Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this
special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision^[1]
of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners
to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their
accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal
rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment,
and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney’s fees.

We have given due course to this petition for, while to the
cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the
valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the
resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab
drivers. As we have heretofore
repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the
powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual
lives.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were
hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers^[2]
and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting
schedule. Aside from the daily
“boundary” of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air­conditioned
taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further
make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
“boundary,” for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver
by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown
reasons. Later, petitioners learned
that he was working for “Mine of Gold” Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a
taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed
passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge,
he went to his home province to recuperate.

In January 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a
taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed,
but his working schedule was made on an “alternative basis,” that is,
he drove only every other day. However,
on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his
“boundary” of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill
worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was
driving a taxi for “Bulaklak Company.”

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the
reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners
told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not
even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was
driving. This was allegedly the
practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair
of their taxicab units. When Maldigan
insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part,
claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to
pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with
the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission
charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor
arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and
such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a
person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could
be interpreted as a mere afterthought.

Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation
that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that
Maldigan was employed by “Mine of Gold” Taxi Company from February
10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September
1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with
other taxi operators. It, accordingly,
affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents’ services
were not illegally terminated. It,
however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.^[3]
Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must
be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at
with grave abuse of discretion.^[4]

Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by
respondents to defray any shortage in their “boundary” is covered by
the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring
employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of
Labor has recognized the same as a “practice” in the taxi
industry. Consequently, the deposits
made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

“Article 114. Deposits
for loss or damage. – No employer shall require his worker to make deposits
from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage
to tools, materials; or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the
employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice
of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as
determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and
regulations.”

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the
rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied
by the employer. Clearly, the same does
not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver
may incur in the remittance of his “boundary.” Also, when private
respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which
petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private
respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal
interest.

However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of
Sabsalon is as follows:

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was
able to withdraw his deposits through vales
or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners
in the amount of P3,448.00. With
respect to Maldigan’s deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even
in the present petition. We accordingly
agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence
shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of
his accumulated cash deposits.^[5]

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had
this to say in his decision: “Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as
a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to
restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out,
and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses
for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed
the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to
consider the amount paid by the driver as
illegal deduction in the context of the law.”^[6]
(Words in parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund
of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents
from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly
noted, car washing after a tour
of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair
play.

On the last issue of attorney’s fees or service fees for private
respondents’ authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers
may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent
themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members
thereof. While it may be true that
Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he
was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is
not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his
services^[7]
necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of
attorney’s fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client’s
representative is a lawyer.^[8]

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney’s fees and directing said public respondent to order and
effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private
respondent Domingo Maldigan’s deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date
of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Presiding Commission Bartolome S. Carale, with Commissioner S. E.
Veloso concurring, in NLRC NCR CA No. 003285-92; Rollo, 35.

^[2]
It appears that Maldigan was hired in November, 1987, although petitioners
claim that he was already working as an extra driver in October, 1986. Sabsalon started working on June 24, 1979.

^[3]
San Miguel Corporation vs. Javate, Jr., G.R. No. 54244, January 27,
1992, 205 SCRA 469; Planters Products, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos.
78524 & 78739, January 20, 1989, 169 SCRA 328.

^[4]
San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 88268, June 2, 1992,
209 SCRA 494.

^[5]
Rollo, 88.

^[6]
Rollo, 24.

^[7]
Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

^[8]
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co.,
et al., L-23959, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 302.