FINASIA INVESTMENTS AND FINANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO P. AGDAMAG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MA…

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals holding that private respondent Rosito A. Castro’s “claim”
against petitioner Finasia Investments and Finance Corporation (FINASIA,
for short) is not one within the contemplation of Section 6(c) of Presidential
Decree 902-A, as amended, which provides for the suspension of all actions for
claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or
receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in 1982, FINASIA extended a loan to Felicisimo Francisco
in the amount of One Hundred Sixty Two Thousand One Hundred Sixty Six and
43/100 (P162,166.43). As security for
the loan, Francisco executed a Real Estate Mortgage dated 8 September 1982 over
a parcel of land owned by private respondent Rosito A. Castro, under a Special
Power of Attorney dated 6 September 1982 executed by Castro in favor of
Francisco.

Subsequently, FINASIA executed a Deed of Assignment dated 23
December 1983 and a Supplemental Deed of Assignment dated 27 March 1985 in
favor of Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank (PSLB), ceding all its collectibles and
collaterals to the latter, including the Promissory Note executed by Francisco,
in consideration of the release by PSLB of all of FINASIA’s obligations to it.

On 27 January 1990,
Castro instituted a complaint against FINASIA, PSLB and Francisco, praying for
the declaration of nullity of the Special Power of Attorney, the Real Estate
Mortgage, and the Deed of Assignment with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, presided by respondent Judge Fernando P.
Agdamag. Castro alleged in the complaint
that the power of attorney he supposedly executed in favor of Francisco was a
forgery.

Claiming that it had been placed under receivership by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which had appointed a Rehabilitation
Receiver, on 21 June 1991, FINASIA filed with the Regional Trial Court a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings under Section 6(c) of PD 902-A, as amended, which
states:

Sec. 6. In order to
effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:

x x x.

c) To appoint one or more receivers of the
property, real and personal, which is the subject of the action pending before
the Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of
the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and
creditors: Provided, however, That the
Commission may, in appropriate cases, appoint a rehabilitation receiver of
corporations, partnerships or other associations not supervised or regulated by
other government agencies who shall have, in addition to the powers of regular
receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers
as are provided for in the succeeding paragraph d) hereof: Provided, further, That the
Commission may appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships
of other government agencies, such as banks and insurance companies, upon
request of the government agency concerned: Provided, finally, that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims
against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or
receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly.

On 24 September 1991, the trial court issued an order denying
FINASIA’s motion on the ground that the subject of the action is not, strictly
speaking, a claim against petitioner as contemplated by Sec. 6(c) of P.D.
902-A. A motion for reconsideration of
said order was, likewise, denied by the trial court in its resolution of
September 11, 1992; hence, FINASIA filed before respondent Court of Appeals, a
special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order of the
trial court dated April 7, 1992 and resolution dated September 11, 1992. In its decision promulgated on April 7, 1992
in CA-G.R. SP No. 27192, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding
that:

x x x. The word ‘claim’ as used in statutes
requiring the presentation of claims against someone must be construed to mean
debts or demand of a pecuniary nature (Vide Gutierrez vs. Baretto-Datu, 115
Phil. 744). It is in this sense that
Sec. 6(c) of P.D. 902-A should be construed, and from that construction arises
the necessity of determining whether the ‘claim’ against FINASIA in Civil Case
No. 90-234 is a claim for a debt or a pecuniary liability so as to fall within
purview of the decree.

The principal cause of action in Civil Case No. 90-234 relates to
the genuineness or nullity of the Special Power of Attorney reportedly conferred upon Francisco and by
which he was able to execute the real estate mortgage over Castro’s property,
the principal defendant in that case being Francisco. The cause of action is, in the true meaning of the word ‘claim’
not a demand for the payment of a debt or for the enforcement of a pecuniary
liability. The substance of the decree
is to prevent a creditor from obtaining an advantage or preference over another
and since the principal purpose of a Civil Case No. 90-234 is to secure a
judicial pronouncement on the question whether the Special Power of Attorney is
a forgery or not, a possible affirmative ruling will not amount to a preference
or advantage to Castro who has not been shown to be a creditor or FINASIA.

Besides, to suspend Civil
Case No. 90­-234 is to deny Castro the opportunity to prove his thesis that the
Special Power of Attorney supposedly conferred by him upon Francisco is a
forgery. This situation will in turn open the possibility that Castro may
lose his property without being able to do anything against it. This will be rank in justice, a situation
which no law ever contemplates.

x x x                                                  x
x x                                                     x
x x.

WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED.^[1]

On 30 April 1992, FINASIA filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision but the
same was denied by public respondent in its Resolution dated 11 September 1992;^[2]
hence, the present recourse.

We agree with the public respondent that the word ‘claim‘ as used in Sec. 6(c) of
P.D. 902-A, as amended, refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It means “the assertion of a right to
have money paid. It is used in special
proceedings like those before administrative court, on insolvency.”^[3]

The word “claim”
is also defined as:

Right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured,
unsecured.

In conflicts of law, a receiver may be appointed in any state which
has jurisdiction over the defendant who owes a claim.^[4]

As used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against
a decedent’s estate, “claim” is generally construed to mean debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature
which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could
have been reduced to simple
money judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract.^[5]

Consequently, the word “claim”
which means “right to payment,” should not be confused with
the principal cause of action in Civil Case No. 90-239 which simply seeks the
nullification of the Special Power of Attorney and other documents because the
signature of Castro appearing therein is a forgery. The cause of action therein does not consist of demand for a
payment of debt or enforcement of pecuniary liability. It has nothing to do with the purpose of
Section 6(c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended, which is to prevent a creditor from
obtaining an advantage or preference over another with respect to action
against corporation, partnership, association under management or receivership
and to protect and preserve the rights of party litigants as well as the
interest of the investing public or creditors. Moreover, a final verdict on the question of whether the special power
of attorney in question is a forgery
or not will not amount to any preference or advantage to Castro who was not
shown to be a creditor of FINASIA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman),
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 21-24.

^[2]
Rollo, ibid.

^[3]
Sibal, PHIL. LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, p. 132, 1966 ed.

^[4]
BLACK’S LAW LEGAL DICTIONARY, p. 224, 5th ed.

^[5]
Gutierrez vs. Barretto Datu, 115 Phil. 741, [1962].