ALEJANDRO QUEMUEL AND RUPERTA SOLIS, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ANGEL S. OLAES AND JULIANA PRUDENTE, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Angel S. Olaes and his, wife, Juliana Prudente, defendants-appellees herein,
wepe plaintiffs in another case (No. 5442 of the CFI of Cavite), wherein
Alejandro Quemuel and his wife Euperta Solis, plaintiffs-appellants herein, were
defendants. In that case No. 5442, the Olaes spouses, registered owners of lot
1095 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, located in Rosario, Cavite, sought
the recovery of the possession of the said lot and rentals therefor, from the
Quemuel spouses, who in their verified answer admitted plaintiffs ownership, but
contended that their occupation was gratuitous. On March 16, 1954, the trial
court ordered Quemuel and his wife to return the possession of lot 1095 to the
Olaes spouses and to pay the latter P20.00 a month from January, 1954, until
they shall have vacated the premises. Quemuel and his wife did not appeal from
said decision which became final on April 22, 1954. Thereafter, the Olaes
spouses sought the execution of the decision and to forestall ejectment, the
Quemuel spouses, filed on July 1, 1954, the present complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5518, CFI of Cavite.

In the present complaint, the Quemuel spouses seek to reduce the monthly
rental of P20.00 fixed in Civil Case No. 5442, and to compel the Olaes spouses
to sell to them (Quemuels) the portion of the lot 1095 where their house is
erected. Respondents, the Olaes spouses, filed a motion to dismiss dated July 9,
1964, alleging lack of cause of action, res adjudicata; prescription,
and the cause of action, if any, is barred by plaintiffs’ failure to set it up
as a counter-claim in civil case No. 5442.

On September 17, 1954, the trial court dismissed the complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs.

An appeal was taken by plaintiffs to the Court of Appeals (Case No. CA-G.E.
No. 14837-R) which, by the agreement of the parties, certified the case to this
Court. The ex parte petition filed by the plaintiffs-appellants in this
Court on August 9, 1956, asking that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite and the defendants-appellees, enjoining them
from demolishing the house of plaintiffs-appellants until there is a final
decision in said case No. 14837, by the Supreme Court, was denied on August 14,
1956 by the latter court.

The lone assignment alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint without trial on the merits and in not granting the reliefs prayed for
by the plaintiffs-appellants. Appellants stated in their brief that if there
will be trial on the merits, they would be entitled to a. decision in their
favor, because they will establish by competent evidence the allegations in
their complaint. And on the claim that they were builders in good faith, they
based the right to buy the lot on which their house is built, upon the decision
of Belen Uy Tayag vs. Rosario Yuseco, et al., 97 Phil., 712; 51 Off.
Gaz., 5140.

It should be recalled at the outstai-t, that the trial court ordered the
dismissal of the complaint, which must have been granted in all or any of the
grounds therein alleged, to wit:

1. The Complaint states no cause of action.—

   The first cause of action of the present complaint alleges that in
   Civil Case No. 5442, the trial court render- ed the decision of March 16, 1954,
   ordering the latter to vacate lot No. 1095 belonging to Olaes and his wife and
   to pay them a monthly rental of P20.00 from January, 1954, until they shall have
   vacated the premises; that plaintiffs believe that the portion they are
   occupying belonged to them; that they occupy only about one-half of the lot;
   that considering the purchase price of the land, its assessed value and the
   interest the price would have ezlrned, the rental should not be more than 7½% or
   P5.60 monthly. Plaintiffs prayed that the rental be reduced to P5.60 a
   month.

   Assuming the truth of the. above allegations, the same do not constitute a
   cause of action. A cause of action presupposes a right of the plaintiff and a
   violation of such right by the defendant. According to the complaint itself, the
   rental of P20.00 monthly and the order to vacate, were provided in a prior
   judgment (Civil Case No. 5442) which is final and its validity is not assailed.
   There being no law that fixes the rental of the same land at 7½% of its alleged
   market value, the plaintiffs have no right thereto, or a right which could be
   violated. The defendants are not compelling the plaintiffs to rent the property
   but wanted them to vacate the premises (Civil Case No. 5442). If the rental
   determined by the trial court were excessive, the plaintiffs are free to vacate
   the property. For plaintiffs to insist on possessing the property and fixing the
   rentals themselves, would have no legal sanction at all.

   In the second cause of action of the present complaint, the
   plaintiffs alleged: That they actually occupy about 384 square meters or
   one-half of lot 1095; of the said area they thought they own 256 square meters
   by inheritance from Romualdo Solis, father of plaintiff, Ruperta Solis, who
   became the owner thereof pursuant to a verba extrajudicial partition made in
   1924; Agapita Solis who sold the entire lot 1095 to defendants, is a sister of
   Romualdo Solis, and there was an error in the inclusion of the 256 square meters
   in the Torrens Title and the sale; they acquired from Valentin Solis, brother of
   both Romualdo and Agapita, a part of the portion occupied by plaintiff’s house
   and warehouse; their house has been there for almost 34 years and is worth
   P4,000; the defendants are rich, have a house and a lot of their own, and will
   not suffer any material or sentimental damage if they sell to the plaintiffs
   one-half of lot No. 1095; plaintiffs offered to pay P960 for the portion they
   are occupying or P1,920.00 for the whole lot.

   On the assumption that the allegations of the second 3 cause of action are
   true, what would be the rights of the parties? The plaintiffs claim that their
   second cause of action is based on Article 448 in connection with Art. 546, of
   the new Civil Code. A cursory reading of the provisions, however, will show that
   they are not applicable to plaintiffs’ case. Under Article 448, the right to
   appropriate the works or improvements or “to oblige the one who built or planted
   to pay the price of the land” belongs to the owner of the land. The only right
   given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the
   improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land
   to the former.

   This is assuming that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith. But the
   plaintiffs are not builders in good faith. From the pleadings and the
   documentary evidence submitted, it is indisputable that the land in question
   originally belonged to the government as part of the Friar Lands Estate and the
   title thereto was in the name of the government until it was purchased by
   Agapita Solis who applied, thru the Bureau of Lands, to purchase the land by
   installments. The corresponding Sale Certificate No. 531, effective July 1, 1909
   (Exhibit 2) was executed. In defendants’ complaint (as plaintiff in civil case
   no. 6442), they alleged that they are the owners of lot 1095 and that defendants
   (plaintiffs herein), “have been occupying southeastern half portion thereof,
   without any right thereto, except the tolerance of plaintiffs” (defendants
   herein), which were admitted, expressly and under oath, in the answer of
   plaintiffs herein. It would, therefore, appear that plaintiffs herein were not
   unaware of the flaw in their title, if any, and that their true relation with
   the herein defendants was that of tenant and landlord, and, that their rights
   are governed by Article 1573 in relation to article 487 of the old Civil Code,
   which reads as follows:—

   “ART. 1573. A lessee shall have with respect to useful and volun- tary
   improvements, the same right which are granted the usufructuaries.”

   “ART. 487. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct any
   improvements, useful or recreative, which he may deem proper, provided he does
   not change its form or substance, hut he shall have no right to be indemnified
   therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do
   so without injury to the property”.

   From the above provisions, it can clearly be inferred that plaintiff cannot
   even compel the defendants to pay for the improvements the former made in the
   property or to sell the latter’s land. Plaintiffs’ only right, is to remove the
   improvements, if it is possible to do so without damage to the land.

   It should be noted that article 448 of the new Civil Code, (equivalent to
   Art. 361 of the old Civil Code), relied upon by plaintiffs, is intended to apply
   only to a case where one builds, or sows, or plants on land in which he believes
   himself to have a claim of title and not to lands wherein one’s only interest is
   that of tenant, under a rental contract, which is the present case (Alburo
   vs. Villanueva, 7 Phil., 277); The tenant cannot be said to be a’
   builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner (Rivera vs.
   Thailand, 48 Phil., 396; see also 3 Manresa 4th Ed. pp. 215-216).

   The trial court, therefore, did not commit any error in dismissing the two
   causes of action.

2. The first cause of action, if any, is barred by a prior judgment.

   As plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5442, the defendants alleged in their
   complaint that the reasonable rental value of the premises in question was
   P20.00 a month (par. 5). In said case No. 5442, the matter of the rental was in
   issue, and the same was considered and decided by the trial court, which ordered
   the defendants therein “to pay a reasonable compensation of P20.00 a month
   beginning with January, 1954, until they shall have left the premises”. In the
   instant case, the parties are the identical parties in Civil Case No. 5442, the
   same lot 1095 is the subject matter of both cases; the same issue, namely, the
   amount of the rental is involved. Even assuming that appellants have a cause of
   action, the doctrine of res judicata already operates against them.

3. The second cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of
   limitations.

   As shown by the documentary evidence submitted with the defendants’ motion,
   to dismiss, lot No. 1095 was purchased by Agapita Solis from the Government on
   July 1, 1909. After full payment of the purchase price, T.C.T. No. 10771
   covering said lot was issued to said Agapita Solis on June 8, 1933, (Exhibits 1
   and 2). Assuming that plaintiffs or their alleged predecessor-in-interest, had a
   cause of action for claiming the ownership of portions of said lot, such cause
   of action accrued at the latest, on June 8, 1933. The plaintiffs or their
   predecessor had ten (10) years from said date, within which to file the
   corresponding action. They, however, filed the instant complaint only on July 1,
   1954, or more than 21 years, after the accrual of the cause of action.

4. The cause of action, if any, is barred by plaintiffs’ failure to set it
   up as a counterclaim in Civil Case No. 5442.

   Whether the cause of action is for recovery of ownership or for an alleged
   right to purchase ins property, or for reimbursement for some improvements, the
   herein plaintiffs as defendants in Civil Case No. 5442, should have set it up as
   a counterclaim in said case, because same was necessarily connected with, or
   arose out of the transactions involved in said case No. 5442 (Sec. 6, Rule 10,
   Rules of Court).

   It is alleged that plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint should. not have been
   dismissed without trial on the merits, because in the case of De Jesus, et al.
   vs. Belarmino, et al. 95 Phil., 365; 50 Off. Gaz., 3064, it was held
   that “where the complaint was dismissed not because of any evidence presented by
   the parties, or as a result of a trial on the merits, but merely on a motion to
   dismiss filed by the defendants, the sufficiency of the motion should be tested.
   on the strength of the allegation of facts contained in the complaint and no
   other”, which has been interpreted to apply to cases where the motion to dismiss
   is based solely on the ground of lack of cause of action. Considering the fact
   that (1) In the case at bar, documentary evidence and the records of the Civil
   Case No. 5442 were presented and considered by the trial court; and (2) in the
   De Jesus case, the only ground for dismissal was the lack of cause of action,
   while in the present case, aside from said ground, plaintiffs alleged other
   grounds, the said ruling finds no application.

In view hereof, we hereby affirm the order appealed from, with costs against
the plaintiffs-appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.