ROSALIO L. FLORENDO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 66, CAPAS, TARLAC, AND CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHI…

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29248, which upheld the validity of the orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, in Criminal Cases Nos. 362 to
365 and 368.

We deny the petition.

I

In a decision dated March 26, 1992, petitioner, together with his
co-accused, was found guilty of the crime of falsification of commercial
documents by respondent Judge Josephine D. Ceballos of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac in Criminal Cases Nos. 362 to 365 and 368. Thereafter, promulgation of judgment was set
on June 15, 1992. On the latter date,
all the accused, except petitioner, were present. However, petitioner’s counsel was present at the promulgation and
he moved for the resetting of the promulgation to June 23, 1992. Respondent Judge denied the motion, finding
no valid ground therefor. The
promulgation then proceeded. Petitioner’s counsel was furnished a copy of the Decision on June 15,
1992 as evidenced by his signature acknowledging receipt at the back of the
last page of the original copy thereof.

On June 16, 1992, respondent Judge issued an order, modifying her
earlier decision dated March 26, 1992 with the deletion of the name of accused
Alejandro Dizon from the decision considering that he was never arraigned.

On June 17, 1992, respondent Judge issued warrants of arrest
against all the accused, including petitioner, for their failure to renew their
bail bonds.

A notice of appeal filed by petitioner on July 6, 1992 was denied
by respondent Judge, in an order dated July 11, 1992, for having been filed out
of time.

On August 4, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Promulgation
of Judgment but the same was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated
August 14, 1992. Likewise, a motion for
the reconsideration of said order was denied on September 29, 1992.

On October 24, 1992, petitioner elevated the matter before the
Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus to
question the orders of respondent Judge. On June 30, 1993, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.

Petitioner elevated the matter before this Court and raised the
following issues:

“1. WHETHER OR
NOT PROMULGATION OF A DECISION CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON FOUR COUNTS, EACH A
LESS GRAVE FELONY, MAY BE MADE IN ABSENTIA;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE AMENDED DECISION SHOULD BE PROMULGATED ANEW;

3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S APPEAL SHOULD BE GIVEN DUE COURSE”
(Rollo, p. 3).

II

The petition is devoid of merit.

The resolution of the instant petition hinges on the proper
interpretation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which provides:

“Promulgation of Judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is
absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the clerk of court.

“If the accused is confined or detained in another province or
city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon
request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to
accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail pending appeal.

“The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused
personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be
present at the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear
thereat the promulgation shall consist in
the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket and a copy thereof shall
be served upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is
for conviction, and the accused’s failure
to appear was without justifiable cause,
the court shall further order the arrest
of the accused, who may appeal within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
to him or his counsel” (Underscoring
supplied).

Under the first paragraph of Section 6 of the Rule, the presence
in person of the accused at the promulgation of judgment is mandatory in all
cases except where the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the
accused may appear through counsel or representative.

Under the third paragraph of Section 6 of the Rule, all the
accused, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged against them, must be
given notice of the promulgation of judgment and the requirement of their
presence. They must appear in person or
in the case of those facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel
or representative. If the accused fails
to appear at the arraignment, the second and third sentences of paragraph three
become operative.

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 is a new provision
introduced by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides for the
promulgation of judgment in absentia (Gupit Jr., Rules of
Criminal Procedure 362-363 [1986]). The
amendment was intended to obviate the situation in the past where the judicial
process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the
promulgation of judgment. In explaining
the amendment, Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented:

“xxx Without this amendatory provision, the ends of public
justice would be set at naught and, where the civil liability ex delicto
was instituted with the criminal action, the offended party could not enforce
either the primary liability of the accused or any subsidiary civil liability,
where proper and involved in the case, as no judgment could be promulgated. Since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
only require prior arraignment as an indispensable requisite and the trial may
thereafter proceed in the absence of the accused, the judgment in the case
being merely the procedural culmination of the trial, the promulgation thereof can
justifiably be made in absentia in the manner set out in this
section” (II Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 369 [6tn ed., 1989]).

The first paragraph of the Rule deals with the personal presence
of the accused at the promulgation of judgment and its exception, i.e.,
in the case of a light offense where his personal presence is dispensed
with. The third paragraph of the same
Rule deals with the presence of all the accused
at the promulgation regardless of the penalty imposed on them. There is no exception under this
paragraph. All the accused must be
present in person or through counsel or a representative.

In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the
counsel of petitioner on June 15, 1992; therefore, he had only up to June 30,
1992 within which to appeal. The notice
of appeal filed on July 6, 1992 was clearly out of time.

It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and
that the proceedings are made of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural requirement
of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At any rate, petitioner does not question
the non-compliance of the requirement of the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket.

Anent the issue on the re-promulgation of the amended decision,
the Solicitor General, in his comment, correctly observed:

“xxx Petitioner cannot harp on the argument that since the
Decision dated March 26, 1992 was amended by an Order dated June 16, 1992
issued by respondent Judge, then the Decision must be re-promulgated.

“The June 16, 1992 Order amending the March 26, 1992 Decision
only refers to accused Alejandro Dizon whose name should not have been included
in the Decision considering that he was never arraigned. The June 16, 1992 Order does not affect
petitioner nor his other co-accused whose conviction had already been validly
promulgated on June 15, 1992” (Rollo, p. 34).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.