REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, RESPONDENTS.

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?

The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this
Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the
judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses
for registration over the lots in question.

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348,
Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in
San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent
spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted
to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties
have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a
decision confirming private respondents’ title to the lots in question, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby
approves the said application and confirms the title and possession of herein
applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B.
Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now
Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San
Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.

“Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding
decree of registration be issued. In
the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of
.265 meters road right-of-way.”

“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo,
p. 25)

On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial
court based on the following ratiocination:

“In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants
were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its
former owner. For this reason, the
prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not
apply. In justice and equity, they are
the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid
for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm
their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the
owners of the same since 1978. It ought
to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one
may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-31189, March 31, 1987). With
particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that
title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the
constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are
not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not
disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su,
G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987).”
(Rollo, pp. 27-­28)

Expectedly, respondent court’s disposition did not merit
petitioner’s approval, hence this
present recourse, which was belatedly filed.

Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for
having been filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented
therein.

At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have
not acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It
maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be
public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong
to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is
not in the juridical sense the
true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only
when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title
would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the
court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

As found by the trial court:

“The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a
bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively
presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title
over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been
complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.” (Rollo, p. 26)

Respondent court echoed the
court a quo’s observation, thus:

“The land sought to be registered has been declared to be
within the alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest
Development (Exhibit ‘P’). The
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District
(IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants
‘whose house of strong materials stands thereon’; that it had been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they
acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled ‘Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan’ duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17,
1978 (Exhibits ‘I’ and ‘J’); and that applicants and their predecessors in
interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the
filing of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the
circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were
Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for registration
in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them.”
(Rollo, p., 27)

The Republic disagrees
with the appellate court’s concept of
possession and argues:

“17. The Court of
Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent spouses only since 1979. However,
tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership. (citing cases)

“18. Then
again, the appellate court found that ‘applicants (respondents) and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30
years prior to the filing of the application for registration.’ This is not,
however, the same as saying that respondents have been in possession ‘since
June 12, 1945.’ (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA No. 141; see also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents’
possession. They fall short of the
required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove
thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on
February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the
starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was
declared for taxation purposes in their name.” (Rollo, pp. 14-15)

The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following
the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and
exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.

As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act
(CA 141) reads:

“Sec. 48. The
following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.” (Underscoring
supplied)

As amended by PD 1073:

“Sec. 4. The
provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945.”

It must be noted that
with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, the law employs the terms “by themselves”,
“the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest”. Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day
so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has
been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to
his possession. In the case at bar,
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but
even as early as 1937. Petitioner does
not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in
possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short
of the required length of time. As
aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents
through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and
continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.

At this juncture, petitioner’s reliance in Republic v. Villanueva
(114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of
title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land
since it still pertains to the State.

Suffice it to state that the ruling in
Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986
case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and
reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991])
where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa,
declared that:

“(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property. x x x

“Herico in particular, appears to be squarely
affirmative:

“x x x. Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner’s
case, with the latter’s proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over
the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. x x x

x x x

‘As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified
in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.’

“Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48
[b]) that the possessor(s] `x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title x x x.’ No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claims is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm
such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ‘x x x (There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law.'” (Underscoring supplied)

Subsequent cases have
hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso
jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v.
CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation
v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v.
Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v.
CA, supra). As such, the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of.

In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means
for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA,
149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely
confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were
able to establish the nature of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was
offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the
subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits “F” to
“F9”). A certified true copy
of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also
formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by
vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only
sister Simplicia (Exhibit “G”). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence
together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the
questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the
government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953,
Records, p. 33).

In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents’ application
for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands
v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner’s thesis.

We disagree.

In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign
nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed
acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity
ends. The applicants in Buyco sought
to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative,
under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was
affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought
the matter before us on review and we reversed.

This Court, speaking
through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:

“As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private
respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or
possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the
private respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a)
the ‘titulo real’ or royal grant (b)
the ‘concession especial’ or special grant; (c) the ‘composicion con el estado’
title or adjustment title; (d) the ‘titulo de compra’ or title by purchase; and
(e) the ‘information posesoria’ or possessory information title, which could
become a ‘titulo gratuito’ or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The
primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.

“If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have
been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):

‘x x x All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been
in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v.
Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594)
The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of
the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.’

`x x x alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-­in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure.’ (Director
of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)

“it is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must
prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the
concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both
Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez
Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated
by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., x x
x, that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act
must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims
to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and
disposable. It is the burden of the
applicant to prove its positive averments.

“In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence
at all to prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable
and disposable land. On the contrary,
the entire property x x x was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the
then 1973 Constitution).

“x x x (P)rivate respondents’ evidence miserably failed to
establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession since time
immemorial, x x x, is patently baseless. x x x When referring to possession, specifically ‘immemorial
possession,’ it means possession of which no man living has seen the beginning,
and the existence of which he has learned form his elders (Susi v. Razon,
supra). Such possession was never
present in the case of private respondents. x x x

“x x x, there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the
finding that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-­interest
possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, x x x.

x x x

“To this Court’s mind, private
respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed
the property – allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the
subject of both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his
estate among his heirs – in such manner as to remove the same from the public
domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he
transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his
heirs. This being the case, his
possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter’s
benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative
ground relied upon in their application. x x x

x x x

“Considering that the private respondents became American
citizens before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired
no vested right, consisting of an imperfect
title, over the property
before they lost their Philippine citizenship.” (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration
of title not merely because they were American citizens at the time of their
application therefor. Respondents
therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated
from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American
citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.

In the case at bar,
private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time
of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested
rights thereon, tacking in the
process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of
time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have
constructed a house of strong
materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiña’s
mother.

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is
the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register
the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the
following pertinent provisions, to wit:

“Sec. 7. Save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.”

“Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee
of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law.” (Underscoring supplied)

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is
similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:

“Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.”

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law,
the relevant provision of which provides:

“Sec. 2. Any
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand
square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural
land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege
herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

“In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for
residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an
additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to
those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.”

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no
other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of
private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his
Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the
time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said
properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in
view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private
in character since private respondents’ predecessors-in­-interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of
a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1)
hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a
private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could
apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII
of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in
BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which
provides:

“Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements
provided for in other laws for the registration
of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act,
unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the province or
city where the property is located a sworn statement showing the date and place
of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and
children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his
landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in
the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of
which he is presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required
under Section 8 of this Act.”

The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP
185 do not apply in the instant case
since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds
before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that
the requirements must likewise
be submitted before the land registration court
prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title
before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving
the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration
is issued. And that is the time when
the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
complied with by the applicants. This
decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the
register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the
decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the
approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration
is yet to be issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J.,
Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., see concurring statement.

Padilla and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., joins J. Cruz in his dissenting opinion.