LOU A. ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ANTONIO G. SIA, RESPONDENTS.

Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the
Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1988 local elections obtaining a
plurality of 126 votes over his nearest rival, herein petitioner Lou A.
Atienza.^[1]
Following Sia’s proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner
filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. EC-5 with the Regional
Trial Court questioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts
in the municipality.^[2]
Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained a
total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. On April 12, 1989 the Regional Trial Court
rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal
elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the
amount of P300,856.19 representing petitioner’s expenses in the election
protest. Private respondent appealed
the trial court’s decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) raising as
errors 1) the computation of the number of votes received by the candidates;
and 2) the alleged award of “excessive damages” in favor of the petitioner.^[3]
The case was docketed as EAC No. 20-89 and assigned to the COMELEC’s Second
Division.

Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court granted petitioner’s motion
for execution pending appeal. However,
private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, docketed as SPC No. 19-91
questioning the order of execution pending appeal. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued a preliminary injunction
stopping the enforcement of the order of execution.

The COMELEC, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order
setting aside the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to
assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his
appeal.^[4]
However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding
Commissioner of the COMELEC’s Second Division issued an Order dated July 18,
1992 dismissing petitioner’s appeal for being moot and academic pursuant to the
Commission’s decision in Resolution No. 2494 declaring the election protest and
appeal cases – as well as petitions for special relief-arising out of the
January 18, 1988 elections dismissed and terminated as of June 30, 1992.^[5]
Thereupon, private respondent sought clarification of the order of dismissal of
EAC No. 20-89 referred to the protest case in the Regional Trial Court or to
the appeal case in COMELEC. In
response, the Second Division of COMELEC stated in its Order dated September
16, 1992 that “(t)he election protest cases mentioned in the aforecited order
are those protest cases over which the Commission has original
jurisdiction. Hence, it is only the
appeal case that was dismissed for being moot and academic.” On the private
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal to the Commission En Banc, wherein he pointed out that the appeal could not be simply
dismissed because it would result to the affirmance of the monetary judgment of
the trial court without considering its
merits on appeal, respondent COMELEC issued an Order, dated 15 October
1992, certifying the case to the Commission en banc pursuant to Section 5, Rule
19 of the COMELEC’s Rules of Procedure.

On January 28, 1993, respondent Commission en banc released its questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of
which states:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as
it hereby RESOLVES, that the dismissal of the appeal by
the Commission (Second Division)
for being moot and academic because of the expiration of the term of
office of the contested position did not thereby revive the vacated judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, said appealed judgment to remain vacated, not having
been resolved on the merits by the Commission for or against any of the
parties; and the judgment directing the protestee-appellant to reimburse the
protestant-appellee the amount of P300,856.19 representing his expenses in the
election protest, is hereby REVERSED, said judgment not being in accordance
with law in the absence of any evidence of any wrongful, or negligent act or
omission on the part of the protestee appellant to justify the award.

Since the principal issue elevated to the Commission on Elections
by the private respondent has been rendered moot and academic by the election
of new municipal officials in the May 11, 1992 elections, the sole question for
our determination is whether or not the Commission on Elections acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it issued its Resolution of January 28, 1993
reversing the lower court’s judgment awarding damages to herein petitioner
after it had earlier dismissed EAC No. 20-89
for being moot and academic. Petitioner
argues that when the appeal from the trial court’s decision was dismissed for
being moot and academic, it was as if “no
appeal had ever been taken” and that the trial court’s decision
thereby remained “untouched,” valid and subsisting.^[6]

We disagree.

Immediately after the Commission on Elections issued its July 18,
1992 Order dismissing EAC No. 20­-89,
the private respondent filed a Motion for Clarification asking whether what was
dismissed by the COMELEC in EAC No. 20-89 was the Election Protest Case No. EC-5 or just the
appeal. In clarification, the COMELEC’s
Second Division immediately issued an order stating that the protest cases
mentioned in its earlier order only included those cases in which the body
possessed original jurisdiction, and hence it was only the appeal case which
was dismissed for being moot and academic.^[7]
Moreover, in its assailed decision, the Commission stressed that its dismissal
of the appeal obviously referred only to that part of the appealed judgment
which was affected by the elections of May 11, 1992, i.e., the portion which
adjudged petitioner as the winner in the election protest. Since the question relating to the lower
court’s award of P300,856.19 could not have been rendered moot and academic by
the May 11, 1992 elections, the COMELEC pointed out that the second part of the
lower court’s decision was a matter which had nothing to do with the expiration
of the term of office and could not have been dismissed by the said body.^[8]

In support of his averments, however, petitioner cites Yorac vs. Magallona^[9] as
authority for his claim that “when the appeal is dismissed, ‘the decision of the lower court shall
stand,’”^[10] and
further contends that the following provision of the Rules of Court should be
given suppletory effect, the Omnibus Election Code and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure being bereft of any provision defining the effect of dismissal of
cases before the said body. Section 2,
Rule 50 of the said Rules states:

Section 2. Effect of
Dismissal. Fifteen days after
the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall return to the court below the
record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the Court showing that
the appeal had been dismissed. Upon
receipt of such certificate in the lower court the case shall stand there as
though no appeal had been taken, and the judgment of the said court may be
enforced with additional costs allowed by the court upon dismissal of the appeal.

We cannot accept the petitioner’s theory. First, because the term of the disputed
office had expired, there was virtually nothing to enforce except the monetary
judgment awarded by the trial court. The COMELEC immediately clarified that said monetary judgment, not
having been mooted by the May, 1992 elections, was not and could not have been
part of its earlier order. Under the
circumstances, therefore, it would have been absolutely illogical to assume
that the case stood originally as though no appeal had been taken to the
Commission plainly because the decision on the main issue – the electoral
protest – could not be enforced. On the
other hand, had the case been dismissed for lack of merit, the lower court would
have been duty-bound, at the very least, to enforce its original decision
finding herein petitioner winner of the mayoralty post in the 1988 municipal
elections in Madrilejos, Cebu.

Second, petitioner’s citation of Yorac vs. Magallona^[11] as authority for his main proposition
is grossly inappropriate and misses the point in issue. The sole question in that case centered on
an election protest involving the mayoralty post in Saravia, Negros Occidental
in the general elections of 1955, which was rendered moot and academic by the
expiration of the term of office in December, 1959.^[12]
It did not involve a monetary award for damages and other expenses incurred as
a result of the election protest. In
responding to the petitioner’s contention that the issues presented before the
court were novel and important and that the appeal should not be dismissed, the
Court held – citing the same provision of the Rules of Court upon which
petitioner staunchly places reliance – that a decision on the merits in the
case would have no practical value at all, and forthwith dismissed the case for
being moot. That is not the case
here. In contradistinction to Yorac, a decision on the merits in the case at bench would clearly
have the practical value of either sustaining the monetary award for damages or
relieving the private respondent from having to pay the amount thus awarded.

This brings us to the substantive issue: Did the COMELEC abuse its discretion in
reversing that portion of the trial court’s decision awarding election expenses
in the amount of P300,856.19?

The Omnibus Election Code provides:

Actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election
contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law.^[13]

Provisions for actual or compensatory damages under the law are
embodied in various Civil Code articles allowing claims for damages under
specific circumstances. Thus, Article
2176 provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi delict, and
is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Specifically, Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Thus, in addition to specific provisions of law allowing actual
or compensatory damages in certain situations, the Civil Code elaborates that
the proper setting for allowance of actual or compensatory damages occurs in
breaches of obligations, i.e., in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts,^[14]
and in crimes and quasi-delicts, where the defendant may be held liable
for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of.^[15]
Given this setting, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an
election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the absence
of the conditions specified under Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil Code, or in the absence of a law expressly
providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. It follows, naturally, that in most election protest cases where the
monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or quasi-contract or
a tortious act or omission, the claimant must be able to point out to a
specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest
expenses against the losing party. This, petitioner has been unable to do.

The country’s early election laws contained provisions requiring
the furnishing of a bond or cash deposit for purposes of payment of expenses
and costs incidental to election contests and appeals.^[16]
The Administrative Code of 1917 for instance provides:

Sec. 482. Bond or Cash Deposit Required of
Contestants. Before the Court shall entertain any such
contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the contest,
counter-contest or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with
two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses and
costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in lieu
of such bond. If the party paying such
expenses and costs shall be successful, they shall be taxed by the court and
entered and be collectible as a judgment against the defeated party.

The Election Law of 1938 (Commonwealth Act No. 357) contained the
same provision with a minor modification providing for increasing or decreasing
the bond or cash deposit “as the course of the contest may require.” This
provision was repeated in toto in the Revised Election Code of 1947.^[17]
Republic Act No. 6388, and the Election Code of 1971,^[18]
P.D. No. 1296, and the 1978 Election Code contained provisions allowing awards
for moral and exemplary damages “as the Commission may deem just if the
aggrieved party has included (such) in his pleadings,”^[19]
but left out the provision for bond and cash deposits found in the earlier election
codes. The provisions for moral and
exemplary damages as well as the early provisions requiring the furnishing of a
bond to cover expenses related to election contests have all but disappeared in
the current Omnibus Election Code.

It may be argued that the provisions for the furnishing of a bond
or cash deposit which were deleted from the 1981 Omnibus Election Code,
nonetheless, appear in the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 42 of the said rules for
instance provides:

Section 1. Filing fees for election contests, quo warranto,
and petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. -?

x x x

(b) Cash Deposits. — In
any protest or counter protest or protest-in-intervention not requiring ballot
revision the following cash deposits shall be paid by the interested party:

(1)     For each election
contest                                           ..
P 1,000.00;

(2)     For each counter
protest or protest-in-intervention    .. P
1,000.00.

(c)     In any protest,
counter-protest or protest-in-intervention requiring ballot revision the following
cash deposits shall be paid by the interested party:

(1)     For each election
contest                                           ..
P 5,000.00;

(2)     For each counter
protest or protest-in-intervention    .. P
5,000.00.

The cash deposits prescribed above shall be applied to the payment
of all expenses incidental to such protest, counter-protest or
protest-in-intervention. When
circumstances so demand, additional cash deposits may be required. Any unused balance thereof shall be returned
to the protestant, counter-protestant or protestant-in?intervention, as
the case may be.

(d)     In case of revision of
ballots, there shall be deposited the sum of P350.00 for every ballot box for
the compensation of the revisors at the rate of P100.00 each and as reserve for
expenses.

(e)     If a claim for damages
and attorney’s fees are set forth in a protest, counter?protest or
protest-in-intervention, an additional filing fee shall be paid at the rate of
P300.00 for the first one hundred fifty thousand pesos and P4.00 for every one
thousand pesos over the fist P150,000.00.

An examination of the above quoted provision, however, reveals
that the bonds or cash deposits required
by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are in the nature of filing fees, not damages. These filing fees obviously refer to the expenses
incurred by the COMELEC in the course of administering election cases and are
species different from the bond or cash deposit required by previous election
laws which are clearly in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages.^[20] Plainly then, the deposit
requirements under previous election laws which were obviously compensatory
damages, were repealed or abrogated as a result of their non-inclusion both in the Election Code of 1978
and the Omnibus Election Code of 1981. If their non-inclusion in the 1978 statute was a mere legislative lapse,
then the previous provisions on bonds or cash deposits would have been included
in the Omnibus Election Code. Their
non-inclusion, and the omission of provisions allowing for moral and exemplary
damages in the Omnibus Election Code, furthermore clearly underscores the
legislative intent to do away with provisions for damages other than those
specified in Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code. In fact, the COMELEC, in justifying its deletion of actual
damages in its assailed en banc
resolution, ignored the fees provision of its Comelec Rules of
Procedure and explained that the bond or cash deposit provisions of previous
election laws were abrogated by their non-inclusion in the current law.

In fine, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides
for the granting of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with
law. That it was the intent of the
legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for
expenses incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or
omission clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent, moreover, to do away with such
provisions merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without
damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor
creates a civil obligation.

Finding no reversible error in the assailed resolution, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

Davide, Jr., J., no part.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 5.

^[2]
Id.

^[3] Rollo, p. 153; Brief for
protestant-appellee, p. 8.

^[4]
Rollo, p. 203; Annex “G”.

^[5]
The Second Division’s Order dated 18 July 1992 states:

Pursuant to Resolution No. 2494,
promulgated by the Commission en banc on July 16, 1992, declaring that
election protest and appeal cases, as well as petitions for special relief,
arising out of the January 18, 1988 elections are deemed dismissed and
terminated as of June 30, 1992, the above-entitled case is hereby considered
MOOT and ACADEMIC. (Rollo p.
204, Annex “H”).

^[6]
Rollo pp. 47-48.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 203.

^[8]
Rollo, p. 14.

^[9]
3 SCRA 76 (1961).

^[10]
Rollo, p. 48.

^[11]
Supra, note 6.

^[12]
Id.

^[13]
B.P. Blg. 881, sec. 259.

^[14]
Civil Code, art. 2201.

^[15]
Id., art. 2202.

^[16]
Act No. 1582 (1907); Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657); Administrative
Code of 1917 (Act. No. 2711); Commonwealth Act No. 357 (1938); Republic Act No.
180 (1947).

^[17]
Republic Act No. 180, June 21, 1947.

^[18]
Sec. 223 of the Election Code of 1971 provides:

Before the Court shall take
cognizance of a protest or a counter protest or a protest in intervention, or
admit an appeal, the party who has filed the pleading or interposed the appeal
shall file a bond with two sureties satisfactory to the court and such
amount it may fix, to answer for the payment of all expenses and costs
incidental to said protest including any amount for moral and exemplary damages
that may be adjudicated by the court. xxx. (Emphasis supplied).

^[19]
P.D. 1296, sec. 194.

^[20]
See supra, Note 18, and compare with Section 1,
Rule 42 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The first provision refers to the filing of a bond with two sureties and
is found in the same provision allowing for moral and exemplary damages while
the latter (see text for Sec. 1, Rule 42) refers to filing fees.