PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN GUNDRAN Y GUIAB, ALIAS JOHNNY, BIENVENIDO GUNDRAN Y YADAO, ALIAS BENNY, AND DANILO GUNDRAN Y YADAO, ALIAS DANNY, ACCUSED-…

In an information filed on June 14, 1984 in Criminal Case No. 72
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXX, of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, herein
accused-appellants Juan Gundran y Guiab, Bienvenido Gundran y Yadao and Danilo
Gundran y Yadao were charged with the murder of one Narciso Curameng, allegedly
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 29th of October 1983, in Barangay Sto.
Domingo, Municipality of Bambang, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named accused Juan
Gundran y Yadao @ Johnny, Bienvenido Gundran y Yadao @ Benny and Danilo Gundran
y Yadao @ Danny, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously arm themselves
with a sharp-bladed knife which is neither being used as a necessary tool or
implement to earn a livelihood nor in pursuit of a lawful activity, and while
in possession and control of said sharp-bladed knife, the above-named accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength and with evident premeditation, with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one Narciso Curameng y Tomas @ Siso, by then and there stabbing him on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him fatal stab wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.”^[1]

The prosecution evidence presented at the trial purported to show
that at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 29, 1983, herein
appellant Juan Gundran was having a drinking spree with a group of friends in
front of the house of one Francisco Espiritu in Barrio Sto. Domingo, Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya when Narciso Curameng, who was seated on a nearby bench, made a
bantering remark directed at Juan Gundran. The latter considered the utterance insulting and the same so incensed
him that a heated argument ensued between the parties. Thereafter, Narciso left the group and
appeared to be heading for home when Juan Gundran suddenly shouted,
“Tiliwin yo, patayen yo!”, meaning, “Catch him, kill him!”.^[2]

Appellants Bienvenido and Danilo Gundran, both sons of Juan
Gundran and who were then engaged in a drinking bout of their own with other
townmates in the nearby house of Eufrocino Francisco, picked up some stones and
hurled these at the victim while chasing him. Narciso Curameng was hit, as a
result of which he became dizzy, thus enabling Bienvenido and Danilo to
overtake him. The brothers thereupon
positioned themselves each on one side of the victim, with Danilo tightly
embracing the victim and strongly holding his left hand, while Bienvenido also
held the victim around the shoulder while gripping Curameng’s right hand.^[3]

With the victim thus
rendered immobile and defenseless, appellant Juan Gundran came forward and
without warning swiftly lunged at Curameng with an eight-inch knife, hitting
the latter on the chest. The victim was
then pushed away by the assailants and he wobbled to his house where he managed
to get an air rifle. Carlos Curameng,
the victim’s father, recalled that he saw his son arrive at their house, weak
and staggering, and the latter told him in the vernacular that “(i)n as
much as I am going to die, I will also kill.”^[4]

Carlos Curameng followed
his son when the latter thereafter left the house armed with the rifle,
apparently to retaliate against his attackers. He saw his son fire at Juan Gundran once, but the shot missed the target
presumably since the victim was already weak, thereby resulting in the
inaccuracy of his aim. Carlos then
grabbed the air rifle from his son and handed the same to somebody nearby. The Gundran brothers thereupon attempted to
inflict injuries on Carlos but he was able to evade the attack. Later, he brought his son to the hospital in
Bambang where the victim was declared dead. The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was
“cardiovascular arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock.”^[5]

Expectedly, the defense presented a different version of the
antecedent facts. Juan Gundran
testified that at around 4:35 to 4:40 P.M. of October 29, 1983, he was in the
house of Francisco Espiritu helping the latter dispose of the meat of a pig
which they had earlier butchered when Narciso Curameng, apparently intoxicated,
arrived and rudely ordered him to prepare “pulutan,” that is, food usually taken with hard
drinks. Juan told him to go upstairs
and get his own food as they
were already through eating. Irked at
the response, Narciso boxed Juan on the left shoulder, prompting the latter to
retreat.^[6]

Narciso threw stones at Juan but he was unable to hit him. Narciso then hurriedly left and, in a little
while, came back with an air rifle and accompanied by his father Carlos,
brother Remigio and a certain Oscar Monterubio. The victim fired once at Juan but missed, while the rest of the
group threw stones at Juan. Oscar
Monterubio grabbed the rifle from the victim and also fired a shot at Juan but
he likewise failed to hit the latter. At this point, the victim got hold of a stone the size of a fist. He attempted to bash Juan on the head with
it, but Juan deftly parried the attack and, at the same time, stabbed the
victim on the chest, after which he retreated to safety.^[7]

The brothers Bienvenido and Danilo Gundran recalled that they
were on the way home in a motorcycle at around 5:00 P.M. of that day when they
saw their father, who was then already in retreat, being attacked by the group
of Carlos Curameng. Bienvenido got off
the motorcycle and tried to pacify the participants in the melee. Later, he and Danilo escorted their father
to their home and it was there that they learned from him about the stabbing
incident.^[8]
Defense witnesses Hipolito Wilson, a farm hand in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, and
Jovita de la, Cruz, a businesswoman who resides in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija,
corroborated the account of the Gundrans.^[9]

At their arraignment on July 31, 1984, with the assistance of
counsel, herein appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.^[10]
Trial thereafter commenced on September 4, 1984 with the presentation of the
first witness for the prosecution and concluded with the testimony of appellant
Juan Gundran on June 25, 1991. On
February 4, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment subject of this appeal,
finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.^[11]

In the present recourse to us, appellants assert that the court a
quo
erred in (a) not giving exculpatory weight to the evidence adduced by
the defense; (b) not finding that appellant Juan Gundran acted in lawful
self-defense; (c) convicting appellants Bienvenido and Danilo Gundran of the
crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; and (d) on the assumption that appellants are guilty,
in convicting them of murder instead of homicide only.^[12]

A thorough and judicious review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution positively point to a conspiracy in the commission of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery with abuse of superior strength, in light of
which appellants must all be held accountable for the death of Narciso
Curameng.

Appellants, in their submissions to the Court, are persistent in
their view that the trial court erroneously gave weight to the testimonies of
the principal witnesses for the prosecution while refusing to give credence to
appellant Juan Gundran’s version of self-defense. They lay stress, in
particular, on the fact that the declarations of prosecution witnesses Jimmy
Manuel and Maximo Pascual to the effect that the deceased was dealt the fatal
stab wound on the left chest by appellant Juan Gundran is contradicted by the
autopsy report which indicates that Narciso Curameng was stabbed on the right
portion of his chest.^[13]

Furthermore, appellants express disbelief that Jimmy Manuel, when
called on the witness stand, could not even recall one or some of the other spectators despite his testimony that not a
few persons had also witnessed the incident. In addition, they contend that the delay of prosecution witness Maximo
Pascual in revealing to the family of the deceased what he had witnessed and in
testifying for the prosecution casts serious doubts on the truthfulness of his
testimony.

Appellants likewise underscore the circumstance that Carlos
Curameng, the victim’s father, did not notice anything unusual about his son
when he arrived to get the air rifle. They call attention to the seeming indifference of witnesses to the
incident, which included some of the victim’s relatives, in not informing
Curameng’s father that his son was seriously wounded by Juan Gundran. Appellants then argue that all the foregoing
considerations conduce to the conclusion that the case for the People is
fabricated. We do not agree.

The facts of the incident
narrated by the prosecution witnesses, none of whom has been shown to have
harbored any ill motive which would make them impute to the Gundrans such a
serious crime, are clearly more logical and credible. Accordingly, we find no compelling reason to depart from the
factual findings of the court below as to the participation of herein
appellants in the killing of Narciso Curameng in the manner summarized in its
decision, which findings are by established case law entitled to high respect
on appeal.

On the contrary, we find
that appellant Juan Gundran’s version of the incident and his supposed act of self-defense do not inspire belief. Where an accused admits having killed his victim on the ground of self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by means of
strong, clear and convincing evidence the presence of this justifying
circumstance.^[14] It is hornbook doctrine that in claiming
self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to show that the killing was justified and
that he incurred no criminal liability therefor.^[15]

Now, analyzing the version of Juan Gundran, it is obviously
unnatural for the deceased to have unnecessarily advanced toward said appellant
with the intention of bashing the latter’s head with a stone and thus run the risk of himself being attacked by the
knife-wielding Juan Gundran. It would
have been more natural for the victim to simply hurl the stone at Juan as what
his purported cohorts were then allegedly doing, obviously because Juan was
armed with a knife which would have the effect of keeping the group of Narciso
Curameng at bay.

Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that appellant Juan
Gundran did not, at the initial stage of the alleged attack, resort to the more
logical and practical matter of running for his life since he was clearly
outnumbered, four to one, by his supposed attackers who were then raining rocks
at him and who were even armed with an air rifle to boot.^[16]
Instead, in a foolhardy and unusual show of courage, he supposedly stood his
ground notwithstanding the fact that his weapon was no match for the potential
assaultive power of the Curamengs. In
the face of such overwhelming opposition, one would have been sufficiently
cowed by fear or at least compelled to act in a manner aimed at self-preservation,
which is, to scamper for safety.

Significantly, Juan Gundran admitted on cross?examination
that he and the victim were close friends and were on good terms prior to the
incident. In fact, the deceased was his
brother-in-law whom he even considered as virtually a son, the latter being of
the same age as his own children. As he
conceded that the deceased had always been respectful toward him and had never
bothered him before the killing,^[17] we
are not inclined to lend credence to his account of the supposedly rude and
irresponsible behavior of Narciso Curameng which gave rise to all the trouble
culminating in the latter’s death.

On the errors assigned by appellants, it is to be admitted that
the victim died due to a fatal stab wound inflicted on the right, and not on
the left, portion of his chest. However, the indubitable fact is that Narciso Curameng was stabbed
within the anatomical area of the chest, hence the seeming contradiction
between the autopsy report and the testimonies of said prosecution witnesses as
to the specific part of the chest where the victim was fatally wounded is
merely a minor and inconsequential lapse which should not adversely affect the
probative value of their declarations in court.^[18]

What is of importance here is that the two principal witnesses
were firm and categorical in their assertions, notwithstanding gruelling
cross-examination, that Juan Gundran delivered the fatal blow using his left
hand although what they perceived was that said blow landed just below the left
nipple on the chest of the victim. In
all probability, said witnesses may have been unduly misled by their
observation that appellant Juan Gundran used his left hand in stabbing the
victim as to make them conclude therefrom that the blow struck the deceased on his
left chest. In any event, it is beyond
cavil that witnesses to a stirring event, such as the occurrence of a crime,
would see differently some details thereof due in large part to the excitement
and confusion that it usually brings.^[19]

In the same vein, neither may the admitted failure of prosecution
witness Jimmy Manuel to remember and recognize other persons, who were likewise
witnesses to the killing, be taken against him. In the natural course of things, this was because his attention
was directed and riveted to the main participants in the fight and not to the
people in the periphery of the scene thereof. Additionally, this witness was just passing by when he came upon the
chilling scene showing the Gundran brothers already firmly gripping the victim and their father, Juan, delivering the
fatal stab wound on the deceased, hence, his inability to recall any of the
other witnesses as his attention was necessarily focused on the protagonists.

Also, prosecution witness Maximo Pascual’s reluctance to testify
at once for the prosecution should not be regarded as corrosive of his account
of the killing since the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in
criminal investigations for such justified reasons is of common knowledge and
has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility.^[20]
The reluctance of said witness is understandable as he was obviously in a dilemma by reason of his close
ties with Juan Gundran, the latter’s son
being his godson, and also his being at the same time a relative of the
Curamengs.^[21]

Further, it is not correct for appellants to claim that Carlos
Curameng did not notice anything unusual about his son and that it is impossible
that the other witnesses to the killing, which included some of the relatives
of the Curamengs, did not even bother to inform the elder Curameng of the
stabbing incident. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, the events happened so rapidly, particularly
the time when the deceased went home to arm himself with an air rifle, that no
opportunity was afforded Carlos Curameng to even notice the stab wound of his
son, especially since the latter was wearing a checkered shirt colored green and
red, which could hide the color of blood. Nevertheless, the circumstance that the victim remarked to his father
that, since he was dying, he might as well also kill, in fact put the father on
notice that something was wrong, hence he followed his son. The silence of the spectators whereby not
one of them told Carlos Curameng of the stabbing may be attributed likewise to
the swiftness of the succession of events which transpired during the incident,
not to speak of the shocking effect thereof on those who witnessed the same.

As for the defense of alibi and simple denials interposed by
appellants Bienvenido and Danilo Gundran, the well-settled rule is that such
defenses are to be considered unavailing in the face of their positive
identification by prosecution witnesses as having had a direct hand in the
slaying of Narciso Curameng.^[22]
Aside from the fact that alibi is inherently weak because of the facility with
which it can be fabricated,^[23] it
becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused
himself and his relatives and not by credible persons.^[24]
It is too doctrinally entrenched as to need no citation of authorities, that
for this defense to be considered favorably, the accused invoking the same must
prove that he was somewhere else and that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.

We hold that appellants acted in confabulation and that murder,
attended by the circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, is
the offense for which appellants must do penance, and not only for the crime of
homicide as they insist.

As fundamental propositions, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it,^[25]
even if they did not agree on all the details. It need not be established by direct evidence.^[26]
No formal agreement is necessary to prove its existence and the same may be
inferred from the acts of the accused tending to show community of criminal
purpose.^[27]
In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused
would thereby be guilty of the crime committed in equal degree.^[28]

In the case at bar, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated
movements of the three assailants. The
concerted act of appellants Bienvenido and Danilo Gundran in pursuing the
victim pursuant to their father’s exhortation and in finally entrapping their
quarry and bringing him back to their father, after which their father then
delivered the fatal stabbing thrust on the already defenseless Narciso
Curameng, cannot but conclusively demonstrate that they were animated by a
common criminal objective of that confederacy, that is, to snuff out the life of Narciso Curameng.

Although the killing was preceded by an altercation which under
normal circumstances would have placed the deceased on guard as to negate the
presence of treachery,^[29] nonetheless the manner in which he was
killed positively points to the fact that herein appellants consciously and
deliberately employed a form of attack to ensure the consummation of their
objective with impunity. Also, the
victim had left the group of Juan Gundran so that there was no more need for
the latter to press any further for a continuation of the confrontation. For this reason, even assuming ex gratia argumenti the circumstance of sufficient provocation which appellant Juan Gundran could possibly have
claimed, the same may no longer be entertained since, by leaving the tense
atmosphere, the deceased did not give any provocation for Juan Gundran or his
sons to further pursue and assault him.^[30]

It is beyond dispute that the unarmed Narciso Curameng had no
opportunity to defend himself for he was then under the firm clutches of
Bienvenido and Danilo Gundran and the stabbing was sudden and unleashed at a
time when he was immobilized and set up for the kill by the Gundran
brothers. It is likewise beyond debate
that appellants purposely and cooperatively took advantage of their superior
strength in overpowering their unarmed victim. Since, however, their superiority in number and consequent
collective strength constituted the means by which they perpetrated their
treacherous and fatal attack on the deceased, this modifying circumstance must
be deemed absorbed in the other qualifying circumstance of treachery.^[31]

On the other hand, appellants are correct in their contention
that the slaying was not attended by evident premeditation, the elements of
which must be proven as clearly
as the commission of the crime itself. Even the principal element of this circumstance, that is, the lapse of a
sufficient interval of time between the determination to commit the crime and
its execution to allow the felon to reflect on the consequence of his act, is
palpably absent.^[32]
Here, the fatal attack on Narciso
Curameng was all over within a period too brief to allow appellants sufficient time to
hearken to the call of their
conscience.^[33]

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed judgment of the court a
quo
in Criminal Case No. 72 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Nocon, and Puno, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Record, 66-67.

^[2]
TSN, July 12, 1985, 4-5, 8-10.

^[3]
Ibid., id., 10-12; September 4, 1984, 6-8.

^[4]
Ibid., id., 12-15; January 29, 1986, 3.

^[5]
Ibid., January 29, 1986, 4-8, 11-15, 18; Original Record, 8; Exhibit
“D”.

^[6]
TSN, July 12, 1989, 2-3.

^[7]
Ibid., id., 3-7.

^[8]
Ibid., September 15, 1987, 6-7; May 12, 1988, 5-6.

^[9]
Ibid., January 29, 1987, 4-9; August 5, 1987, 3-7.

^[10]
Original Record, 90.

^[11]
Ibid., 423; per Executive
Judge Vincent Eden C. Panay.

^[12]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 1; Rollo, 69.

^[13]
TSN, September 4, 1984, 13; July 12, 1985, 12; Original Record, 8; Exhibit
“D”.

^[14]
People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 (1993).

^[15]
People vs. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991).

^[16]
TSN, July 12, 1989, 4.

^[17]
TSN, July 12, 1989, 10-11.

^[18]
People vs. Castor, 216 SCRA 410 (1992).

^[19]
People vs. Flores, et al., 217 SCRA 613 (1993).

^[20]
People vs. Dominguez, et al., 217 SCRA 170 (1993).

^[21]
TSN, October 7, 1985, 11-13.

^[22]
People vs. Cabuang, et al., 217 SCRA 675 (1993).

^[23]
People vs. Dabon, 216 SCRA 656 (1992).

^[24]
People vs. Yadao, et al., 216 SCRA 1 (1992).

^[25]
People vs. Maranion, et al., 199 SCRA 421 (1991).

^[26]
People vs. Umbrero, et al., 196 SCRA 821
(1991).

^[27]
People vs. Arroyo, et al., 201 SCRA 616 (1991).

^[28]
People vs. Sadia, Jr., et al., 203 SCRA 62
(1991).

^[29]
People vs. Macalino, et al., 177 SCRA 185 (1989).

^[30]
People vs. Alconga, et al., 78 Phil. 366
(1947).

^[31]
People vs. Bañez, 214 SCRA 109 (1992).

^[32]
People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642 (1991).

^[33]
People vs. Carmina, et al., 193 SCRA 429
(1991).