UNITED PARACALE MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND JOSE CHUATENGCO, RESPONDENTS.

The instant petition seeks a review of the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals which has affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, dismissing Civil Case No. 4905.

The facts of the case, summarized by respondent appellate court,
may be stated, thus:

On 14 April 1982, petitioner United Paracale Mining Company filed
a complaint (docketed Civil Case No. 4905) against the Director of Lands and
fifty-three (53) other individual defendants, alleging, among other things,
that the company was the owner of some forty?nine (49) mining claims
located in Paracale, Camarines Norte, having located and perfected the claims
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, as
amended. These mining claims were
thereby supposed to be private property of the company and segregated from the
mass of the public domain. Since 1930
and 1934 up until now, petitioner, by itself and through its
predecessors-in-interest, had been performing the annual assessment work
required by law, filing the corresponding affidavits of assessment work with
the office of the mining recorder and paying real estate taxes on the mining
claims. Petitioner had applied for a
patent on the claims, and the Bureau of Mines approved and recognized the
company’s rights over the mining claims.

On 16 October 1978, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Mines an
application for mining lease over the claims, with a reservation that
“(t)he filing of th(e) application for mining lease (was) without
prejudice to the rights of the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest in
and all the mineral claims object thereof acquired under the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, x x x.”

On 11 June 1982, thirty-seven (37) of the fifty-three (53)
individual defendants filed an answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint. On 08 September 1992, herein
private respondent Jose Chuatengco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
asseverating that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Chuatengco cited Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1214 which directed “(h)olders of subsisting and valid
patentable mining claims, lode or placer, located under the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, shall file a mining lease
application x x x within one (1) year from the approval of this Decree, and
upon the filing thereof, holders of the said claims shall be considered to have
waived their rights to the issuance of mining patents therefor: Provided, however. That the non-filing of the application for mining lease by the
holders thereof within the period (therein) prescribed (would) cause the
forfeiture of all x x x rights to the claim.”

On 25 April 1966, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss;
whereupon, petitioner filed an appeal with respondent court. On 15 November 1990, the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Here then is the instant petition.

The query of petitioner: “What is actually the right of a locator of mining
claim located and perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902. Does he have an absolute right of ownership,
or merely a right to possess said claim?”

Petitioner contends that there are two (2) conflicting rulings
made by this Court on the same issue. In Director of Lands vs. Kalahi
Investments, Inc. (169 SCRA 683), a locator of mining claims perfected under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 has been held not to have an absolute right of
ownership over said claims but merely a possessory right thereto. In Atok-Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals and Liwan Consi (193 SCRA 71), however, a locator of mining
claim perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court has ruled, does
have an absolute right of ownership over his claim being thereby removed from
the public domain.

In its resolution, dated 01 June 1992, the Court required
respondents to file their respective comments.

On 10 November 1993, the Solicitor General filed a comment and
motion, dated 06 November 1993, alleging that when petitioner appealed the
trial court’s order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 4905, only private
respondent Chuatengco was named adverse party; the Director of Lands was not
included. The Solicitor General thus
prayed:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed
that the Director of Lands be excluded as respondent in the present petition;
that the motions for extension of time to file comment in behalf of the
Director of Lands be disregarded; and that the Director of Lands be excused
from filing the required comment.”^[1]

Atty. Freddie Venida, counsel for private respondent, has failed
to comply with the Court’s resolution of 10 February 1993, notice of which
appears to have been received by him on 07 April 1993. The period given him having expired on 17
April 1993, the required comment is hereby dispensed with.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.–Parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.”

An action cannot proceed unless the
indispensable parties are joined;^[2] that
joinder is mandatory and, unless such indispensable parties are impleaded, the
case must be dismissed.^[3]
Clearly, the Director of Lands is an indispensable
party to the case, and his omission is fatal to the cause of herein petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero, and Melo,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., (Chairman), no
part.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 116.

^[2]
See Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 713; Cortez vs.
Avila, 101 Phil. 205; Borlasa vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345.

^[3]
See National Development Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 422.