APOLINARIO GONZALES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND IMELDA CARATAO, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the
decision, dated 12 February 1993, of the Court of Appeals, sustaining the
validity of the order, dated 15 June 1992, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
9) of Malolos, Bulacan, which has reconsidered and set aside its previous order
of 30 March 1992 provisionally dismissing criminal cases for multiple rape
filed against petitioner.

The backdrop settings may be briefly recited; thus:

A criminal complaint for qualified seduction (of private
complainant Imelda Caratao), following a preliminary investigation, was filed
(docketed Criminal Case No. 2560) with the Municipal Trial Court of Obando,
Bulacan, against herein petitioner Apolinario Gonzales. The latter, upon arraignment, pleaded
“not guilty” to the charge. The presentation of evidence by the prosecution started in May 1983 and
was concluded in November 1988. Thereafter, the defense took its turn. When the defense was about to rest its case, the prosecution filed a
motion to instead commit the accused to answer to a charge for rape since the
evidence submitted indicated that rape, not qualified seduction, was evidently
committed. Petitioner opposed the
motion. On 17 January 1990, the trial
court issued an order which, in part, read:

“The evidence adduced in the prosecution of this case clearly
and manifestly show that the crime of Qualified Seduction as defined and
penalized under the provisions of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code has not
been proven. The crime of rape is an
offense beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.

“If there was a mistake in the charging of the proper offense
against the accused, thus the motion, to commit and detain him under the
authority of section 11 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the trying Court must
have jurisdiction to hear the original case and that of the subsequent case to
be filed against the accused.

“The Court having no jurisdiction to institute nor try the
offense of rape, cannot, and will not, assume the jurisdiction of the Public
Prosecutor, for it is their prerogative to file necessary complaint or
information against any accused, jurisdiction of which falls exclusively with
the Regional Trial Court.

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no sufficient
evidence to prove the crime of Qualified Seduction as charged in the complaint,
this case is hereby dismissed.”^[1]

Following the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2560, the
prosecution filed six (6) separate informations for rape, alleged to have been
committed on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 November 1982, before different branches
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. These cases were later consolidated
(docketed Criminal Cases No. 1858-M-90 to No. 1864-M-90, inclusive).

When arraigned, Gonzales pleaded “not guilty” to the
charges. In the hearing of 01 July
1991, the prosecution presented its first witness, a brother of private
complainant. On 23 March 1992, the
private complainant and her counsel not having appeared, the public prosecutor
requested a postponement of the hearing. Petitioner did not object to the postponement. On 30 March 1992, the public prosecutor again requested that the
hearing be postponed on the same ground. This time, the defense objected and moved for the dismissal of the
cases, claiming that the delay would violate petitioner’s right to a speedy
trial. The trial court issued an order,
which read:

“On motion to this effect of the defense counsel predicated on
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial as viewed against the
repeated absences of the complaining witness despite due notice, and without
objection on the part of the Trial Prosecutor, the above-entitled case is
hereby DISMISSED PROVISIONALLY with the express consent of the accused and with
costs de officio.

“SO ORDERED.”^[2]

On the very same day, private counsel for private complainant
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the court’s order, alleging that they
(the complainant and private counsel) “were already within the Court
premises but complainant was afraid to enter the courtroom in the absence of
(her) counsel who was then attending a hearing before another branch of (the)
Court.” On 15 June 1992, the trial court, finding the motion for
reconsideration to be impressed with merit, issued an order lifting and setting
aside the 30 March 1992 order of dismissal.

A petition for certiorari was filed by Gonzales
with the Court of Appeals. On 12
February 1993, respondent appellate court issued its questioned decision which
dismissed the petition and affirmed the trial court’s order of 15 June 1992.

Hence, the instant petition.

We uphold the appealed decision.

Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense. – When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause
to detain him. In such case, the court
shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the proper information.”

The dismissal of the charge for qualified
seduction is clearly sanctioned by the above-quoted rule in order to pave the
way for the filing of the proper offense for the crime of rape. The accused cannot invoke double jeopardy;
for that kind of jeopardy to arise, the following requisites must be extant:

(1)  
The previous complaint or information or other formal charge
is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;

(2)  
The court has jurisdiction to try the case;

(3)  
The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge;
and

(4)  
The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed
without his express consent.

When all the above elements concur, a
second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said
offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which
necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged,
can be rightly barred.

Here, there is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did not
have the requisite jurisdiction to try the offense of rape, a crime that lies
instead within the province of the Regional Trial Court to take cognizance
of. Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 2560 for qualified seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was
provisional but likewise with the express consent of the accused (herein
petitioner).

Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical
offenses. The elements of rape — (1)
that the offender has had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act is accomplished (a) by using force or
intimidation, or (b) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the woman is under twelve (12) years of age —
substantially differ from the elements of qualified seduction. The latter requires (1) that the offended
party is a virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried and of good
reputation; (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years
of age; (3) that the offender has sexual intercourse with her; and (4) that
there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the
offender. While the two felonies have
one common element, i.e., carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary
in all other respects.

Contrary to the assertion of accused-petitioner, the case of People vs. Samillano (56
SCRA 573), did not hold that qualified seduction is necessarily included in
rape; what this Court has said is that one who is charged with rape may be
found guilty of qualified seduction when the “verified complaint for rape
contains allegations which aver the crime of seduction.”

We recognize, and we have thus heretofore upheld,^[3]
an accused’s right to speedy trial; in this instance, however, we see no
transgression thereof. The appellate
court itself has found, and later concluded, that “with only two (2)
postponements in the same month entailing an interval of just seven (7) days,
the proceedings have not been unreasonably delayed in violation of the right to
speedy trial.” Looking at the records ourselves, we find no cogent reason
to rule otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of respondent
appellate court is AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 37.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 38.

^[3]
People vs. Abaño, 97 Phil. 28; People vs. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016;
Salcedo vs. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811.