MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, PETITIONERS, VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of
a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women’s
groups and the youth. Demonstrations
were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an
affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success
in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City. To this end, it leased a portion
of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the
herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
was swift and hostile. On December 7,
1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE
NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT
FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan
de Oro, in session assembled that:

SECTION 1. – That pursuant
to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its
territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person,
partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.

SECTION 2. – That it shall
be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or
corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the
use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.

SECTION 3. – PENALTIES. – Any violation of such existing business
permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following
penalties, to wit:

a) Suspension of the
business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the
business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of
P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of
the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and
subsequent offenses.

SECTION 4. – This Ordinance
shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On
January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE
NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF
CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990
against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another
Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of
CASINO;

WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No.
3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing
Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its
premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4),
Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City
Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity
inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or
prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect
social and moral welfare of the community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

SECTION 1. – The operation
of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.

SECTION 2. – Any violation
of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be
imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the
operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure
thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months
nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the
discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and
maintenance of gambling CASINO.

SECTION 3. – This Ordinance
shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of
general circulation.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it
was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals
declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement.^[1]
Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.^[2]

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.^[3]
They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under
existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does
not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of
a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City’s territorial limits.

2. The phrase “gambling and other
prohibited games of chance” found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) –
(v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean “illegal gambling.”

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul
P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory
to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable,
not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality
concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

6. It
had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the
issues presented in this present case.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize
and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation,^[4]
this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the
benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest
revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of
Customs.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local
Government Code. It is expressly vested
with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now
embodied in Section 16 as follows:

SEC. 16. – General
Welfare. – Every local government
unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares
that:

Sec. 458. – Powers,
Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions
necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this
connection, shall:

x x x

(v) Enact
ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution,
establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money
or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to
the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to
regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the
interest of the general welfare.^[5]

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they
involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and
even by the Constitution itself. The
legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over
all kinds of gambling and not only over “illegal gambling” as the
respondents erroneously argue. Even if
the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the
government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its
territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government
Code.

It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the
policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X
of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to
strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress
gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized
the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the
policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly
authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette,
it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemos.^[6]
Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power
casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have
easily done. The fact that it did not
do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit
all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of
casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had
the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is
deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR
under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not
conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing
clause reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the
effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in
favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling
for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of
Interpretation. – In the
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers
and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

x x x

(c) The general
welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically
harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions
of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the
vice. They invoke the State policies on
the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected,
call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,^[7]
which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of
gambling. They also impugn the wisdom
of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as “a martial law instrument”) in
creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos “on land and sea
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.”

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to
the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at
all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit. In
the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte
but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit
to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.^[8]
That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their
own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and
not to the courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is
the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our
own convictions on the propriety of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions^[9]
has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following
substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene
the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or
oppressive.

3) It must not be partial
or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but
may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and
consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be
unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government
Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.”
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but
are in fact permitted by law. The
petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have
excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of
the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it
is associated. Accordingly, we conclude
that since the word “gambling” is associated with “and other
prohibited games of chance,” the word should be read as referring to only
illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must
be prevented or suppressed.

We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the
problem quite conclusively. But we will
not. The vigorous efforts of the
petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the
earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they
contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they
prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have
an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an
ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been
made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the
national lawmaking authority. In their
view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely
“modified pro tanto” in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now
operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit
concerned. This modification of P.D.
1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or
repeal another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only
been “modified pro tanto,” they are actually arguing that it
is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the
Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be
not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is
not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the
word “shall” as used therein is to be given its accepted
meaning. Local government units have
now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners’
view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to
regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government
units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to
exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer
be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through
the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of
the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which
painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed
(or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced
below, will disclose the omission:

SEC. 534. Repealing Clause.
– (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the “Local Government Code,” Executive Order No.
112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential
Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions,
memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby
repealed.

(c) The provisions
of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund;
Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special
Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree
No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos.
381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of
no force and effect.

(d) Presidential
Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded
projects.

(e) The following
provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Code: Sections
2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and
74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 972, as amended, and

(f) All general and
special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not
lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intention. In Lichauco & Co. v.
Apostol,^[10]this
Court explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all
proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this
intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation
of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory
construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to
the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with
reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of
general to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D.
1869. On the contrary, as the private
respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two
later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims
under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment
or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for
the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR
revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the
Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the
entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one
statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must
exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a
becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a
conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible. This is possible in the case before
us. The proper resolution of the
problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of
gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like
P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in
such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws
equally effective and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds
of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept;
it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners’ suggestion that the Code
authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction
between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the
will of the legislature. Plausibly,
following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as
authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of
arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances
in question are valid. On the contrary,
we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and
force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing
the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in
general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived
their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot
exist. As it creates, so it may
destroy. As it destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act,
and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We
know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are
concerned. They are, so to phrase it,
the mere tenants at will of the legislature.^[11]

This
basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that
Congress retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power
to destroy. The power to grant still
includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like
the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax,^[12]
which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate
it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners
for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare
of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that “the hope of
large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the
workman”^[13]
and that “habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin.”^[14]
In People v. Gorostiza,^[15]
we declared: “The social scourge
of gambling must be stamped out. The
laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit.” George Washington called
gambling “the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of
mischief.” Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to
decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done
in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court
only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official
acts. We do not find such contravention
here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code,
which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those
forms of gambling prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that
cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting
the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., see separate opinion.

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^[1]
Rollo, pp. 64-94.

^[2]
Ibid., pp. 53-62.

^[3]
Pryce was dropped as private respondent in the resolution of the Court dated
June 13, 1994.

^[4]
197 SCRA 53.

^[5]
Sec. 458, [2(vi-xv); [3(ii-vii)]; [4(i-ix)], Local Government Code, 1991.

^[6]
Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish.

^[7]
39 Phil 102.

^[8]
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516, quoting Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 379-380.

^[9]
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157; Solicitor General v.
Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837; De la Cruz v. Paras, 123
SCRA 569; U.S. v. Abandan, 24 Phil. 165.

^[10]
44 Phil. 138.

^[11]
Clinton v. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455.

^[12]
Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution.

^[13]
Planiol, Droit Civil, Vol. 2, No. 2210.

^[14]
Ibid.

^[15]
77 Phil. 88.

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