G.R. No. 107167. August 15, 1994

LUMEN POLICARPIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 83 AND GROUP DEVELOPERS AND FINANCIERS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions August 15, 1994 THIRD DIVISION VITUG, J.:
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VITUG, J.:


This petition for review takes issue on the interpretation made
by the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Quezon City on this Court’s decision of
29 November 1988 in G.R. No. 73421. The
petition seeks to reverse an order, dated 14 September 1992, of the RTC issuing
a writ of execution of the judgment which now has long become final and
executory.

On 05 December 1970, private respondent Group Developers and
Financiers, Inc., and petitioner Lumen Policarpio entered into a “Pre-need
Purchase Agreement” for the purchase by petitioner of one “Heritage Family
Court Estate Block,” a memorial
lot, for the amount of P59,836.00, payable as follows: P5,983.60, by way of downpayment, and the balance at the rate of
P1,197.92 each month, starting 16 January 1971, for sixty (60) months. On 05 December 1970, petitioner paid private
respondent the downpayment of
P5,983.60, but thereafter failed to remit the installments due under the
agreement.

In a “Supplemental Agreement” entered into by the parties,
private respondent corporation agreed to construct for petitioner a “Family
Court Unit” on the property for P20,000.00, payable by petitioner thusly: P4,000.00, representing the 20% downpayment
of the contract price, and the
balance in twelve (12) equal monthly installments plus interest. On
07
December 1970, petitioner paid the downpayment of P4,000.00 but, here
again, no further payments were made.

In both agreements, it was stipulated that in case of a failure
of compliance by petitioner of any of the covenants thereof, the agreements
could, thirty (30) days after such default, be declared null and void at the option of private
respondent, which could then re­enter and take possession of the premises. All payments made prior thereto would,
furthermore, pertain to private respondent by way of liquidated damages.

On 25 April 1971, petitioner’s father, Don Simeon C. Policarpio,
was interred at the Loyola Memorial Park. Petitioner agreed to pay the sum of P275.00 as interment services which
itself, however, was not paid. Later,
three other relatives of petitioner were interred at the unit.

Private respondent ultimately filed an action against petitioner,
praying, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:

“1. The Pre-Need Purchase Agreement (Annex ‘A’)
and the Supplement to the Pre-Need Purchase Agreement (Annexes ‘B’ and ‘B­-1’)
be deemed rescinded, that your plaintiff be allowed to take possession of the
premises and of all the improvements thereon, and that your plaintiff be
allowed to retain the amounts of P9,983.60 representing the down payments paid
in under said contracts;

“2. Your plaintiff be authorized to disinter
and relocate the remains of Don Simeon Cristobal Policarpio to a single
interment unit in the same Park and that defendant be charged with the value
thereof in the amount of P1,680.00, together with the expenses necessary for
that purpose;

“3. Defendant be held liable to your plaintiff
for the following amounts:

“‘(a) P43,937.60 in concept of actual damages
arising from her refusal to proceed with the contract and from the
non-disposition of the Family Court Estate and for the Family Court Unit
constructed there;

‘(b) P275.00 with interest thereon from May 25, 1971 until the amount is
fully paid for the services rendered in the interment of Don Simeon Cristobal
Policarpio on April 25, 1971;

‘(c) 10,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees;

‘(d) Such amount as this Honorable Court may deem just, equitable and
effective by way of exemplary and temperate damages;

‘(e) Costs of the suit and expenses of litigation.’

“Your plaintiff
likewise prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable
in the premises.”[1]

Petitioner failed to appear at the pre-trial. She was declared in default. On 08 July 1974, judgment was rendered by
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, thusly:

“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
for the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

“1. The Pre-Need Purchase Agreement & the
Supplemental Agreement are hereby deemed rescinded and plaintiff is allowed to
take possession of the premises subject thereof;

“2. The sum of P9,983.60 representing the
downpayment made by the defendant is deemed forfeited in favor of the plaintiff
as liquidated damages;

“3.   To pay the proportionate cost of the
interment unit used by the late Don Simeon Cristobal Policarpio thirty (30)
days from notice;

“4.   In case defendant fails to comply with the
foregoing paragraph (Par. 3 of the dispositive portion of this decision), plaintiff
is authorized to disinter and relocate the remains of Don Simeon Cristobal
Policarpio to a single interment unit and defendant is ordered to pay the sum
of P1,680.00 representing the value thereof as well as the expenses incidental
thereto;

“5.   To pay the sum of P275.00 representing the
value of interment services with legal interest thereon from May 25, 1971 until
the same is fully paid;

“6. To pay the sum of P2,500.00 as attorney’s
fees; and

“7. To pay the costs of suit.

“SO ORDERED.”[2]

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asking (1)
that petitioner should instead be required to pay the full balance due under
the contract and not merely the proportionate cost of the interment unit occupied by the remains
of Don Simeon Cristobal Policarpio or, in the alternative, to surrender
possession of the entire Family Court Unit, and (2) that petitioner should be
ordered to pay the damages proven by private respondent. On 03 October 1974, the trial court issued
an order, which read:

“WHEREFORE, after considering the reasons adduced by the plaintiff
and finding the same to be well taken,
the motion for reconsideration is granted, and the dispositive portion of the
decision dated
July 8, 1974 is
hereby amended to read as follows:

“‘WHEREFORE, the court
finds the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance to be well established,
and hereby orders the defendant:

‘1. To pay the
plaintiff the amount of P90,860.70 which constitutes the entire balance due the
plaintiff from the defendant for the defendant’s acquisition of a Family Court
Unit in the Heritage Family Court Estate Block No. 7 of Loyola Memorial Park at
Marikina, Rizal, owned and operated by the plaintiff;

‘2. In the alternative, should the defendant
fail to pay the amount of P90,860.70 within 60 days from receipt of this order,
the defendant is hereby ordered to surrender the premises consisting of the
Heritage Family Court Estate Block 7 and the Family Court Unit presently
occupied by the defendant and her family to the plaintiff, and to pay the
amount of P39,918.00 by way of damages;

‘3. Should the plaintiff choose the second
alternative and require the surrender of the premises, the court hereby
authorizes the plaintiff to transfer the remains of Don Simeon Cristobal
Policarpio to a suitable interment lot within Loyola Memorial Park at the
expense of the defendant.’”[3]

Private respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the court erred in not ordering petitioner to pay outstanding
interest on the unpaid installments and the amount of P275.00 with interest
thereon from 25 May 1971, as well as attorney’s fees, originally adjudged. On 30 December 1974, the trial court issued
another order, viz:

“WHEREFORE, the order of this court dated October 3, 1974 modifying
the dispositive portion of the decision dated July 8, 1974 is hereby amended so
as to include that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the sum of P275.00
representing the value of interment service with legal interest from May 25, 1971 until the same is fully paid
and to pay the sum of P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.

“SO ORDERED.”[4]

Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of Lumen
Policarpio. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, Group Developers and Financiers, Inc., went
to this Court on appeal by review on certiorari (docketed
G.R. No. 73421). On 29 November 1988,
the Third Division of this Court, through now retired Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., decided thusly:

“WHEREFORE, the respondent Appellate Court’s decision is hereby SET
ASIDE and the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision rendered on
July 8, 1974 is hereby reinstated. Costs against respondent Policarpio. Atty. Amador Y. Isonza, Jr., is ordered to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice of this decision why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for failure to file a memorandum inspite of the extensions of time
he requested and which were granted.

“SO ORDERED.”[5]

Herein private respondent corporation filed a motion for the
execution of the judgment which the Regional Trial Court granted on 02 December
1991. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The trial court deferred
action on the motion pending the resolution by this Court of a motion for
clarification which was meanwhile filed by petitioner. This Court, however, resolved to refer the
motion to the court of origin. On 12
March 1992, petitioner filed a manifestation with the trial court to the effect
that she was willing to pay the amount of P140,000.00 in settlement of her
obligation. She made a tender of
payment which private respondent rejected; instead, the latter filed a motion
to enforce execution of the judgment. Petitioner filed a “manifestation and
motion” for consignation (of P140,000.00) and asked that the running of the
interest be held to cease as of 09 April 1992, when the tender of payment was
made to private respondent. On 14
September 1992, the trial court issued the herein questioned order, reading:

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares that only the Decision dated
July 8, 1974, without the amendments should be enforced by writ of execution.

“Consequently, defendant’s ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ dated
December 13, 1991 and ‘Motion for Consignation’ dated May 23, 1992 are hereby
DENIED.

“Plaintiff’s ‘Motion to Enforce
Execution’ dated May 18, 1992 is hereby GRANTED. Let the corresponding writ of
execution be issued for the
enforcement of the reinstated dispositive portion of the Decision dated July 8,
1974.

“SO ORDERED.”[6]

On 21 October 1992, petitioner filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari, as well as an urgent motion for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
both dated 17 October 1992.

The petition avers that –

“RESPONDENT COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN NOT CONSIDERING THE ORDERS DATED
OCTOBER 3, 1974 and DECEMBER 3, 1974 RESPECTIVELY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JULY 8, 1974 DECISION.

“RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
ESTOPPED FROM INSISTING ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 8, 1974 DECISION
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE ORDERS DATED OCTOBER 3, 1974 and DECEMBER 3, 1974
RESPECTIVELY AND THE MEANING IMPARTED IN THE DECISION OF THIS SUPREME COURT.”[7]

Acting on the urgent motion for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, this Court, in its
resolution of 28 October 1992, resolved “to DIRECT private respondent to allow
petitioner and her relatives access into their family tomb located at
respondent’s Loyola Memorial Park, on November 1 and 2 only, for them to clean
the place and pay homage to their dead parents in observance of All Saints’
Day.”[8]
On 06 November 1992, petitioner filed a
supplemental petition which this Court denied, in its 25 November 1992 resolution, for raising an entirely new
issue.[9]

The petition has no merit.

First. The
decision of this Court, dated 29 November 1988, has categorically stated that
“the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision rendered on July 8, 1974 is x x x reinstated.” Having pointed out
with particularity the decision of the court a quo to be reinstated, which has
become final and executory, we cannot effect the modification that petitioner now
suggests against the vehement objections of private respondent.

Second. A circumspect reading of the 29
November 1988 decision of this Court would show that it evidently did not fail
to take into account the orders, dated 03 October 1974 and 30 December 1974, of
the trial court issued subsequent to
the decision of 08 July 1974. This
Court has said:

“Nowhere in Policarpio’s pleadings did she deny her indebtedness to
the petitioner. Even in her appeal, she
merely raised as issues her having been declared in default and the trial
court’s decision finding the claim for specific performance meritorious thereby
converting the suit for rescission into one for specific performance.

“On this latter point, the relevant provision is Rule 18, Sec. 5 of
the Rules of Court which provides:

‘“Extent of relief
to
be awarded. — A judgment
entered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different
in kind from that prayed for.’”[10]

The above rule has repeatedly been
stressed by us.[11]
A court is bereft of jurisdiction to award, in a judgment by default, a relief
other than that specifically prayed for in the complaint.[12]
Observe that this Court’s decision of 29 November 1988 accords with the prayer
of private respondent in its complaint.

Third. The decision
has long since become final and executory.[13] It
is settled that final decisions are no longer open to amendments or modifications;[14]
otherwise, we will see no end to litigations.

Fourth. It
is now too late in the day for petitioner to raise the issue on estoppel; if at
all, that issue should have been threshed out in G.R. No. 73421.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the order,
dated 14 September 1992, of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano,
(Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo,
JJ., concur.


[1]
Records, pp. 7-8.

[2]
Rollo, p. 38.

[3]
Rollo, pp. 59-60.

[4]
Rollo, p. 46.

[5]
Rollo, p. 65.

[6]
Rollo, pp. 54-55.

[7]
Rollo, p. 19.

[8]
Rollo
, p. 47.

[9]
Rollo, p. 16.

[10]
Records, Annex B.

[11]
Keller & Co., Ltd. vs. COB Group Marketing, Inc., 141 SCRA 86;
Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834

[12]
Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166.

[13]
On 26 December 1988.

[14]
Adez Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 623; Marquez vs.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 74; International School, Inc. vs. Minister
of Labor and Employment, 175 SCRA 507.