DELFIN YAMBAO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ANGELINA GONZALES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an action filed by Delfin Yambao against Angelina Gonzales and Maria
Pablo praying that the latter be ordered to appoint and employ him as tenant
during his lifetime on the parcels of land bequeathed to and inherited by them
from Maria Gonzales, as well as to deliver to him the value of the harvests
belonging to him as tenant of said parcels of land. In their answer, defendants
averred that the provisions of’ the will relied upon by plaintiff are not
mandatory; that the determination of who should be the tenant of the land is
vested in a special court; and that the present action is not the proper
remedy.

After trial, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient cause
of action. It held that the provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff
merely amount to a suggestion to the defendants who, though morally bound, are
not legally compelled to follow said suggestion, invoking as authority Article
797 of the old Civil Code. Plaintiff has appealed.

The pertinent provisions of the will relied upon by appellant read as
follows:

“Dapat din naman malaman, ng dalawa kong taga-pagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at
ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O GAMPANAN GAYA ng mga
sumusunod:

*                   *                   *                   *   
               *                   *                   *

“(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabaho ng bukid
habang panahon, at ang nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala ng Albasea
samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin at may utang pa.”

It appears that on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will
bequeathing to appellees all her properties situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The
will was probated in 1948. Immediately, thereafter, appellant went to appellees
to request that he be placed as tenant of the riceland which, by an express
provision of said will, they were directed to give to him for cultivation as
tenant, and when they refused alleging that they had already given it to another
tenant he filed the present action.

In holding that the provisions of the will relied upon by appellant imposes
only a moral but not a legal obligation, the trial court went
on to consider the import of the word “pahihintulutan” employed with reference
to appellant. In its opinion said word only means to permit or to
allow, but not to direct appellees to appoint appellant as tenant. Rather,
it opines, it merely contains a suggestion to employ because the testatrix did
not use the words “ipinag-uutos ko” which she used in connection with other
provisions of the will, so that there is no clear indication that it was her
intention to make such provision compulsory.

We believe, however, that the trial court has not properly interpreted the
real import of the wish of the testatrix. Analyzing it carefully we will find
that the same contains a clear directive to employ appellant as may be seen from
the words preceding the word “pahihintulutan” which say: “Dapat din naman
malaman, ng dalawa kong taga-pagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES na
sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O GAMPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod.” The words “dapat
TUNGKULIN O GAMPANAN” means to do or to carry out as a mandate
or directive, and having reference to the word “pahihintulutan”, can convey no
other meaning than to impose a duty upon appellees. To follow the
interpretations given by the trial court would be to devoid the wish of the
testatrix of its real and true meaning.

Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial court, is
inapplicable. That refers to an institution of an heir intended to be
conditional by providing that a statement to that effect cannot be considered as
a condition unless it appears clearly that such is the intention of the
testator. We are not faced here with any conditional institution of heirship.
What we have is a clear-cut mandate which the heirs cannot fail to carry
out.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Appellees are hereby
ordered to employ appellant as tenant immediately after this decision has become
final. Costs against appellees.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.