ARMANDO S. OLIZON AND ILUMINADA C. OLIZON, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PRUDENTIAL BANK, RESPONDENT.

The factual alpha of the present dispute was sometime in 1967
when the spouses Armando and Iluminada Olizon obtained a loan from respondent
Prudential Bank in the amount of P25,000.00 and, as security therefor, they
executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land consisting of 1,000 square meters located at Barrio Calaanan, Kalookan
City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
24604 of the Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City. Unfortunately, that transaction spawned the succeeding events
hereunder chronologically narrated, eventuating in this appeal wherein we are
now expected to pen the judicial omega.

It appears from the records that the Olizon spouses failed to pay
their aforestated obligation upon its maturity, so private respondent
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. At a public auction thereafter held on March 11, 1975, the
subject property was sold to respondent bank as the highest bidder, pursuant to
which it was issued a certificate of sale as of the same date. On March 12, 1974, the said certificate of
sale was duly annotated at the back of petitioner’s Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 24604.

On June 5, 1978, again due to the failure of petitioner spouses
to redeem the foreclosed property within the period of redemption, title to the
property was consolidated in favor of respondent bank.^[1]

On January 14, 1986, respondent bank filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City a petition to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 24604, which was lost
in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City, the said proceeding
being docketed as Case No. C-2746.^[2]

On June 11, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City
ordered the reconstitution prayed
for. As a consequence, Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 24604 in the name of
the Olizon spouses was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 149858 was issued on June 5, 1987 in the name of respondent bank.^[3]

On November 27, 1989, respondent bank this time filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession against petitioner spouses, docketed as LRC Case No. C-3094,^[4]
and which petition was granted by the trial court on February 8, 1990.^[5]

On March 8, 1990, a petition, by way of opposition, was filed by
petitioner spouses wherein they sought the cancellation of the writ of
possession, the nullification of the certificate of sale dated March 11, 1974,
and/or the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings. In support thereof, they alleged lack of
notice of the auction sale and lack of posting of the notice of sale as
required by Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.^[6]

After trial, the court a quo issued an order dated July
16, 1990, with the following dispositive portion:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares
that:

1.              
The foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the
spouses Olizons, as well as the certificate of sale dated March 11, 1974 as (sic) null and void;

2.              
The writ of possession
is hereby set aside; and

3.              
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel
Transfer Certifi­cate of Title No. 149858 issued in the name of Prudential Bank
and to reinstate Trans­fer Certificate of Title No. 24604 to (sic) spouses
Armando S. Olizon and Iluminada C. Olizon.

SO ORDERED.”^[7]

Private respondent appealed the said decision to the Court of
Appeals which rendered its questioned decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 29482, dated
September 9, 1992, with a disposition of reversal, thus:

“WHEREFORE, the Decision (sic) dated July 16, 1990 of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan in LRC Case No. 3094 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and another rendered upholding the validity of the foreclosure sale of the real
estate mortgage and the writ of possession dated February 8, 1990.”^[8]

Petitioners have now come to us through the present petition
wherein they contend that:

1.              
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court since
there is evidence to show that the requirements of Sec. 3, Act No. 3135, as
amended, were not complied with.

2.              
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners had
notice of the foreclosure sale.

3.              
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners had
totally abandoned the subject property, as this is not supported by the
evidence.^[9]

We do not find substantial merit in the petition.

Herein petitioners are now seeking the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted more than 20 years ago, invoking
therefor two grounds, namely, lack of personal notice to the mortgagors about
the foreclosure sale, and the failure of the mortgagee bank to comply with the
posting requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.

It is now a well-settled rule that personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary.^[10]
Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice
of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a
newspaper of general circulation. Hence, the lack of personal notice to the mortgagors, herein
petitioners, is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.

Neither can the supposed failure of respondent bank to comply
with the posting requirement as provided under the aforesaid Section 3, under
the factual ambiance and circumstances which obtained in this case, be
considered a sufficient ground for annulling the aforementioned sale. We are not unaware of the rulings in some
cases that, under normal situations, the statutory provisions governing publication
of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and that failure to publish the notice
of auction sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect
which invalidates the sale. However,
the unusual nature of the attendant facts and the peculiarity of the confluent
circumstances involved in this case require that we rule otherwise.

Petitioners cited authority on the requisite publication of
notices is not so all-embracing as to deny justified exceptions thereto under
appropriate situations. Petitioners
quote this passage from Tambunting et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.^[11]
which is not conclusive hereon for not being exactly in point, based as it is
on different facts, thus:

“The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of
notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that
even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale
at least voidable. Interpreting Sec.
457 of the Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in Sec. 18[c] of Rule 39, Rules
of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) in Campomanes vs. Bartolome and German
& Co. (38 Phil. 8081), this Court held that if a sheriff sells without the notice prescribed by the Code of
Civil Procedure induced thereto by the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no
title passes. x x x.” (Emphasis
supplied.)

At any rate, respondent Court of Appeals has this commendable
ratiocination on the aforestated twin errors assigned by petitioners:

“The decisive issue which must be resolved is whether or not the
statutory requirements of notice have been complied with in this case. Section 12 of the mortgage contract reads:

‘12. All
correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses,
subpoenas or notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial action shall be
sent to the Mortgagor at No. 82 Naval Street, Malabon, Rizal or at the address
that may hereafter be given in writing by the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee. The mere act of sending any correspondence
by mail or by personal delivery to the said address shall be valid and
effective notice to the Mortgagor for
all legal purposes, and
x x x shall not excuse or relieve the mortgagor from the effects of such
notice.’ (Italics supplied.)

“The foregoing stipulation is the law between petitioner and
oppositors-spouses and should be complied with faithfully.

“That the mortgagors were actually notified by appellant bank of
the foreclosure proceedings is shown by its letters to the Olizons before the
actual sale at public auction of the subject property, to wit: (1) Letter dated January 16, 1973 of Atty.
Octavio D. Fule, Legal Officer of appellant bank to the Olizons informing the
latter that their failure to pay their obligations will constrain appellant
bank to institute appropriate legal action against them; (2) Letter dated
January 31, 1974 of Atty. Octavio D. Fule, Legal Officer of appellant bank,
informing the Olizons that Prudential Bank has filed foreclosure proceedings
under Act 3135, as amended.

x x x

“Furthermore, notice of sale was duly published in accordance with
law and furnished the Olizons. The
evidence presented during the trial of the case show that the then Clerk of
Court, Emma Ona, sent a printed letter dated February 18, 1974 informing the
Olizons that appellant bank had filed an application to foreclose their real
estate mortgage and the public auction of the mortgaged parcel of land was sent
on March 11, 1974, together with a copy of the Notice of Sale. The document is more than ten (10) years old
and the absence of a registry receipt in the case folder of the foreclosure
records of the Sheriff of the City of Caloocan, does not indicate that the
Olizons did not receive a copy of the aforesaid notice of sale, it being
presumed that the sheriff performed her duties and that foreclosure proceedings
are regular. x x x.” (Citations
omitted.)^[12]

Furthermore, unlike the situation in previous cases^[13]
where the foreclosure sales were annulled by reason of failure to comply with
the notice requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended, what is
allegedly lacking here is the posting of the notice in three public places, and
not the publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation.

We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications
have more far-reaching effects than posting on bulletin boards in public
places. There is a greater probability
that an announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general circulation,
which is distributed nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than
that posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its location
may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general
circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting
requirement of the law. By such
publication, a reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those
interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose of the law had been
thereby subserved.

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place and
terms of the sale. Notices are given
for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained, immaterial
errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if
mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to
deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to
prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or omissions will be fatal
to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.^[14]

In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since
there was sufficient publicity of the sale through the newspaper
publication. There is completely no
showing that the property was sold for a price far below its value as to
insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing or even an intimation of
collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and respondent bank. This being so, the alleged non-compliance
with the posting requirement, even if true, will not justify the setting aside
of the sale.

Moreover, herein petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
proving by convincing evidence their allegation that there was actually no
compliance with the posting requirement. The foreclosure proceeding has in its favor the presumption of
regularity,^[15]
and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on petitioners. Where the allegation is an essential part of
the cause of action or defense in a civil case, whether posited in an
affirmative or negative form, the burden of evidence thereon lies with the
pleader.^[16]
Besides, the fact alone that there was no certificate of posting
attached to the sheriff’s records of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not
sufficient to prove the lack of posting, especially in this case where
the questioned act and the record thereof are already 16 years old. It is quite unfair to now shift to
respondent bank the burden of proving the fact of posting considering the
length of time that has elapsed, aside from the fact that the sheriff who
conducted the public sale and who was responsible for the posting of the notice
of sale is already out of the country, with the records being silent on his
present whereabouts or the possibility of his returning here.

Indeed, even on equitable considerations alone, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty must stand. As aptly found by the Court of Appeals:

“x x x. It is not a matter
of lack of compliance with the requirements of the law, rather, it is a matter
of unavailability of certain documents due to the loss thereof, considering
that more than sixteen (16) years had lapsed from the date of the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Indeed, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by the sheriff, more particularly, compliance with
the provisions of Act 3135, as amended, has not been overturned by the
Olizons.”^[17]

Nor are these all that we wish to expound hereon, for this is one
case where we find the necessity for the application of the equitable principle
of estoppel by laches in order to avoid an injustice.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.^[18]

In the case at bar, petitioners are already considered estopped
through laches from questioning the regularity of the sale as well as the
ownership of the land in question. It
is evident from the records that the petition to annul the foreclosure sale was
filed by herein petitioners only after 16 long years from the date of sale and
only after a transfer certificate of title over the subject property had long
been issued to respondent bank. Herein
petitioners failed to advance any justification for their prolonged inaction. It would be inequitable to allow petitioners, after the lapse of an
almost interminable period of time, to defeat an otherwise indefeasible title
by the simple and dubious expedient of invoking a purported irregularity in the
foreclosure proceedings.

Although a sale
under a power contained in a mortgage or trust deed has been defectively
executed and the mortgagor has the right to disaffirm the same, he may, by
laches or by acts amounting to an estoppel or ratification, cure the defect and
render the sale valid.^[19]
Where a sale under a power is voidable at the election of the mortgagor for
some irregularity — such as that the mortgagee purchased without authority, or
that there was an inadequacy in the price obtained, a want of sufficient or
proper notice, or the like — the mortgagor must institute proceedings for
avoidance within apt and reasonable time, or his laches will bar him of relief.^[20]
Thus, a party seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale made under a power of
sale must bring his action without unreasonable delay. The court generally will refuse to grant
relief when there has been great and unreasonable delay, amounting to laches,
in seeking its aid.^[21]

Besides, it has been said that in seeking to set aside a
foreclosure sale, the moving party must act promptly after he becomes aware of
the facts on which he bases his complaint, and in this connection, notice of an
irregularity may be presumed from the fact that the mortgagor has knowledge of
the sale, as he is thereby put on inquiry, and is bound to use diligence in
discovering any defects in the proceedings.^[22]
Having failed to do so, petitioners cannot now be heard on their much belated
plaints.

Moreover, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that
registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world. The record is a constructive notice of its
contents as well as of all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it
contains.^[23] Therefore, in the case at bar, the
annotation of the certificate of sale on petitioners’ Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 24604 and the filing of the affidavit of consolidation with the
Register of Deeds constituted constructive notice of both acts to herein
petitioners. Consequently, as early as
March 11, 1974^[24] when the certificate of sale was annotated
at the back of their title, petitioners were already charged with knowledge of
the foreclosure sale, yet they still failed or refused to take the necessary
steps to protect their rights over the subject property.

It also bears stressing that petitioners entered their appearance
in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City where the petition for
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 was filed by
respondent bank, as shown by said court’s order dated June 11, 1986.^[25]
It was then incumbent on petitioners to have filed an objection or opposition
to the reconstitution if they sincerely believed that the property rightfully
belongs to them. Significantly,
petitioners neither moved for the reconsideration of nor appealed from the
order of the lower court granting reconstitution of title in the name of
respondent bank.

Finally, the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time warrants not only a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either had abandoned it or declined to assert it, but also casts
doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to
the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity.^[26]
In the present case, at no time after the debt became due and demandable and
the mortgage property had been foreclosed, or even thereafter, did petitioners
offer to pay their mortgage obligation to redeem their property. Petitioners’ collective acts are, therefore,
indicative of their acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings and the sale, as well as a recognition of respondent
bank’s just and legal title over the property acquired thereby.

We, therefore, cannot but concur in these observations of
respondent Court:

“The evidence on record, likewise show that after the foreclosure
proceedings in 1974, the Olizons had totally abandoned actual ownership over
the subject property in favor of appellant bank, leaving it to appellant bank
to pay the real estate taxes over the subject property. In fact, in the reconstitution of the
owner’s title in Case No. C-2746, while the Olizons entered their appearance
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan, they did not oppose the petition
of appellant bank, despite the fact that the certificate of sale and final deed
of sale as well as consolidation of the ownership were submitted as evidence by
appellant bank in the reconstitution process. It was only after they noticed the lack of certain documents in the
possession of the sheriff that they thought of raising technicalities. x x x.”^[27]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the
assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., in the result.

*
The word “Spouses” (or the abbreviation “Sps.”), stated before the names of
petitioners in the title of this case during the proceedings in the two lower
courts, has been eliminated from the caption here as it is neither indicative
of an official position nor an accepted honorific.

^[1]
Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 29482,
1-2; Rollo, 21-22.

^[2]
See Exhibit N-1, Folder of
Exhibits, LRC Case No. C-3094,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kalookan City.

^[3]
Original Record, 7.

^[4]
Ibid., 1-4.

^[5]
Ibid., 23.

^[6]
Ibid., 43-45.

^[7]
Ibid., 80-82; per Judge Arturo A. Romero.

^[8]
Rollo, 26. Justice Jorge S.
Imperial, ponente, with Justices Serafin E. Camilon and Cancio C.
Garcia, concurring.

^[9]
Ibid., 11.

^[10]
Cortes, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 73678,
July 21, 1989, 175 SCRA 545; Cruz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 90369, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 170; Gravina, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 97070, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 178.

^[11]
L-48278, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 16; Rollo, 96.

^[12]
Rollo, 24-25.

^[13]
Tambunting, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; Masantol Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 97132 and 70937, December 10, 1991, 204 SCRA 752.

^[14]
Bacon vs. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., 131 U.S. 258, 33 L. Ed 128, 9 S
Ct 787; State ex rel. Raulerson vs. Sloan, 134 Fla 632, 14 So 128.

^[15]
Philippine National Bank vs. Adul, etc., et al., G.R. No. 52823,
November 2, 1982, 118 SCRA 110.

^[16]
See Industrial Finance Corporation vs. Tobias, L-41555, July 27, 1977,
78 SCRA 28.

^[17]
Rollo, 26.

^[18]
Tejido, et al. vs. Zamacoma, et al., G.R. No. 63048, August 7, 1985, 138
SCRA 78, citing Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450,
April 15, 1963, 23 SCRA 29; Sotto vs. Teves, et al., L-38018, October
31, 1978, 86 SCRA 154.

^[19]
55 Am. Jur. 2d, Ratification and Estoppel, 750.

^[20]
55 Am. Jur. 2d, Laches, 751.

^[21]
59 C.J.S., Mortgages, 1059.

^[22]
59 C.J.S., Mortgages, 1060.

^[23]
People vs. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597.

^[24]
Exhibit A, Folder of Exhibits, LRC Case No. C-3094, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 120, Kalookan City.

^[25]
Exhibit N-1, ibid., id.

^[26]
Guerrero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-35250, November 29,
1983, 126 SCRA 109; Villamor, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
L-41508, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 574.

^[27]
Rollo, 26.