FINASIA INVESTMENTS AND FINANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO P. AGDAMAG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MA…
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Finasia Investments and Finance Corporation versus Court of Appeals
The Case
This is a petition brought by Finasia Investments and Finance Corporation, which I will call Finasia, against the Court of Appeals and the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Finasia asks the Supreme Court to reverse the appellate court's ruling that the suit filed against it by private respondent Rosito Castro is not a "claim" within the meaning of Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, the law providing for the suspension of all actions for claims against corporations under management or receivership. The case matters because it fixes the meaning of the word "claim" in that suspension provision: it is a demand of a pecuniary nature, a right to payment, and not every suit in which a corporation happens to be a defendant.
Procedural History
Castro filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, presided by Judge Fernando Agdamag, seeking the nullity of certain documents and a preliminary injunction. Finasia moved to suspend the proceedings under Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, claiming it had been placed under receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the subject of the action was not, strictly speaking, a claim against Finasia as contemplated by the decree. Finasia's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Finasia then filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, agreeing with the trial court that the word "claim" means debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. Finasia's motion for reconsideration was denied, and so it came to the Supreme Court by petition for review.
Facts
Sometime in 1982, Finasia extended a loan to Felicisimo Francisco in the amount of 162,166 pesos and 43 centavos. As security, Francisco executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land owned by Castro, acting under a special power of attorney that Castro had supposedly executed in Francisco's favor.
Finasia later executed a deed of assignment and a supplemental deed of assignment in favor of Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank, ceding all its collectibles and collaterals, including Francisco's promissory note, in consideration of the bank's release of all of Finasia's obligations to it.
In January 1990, Castro sued Finasia, the bank, and Francisco before the Makati trial court, praying for the declaration of nullity of the special power of attorney, the real estate mortgage, and the deed of assignment, with a writ of preliminary injunction. Castro alleged that the power of attorney he supposedly executed in favor of Francisco was a forgery. Finasia then sought to suspend the proceedings on the ground that it had been placed under receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Issues
- Whether or not the word "claim" in Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature.
- Whether or not Castro's action for the nullity of the special power of attorney, the real estate mortgage, and the deed of assignment is an action for a claim against Finasia that must be suspended under Section 6(c) of the decree.
Applicable Provisions
Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, provides:
Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers: x x x. c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: Provided, however, That the Commission may, in appropriate cases, appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships or other associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies who shall have, in addition to the powers of regular receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers as are provided for in the succeeding paragraph d) hereof: Provided, further, That the Commission may appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships of other government agencies, such as banks and insurance companies, upon request of the government agency concerned: Provided, finally, that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.
This is the very provision invoked by Finasia, and the whole case turns on whether Castro's suit is an action for a claim within its final clause.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the word "claim" in Section 6(c) of the decree refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It means the assertion of a right to have money paid, and is used in special proceedings such as those before administrative courts and in insolvency. The Court also adopted the definition of "claim" as a right to payment, whether or not reduced to judgment, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, legal or equitable, secured or unsecured, or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. As used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent's estate, the Court added, "claim" is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments.
On the second issue, the Court held that Castro's action is not such a claim. The principal cause of action is simply the nullification of the special power of attorney and the other documents because Castro's signature thereon is a forgery. It does not consist of a demand for the payment of a debt or the enforcement of a pecuniary liability. It has nothing to do with the purpose of Section 6(c), which is to prevent a creditor from obtaining an advantage or preference over another with respect to actions against a corporation under management or receivership, and to protect and preserve the rights of party litigants as well as the interest of the investing public or creditors. A final verdict on the question of forgery will not amount to any preference or advantage in favor of Castro, who was not shown to be a creditor of Finasia.
Doctrine
The word "claim" in Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, means a debt or demand of a pecuniary nature, a right to payment. The suspension of all actions for claims against a corporation under management or receivership applies only to suits that seek the payment of a debt or the enforcement of a pecuniary liability. An action that merely seeks the nullity of documents, such as a forged special power of attorney, a real estate mortgage, and a deed of assignment, is not a claim and is not suspended, because it neither demands payment nor threatens to give the plaintiff a preference over other creditors.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied Finasia's petition, sustaining the Court of Appeals and the trial court, so that Castro's action for nullity may proceed.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a "claim" under Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A is a right to payment, a demand of a pecuniary nature, not every suit against a corporation under receivership. Examiners use this case to test the scope of the suspension of actions against corporations under management or receivership, and to distinguish a money claim from an action for the nullity of documents.