HEIRS OF GEORGE BOFILL, IGNACIO BOFILL, VICTORIA B. ANASTACIO, REGINA FRANCISCA B. CHUACHINGCO, EVELYN B. SERRA, MANUELITA B. VIZCONDE, LAGRIMAS B. DULLANO, LOURDES B. DASAL, MA…

This case arose from an action for
declaration of ownership over Lot No. 2954-A of the Panay Cadastre, situated in
Bo. Linatiran, Panay, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-19894, filed by petitioners against the Sps. Enrique and Flordeliza Begalan and Sps. Jose and Bernardita Catalan,
two (2) of private respondents herein. Joining their cause, the heirs of Manuel Barredo, claiming also to be
owners of the lot in litigation, filed a complaint in intervention against the
petitioners herein, heirs of Manuel Bofill.

On 12 August 1988, the trial court rendered a decision declaring
petitioners the owners of the lot in question and entitled to the possession
thereof, ordering respondents as defendants therein to vacate the premises, and
to pay petitioners P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The counterclaim as well as the complaint in intervention was
dismissed.^[1]

The rationale for the foregoing disposition of the trial court is
that –

x x x the claim of the plaintiff-intervenors and defendants over
this land mainly anchored on the supposed Deed of Exchange of March 8, 1944,
executed between Manuel Bofill and Cornelio Barriatos, was a mere exchange of
collateral(s) from Lot 526 to Lot 2954-A for a loan of P450.00 obtained by
Manuel Bofill. The said loan having
been paid one year thereafter, said deed of exchange as collateral for said
loan was rendered without legal force and effect, hence no entry in the title
covering the lot was made regarding said loan, nor was the title in the name of
Manuel Bofill transferred to anybody else up to the present time.

The case filed by Juana Brillo against Sotera Bofill x x x on
November 17, 1975 for the registration of the Deed of Exchange of 1944 and for
the surrender of the original title was done thirty-one (31) years after its
execution, considering laches and prescription, is also without force and
effect x x x x Moreover, the order in said case has become moot and academic
upon the death of Sotera Bofill and the surrender of RO-1456 by her heirs and
the cancellation of the same upon the execution of an Extra-Judicial Partition
by the heirs of Manuel Bofill and Sotera Bofill and the issuance of the present
Certificate of Title No. 19894 in the name of the plaintiffs.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 31 August
1992 reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court. It directed the Register of Deeds of Capiz
“x x x to divide TCT No. 19894 into two titles: one in the name of the plaintiffs without including the portion
covered by Lot No. 2954-A; the other title covering Lot No. 2954-A in the name
of the heirs of Manuel Barredo (herein intervenor-appellants), after payment of
the required taxes and fees.”

In this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, we reverse the appellate court and reinstate the judgment of the court
a quo.

First. The
Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the findings of the trial court which we
find to be supported by the evidence on record. Specifically, it discarded the testimonial evidence proving that
the Casugot^[2] involves an exchange of collaterals
securing the P450-loan of Bofill to a certain Cornelio Barriatos without citing
any contrary proof nor explaining why such factual finding should be thrown out
or ignored. In the same fashion, it
casually brushed aside the factual finding of the trial court that the loan of
Bofill was paid one year after the execution of the Casugot thereby
rendering it without further effect.^[3]

We note that this Casugot written in Hiligaynon is ambiguous as the exchange can refer
to ownership, possession, collateral, etc. It does not necessarily apply to ownership alone as understood by the
Court of Appeals. Apparently, the error
of the appellate court lies in the interpretation of the Casugot when it stated in its decision that the document “speaks
eloquently of Manuel Bofill’s intention to transfer” Lot 2954-A to
Barriatos and concluded that it was an exchange of ownership of two (2)
lots. This error is not surprising as
the appellate court not only adopted the English translation of the Casugot offered by private respondents, which was obviously tailored to
suit their purpose, but also because it
omitted a material phrase stipulating that Barriatos was returning Lot 526 to
Bofill. Without that phrase on the return of
Lot 526 it would appear, as it does, that Bofill donated Lot 2954-A to
Barriatos which, in effect, would render the deed of exchange an absurdity. Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and precise in quoting data
from the records, perhaps it would have arrived at the right conclusion.

Second. Admittedly,
the Casugot clearly reflects the agreement of
Bofill and Barriatos with regard to the ownership of Lot 2954, now comprising
Lot 2954-A, which is the lot in controversy, and Lot 2954-B. Therein is their clear and categorical covenant: “MANUEL F. BOFILL is the real and
absolute owner of two (2) parcels of land, Lot 2954 and Lot 526.” This
declaration is decisive in the disposition of this case as it contains an
express stipulation by the signatories thereto on the ownership of Bofill of
the lot in question binding upon them and their successors in interest.

Private respondents attempt to crush this overwhelming evidence
by giving certain portions of the Casugot a connotation contrary to the
agreement and intention of the parties. Private respondents allege that the 1939 plan subdividing Lot 2954 into
Lot 2954-A in the name of Barriatos and Lot 2954-B in the name of Bofill
reveals the extent of ownership of the parties over Lot 2954. But the plan reflecting this subdivision is
not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to the delineation of their
possession. The best proof of the
ownership of Manuel Bofill is the certificate of title in his name. Moreover, the parties to the agreement
apparently did not consider the placing of Lot 2954-A in the name of Barriatos
as a transfer of ownership because when they executed the Casugot in 1944 they still acknowledged Bofill as the real and
absolute owner of the entire Lot 2954.

Private respondents call our attention to the statement in the Casugot to the effect that Barriatos was already in possession of Lot
2954-A before the subdivision of the lot. This argument is based on an erroneous premise since nowhere in the Casugot is the word “possession” or its equivalent in Hiligaynon mentioned. It is only
in the English translation proposed by intervenors, which the Court of Appeals
injudiciously adopted, where that word appears. In any case, the exchange of lots as used in the Casugot can refer to exchange of ownership, of possession, of
collaterals, or of any other attribute of ownership. Definitely, exchange of lands does not necessarily refer to
exchange of ownership. Besides,
possession is not a definitive proof of ownership, nor is non-possession
inconsistent therewith. Hence, the
claim that Barriatos was the possessor of Lot 2954-A is not incompatible with
Bofill’s claim of ownership.

Private respondents next point us to the crux of the Casugot whereby Barriatos returns his interest in Lot 526 to Bofill in
exchange for Lot 2954-A. However, it is
not clear from the provision what interest was being traded by the
parties. Consequently, we are
constrained to lean on the premise they themselves established in the first
part of the Casugot, i.e., that Bofill is the real and
absolute owner of Lot 526 and Lot 2954. Barriatos not being the owner of either lot, there could not have been a
transfer of ownership between them.

As regards the clause creating a right of way on Lot 2954-A in
favor of Lot 2954-B undisputably belonging to Bofill, private respondents argue
that Bofill would not have required such easement if he were the owner of Lot
2954-A, the latter being considered a servient estate. This argument is fallacious; it is non sequitur. Bofill
did not lose ownership of his lot by imposing on it a right of way in favor of
another lot belonging to him. Besides,
we cannot ignore the practice in the provinces that in giving a realty for a
collateral, possession usually goes with it. At the time the Casugot was entered into between the parties,
this was a common practice. This
further explains the real transaction between them and why Bofill had to demand
a right of way over his own land, so that when possession thereof should be
transferred to a third person he could still pass through it, otherwise, he may
have no ingress to or egress from his estate.

Private respondents focus on the stipulation that if a
certificate of title over Lot 2954-A would be issued to Barriatos the
above-mentioned right of way would be annotated thereon. While the signatories expressed the
possibility of transferring Lot 2954-A to Barriatos in the future, it is quite
clear that the provision cited does not forthwith effect such transfer. The records do not reveal that the transfer
was eventually carried out by the parties or their successors in interest.

Third. As
regards the case filed by Juana Brillo against Sotera Bofill for the surrender
of the duplicate certificate of title, the appellate court stated that –

x x x the CFI is also convinced of the strength of Juana Brillo’s
claim of ownership (which herein appellant-intervenors subsequently acquired)
based originally on the aforequoted Deed of Exchange. The above decision does not appear to have been appealed. Thus it is already the law of the case
between therein parties and their successors in interest. The CFI’s Decision being against plaintiff’s
mother is binding against the plaintiffs (see Sec. 49, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court).

We cannot agree with this conclusion. For, it was error for the Court of Appeals to assume that the
issue of ownership over Lot 2954-A was already determined in Special Case No.
1828 as to bar the present action for declaration of ownership. In that case, the CFI simply directed the
mother of petitioners, Sotera Vda. de Bofill, to surrender the duplicate
certificate of title over Lot 2954 so that the Casugot and
the subsequent instruments of sale covering Lot 2954-A could be annotated
thereon. Definitely, that court did not
declare Juana Brillo owner of the lot in question. The sole issue resolved by the CFI was whether Juana Brillo was
entitled to have the Casugot as well as the documents of sale
conveying the rights of Barriatos to her thereunder recorded in the Certificate
of Title No. RO-1456 in the name of Manuel Bofill. The ownership of Lot 2954-A and Lot 526 was never raised, hence, was not determined therein in Special Case
No. 1828.

Although Juana Brillo prayed for the cancellation of RO-1456 and
the issuance of a separate certificate of title in her name which would
effectively divest Bofill of his title over Lot 2954-A, this was not granted by
the CFI. The CFI merely directed the
annotation of the deeds on RO-1456 apparently because there was not enough
evidence to negate the title of Bofill over Lot 2954-A. Besides, this was not the appropriate
proceeding to adjudicate the ownership of the property. The evidence adduced by Brillo was only
sufficient to compel Sotera Vda. de Bofill to surrender certificate of title
No. RO-1456. It was not adequate to
settle the issue of ownership.

The factual finding of the CFI in Special Case No. 1828 that Lot
526 was owned by Barriatos was, to say the least, erroneous considering that
the Casugot, apparently the same document from
which the CFI drew its conclusion, expressly stipulates that Bofill was the
owner thereof. In asserting that
Barriatos was the real owner of Lot 2954-A and therefore implying that Bofill
was the owner of Lot 526, respondents are assailing albeit unwittingly the very
decision in Special Case No. 1828 which they now set up as res judicata in
this case. Thus, in adopting a theory
contrary to that maintained in a former decision, a party is now precluded from
raising that case as a bar to a subsequent one. Incidentally, the error
was adopted by the Court of Appeals.

We emphasize that the decision in Special Case No. 1828 could not
bind petitioners herein as they were not parties thereto. The order directing their mother to
surrender RO-1456 that was supposed to be in her possession was only personal
to her and could not bind anybody else, particularly petitioners herein who
were not parties thereto nor notified thereof.

Fourth. In
reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals also reasoned out that –

x x x there is no evidence that plaintiffs religiously paid the taxes
due thereon from 1947 up to the filing of their complaint. What appears to have been paid by the
plaintiffs were only for the period from 1972 to 1987. However, the same were paid by the plaintiffs belatedly in 1986 and 1987, evidently
in anticipation of this controversy. Besides, the receipts of this period do not show whether the taxes paid
were also for Lot No. 2954-A considering that they (plaintiffs) own Lot
2954-B. Moreover, payments of realty
taxes, more so if not regularly made, are not conclusive evidence of ownership
(see Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393).

This again is error. The
issue as to who of the parties paid the property taxes in good faith is not
really paramount in the determination of ownership considering that generally municipal
treasurers simply accept payments regardless of conflicting claims of
ownership. After all, statements in the
tax receipts showing such payment are far inferior to the recitals in the
certificate of title. With the Casugot and the certificate of title against them, private respondents
miserably failed to carry their burden to a successful conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas
City, Branch 16, in favor of petitioners in Civil Case No. V-5374 is REITERATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision in Bofill v. Begalan, Civil Case No. V-5374, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas City, Br. 16, penned by Judge Odon C. Yrad, Jr.

^[2]
Casugot in Hiligaynon means agreement or stipulation. The full title of the Casugot is Casugot Sa Pag Binaylohan Sing Duta, which literally means agreement on
the exchange of land. This is the same deed
of exchange referred to in the RTC decision. Hiligaynon is an
Austronesian language of the Hiligaynon
people (those inhabiting Panay and part of Negros, Philippines)
related but not mutually intelligible with Cebuano and frequently considered a
dialect of Bisayan (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1986 Ed., p.
1069).

^[3]
Review of the findings of the Court of Appeals is not a function that this
Court ordinarily undertakes, for as a general rule, such findings are binding
and conclusive upon us (Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 67 and cases
cited therein; People v. Traya, 147 SCRA 381; Apex Investment and
Financing Corp. v. IAC, 166 SCRA 458). However, jurisprudence has developed certain exceptions to that rule,
namely: (1) where the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is made on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellants and appellee; (6) the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of
facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Tapalla v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 100682, 31 May 1993, 222 SCRA 825, 829).