CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CENECO), PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FOURTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY, JOSE HICETA, REGINA ILON, GILDERBRANDO GISON…

Private respondents are employees of petitioner, an electric
cooperative company. They have worked
for petitioner from a high of four and one half (4 1/2) years to a low of ten
(10) months. Their work forms an
integral part of the business of petitioner. Despite the length of their service, they were extended permanent
appointments only on July 13, 1988, retroactive to June 16, 1988.

Petitioner has a collective bargaining agreement with its
employees’ union for a duration of three (3) years from April 1, 1987 up to
March 31, 1990. Article VII of the
agreement provides for the following wage increase:

“Section 1. – The Electric Cooperative hereby agrees to grant
all employees covered by this agreement
across the board increase on the basic monthly salary of P350.00 for the first
year, effective April 1, 1987, in the following manner:

1. Partial payment of
P200.00 monthly to start July 1, 1987 to March 31,1988.

2.     
Differentials of:

a. P350.00, for the period covering April 1,
1987 to June 30, 1987 plus and/or the additional of

b. P150.00 for the period covering July 1, 1987 to March 31, 1988 shall
be paid in three successive monthly installments starting April 1988.”

The collective bargaining agreement
covers the following employees:

“ARTICLE I
COVERAGE

All the permanent employees and workers of the Central Negros
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CENECO), hereinafter referred to as the Electric
Cooperative, as covered, except the following:

1.  Those performing managerial functions,
confidential employees regardless of status and those whom the Electric
Cooperative and the Union may individually agree upon to be excluded.

2.  Temporary and probationary employees or those
whose period of employment is fixed and/or who are employed on a trial basis
for a definite period; and those who are under special contract.”

Though they were made permanent in 1988, private respondents
demanded payment of the three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) wage increase for
the year 1987 as provided by the above collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner denied their demand.

As called for by the parties’ collective bargaining agreement,
the demand was treated as a grievance. The grievance remained unsettled until their collective bargaining
agreement expired on April 1, 1990. Private respondents then filed their complaint with the Labor Arbiter on
May 18, 1990. Labor Arbiter Cesar D.
Sideno of the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit on March 12, 1991. His Decision was, however, reversed by the NLRC, 4th Division, Cebu
City, on September 18, 1991.^[1] It
held that: (1) private respondents
became regular employees six (6) months after hiring, and hence, entitled to
the across-the-board wage increase for the first year of the collective
bargaining agreement starting from April 1, 1987 to March 1988; and (2) private
respondents’ complaint has not prescribed.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the
following issues:

“1.     WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
COVERED BY THE WAGE INCREASES OF P350.00
A MONTH DURING THE FIRST YEAR
OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT;

2.            
WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLES 280 AND 281 OF THE LABOR CODE WILL
APPLY;

3.            
WHETHER OR NOT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED;

4.            
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO EXHAUST THE
REQUIRED REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AS
STIPULATED IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.”

Petitioner contends that its collective bargaining agreement
clearly excludes “temporary or probationary employees xxx”. It stresses that private respondents were
extended appointments as permanent workers only on July 13, 1988 retroactive to
June 16, 1988. The contention overlooks
Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code, viz:

“ARTICLE 280. Regular
and Casual Employment — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed
for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season.

“An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a
regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually exists.” (Emphasis supplied)

“ARTICLE 281. Probationary
employment — Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the
date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship
agreement stipulating a longer period. The
services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed
to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee.”

It cannot be denied that private
respondents attained the status of regular employees even before 1988. Firstly, they perform activities which are
necessary or desirable in the usual business of the petitioner as an electric
cooperative. They are meter inspectors,
PABX operators, utility men, disconnectors, linemen, messengers, secretaries,
clerks, typists, plumbers, mechanics, draftsmen, HRD personnel, collectors and
electricians. Indeed, their
appointments would not have been regularized if their jobs were not
indispensable in the daily operation of the petitioner’s business. Secondly, they had worked for petitioner for
more than six (6) months before they were given regular appointments. They had been hired on various dates
starting from 1984.

Petitioner’s insistence that private respondents became regular
employees only when they were extended appointments on July 13, 1988 is
deplorable. Articles 280 and 281 of our
Labor Code, supra, put an end to the pernicious practice of
making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of
extending to them probationary appointments, ad infinitum. Thus, Article 281, supra,
placed a ceiling on probationary employment, i.e., not to exceed six (6) months
from the date the employee started working. On the other hand, Article 280, supra, defined when an
employment shall be regular notwithstanding any written agreement to the
contrary. In other words, the
graduation of an employee from casual or probationary to regular does not
depend on the arbitrary will of his employer. Rightly so, for if there is any group of employees that needs robust
protection from the exploitation of employers, it is the casuals and
probationaries. Usually the lowliest of
the lowly, they are most vulnerable to abuses of management for they would
rather suffer in silence than risk losing their jobs. The Labor Code has come to their succor by stopping schemes to
eternalize their temporary status.

Petitioner’s too niggard a regard to the rights of its employees
becomes more evident with its contention that even if private respondents were
to be considered regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, still,
they can only claim security of tenure but not the benefits of the said collective
bargaining agreement. Petitioner’s
contention does not convince for it will result in an anomalous situation where
we have to categorize regular employees into two (2) kinds – one entitled to
security of tenure plus the benefits of the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement, and the other, entitled to security
of tenure alone. Such a classification
finds no sanction under the Labor Code for it distinguishes where there is no
difference. Not even the collective
bargaining agreement of the parties justifies the submission. For reasonably read and interpreted, the
parties collective bargaining agreement excludes only three classes, viz:

“1.  Those performing managerial functions,
confidential employees regardless of status and those whom the ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE and the UNION may individually agree upon to be excluded.

“2.  Temporary or probationary employees or those
whose period of employment is fixed and/or who are employed on a trial basis
for a definite period; and those who are under special contract.

“3.  Casuals and Extra Laborers.”

Private respondents do not belong to the
excluded categories. Their employments
had been regularized. There is no
reason to deny them the benefits granted by their collective bargaining
agreement when they contributed to the profits of management through their labors.

Petitioner also clings to the contention that the claim of
private respondents has already prescribed. It is alleged that the cause of action of private respondents accrued on
April 1, 1987, the date of the effectivity of the collective bargaining agreement
while their complaint was filed only on May 18, 1990. Our attention is called to Article 291 of the Labor Code which
provides that all money claims arising from employer-employee relationship
shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued.

We hold that the claim has not prescribed. Within the three-year prescriptive period,
private respondents submitted their claim to the grievance committee as
provided for in their collective bargaining agreement and as called for by our
laws. Thus Articles 260 and 261 of the
Labor Code provide, to wit:

“ARTICLE 260. Grievance
Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration. —
The parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein
provisions that will ensure the mutual observance
of its terms and conditions. They shall
establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies.

“All grievances
submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settled within seven (7)
calendar days from the date of its submission shall automatically be referred
to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

“xxx                                                   xxx                                                       xxx”

“ARTICLE 261. Jurisdiction
of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. — The Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly,
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are
gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and
shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.

“The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional
Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain
disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary
Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement”

Likewise,
Rule XI, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides:

“SECTION 1. Jurisdiction
of voluntary arbitrator
or panel of voluntary arbitrators.– The voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators named in the collective bargaining agreement shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide all grievances arising
from the implementation or interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies which remain unresolved after exhaustion of the grievance
procedure.

“The voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators,
upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor
disputes including unfair labor practice and bargaining deadlocks.”

“SECTION 2. Referral of cases to voluntary arbitration. — All grievances unsettled or unresolved
within seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission for resolution
to the last step of the grievance machinery shall automatically be referred to
voluntary arbitration prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement.

“The Commission, its regional branches and the Regional
Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain
disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to the appropriate grievance machinery
or voluntary arbitration provided in
the collective bargaining agreement.

“In case issues arising from the interpretation or
implementing of the collective bargaining agreement or those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies are raised in
notices of strikes or lockouts or requests for preventive mediation, the
regional branch of the Board shall advise the parties to submit the issue/s to
voluntary arbitration.”

As
noted by public respondent, the grievance of private respondents remained
unsettled until the parties’ collective bargaining agreement expired on April
1, 1990. With the expiration of their
collective bargaining agreement, its provision requiring the parties to resort
to voluntary arbitration ceased to have any effect at all. Consequently, private respondents lost no
time in filing their complaint with the labor arbiter on May 18, 1990. It is obvious that private respondents did
not sleep on their right for more than three years as alleged by the petitioner
and, hence, prescription will not lie against them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
petition is dismissed there being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent in its Decision of September 18, 1991. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Commissioner Irinea E. Ceniza with Presiding Commissioner Ernesto G.
Ladrido III and Commissioner Bernabe S. Batuhan, concurring.