PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL CAÑEJA Y ILAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In an information^[1] filed
on 29 January 1991 with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 91-90985 and raffled to its Branch 5, accused Manuel Cañeja
was charged with the violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972), as amended, committed as follows:

“That on or about January 26, 1991, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale to poseur buyer white
crystalline substance wrapped in an aluminum foil with a gross weight of 0.0958
gram, known as SHABU, containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.

Contrary to law.”

The accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 1 March
1991.^[2]
Subsequently, pre-trial was conducted on 7 August 1991, after which the trial
court issued the following pre-trial order:

“The Prosecution and the Defense agreed to admit the following:

1. Accused admits that he is the same accused
charged in the Information;

2. Accused admits the genuineness,
authenticity and due execution of the following documents:

Exhibit ”A” – Letter Referral

“B” – Certification

“C”
– Report

3. Accused admits that specimen Exhibit “C-1”
was submitted to the Forensic Chemist of the NBI for examination and was found
to be positive of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, per Certification, Exhibit “B”
and Report, Exhibit “C;”

4. Prosecution admits that when the accused was
arrested, the police authorities does [sic] not have a search warrant or
warrant of arrest.”^[3]

After due trial on the merits, during which Joel Ubago and Pat.
Edmund^[4]
Usita testified for the prosecution, while the accused, Ian Joel, Bong Claveria,
and Joseph Balisi testified for the defense, the trial court promulgated on 31
March 1992 a judgment^[5] of
conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
convicting the accused Manuel Caneja y Ilas of the crime charged and hereby
sentences him to serve the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine ranging from
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos in line with Section 15 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.

SO ORDERED.”^[6]

The evidence for the prosecution upon which the conviction was
based was summarized by the trial court as follows:

“The Prosecution presented Joel Ubago as its first witness. He testified that he is an ‘asset’ or
informer of Police Station No. 8. He
claimed that while he was at the station to bring food to his uncle who was a
policeman, he overheard that the policemen were looking for Alias Resty who was
allegedly selling prohibited drugs at Bacood, Sta. Mesa. Since he knew Alias Resty because he had a
friend who used to buy shabu from him, he volunteered to cooperate with the
police by acting as the poseur-buyer in their buy-bust operation.

A team was then formed and, pursuant to the plan, he and three
policemen, namely Pat. Sinag, Pat. Reya and Pat. Usita boarded a taxi and
proceeded to the house of Alias Resty or accused Manuel Cañeja. Upon reaching the place, Joel Ubago went to
the front of accused’s house, leaving the three policemen in the taxi which was
parked about 30 or 35 meters away from the house. He had with him the marked money consisting of a P100 bill
(Exhibit “1”) given to him by the police to be used in buying the prohibited
drugs. When accused saw Joel Ubago, he
approached the latter and asked ‘how many he would get from him.’ Ubago told
the accused to give him one, then said accused took the P100 bill and entered the house. About three minutes later, accused returned
and handed to the witness the shabu wrapped in an aluminum foil (Exhibit
“C-1”). After receiving Exhibit “C-1”,
Ubago gave the signal to the police by holding his head. The policemen came and accused was arrested,
after which he was brought to the precinct.

The prosecution presented as its second witness Pat. Edmund Usita
who testified that on January 26, 1990, he was a police investigator assigned
at Precinct 8. He claimed that on said
date, at about 2:00 P.M., he was with Pat. Reya, Pat. Sinag and Joel Ubago for
the purpose of conducting a buy-bust operation. Pursuant to their plan, Joel Ubago, the poseur-buyer went
directly to the residence of accused Manuel Cañeja while he and the other
policemen waited inside a taxicab parked about 30 to 35 meters away.

In the course of his testimony, Usita also identified the money
(Exh. “D”), which Joel Ubago had used in the buy-bust operation.”^[7]

The accused denied that he was caught in flagrante selling
shabu. According to him, he was playing
darts with some friends inside their house at 3449 Torres Street, Bacood, Sta.
Mesa, Manila, in the afternoon of 26 January 1991 when an acquaintance named
“Onchie,” who was with another man whom he identified as Joel Ubago, called him
from outside the gate of their fence. When he approached them, “Onchie” and Joel suddenly held his left hand
and the back of his pants, and, almost simultaneously, a taxi with four
policemen in plain clothes arrived and forced him to board the vehicle. He was taken by his captors to Police
Precinct No. 8 of the Western Police District.^[8] In
the police station, he was mauled by the policemen and forced to admit
ownership of the shabu they had shown him. “Onchie” implicated him because they had a quarrel during one of their
basketball games.^[9]
His brother-in-law, John Balisi, followed him to the police station.

On cross-examination, the accused identified “Onchie” as Michael
Ferrer,^[10]
with whom he used to play basketball three times a week, but that after their
quarrel, he never saw “Onchie” again until the incident in question. He likewise admitted that he knows Joel whom
he met once before his arrest and after that he learned that Joel was
responsible for the capture of drug-users, drug-pushers, and hold-up men in
their area.^[11]

Ian Jose corroborated the testimony of the accused. He testified that he was with the accused in
the afternoon of 26 January 1991. His
other companions were Joseph Claveria, Richard, and James. Their game ended abruptly when “Onchie,”
accompanied by another man (Joel), called the accused from outside the
gate. When the accused approached the
pair, he saw Joel put his arms around the accused. Suddenly, four men on board a taxi approached them and forced the
accused inside the vehicle.^[12]

Bong Claveria corroborated the testimony of Ian Jose.^[13]

John Joseph Balisi, the accused’s brother-in-law, told the court
that he visited the accused at the police station on the night he was
arrested. He talked with some policemen
in the station; they demanded P50,000.00 from him, but he told them that he did
not have that amount.^[14] On
cross-examination, he declared that he informed the accused’s mother about the
money demanded by the policemen, but she remarked that she would not pay
because her son had not done anything wrong. He gathered from the police logbook which was shown to him at the
precinct that his brother-in-law was arrested on a charge concerning shabu.^[15]

The accused appealed from the decision to this Court. In his Appellant’s Brief, he ascribes to the
trial court the commission of the following errors:

“1. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CONTRADICTING
AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS JOEL UBAGO AND DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.

2. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”^[16]

The appellant alleges that the challenged decision is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, and conjectures or is based on a
misapprehension of facts, and that it relies heavily on the testimony of Joel
Ubago, the alleged poseur-buyer, whose credibility is doubtful because he lied
in court about his criminal record and about the circumstances of his
incarceration. He urges that these
circumstances take this case out of the general rule that the factual findings
of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
weight and respect. He further contends
that his testimony that he “was mauled by the police when he refused to admit
[possession of] the SHABU at the Police Precinct” was not rebutted.

The appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
recommends the affirmance of the trial court’s decision because the alleged
inconsistency or falsity in the testimony of Joel Ubago is not material to this
case, pertaining as it does to minor and irrelevant matters, and does not
impair the essential integrity of his testimony as a whole. The appellee counters the appellant’s claim
that he was mauled by the police by stating that even if the mauling did take
place, the same did not result in any forced confession — the appellant’s
conviction was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrance
delicto selling shabu in a buy-bust operation, not on the basis of any
confession.

We affirm the decision of the trial court.

We are convinced, after a review of the records of the case and
the testimonies of the witnesses, that the guilt of the appellant was proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony
of the poseur-buyer was consistent and credible in all its material points and
was corroborated by the testimony of Pat. Edmund Usita, a member of the buy-bust
team. Joel Ubago, an “asset” or
informer of Precinct No. 8, convincingly testified that he volunteered to be
the poseur-buyer when he heard that policemen from this station were out to
catch one alias “Resty,” (the accused) a known drug pusher in the area, in a
buy-bust operation.^[17] Joel
is well acquainted with the appellant having at least twice accompanied a
friend in buying shabu from the latter.^[18]
Acting out his part as the buyer with the three members of the police force
close by, albeit out of appellant’s sight, Joel succeeded in procuring from him
a crystalline substance which, when sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)^[19] and
tested, was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.^[20]
The “Booking Sheet and Arrest Report”^[21]
dated 27 January 1991, which was prepared by the three police-members of the
buy-bust team, confirms this fact.

Joel Ubago’s answers to the cross-examination questions enhanced
further rather than weakened the truthfulness of his account of the buy-bust
operation. Thus:

“ATTY. SANCHEZ (to witness):

x x x

Q.   Mr.
witness, you acted here as poseur buyer, Who handed you the alleged P100.00
bill?

A.    Pat.
Usita.

Q.   When
Usita handed to you the P100.00 bill, what did he tell you if any?

A.    To
use it in buying the shabu.

Q.   Is
that the only thing that Usita tell [sic] you?

A.    I
was told that the money given to me was a marked money, then they even took the
serial number.

Q.   After
giving you the alleged marked money, what did you do with it?

A.    I
went in front of the house of the accused.

Q.   Did
it not occur to your mind to go to that place to buy shabu other than the house
of the accused?

A.    Because
the accused is well-known to the police as the one selling shabu, and that he
is known to be a smart one, that is why, I went to his place.

Q.   From
whom did you learn this Mr. witness?

A.    I
came to learn that in Precinct 8.

x x x

Q.   What
was the accused doing for the first time you saw him?

A.    He
was standing and he even went to me, he even met me.

Q.   But
Mr. witness, that was only the third time, you saw the accused, is that
correct?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   You
know him very well?

COURT:

He said three (3) times.

ATTY. SANCHEZ (to witness):

Q.   And you met him for the third time,
you said that he approached you, what is the conversation between you and the
accused?

A.    I
was asked how many will I be buying.

Q.   You mean to say Mr. witness without asking
your name, he immediately asked you how many/much shabu will you get?

A.    Yes,
sir, because he already knew me and we have met twice before that.

x x x

Q.   During
the buy-bust operation when you alleged that accused asked you how much shabu
did you buy, what did you tell him?

A.    P100.00

Q.   What
did he do if any?

A.    He
took the P100.00 bill from me and then he went inside his house to get the
shabu.

x x x

Q.   Where
did the buying of shabu took place, is it on the street?

A.    Outside
their gate.”^[22]

The appellant has not shown any ulterior motive for Joel to
impute a criminal offense upon him; his grievance is directed against “Onchie,”
with whom he quarreled and who, he alleged, was with Joel. There is no evidence that Joel was under the
sway of “Onchie” and was used by the latter to wreak vengeance on the
appellant. It is settled that where
there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate, that the principal witness for
the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was
not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.^[23]

As to the alleged doubtful credibility of Joel arising from his admission that he has a pending case
for possession of shabu and was detained until he was able to put up a bailbond, suffice it to say that
such admission, given openly and without hesitation, enhanced rather than
impaired his credibility. It should be
noted that the incident for which Joel was arrested and charged occurred in
April 1991 or three months after the buy-bust operation in this case, and that
eventually he was acquitted^[24] on 9
July 1991. That he was unable to
categorically state the duration of his detention is understandable. The fact too that he even changed his
testimony regarding the date of his release is immaterial, if not irrelevant,
for it was more of a correction or an inconsistency on a trivial matter. In any event, the following rule is settled:

“It is perfectly reasonable to believe the
testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with
respect to other facts. And it has been
aptly said that even when
witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be
credited. Suffice it to say, in this
connection, that a trial court by reason of its proximate contact with
witnesses, [is] in a more competent position to discriminate between the true
and the false …”^[25]

The failure of the prosecution to rebut the appellant’s testimony
that he was mauled by the police and forced to admit that he was caught selling
shabu is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. First, the appellant’s assertion of torture was obviously a belated
claim which cannot inspire belief. On
cross-examination, the appellant alleged that he was mauled by four policemen
and was hit with a “dos por dos,” inflicting injuries on his knees and
face. With four assailants and a “dos
por dos,” he must have been badly battered. Yet, he admitted that he did not submit himself to medical
treatment or examination. He did not
testify that he requested for such examination.^[26]
Second, and more importantly, he was not convicted of the offense charged on
the basis of a confession, oral or written, as there was none presented in
court.

We therefore affirm the court’s finding that the appellant is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 15, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

However, the penalty imposed upon the appellant must be modified
in view of the new amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659^[27]
to Section 15, Article III, and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No 6425, as
amended. R.A. No. 7659 was approved on
13 December 1993 and took effect on 31 December 1993. As thus further amended, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was
changed from “life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos” to “reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.” However,
pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, which amends Section 20 of R.A. No.
6425, the new penalty shall be applied if the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved falls within the first paragraph of the amended Section 20, and if the
quantity would be lower than those specified in said first paragraph, the
penalty shall be from “prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.”
The pertinent portion of the amended Section 20 reads as follows:

“SEC. 20. Application of Penalties,
Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. — The
penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

x x x

3. 200 grams or more of shabu
or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

x x x

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.”

The penalty then in Section 15 is now based on the quantity of the
regulated drugs involved, except where the victim is a minor or where the
regulated drug involved in any offense under Section 15 is the proximate cause
of the death of the victim, in which case the maximum penalty prescribed in
Section 15 shall be imposed regardless of the quantity of the regulated drugs
involved.^[28]

In People vs.
Martin Simon y Sunga,^[29] decided on 29 July 1994, this Court
ruled as follows:

(1) Provisions of R.A. No. 7659 which are
favorable to the accused shall be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code.

(2) Where the quantity of the dangerous drug
involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph of Section
20 of R.A. No. 6425, the penalty to be imposed shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. The reason is that there is an overlapping
error, probably through oversight in the drafting, in the provisions on the
penalty of reclusion perpetua as shown by its dual imposition, i.e.,
as the minimum of the penalty where the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved is more than those specified in the first paragraph of the amended
Section 20 and also as the maximum of the penalty where the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved is less than those so specified in the first
paragraph.

(3) Considering that the aforesaid penalty of prision
correccional to reclusion temporal shall depend upon the quantity of
the dangerous drugs involved, each of the component penalties thereof — prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal — shall be
considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity, such
that the quantity of the drugs enumerated in the second paragraph should then
be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the
same, as the bases for determining the appropriate component penalty.

4) The modifying circumstances in the Revised
Penal Code may be appreciated to determine the proper period of the
corresponding imposable penalty or even to effect its reduction by one or more
degrees; provided, however, that in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty lower than prision correccional.

5) In appropriate instances, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law shall be applied and considering that R.A. No. 7659 has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code with their technical
signification and effects, then the crimes under the Dangerous Drugs Act shall
now be considered as crimes punished by the Revised Penal Code; hence, pursuant
to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate penalty which
may be imposed shall be one whose maximum shall be within the range of the
imposable penalty and whose minimum shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to the imposable penalty.

With the foregoing as our touchstones, and it appearing that the
quantity of the shabu recovered from the accused in this case is only 0.0958
gram, the imposable penalty under the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6425, as further amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, should be prision
correccional.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused may then be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as
maximum.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 5 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification
of the penalty. Appellant MANUEL CAÑEJA
Y ILAS is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Six (6) months of arresto mayor
as minimum to Six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quiason, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Cruz, (Chairman), J., on
official leave.

---

^[1]
Original Records (OR), 1.

^[2]
OR, 7.

^[3]
Id., 17.

^[4]
Edmun in the decision of the trial court.

^[5]
OR, op. cit., 98-105; Rollo, 11-18. Per Judge
Cesar J. Mindoro.

^[6]
OR, 105; Rollo, 18.

^[7]
OR, 99-100; Rollo, 12-13.

^[8]
TSN, 18 August 1992, 3-4.

^[9]
Id., 5-6.

^[10]
Id., 7.

^[11]
Id., 10.

^[12]
TSN, 25 June 1992, 2.

^[13]
TSN, 22 July 1992, 3.

^[14]
TSN, 18 August 1991, 21.

^[15]
Id., 27.

^[16]
Rollo, 31.

^[17]
TSN, 8 August 1991, 5.

^[18]
Id., 4.

^[19]
Exhibit “A.”

^[20]
Exhibit “B.”

^[21]
Exhibit “3”; OR, 85.

^[22]
TSN, 21 August 1991, 9-12.

^[23] People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148
[1992].

^[24]
TSN, 8 August 1991, 12-13.

^[25]
People vs. Malillos, 24 SCRA 133, 140-141 [1968] (cititations omitted);
People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532 [1975]; People vs. Mozar, 130 SCRA
568 [1984]; People vs. Osias, 199 SCRA 574 [1991]; People vs.
Ducay, G.R. No. 86939, 2 August 1993.

^[26]
TSN, 18 August 1992, 19.

^[27]
“An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for
that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Laws, and for
Other Purposes.”

^[28]
Section 15, second paragraph, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. See also Section 4, second paragraph;
Section 5, second and third paragraphs; and Section 15-a, second and third
paragraphs.

^[29]
G.R. No. 93028.