petition before the Court deserves no less than
outright dismissal for the reason that petitioners, as concerned citizens and
as taxpayers and as members of Congress, do not possess the necessary legal standing
to assail the validity of the contract of lease entered into by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
relative to the establishment and operation of an “On-line Hi-Tech Lottery
System” in the country.
As announced in Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. [1912], 559 ),
“[J]udicial power in its nature, is the power to hear and decide causes
pending between parties who have the right to sue and be sued in the
courts of law and equity.” Necessarily, this implies that a party must
show a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy or an injury to himself
that can be addressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation
of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify the court’s remedial powers in his behalf
(Warth vs. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490; Guzman vs. Marrero, 180 U.S. 81;
McMicken vs. United States, 97 U.S. 204). Here, we have yet to see any of petitioners acquiring a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy or being placed in a situation whereby
injury may be sustained if the contract of lease in question is
implemented. It may be that the
contract has somehow evoked public interest which petitioners claim to
represent. But the alleged public
interest which they pretend to represent is not only broad and encompassing but
also strikingly and veritably indeterminate that one cannot truly say whether a
handful of the public, like herein petitioners, may lay a valid claim of
representation in behalf of the millions of citizens spread all over the land
who may have just as many varied reactions relative to the contract in
question.
Any effort to infuse personality on petitioners by considering
the present case as a “taxpayer’s suit” could not cure the lack of locus standi on the part of petitioners. As understood in this jurisdiction, a
“taxpayer’s suit” refers to a case where the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation (Pascual vs. Secretary of
Public Works, 110 Phil. [1960] 331; Maceda vs. Macaraig,
197 SCRA [1991]; Lozada vs.
COMELEC, 120 SCRA
[1983] 337; Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA [1980] 392; Gonzales vs. Marcos, 65 SCRA [1975] 624). It cannot be overstressed that no public
fund raised by taxation is involved in this case. In fact, it is even doubtful if the rentals which the PCSO will
pay to the lessor for its operation of the lottery system may be regarded as
“public fund”. The PCSO is
not a revenue-collecting arm of the government. Income or money realized by it from its operations will not and
need not be turned over to the National Treasury. Rather, this will constitute corporate funds which will remain
with the corporation to finance its various activities as authorized in its
charter. And if ever some semblance of
“public character” may be said to attach to its earnings, it is
simply because PCSO is a government-owned or controlled entity and not a purely
private enterprise.
It must be conceded though that a “taxpayer’s suit” had
been allowed in a number of instances in this jurisdiction. For sure, after the trail was blazed by Pascual
vs. Secretary of Public Works, supra, several more followed. It is to be noted, however, that in those
occasions where this Court allowed such a suit, the case invariably involved
either the constitutionality of a statute or the legality of the disbursement
of public funds through the enforcement of what was perceived to be an invalid
or unconstitutional statute or legislation (Pascual, supra; Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc. vs. Jimenez, 15 SCRA [1965] 479; Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc. vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA [1966] 300; Tolentino
vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA [1971] 702; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA
[1965] 569; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, 13
SCRA [1965] 377).
The case before us is not a challenge to the validity of a
statute or an attempt to restrain expenditure of public funds pursuant to an
alleged invalid congressional enactment. What petitioners ask us to do is to nullify a simple contract of lease
entered into by a government-owned corporation with a private entity. That contract, as earlier pointed out, does
not involve the disbursement of public funds but of strictly corporate money. If every taxpayer, claiming to have interest
in the contract, no matter how remote, could come to this Court and seek
nullification of said contract, the day may come when the activities of
government corporate entities will ground to a standstill on account of
nuisance suits filed against them by persons whose supposed interest in the
contract is as remote and as obscure as the interest of any man in the
street. The dangers attendant thereto
are not hard to discern and this Court must not allow them to come to pass.
One final observation must be emphasized. When the petition at bench was filed, the
Court decided to hear the case on oral argument on the initial perception that
a constitutional issue could be involved. However, it now appears that no question of constitutional dimension is
at stake as indeed the majority barely touches on such an issue, concentrating
as it does on its interpretation of the contract between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the petition.
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
My views against gambling are a matter of judicial record. In Basco v. PAGCOR, (G.R. No. 91649,
14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52) I expressed these views in a separate opinion where I
was joined by that outstanding lady jurist, Mme. Justice A. Melencio-Herrera
whose incisive approach to legal problems is today missed in this Court. I reproduce here those views because they
are highly persuasive to the conclusions I reach in the present controversy:
“I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my
brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means
that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition,
control, and regulation of the entire
activity known as gambling properly pertain to “state policy.” It is,
therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and
the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire
area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy.
The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom,
morality or expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of
government in areas which fall within their authority, except only when such
policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This case does not involve such a factual
situation.
However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to
gambling in any form. It demeans the
human personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one’s self-respect,
which in the long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral
character. Gambling has wrecked and
will continue to wreck families and homes; it is an antithesis to individual
reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones
of real economic progress and national development.
Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or
privatized. The revenues realized by
the government out of “legalized” gambling will, in the long run, be
more than offset and negated by the irreparable damage to the people’s moral
values.
Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals
against “illegal gambling” is
fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very
activity it seeks to eradicate.
One can go through the Court’s decision today and mentally replace
the activity referred to therein as gambling, which is legal only
because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity
known as prostitution. Would
prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law,
franchised, and “regulated” by the government, in return for the
substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable
projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative
department outlaws all forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy,
and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be for
the nation.”
We presently have the sweepstakes lotteries; we already have the
PAGCOR’s gambling casinos; the Filipino people will soon, if plans do not
miscarry, be initiated into an even more sophisticated and encompassing
nationwide gambling network known as the “on-line hi-tech lotto
system.” To be sure, it is not wealth producing; it is not export oriented. It will draw from existing wealth
in the hands of Filipinos and transfer it into the coffers of the PCSO and its
foreign partners at a price of further debasement of the moral standards of the
Filipino people, the bulk of whom are barely subsisting below the poverty line.
1. It is said that
petitioners[1]
have no locus standi to bring this suit even as they challenge
the legality and constitutionality of a contract of lease between the PCSO, a
government-owned corporation and the PGMC, a private corporation with substantial
(if not controlling) foreign composition and content. Such contract of lease contains the terms and conditions under
which an “on-line hi-tech lotto system” will operate in the country.
As the ponente of the extended, unsigned en banc
resolution in Valmonte v. PCSO, (G.R. No. 78716 and G.R. No. 79084, 22
September 1987), I would be the last to downgrade the rule, therein reiterated,
that in order to maintain a suit challenging the constitutionality and/or
legality of a statute, order or regulation or assailing a particular
governmental action as done with grave abuse of discretion or with lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner must show that he has a clear personal
or legal right that would be violated with the enforcement
of the challenged statute, order or regulation or the implementation of the
questioned governmental action. But, in
my considered view, this rule maybe (and should be) relaxed when the issue
involved or raised in the petition is of such paramount national interest and
importance as to dwarf the above procedural rule into a barren
technicality. As a unanimous Court en banc
aptly put it in De Guia vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208
SCRA 420,
“Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court
observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection,
much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in
Parañaque. As such, he does not appear
to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or
substantial interest. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976. 73 SCRA 333; Municipality of Malabang vs.
Benito, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533) He does not also allege
any legal right that has been violated
by respondent. If for this alone,
petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved,
concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by
the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of
the Constitution by respondent, We resolved to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We
perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through Mr. Justice
Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña vs. Comission on Elections.”
I view the present case as falling within the De Guia
case doctrine. For, when the contract
of lease in question seeks to establish and operate a nationwide gambling
network with substantial if not controlling foreign participation, then the
issue is of paramount national interest and importance as to justify and
warrant a relaxation of the above-mentioned procedural rule on locus standi.
2. The charter of the PCSO
– Republic Act No. 1169 as mended by BP No. 42 – insofar as relevant, reads:
“Sec. 1. The
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. – The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the
Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for
funds for health programs, medical assistance
and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the
general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand Four
Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended,
and shall have the authority:
‘A. To hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, in such frequency
and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations
as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
‘B. Subject to the
approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health and
welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be
profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign,
except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the
purpose of providing for permanent and continuing sources of funds for health
programs, including the expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and
services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such investments will not compete with the private sector
in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority.”
It is at once clear from the foregoing legal provisions that, while
the PCSO charter allows the PCSO to itself engage in lotteries, it does not
however permit the PCSO to undertake or engage in lotteries in
“collaboration, association or joint venture” with others. The palpable reason for this prohibition is,
that PCSO should not and cannot be made a vehicle for an otherwise prohibited
foreign or domestic entity to engage in lotteries (gambling activities) in the
Philippines.
The core question then is whether the lease contract between PCSO
and PGMC is a device whereby PCSO will engage in lottery in collaboration,
association or joint venture with another, i.e. PGMC. I need not go here into the details and different specific
features of the contract to show that it is a joint venture between PCSO and
PGMC. That has been taken care of in
the opinion of Mr. Justice Davide to which I fully subscribe.
On a slightly different plane and, perhaps simplified, I consider
the agreement or arrangement between the PCSO and PGMC a joint venture because each party to the contract contributes
its share in the enterprise or project. PGMC contributes its facilities, equipment and know-how
(expertise). PCSO contributes (aside
from its charter) the market, directly or through dealers – and this to me is
most important – in the totality or mass of the Filipino gambling
elements who will invest in lotto tickets. PGMC will get its 4.9% of gross receipts (with assumption of certain
risks in the course of lotto operations); the residue of the whole exercise
will go to PCSO. To any person with a
minimum of business know-how, this is a joint venture between PCSO and PGMC,
plain and simple.
But assuming ex gratia argumenti that such
arrangement between PCSO and PGMC is not a joint venture between the two of
them to install and operate an “on-line hi-tech lotto system” in the
country, it can hardly be denied that it is, at the very least, an association
or collaboration between PCSO and PGMC. For one cannot do without the other in the installation, operation and,
most importantly, marketing of the entire enterprise or project in this
country.
Indeed, the contract of lease in question is a clear violation of
Republic Act No. 1169 as amended
by BP No. 42 (the PCSO charter).
Having arrived at the conclusion that the contract of lease in
question between the PCSO and PGMC is illegal and, therefore, invalid, I find
it unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised in the pleadings and
arguments of the parties.
I, therefore, vote to give DUE COURSE to the petition and to
declare the contract of lease in question between PCSO and PGMC, for the
reasons aforestated, of no force and effect.
[1]
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, a non-stock corporation composed of civic-spirited
citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause
of truth, justice and national renewal as well as members of the Board of
Trustees of KILOSBAYAN as taxpayers and concerned citizens and senators Freddie
Webb, Wigberto Tanada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo as taxpayers,
concerned citizens and legislators.
230
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3
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
At the outset, let me state that my religious faith and family
upbringing compel me to regard gambling, regardless of its garb, with hostile
eyes. Such antagonism tempts me to view
the case at bench as a struggle
between good and evil, a fight between the forces of light against the forces
of darkness. I will not, however, yield
to that temptation for we are not judges of the Old Testament type who were not
only arbiters of law but were also high priests of morality.
I will therefore strictly confine the peregrinations of my mind
to the legal issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioners have the locus standi to file the petition
at bench; and (2) assuming their locus
standi, whether or not the Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC
is null and void considering: (a)
section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42 (Charter of PCSO) which
prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity”; (b) Act No. 3836 which requires a
congressional franchise before any person or entity can establish and operate a
telecommunication system; (c) section 11, Art. XII of the Constitution, which
requires that for a corporation to operate a public utility, at least 60% of
its capital must be owned by Filipino citizens; and (d) R.A. No. 7042,
otherwise known as the “Foreign Investments Act”, which includes all
forms of gambling in its “negative list.”
While the legal issues abound, I deferentially submit that the
threshold issue is the locus standi, or standing to sue, of petitioners. The petition describes petitioner
Kilosbayan, Inc., as a non-stock corporation composed of “civic spirited
citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the
cause of truth, justice, and national renewal.”[1]
Petitioners Jovito R. Salonga, Cirilo A. Rigos, Ernie Camba, Emilio C.
Capulong, Jr., Jose Abcede, Christine Tan, Felipe L. Gozon, Rafael G. Fernando,
Raoul V. Victorino, Jose Cunanan, and Quintin S. Doromal joined the petition in
their capacity as trustees of Kilosbayan, Inc., and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens.[2]
Petitioners Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tanada joined the petition as senators,
taxpayers and concerned citizens.[3]
Petitioner Joker P. Arroyo joined the petition as a member of the House of Representative, a taxpayer and a concerned
citizen.[4]
With due respect to the majority opinion, I wish to focus on the
interstices of locus standi, a concept described by Prof. Paul Freund as “among the most
amorphous in the entire domain of public law.” The requirement of standing
to sue inheres from the definition of judicial power. It is not merely a technical rule of procedure which we are at
liberty to disregard. Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
“x x x
“Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” (Underscoring supplied)
The phrase “actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” has
acquired a cultivated meaning given by courts. It spells out the requirements that must be satisfied before one can
come to court to litigate a constitutional issue. Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, gives a
shorthand summary of these requirements when he states that no constitutional
question will be heard and decided by courts unless there is a showing of the
following: x x x (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.[5]
The complexion of the rule on locus standi has been
undergoing a change. Mr. Justice Cruz
has observed the continuing relaxation of the rule on standing,[6]
thus:
“x x x
“A proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Until and unless such actual or potential
injury is established, the complainant cannot have the legal personality to
raise the constitutional question.
“In Tileson v. Ullmann,
a physician questioned the constitutionality of a law prohibiting
the use of contraceptives, upon the ground that it might prove dangerous to the
life or health of some of his patients whose physical condition would not
enable them to bear the rigors of childbirth. The court dismissed the challenge, holding that the patients of the
physician and not the physician himself were the proper parties.
“In Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, the petitioner challenged in a quo
warranto proceeding the title of the respondent who, he claimed, had been
appointed to the board of medical examiners in violation of the provisions of
the Medical Act of 1959. The Supreme
Court dismissed the petition, holding that Cuyegkeng had not made a claim to
the position held by Cruz and therefore could not be regarded as a proper party
who had sustained an injury as a result of the questioned act.
“In People v. Vera, it was held that the Government of
the Philippines was a proper party to challenge the constitutionality of the
Probation Act because, more than any other, it was the government itself that
should be concerned over the validity of its own laws.
“In Ex Parte Levitt, the petitioner, an American
taxpayer and member of the bar, filed a motion for leave to question the
qualifications of Justice Black who, he averred, had been appointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The Court dismissed the petition, holding
that Levitt was not a proper party since he was not claiming the position held
by Justice Black.
“The rule before was that an ordinary taxpayer did not have
the proper party personality to question the legality of an appropriation law
since his interest in the sum appropriated was not substantial enough. Thus, in Custodio v. Senate President,
a challenge by an ordinary taxpayer to the validity of a law granting back pay
to government officials, including members of Congress, during the period
corresponding to the Japanese Occupation was dismissed as having been commenced
by one who was not a proper party.
“Since the first Emergency
Powers Cases, however, the rule has been changed and it is now permissible
for an ordinary taxpayer, or a group of taxpayers, to raise the question of the
validity of an appropriation law. As
the Supreme Court then put it. ‘The
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.’
“In Tolentino
v. Commission on Elections, it was held that a senator had the proper party
personality to seek the prohibition of a plebiscite for the ratification of a
proposed constitutional amendment. In PHILCONSA v. Jimenez, an
organization of taxpayers and citizens was held to be a proper party to
question the constitutionality of a law providing for special retirement
benefits for members of the legislature.
“In Sanidad
v. Commission on Elections, the Supreme
Court upheld the petitioners as proper parties, thus ?
‘As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in
L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi
to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031,
and 1033. It is now an ancient rule
that the valid source of a statute – Presidential Decrees are of such nature –
may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. At the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined,
upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State
for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million
Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates
the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners
as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money
sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the
Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regard taxpayer’s suits, this Court enjoys that open
discretion to entertain the same or not. For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion
affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are
predicated may be inquired into.’
“In Lozada
v. Commission on Elections, however, the petitioners were held without
legal standing to demand the filling of vacancies in the legislature because
they had only ‘a generalized interest’ shared with the rest of the
citizenry.”
Last July 30, 1993, we further relaxed
the rule on standing in Oposa, et
al. v. Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,[7] where we recognized the locus
standi of minors representing themselves as well as
generations unborn to protect their constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
I am perfectly at peace with the drift of our decisions
liberalizing the rule on locus
standi. The once stubborn disinclination to
decide constitutional issues due to lack of locus standi is
incompatible with the expansion of judicial power mandated in section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, i.e., “to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.” As we held
thru the ground breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Cruz in Daza v. Singson,[8] this provision no longer
precludes the Court from resolving political questions in proper cases. But even perusing this provision as a
constitutional warrant for the court to enter the once forbidden political thicket,
it is clear that the requirement of locus
standi has not been jettisoned by the Constitution for it still
commands courts in no uncertain terms to settle only “actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.” Stated otherwise, courts are neither free to decide all
kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are
they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a
grievance. The rationale for this
constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is
intended “to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and,
perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary’s overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government.”[9] It thus goes to the very essence of
representative democracies. As Mr.
Justice Powell carefully explained in U.S. v. Richardson,[10]
viz:
“Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to
the expansion of judicial power. It
seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing
would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a
shift away from a democratic form of government. I also believe that repeated and essentially head-on
confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches
of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the
former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not
exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions
of the other branches. We should be
ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to
permit at large oversight of the elected branches of government by a
nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judicial branch. Moreover, the argument that the Court should
allow unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing underestimates the ability of
the representative branches of the Federal Government to respond to the citizen
pressure that has been responsible in large measure for the current drift
toward expanded standing. Indeed,
taxpayer or citizen advocacy, given its potentially broad base, is precisely
the type of leverage that in a democracy ought to be employed against the
branches that were intended to be responsive to public attitudes about the
appropriate operation of government. ‘We must as judges recall that, as Mr. Justice Holmes wisely observed,
the other branches of Government are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.’
“Unrestrained standing in federal taxpayer or citizen suits
would create a remarkably illogical system of judicial supervision of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government. Randolph’s proposed Council of Revision, which was repeatedly rejected
by the Framers, at least had the virtue of being systematic; every law passed
by the legislature automatically would have been previewed by the judiciary
before the law could take effect. On
the other hand, since the judiciary cannot select the taxpayers or citizens who
bring suit or the nature of the suits, the allowance of public actions would
produce uneven and sporadic review, the quality of which would be influenced by
the resources and skill of the particular plaintiff. And issues would be presented in abstract form, contrary to the
Court’s recognition that ‘judicial review is effective largely because it is
not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only
to remedy a particular, concrete injury.’ Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-741, n.16
(1972).”
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing
of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in
character. Given the sparseness of our
resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our
people is severely limited. For courts
to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors
is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render
themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that
clearly confronts our judiciary today.
Prescinding from these premises, and with great reluctance, I am
not prepared to concede the standing to sue of petitioners. On a personal level, they have not shown
that elemental injury in fact which will endow them with a standing to
sue. It must be stressed that petitioners are in the main,
seeking the nullity not of a law but of
a Contract of Lease. Not one of the
petitioners is a party to the Contract of Lease executed between PCSO and
PGMC. None of the petitioners
participated in the bidding, and hence they are not losing bidders. They are complete strangers to the
contract. They stand neither to gain
nor to lose economically by its enforcement. It seems to me unusual that an unaffected third party to a contract
could be allowed to question its validity. Petitioner Kilosbayan cannot justify this officious interference on the
ground of its commitment to “truth, justice and national renewal.”
Such commitment to truth, justice and national renewal, however noble it may
be, cannot give Kilosbayan a roving commission to check the validity of
contracts entered into by the government and its agencies. Kilosbayan is not a private commission on
audit.
Neither can I perceive how the other petitioners can be
personally injured by the Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC even if
petitioner Salonga assails as unmitigated
fraud the statistical probability of winning the lotto as he compared it to the
probability of being struck twice by lightning. The reason is obvious: none of the petitioners will be exposed to this alleged fraud for all of
them profess to abjure playing the lotto. It is self-evident that lotto cannot physically or spiritually injure
him who does not indulge in it.
Petitioners also contend they have locus standi as taxpayers. But the case at bench does not involve any
expenditure of public money on the part of PCSO. In fact, paragraph 2 of the Contract of Lease provides that it is
PGMC that shall build, furnish, and maintain at its own expense and risk
the facilities for the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO and shall bear all
maintenance and other costs. Thus, PGMC
alleged it has already spent
P245M in equipment and fixtures and would be investing close to P1 billion to
supply adequately the technology and other requirements of PCSO.[11]
If no tax money is being illegally deflected in the Contract of Lease between
PCSO and PGMC, petitioners have no standing to impugn its validity as
taxpayers. Our ruling in Dumlao v. Comelec,[12] settled this issue well enough, viz:
“However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case,
namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 5 BP Blg. 52, do not
directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure
of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that
their tax money is ‘being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power’ (Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds
by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18
SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs.
Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer’s
suit, per se, is no
assurance of judicial review. As held
by this Court in Yan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this
Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer’s suit should be entertained.”
Next, petitioners plead their standing as “concerned
citizens.” As citizens, petitioners are pleading that they be allowed to
advocate the constitutional rights of other persons who are not before the
court and whose protection is allegedly their concern. A citizen qua citizen suit urges a greater relaxation of the rule
on locus standi. I
feel no aversion to the further relaxation
of the rule on standing to accommodate what in other jurisdictions is known
as an assertion of jus tertii in constitutional
litigation provided the claimant can demonstrate: (1) an injury in fact to himself, and (2) the need to prevent the
erosion of a preferred constitutional right of a third person. As stressed before, the first requirement of
injury in fact cannot be abandoned for it is an essential element for the
exercise of judicial power. Again, as stressed by Mr. Justice Powell, viz:[13]
“The revolution in standing doctrine that has occurred,
particularly in the 12 years since Baker v. Carr, supra, has not meant,
however, that standing barriers have disappeared altogether. As the Court noted in Sierra Club,
‘broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing
is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking
review must himself have suffered an injury.” 405 U.S., at 738 . . .
Indeed, despite the diminution of standing requirements in the last decade, the
Court has not broken with the traditional requirement that, in the absence of a
specific statutory grant of the right of review, a plaintiff must allege some
particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the street.
I recognize that the Court’s allegiance to a requirement of
particularized injury has on occasion required a reading of the concept that
threatens to transform it beyond recognition. E.G., Baker v. Carr, supra; Flast v. Cohen, supra. But despite such occasional digressions, the
requirement remains, and I think it does so for the reasons outlined
above. In recognition of those
considerations, we should refuse to go the last mile towards abolition of
standing requirements that is implicit in broadening the ‘precarious opening’
for federal taxpayers created by Flast, see 392 U.S., at 116 (Mr. Justice
Fortas, concurring) or in allowing a citizen qua citizen to invoke the power of
the federal courts to negative unconstitutional acts of the Federal Government.
In sum, I believe we should limit the expansion of federal taxpayer
and citizen standing in the absence of specific statutory authorization to an
outer boundary drawn by the results in
Flast and Baker v. Carr. I think we
should face up to the fact that all such
suits are an effort ‘to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air . . .
generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of
power in the Federal System.’ Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 106. The Court should explicitly reaffirm
traditional prudential barriers against such public actions. My reasons for this view are rooted in
respect for democratic processes and in the conviction that ‘[t]he powers of
the federal judiciary will be adequate for the great burdens placed upon them
only if they are employed prudently, with recognition of the strengths as well
as the hazards that go with our kind of representative government.’ Id., at 131
The second requirement recognizes society’s right in the
protection of certain preferred rights in the Constitution even when the
rightholders are not before the court. The theory is that their dilution has a substantial fall out detriment
to the rights of others, hence the latter can vindicate them.
In the case at bench, it is difficult to see how petitioners can
satisfy these two requirements to maintain a jus tertii claim. They claim violation of two
constitutional provisions, to wit:
“Section 1, Article XIII. – The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
“To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.”
and
“Section 11, Article XII. – No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorizations be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in
the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers
of such corporation or association must be citizen of the Philippines.”
Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution cannot be the matrix
of petitioners’ jus tertii claim
for it expresses no more than a policy direction to the legislative in
the discharge of its ordained duty – to give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good. Whether the act of the
legislature in amending the charter of PCSO by giving it the authority to
conduct lotto and whether the Contract of Lease entered into between PCSO and
PGMC are incongruent to the policy direction of this constitutional provision
is a highly debatable proposition and can be endlessly argued. Respondents steadfastly insist that the operation
of lotto will increase the revenue base of PCSO and enable government to
provide a wider range of social services to the people. They also allege that the operation of
high-tech lotto will eradicate illegal jueteng. Petitioners are scandalized by this
submission. They dismiss gambling as
evil per se and castigate government for attempting to
correct a wrong by committing another wrong. In any event, the proper forum for this debate, however cerebrally
exciting it may be, is not this court but congress. So we held in PCSO
v. Inopiquez, to wit:[14]
“By bringing their suit in the lower court, the private
respondents in G.R. No. 79084 do not question the power of PCSO to conduct the
Instant Sweepstakes game. Rather, they assail
the wisdom of embarking upon this project because of their fear of the
‘pernicious repercussions’ which may be brought about by the Instant
Sweepstakes Game which they have labelled as ‘the worst form of gambling’ which
thus ‘affects the moral values’ of the people.
“The Court, as held in several cases, does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice, or expediency of legislation and executive
acts. It is not the province of the
courts to supervise legislation or executive orders as to keep them within the
bounds of propriety, moral values and common sense. That is primarily and even exclusively a concern of the political
departments of the government; otherwise, there will be a violation of the
principle of separation of powers.” (Underscoring supplied)
I am not also convinced that petitioners can justify their locus standi to advocate the rights
of hypothetical third parties not before the court by invoking the need to keep
inviolate section 11, Article XII of the Constitution which imposes a nationality requirement on operators
of a public utility. For even assuming arguendo that PGMC is a public
utility, still, the records do not at the moment bear out the claim of
petitioners that PGMC is a foreign owned and controlled corporation. This factual issue remains unsettled and is
still the subject of litigation by the parties in the Securities and Exchange
Commission. We are not at liberty to
anticipate the verdict on this contested factual issue. But over and above this consideration, I
respectfully submit that this constitutional provision does not confer on third
parties any right of a preferred status comparable to the Bill of Rights whose
dilution will justify petitioners to vindicate them in behalf of its
rightholders. The legal right of hypothetical
third parties they profess to advocate is to my mind too impersonal, too
unsubstantial, too indirect, too amorphous to justify their access to this
Court and the further lowering of the constitutional barrier of locus standi.
Again, with regret, I do not agree that the distinguished status
of some of the petitioners as lawmakers gives them the appropriate locus standi. I cannot perceive how
their constitutional rights and prerogatives as legislators can be adversely
affected by the contract in question. Their right to enact laws for the general conduct of our society remains
unimpaired and undiminished.[15]
Their status as legislators, notwithstanding, they have to demonstrate that the
said contract has caused them to suffer a personal, direct, and substantial injury in fact. They cannot simply advance a generic
grievance in common with the people in general.
I am not unaware of our ruling in De Guia v. Comelec,[16]
viz:
“Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court
observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection,
much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in
Paranaque. As such, he does not appear
to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or
substantial interest. (Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L?44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333; Municipality of
Malabang vs. Benito, G.R. No. L?28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533). He does not also allege any legal right that
has been violated by respondent. If for
this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved,
concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by
the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of
the Constitution by respondent, We resolved to brush aside the question of
procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory
relief. We so held similarly through
Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmena vs. Commission on Elections.”
It is my respectful submission, however,
that we should re-examine de Guia. It
treated the rule on locus standi as a mere procedural rule. It is not a plain procedural rule but a
constitutional requirement derived from section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
which mandates courts of justice to settle only “actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.” The phrase has been construed since time immemorial to mean that a party in a constitutional litigation
must demonstrate a standing to sue. By
downgrading the requirement on locus
standi as a procedural rule which can be discarded in the
name of public interest, we are in effect amending the Constitution by judicial
fiat.
De Guia would also brush aside the rule on locus standi if a case raises an important
issue. In this regard, I join the
learned observation of Mr. justice Feliciano: “that it is not enough for the Court simply to invoke ‘public
interest’ or even ‘paramount considerations of national interest,’ and to say
that the specific requirements of such public interest can only be ascertained on a ‘case to case’ basis. For one thing, such an approach is not
intellectually satisfying. For another,
such an answer appears to come too close to saying that locus standi
exists whenever at least a majority of
the Members of this Court participating in a case feel that an appropriate case
for judicial intervention has arisen.”
I also submit that de Guia failed to perceive that the rule on locus standi has little to do with the issue posed
in a case, however, important it may be. As well pointed out in Flast v.
Cohen:[17]
“The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the
party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues
he wishes to have adjudicated. The
‘gist of the question of standing’ is whether the party seeking relief has
‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.’ Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the
question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party
to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue
itself is justiciable. Thus, a party
may have standing in a particular case, but the federal court may nevertheless
decline to pass on the merits of the case because, for example, it presents a
political question. A proper party is
demanded so that federal courts will not be asked to decide ‘ill-defined
controversies over constitutional issues,’ United public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947), or a case which is of ‘a hypothetical or abstract
character,’ Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240
(1937).”
It is plain to see that in de Guia, the
court took an unorthodox posture, to say the least. It held there was no proper party before it, and yet it resolved
the issues posed by the petition. As
there was no proper party before the court, its decision is vulnerable to be
criticized as an advisory opinion.
With due respect, the majority decision appears to have set a
dangerous precedent by unduly trivializing the rule on locus standi. By its decision, the majority has
entertained a public action to annul a private contract. In so doing, the majority may have given
sixty (60) million Filipinos the standing to assail contracts of government and
its agencies. This is an invitation for
chaos to visit our law on contract, and certainly will not sit well with
prospective foreign investors. Indeed,
it is difficult to tread the path of the majority on this significant
issue. The majority granted locus
standi to petitioners because of lack of any other party with more direct
and specific interest. But one has
standing because he has standing on his own and standing cannot be acquired
because others with standing have refused to come to court. The thesis is also floated that petitioners
have standing as they can be considered taxpayers with right to file derivative
suit like a stockholder’s derivative suit in private corporations. The fact, however, is that PCSO is not a
private but a quasi-public corporation. Our law on private corporation categorically sanctions stockholder’s
derivative suit. In contrast, our law
on public corporation does not recognize this so-called taxpayer’s derivative
suit. Hence, the idea of a taxpayer’s
derivative suit, while alluring, has no legal warrant.
Our brethren in the majority have also taken the unprecedented
step of striking down a contract at the importunings of strangers thereto, but without
justifying the interposition of judicial power on any felt need to prevent
violation of an important constitutional provision. The contract in question was voided on the sole ground that it
violated an ordinary statute, section 1 of R.A. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg.
42. If there is no provision of the
Constitution that is involved in the case at bench, it boggles the mind how the
majority can invoke considerations of national interest to justify its abandonment
of the rule on locus standi. The
volume of noise created by the case
cannot magically convert it to a case of paramount national importance. By its ruling, the majority has
pushed the Court in unchartered water bereft of any compass, and it may have
foisted the false hope that it is the repository of all remedies.
If I pay an unwavering reverence to the rule of locus standi,
it is because I consider it as a touchstone in maintaining the proper balance
of power among the three branches of our government. The survival of our democracy rests in a large measure on our
ability to maintain this delicate
equipoise of powers. For this reason, I
look at judicial review from a distinct prism. I see it both as a power and a duty. It is a power because it enables the judiciary to check excesses
of the Executive and the Legislative. But, it is also a duty because its requirement of locus standi,
among others, keeps the judiciary from overreaching the powers of the other
branches of government. By balancing
this duality, we are able to breathe life to the principle of separation of
powers and prevent tyranny. To be sure,
it is our eternal concern to prevent tyranny but that includes tyranny by
ourselves. The Constitution did not
install a government by the judiciary, nay, not a government by the unelected. In offering this submission, I reject the
sublimal fear that an unyielding insistence on the rule on locus standi
will weaken the judiciary vis-a-vis the other branches of
government. The hindsight of history
ought to tell us that it is not power per se that strengthens. Power
unused is preferable than power misused. We contribute to constitutionalism both by the use of our power
to decide and its non use. As well
said, the cases we decide are as significant
as the cases we do not decide. Real
power belongs to him who has power over power.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, and strictly on the ground of lack of locus standi on the part of
petitioners, I vote to DENY the petition.
[1]
Petition, pp. 5-6.
[2]
Ibid, p. 6.
[3]
Ibid, p. 7.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Philippine Political Law, 1989 ed., p. 18 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95
SCRA 392.
[6]
Ibid., citations omitted.
[7]
G.R. No. 101083.
[8]
G.R. No. 86344, 180 SCRA 496 [1989].
[9]
Dorsen, Bender, Neuborne, Political and Civil Rights in the United, States,
Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 1200.
[10]
418 U.S. 166, 194 S. Ct. 2940, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 [1974].
[11]
Manila Bulletin, April 21, 1994, pp. 1 and 8.
[12]
95 SCRA 392, 403.
[13]
US v. Richardson, op. cit.
[14]
G.R. No. 79084, September 22, 1987.
[15]
Compare Coleman v. Miller, 307 US 433 [1939]; Mitchell v. Laird,
488 F2d 611 CD.C. Cir. 1973); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F2d 430 CD.C. Cir.
1974).
[16]
G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420.
[17]
392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L ed. 2d. 947 [1968].
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Judicial power encompasses both an authority and duty to resolve
“actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” (Article VIII, Section
1, 1987 Constitution). As early as the case of Lamb vs. Phipps,[1]
this Court ruled: “Judicial power,
in its nature, is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity.”[2] An
essential part of, and corollary to, this principle is the locus standi
of a party litigant, referring to one who is directly affected by, and whose
interest is immediate and substantial in, the controversy. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in
the outcome of the case or an
injury to himself that can be redressed
by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the court’s
jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his
behalf.[3]
If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can easily become too unwieldy
by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small degree,
adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality.
Locus standi, nevertheless, admits
of the so-called “taxpayer’s suit.” Taxpayer’s suits are actions or
proceedings initiated by one or more taxpayers in their own behalf or,
conjunctively, in representation of others similarly situated for the purpose
of declaring illegal or unauthorized certain acts of public officials which are
claimed to be injurious to their common interests as such taxpayers (Cf. 71 Am
Jur 2d., 179-180). The principle is
predicated upon the theory that taxpayers are, in equity, the cestui que
trust of tax funds, and any illegal diminution thereof by public officials
constitutes a breach of trust even as it may result in an increased burden on
taxpayers (Haddock vs. Board of Public Education, 86 A2d 157;
Henderson vs. McCormick, 17 ALR 2d 470).
Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court, in his
concurring opinion in Ashwander vs. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 U.S. 288),
said:
“x x x. The Court will
not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
that he is injured by its operation. Tyler v. The Judges, 179 U.S. 405; Hendrick v. Maryland, 234 U.S. 610,
621. Among the many applications of
this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to
one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained. Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Miller, 283
U.S. 96, 99-100. In Fairchild v.
Hughes, 258 U.S. 126; the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.”
Justice Brandeis’ view, shared by Justice
Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission vs. McGrath (351 U.S.
123), was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Flast vs. Cohen (392 U.S. 83)
which held that it is only when a litigant is able to show such a personal
stake in the controversy as to assure a concrete adverseness in the issues
submitted that legal standing can attach.
A “taxpayer’s suit,” enough to confer locus standi to a party, we have held before, is understood to
be a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[4]
It is not enough that the dispute concerns public funds. A contrary rule could easily lead to a
limitless application of the term “taxpayer’s suit,” already by
itself a broad concept, since a questioned act of government would almost so
invariably entail, as a practical matter, a
financial burden of some kind.
To be sure, serious doubts have even been raised on the propriety
and feasibility of unqualifiedly recognizing the “taxpayer’s suit” as an exception from the standard rule
of requiring a party who invokes the exercise of judicial power to have a real
and personal interest or a direct injury in the outcome of a controversy. This Court has heretofore spoken on the
matter, at times even venturing beyond the usual understanding of its
applicability in the name of national or public interest. It is remarkable, nevertheless, that the
accepted connotation of locus standi has still managed to be the
rule, sanctioning, by way of exception, the so-called “taxpayer’s
suit” which courts accept on valid and compelling reasons.
A provision which has been introduced by the 1987 Constitution is
a definition, for the first time in our fundamental law, of the term
“judicial power,” as such authority and duty of courts of justice
“to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” (Article VIII,
Section 1, Constitution). I take it
that the provision has not been intended to unduly mutate, let alone to
disregard, the long established rules on locus standi. Neither has it been meant, I most
respectfully submit, to do away with the principle of separation of powers and
its essential incidents such as by, in effect, conferring omnipotence on, or
allowing an intrusion by, the courts in respect to purely political decisions,
the exercise of which is explicitly vested elsewhere, and subordinate, to that
of their own, the will of either the Legislative Department or the Executive
Department — both co-equal, independent and coordinate branches, along with
the Judiciary, in our system of government. Again, if it were otherwise, there indeed would be truth to the charge,
in the words of some constitutionalists, that “judicial tyranny” has
been institutionalized by the 1987 Constitution, an apprehension which should,
I submit, rather be held far from truth and reality.
In sum, while any act of government, be it executive in nature or
legislative in character, may be struck down and declared a nullity either
because it contravenes an express provision of the Constitution or because it
is perceived and found to be attended by or the result of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that issue, however,
must first be raised in a proper judicial controversy. The Court’s authority to look into and grant
relief in such cases would necessitate locus standi on the part
of party litigants. This requirement, in
my considered view, is not merely procedural or technical but goes into the
essence of jurisdiction and the competence of courts to take cognizance of
justiciable disputes.
In Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation vs. Laron,[5]
this Court ruled:
“x x x. Considering
the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax
law, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, specially explicated in the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the Government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit. (Citing Kapatiran vs. Tan, G.R. No. 81311,
June 30, 1988.)
“However, for the above rule to apply, it is exigent that the
taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by
the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. (Citing Estate of George Litton vs. Mendoza,
G.R. No. 49120, June 30 1988.) Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation (citing 11 Am.
Jur. 761; Dumlao, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392) and that he
will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. (Citing Sanidad,
et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., 73 SCRA 333.) It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public. (Citing Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, cited in 15 SCRA 497,
Annotation.)
As so well pointed out by Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason during
the Court’s deliberations, “due respect and proper regard for the rule on locus
standi would preclude the rendition of advisory opinions and other forms
of pronouncement on abstract issues, avoid an undue interference on matters
which are not justiciable in nature and spare the Court from getting itself
involved in political
imbroglio.”
The words of Senate President Edgardo J. Angara, carry wisdom; we
quote:
“The powers of the political branches of our government over
economic policies is rather clear: the
Congress is to set in broad but definite strokes the legal framework and
structures for economic development, while the Executive provides the
implementing details for realizing the economic ends identified by Congress and
executes the same.
“x x x x x x x x x.
“If each economic decision made by the political branches of
government, particularly by the executive, are fully open to re-examination by
the judicial branch, then very little, if any, reliance can be placed by
private economic actors on those decisions. Investors would always have to factor in possible costs arising from
judicially-determined changes affecting their immediate business,
notwithstanding assurances by executive authorities.
“Judicial decisions are, in addition, inflexible and can never
substitute for sound decision-making at the level of those who are assigned to
execute the laws of the land. Since
judicial power cannot be exercised unless an actual controversy is brought
before the courts for resolution, decisions cannot be properly modified unless
another appropriate controversy arises.” (Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, ‘The
Supreme Court in Economic Policy Making,’ Policy Review – A
Quarterly Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 1,
No. 1, January-March 1994, published by the Senate Policy Studies Group, pp.
2-3.)
A further set-back in entertaining the petition is that it
unfortunately likewise strikes at factual issues. The allegations to the effect that irregularities have been
committed in the processing and evaluation of the bids to favor respondent PGMC;
that the Malacañang Special Review Committee did not verify warranties embodied
in the contract; that the operation of telecommunication facilities is
indispensable in the operation of the lottery system; the involvement of
multi-national corporations in the operation of the on-line “hi-tech”
lottery system, and the like, require the submission of evidence. This Court is not a trier of facts, and it
cannot, at this time, resolve the above issues. Just recently, the Court has noted petitioners’ manifestation of
its petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission “for the
nullification of the General Information Sheets of PGMC” in respect
particularly to the nationality holdings in the corporation. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would
not justify a disregard of the jurisdiction of, nor would it permit us to now preempt, said Commission on
the matter.
Petitioners strongly assert, in an attempt to get the Court’s
concurrence in accepting the petition, that since lottery is a game of chance,
the “lotto” system would itself be a “crime against morals”
defined by Articles 195-199[6] of
the Revised Penal Code. Being immoral
and a criminal offense under the Revised Penal Code, petitioners contend, any
special law authorizing gambling must, by all canons of statutory
constructions, be interpreted strictly against the grantee. Citing previous decisions of this Court,
they maintain that lottery is gambling, pure and simple,[7] and
that this Court has consistently condemned the immorality and illegality of gambling
to be a “national offense and not a minor transgression;[8]
“that it is a social scourge which must be stamped out;”[9]
and, that it is pernicious to the body politic and detrimental to the nation
and its citizens.[10]
I most certainly will not renounce this Court’s above
concerns. Nevertheless, the Court must
recognize the limitations of its own authority. Courts neither legislate nor ignore legal mandates. Republic Act No. 1169, as amended,
explicitly gives public respondent PCSO the authority and power “to hold
and conduct sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar
activities.” In addition, it is authorized:
“c. To undertake any other
activity that will enhance its funds generation,
operations and funds management capabilities,
subject to the same limitations provided for in the preceding paragraph.
“It shall have a Board of Directors, hereinafter designated
the Board, composed of five members who shall be appointed, and whose
compensation and term of office shall be fixed, by the President.
“x x x x x x x x x.
“Section 9. Powers and
functions of the Board of Directors. – The Board of Directors of the
Office shall have the following powers and functions.
“(a) To adopt or amend such rules and regulations
to implement the provisions of this Act.
“x x x x x x x x x.
“(d) To promulgate rules and
regulations for the operation of the Office and to do such
act or acts as may be
necessary for the attainment of its purposes
and objectives.” (Underscoring supplied).
In People vs. Dionisio,[11]
cited by the petitioners themselves, we remarked: “What evils should be corrected as pernicious to the body
politic, and how correction should be done, is a matter primarily addressed
to the discretion of the legislative department, not
of the courts x x x.” In
Valmonte vs. PCSO,[12] we
also said:
“The Court, as held in several cases, does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation and executive
acts. It is
not the province of the courts to supervise legislation or executive orders as to keep them
within the bounds of propriety, moral values and common sense. That is
primarily and even exclusively a concern of the political departments of the
government; otherwise, there will be a violation of the principle of separation
of powers.”
The constraints on judicial power are clear. I feel,
the Court must thus beg off, albeit not without reluctance, from giving due
course to the instant petition.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
[1]
22 Phil. 456, 559.
[2]
See also Lopez vs. Roxas,
17 SCRA 761.
[3]
Warth vs. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-499, 45 L.Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975); Guzman vs. Marrero, 100
U.S. 81, 45 L.Ed. 436, 21 S.Ct. 293 (1901); McMicken vs. United States,
97 U.S. 204, 24 L.Ed. 947 (1978); Silver Star Citizens’ Committee vs.
Orlando Fla. 194 So. 2d 681 (1967); In Re Kenison’s Guardianship, 72 S.D. 180,
31 N.W. 2d 326 (1948).
[4]
See Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331; Maceda v.
Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771; Loads v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337; Dumlao vs.
COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392; Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624.
[5]
176 SCRA 240, 251.
[6]
The provisions of Arts. 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code (Forms of Gambling
and Betting), Republic Act No. 3063 (Horse Racing Bookies), Presidential Decree No. 483 (Penalizing
Betting, Game-fixing or Pointshaving and Machinations in Sports Contests); No.
449, as amended (Cockfighting Law of 1974); No. 510 (Slot Machines) in relation to Opinion Nos.
33 and 97 of the Ministry of Justice; No. 1306 (Jai-Alai Bookies) have been
repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1602, otherwise known as the New Gambling
Law (Prescribing Stiffer Penalties on Illegal Gambling). Subsequently, Letter of Instruction No. 816
was issued which excluded certain prohibited games under Presidential Decree
No. 1602.
[7]
U.S. v. Filart, 30 Phil. 80, 83
/1915/; U.S. v. Baguio, 39 Phil. 962, 966.
[8]
Ly Hong v. Republic, 109 Phil.
635.
[9]
People v. De Gorostiza, et al., 77 Phil. 88.
[10]
People v. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 129.
[11]
22 SCRA 1299, 1302.
[12]
G.R. No. 78716 and G.R. No. 79084, En
Banc Resolution, 22 September 1987.