PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, JR., JUDGE RTC OF MAKATI METRO MANILA, BR. 137; CEFERINO …

This Petition for Review
on Certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of 25 November
1991 and Resolution of 2 March 1992 of the respondent Court of Appeals,
upholding the writ of execution issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati in
Civil Case No. 16699.

The antecedent events
that led to the present petition might be culled, thus –

The Republic of the Philippines filed in 1987, with the Regional
Trial Court a petition for quo warranto, docketed as Civil Case
No. 16699, seeking to exclude from the franchise of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (“PNCC”) certain segments of the Northern
Luzon Expressway and Southern Luzon Expressway. The court denied the Republic’s prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Its motion for reconsideration having likewise been denied,
the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals a petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 13235, for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On 04 August 1989, the appellate court
issued a decision granting the writ prayed for.

PNCC forthwith filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 89557, questioning the decision of the
appellate court. Before final action
could be taken by this Court, the parties entered into a compromise agreement,
expressing, after a recital of the mutual covenants of the parties, that –

“Should PNCC fail to comply with any of its commitments under
this Compromise Agreement set forth in paragraph 2 (c) hereof, the Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 4, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13235, entitled ‘Republic of the Philippines versus Hon. Jesus
Guerrero, RTC Br. 148, Makati, Metro Manila, and Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) formerly CDCP; Federation of Parañaque Homeowners’
Associations and Ceferino P. Padua, Intervenors; Amelito Mutuc, Intervenor;
Fernando A. Gaite, Intervenor’ shall become immediately final and
executory. This sanction becomes
without force and effect upon
PNCC’s compliance with such commitments except its other commitments under this
Agreement and the maintenance of the questioned
portions of the expressways which PNCC shall continue pursuant to
paragraph 2 (b) hereof.”

Finding
the compromise agreement not to be contrary to law, morals, public order, good
customs or public policy, this Court, in its decision, dated 20 August 1990,
gave its imprimatur thereto and thus enjoined the parties to faithfully comply
with the terms and conditions thereof.

Several months later, on the contention that PNCC had violated the compromise agreement, a writ
of execution was applied for with the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) in Civil Case No. 16699, thus resuscitating the judicial
controversy. The issue of whether the
compromise agreement had in truth been observed or breached by PNCC had well
preoccupied the parties and the trial court, until, finally, the latter issued
the writ applied for in its Orders of 17 June 1991 and 19 August 1991.

A petition for certiorari was filed by PNCC with the Court of Appeals, this time docketed as
CA-G.R. 25859, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC and its
findings. The Court of Appeals, in its
decision of 25 November 1991, denied the petition and sustained the validity of
the writ of execution issued by
the RTC.

Hence, the instant petition
(G.R. No. 104437).

The petitioner, which we
find to have been ably represented by the Office of the Government Counsel, insists that the challenged writ of execution has been improperly issued. Such writ, the petitioner maintains, can only be issued by the court which has rendered the judgment. The petitioner, in main, relies on Section
8, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court providing that “the writ of execution
must issue in the name of the Republic of the Philippines from the court in
which the judgment or order is entered; x x x.” The petitioner
points out that the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 89557, which has
approved the compromise, is upon an original action, that has sought to nullify
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13235. Observe, however, that
the latter case, in turn, has been occasioned by RTC’s denial of the Republic’s
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 16699.

In any case, the rule
invoked by the petitioner is not without exceptions. Even the petitioner itself concedes that one such
exception is when “the records of the case had been transferred to another
court,” in which event the latter may issue the writ. In practice, in the case of the appellate
courts, this Court included, rarely would the court by itself execute its own
decision, whether the petition is brought up to it under Rule 45 or under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Almost
invariably, the appellate records, including the judgment, are forwarded to the
court whose decision or order has been questioned or put to issue. Thus, our decision and other records in G.R.
No. 89557, have been, upon entry of judgment, transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, the latter’s decision being the subject of the petition in G.R. No.
89557. In the same vein, the Court of
Appeals, in turn, has returned the records to the RTC, the latter being the
court, as we have earlier said, where the judicial controversy on the subject
matter involved in the case had, in the first place, originated. This we can do, and in so doing, the Court
is not thereby conferring jurisdiction on a court where none theretofore has
altogether existed.

But in the same way that it can allow the lower court to issue
the writ of execution, it is also within this Court’s prerogative to itself
consider the application for such a writ.

The Rules of Court, Section 8 of Rule 39 included, are rules of
procedure, and, whenever called for, they should be so construed as to give
effect, rather than to defeat, their essence. The Rules are designed to facilitate, rather than hinder, the
expeditious settlement of controversies and, with it, the prompt dispensation
of justice.

While the matter of estoppel, given the above conclusion, no
longer is an issue still required to be resolved, we, nonetheless, deem it
appropriate to express our agreement with the petitioner that, under the
circumstances which has put it to task, it has indeed, only been constrained,
as it is entitled, to make its own submissions which, in our view, fall short
of seeking its own affirmative relief that might have warranted estoppel to set
in against it.

Instead of a peremptory resolution of the case solely predicted
on the purely legal issues that have been raised, the Court has thought it to
be imperative, nonetheless, to have the parties address with greater paramount
concern the “safety and convenience of an innumerable number of
commuters” than just the “legal niceties, occupying, so to speak, the
forefront of the scenario.” Thus, in its deliberations on 25 August 1993,
this Court has instead resolved to require the parties to appear before it for
hearing on 27 September 1993, with these words:

“One overriding matter. The Government Corporate Counsel has asked us to consider the following
point, which we here reproduce;
viz:

“x x x                                        x x x                                         x x x.

‘(c)   Further, the continued implementation of the
said Writ greatly inconveniences the estimated 200,000 motorists availing of
the facilities on a daily basis inasmuch as the absence of road maintenance and
upkeep will cause rapid deterioration of the road facilities. Petitioner, as operator thereof, stands to
also incur tremendous expenses just to bring the condition of the facilities
back to order, without benefit of security or relief therefrom;

‘x x x                                           x
x x                                         x
x x.’

“Seconding the petitioner’s above apprehensions are the Toll
Regulatory Board and the Department of Public Works and Highways, which have
both expounded, in their Joint Comment, their own position on the matter, as
follows:

“‘That as a result of the parties squabbles, the contested
segments of the expressways have been left without prior preparation to the
care of the Government, which with all of its budgetary limitations, cannot be
expected to devote its full energy and resources thereto. The operation of a road as a toll facility
is a multi-faceted undertaking, which does not merely connote a routinary
maintenance of road surfaces, shoulders, ditches, drainage structures but also
includes traffic services, traffic enforcement, motorist assistance, fences,
removal of debris, roadside cleaning, security, grass cutting, and providing
ambulances and towing services. In
fact, for a complete maintenance of the expressways three more government
agencies should be directly involved, and they are: Traffic Engineering Center of the Department of Transportation
and Communication, for traffic engineering facilities, lane markings, signs, other
traffic control devices; Philippine National Police, for security traffic
enforcement and motorist assistance; and the Metro Manila Authority, for
maintenance of cleanliness of non-road side facilities, such as plants, lights
and phones. Thus, all these other
agencies shall be needing additional funding for such services. Besides, at present, the questioned segments
need major rehabilitation works and not a mere routinary maintenance works.’

“We are not unmoved. It is enough that one reads daily newspaper reports and hears broadcast
accounts or, perhaps even better, simply negotiates the entire length of each
expressway – both the franchised and the so-called disenfranchised portions –
to appreciate why this Court cannot close its eyes to the above concerns. This case undeniably is impressed with
public interest, affecting, as it does, no less than the safety and convenience
of an innumerable number of commuters. Yet, we are puzzled by what seems to be a finical to legal niceties,
occupying, so to speak, the forefront of the scenario. With all due respect, should not the welfare
of the riding public be considered more paramount than the legal intricacies
posed in this case?

“The Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of Government
Corporate Counsel, and, but not least, the Toll Regulatory Board, as well as
the Department of Public Works and Highways, all governmental entities
themselves, posit conflicting views. Lest it be misunderstood, our approval of the compromise agreement in G.R.
No. 89557 not withstanding, the real parties thereto are certainly not
precluded from re-examining their respective positions, if truly desirable, and
from accordingly reacting in consonance therewith. A compromise agreement, although judicially approved, is still
basically an agreement, and it is precisely for this reason that a court is
not, as a general rule, free to impose on the parties a judgment different from
the terms and conditions thereof (Philippine Bank of Communications vs.
Echiverri, G.R. L-41795, 99 SCRA 508/1980/). Like any other contract, so long as the obligation remains out­standing,
a compromise agreement can be the subject of change or modification, freely
entered into, that would thereby have effects no different from those arising
from novation (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, G.R. No. L-35615, 75 SCRA 234/1977/;
Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, G.R, No. L-25897, 72 SCRA 388/1976/). It is also hardly debatable that agreements
may be affected by the interposition of important public policy.”

During the hearing held
on 27 September 1993, the parties appeared; on even date, following the oral
submissions made, the Court issued the following resolution:

“In today’s hearing, petitioner Philippine National
Construction Corporation was represented by Asst. Government Corporate Counsel
Ramiro Madarang and State Corporate Attorney Jesus Clariza, both of the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel. Asst. Solicitor General Mariano Martinez appeared and argued for
respondent Republic. Attys. Ceferino
Padua and Fernando Gaite appeared and argued as intervenors.

“After hearing the arguments of the parties, the court
Resolved to require them to SUBMIT simultaneous MEMORANDA, and to discuss therein the points
brought out during the hearing, within ten (10) days from today, September 27,
1993.

“Considering that public interest, including the interest of
the public in safe, secure and modern highways which must be continuously and
effectively maintained and policed, is or has become heavily engaged in this
case; and considering further that the principal parties, that is, petitioner
PNCC and respondent Republic of the Philippines (which owns 93% of the stock of
petitioner and therefore controls petitioner), have both announced during the
oral hearing their mutual intent to arrive at a practical and operable
agreement that would not only re­solve the issues of this case but also take
adequate account of the paramount interest of the public, while consulting with
herein intervenors, the court also Resolved to REQUIRE said
petitioner and respondent to SUBMIT to this Court the agreement that they shall have reached,
within thirty (30) days from today, 27 September 1993.”

Since then, other
pleadings have been filed with this Court by the parties and others, including
by some concerned local officials, which are all hereby NOTED.

On 26 November 1993, a Joint
Manifestation and Motion was filed with this Court. Its full text:

“JOINT MANIFESTATION AND MOTION

“Petitioner Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) and respondents Republic of the Philippines, Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) and the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), by their respective
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Tribunal respectfully jointly
manifest:

“1.  That petitioner and the
respondents aforementioned, all government agencies, affirm that the instant
case is impressed with public interest which require, no less, an efficient, comfortable and
safe passage along the expressways;

“2.  Cognizant of this pressing and paramount
consideration, petitioner and public respondents agree to set aside the legal
differences which characterized their previous conflicting stands and to adopt
a common approach which will best serve the interest of the public;

“3.  Petitioner and public respondents recognize
that the disputed portions of the North and South Luzon expressways have
deteriorated badly and are in a sad state today. There is, in fact, an urgent need not only to arrest the
continuing deterioration, but to restore and improve both the physical
facilities and the requisite services within the said portions of the expressways;

“4.  The required immediate restoration and
improvement of the said disputed portions of the expressways can be best
undertaken, and petitioner and public respondents agree, as follows:

“‘4.1.   The disputed segments of the expressways
(Nichols to Alabang in the
South and Balintawak to Tabang in the North) shall be recognized as part of the franchise of, or otherwise restored as
toll facilities to be operated
by, petitioner PNCC;

‘4.2.  Should this Honorable Court agree with this
arrangement, PNCC shall thence be allowed to regain control of the disputed
segments and to resume toll collection thereon based on 1983-approved TRB rates
within seven (7) calendar days from the finality of this Honorable Court’s
judgment and after PNCC shall have been placed in actual control of the
disputed segments;

‘4.3.  Within three (3) months from the finality of
this Honorable Court’s judgment and from the time PNCC is placed in full
control of the disputed segments, PNCC will restore the following thereon, to
wit:

a)           
Traffic management, to include traffic control, security, and
safety services;

b)           
Damaged pavements and shoulders;

c)           
Right-of-way fences;

d)           
Operation of toll booths; and

e)           
Tollways lights; call boxes in the North Luzon Expressway and,
where required by the TRB, call boxes in the South Luzon Expressway;

‘4.4.  PNCC will prepare a program for major
rehabilitation and initiate pre-construction activities thereon within four (4)
months from the finality of this Honorable Court’s judgment giving full control
of the disputed segments back to PNCC;

‘4.5.  Thereafter, PNCC will pursue the
pre-construction activities on the disputed segments as determined by DPWH/TRB
and, once the results of the
pre-construction activities are approved by DPWH and TRB, will embark on extensive rehabilitation works
and improvement of facilities thereon under the supervision of the DPWH and TRB.’

“5.  Premises considered, petitioner and public
respondents respectfully entreat and move this Honorable Court to approve the
afore-delineated agreement and to render judgment on the basis thereof.

“Other and/or further relief or remedy just and equitable in
the premises, including the nullification of the writ of execution issued by
the respondent RTC Judge and the questioned decision/resolution of the Court of
Appeals, are likewise prayed for.

“SO RESPECTFULLY MOVED AND PRAYED FOR.

Manila, September 27, 1993.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL                                                                                  REPUBLIC
OF THE

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION                                                              PHILIPPINES

represented by the

Solicitor General

Petitioner                                                                                             Respondent

By:

(Sgd.)                                                                                        (Sgd.)

RAMONCITO C. ABAD                                                                                RAUL
I. GOCO

President                                                                                             Solicitor
General

Assisted by:

(Sgd.)                                                                                                 (Sgd.)

OSCAR I. GARCIA                                                                                       MARIANO
M. MARTINEZ

Government Corporate                                                                                Assistant
Solicitor

Counsel                                                                                               General

IBP OR NO. 341273,                                                                                    OFFICE OF THE

01/15/93, Pangasinan                                                                                  SOLICITOR GENERAL

No. 134
Amorsolo Street

(Sgd.)                                                                                             Legaspi
Village

RAMIRO R. MADARANG                                                                 Makati, Metro Manila
Asst. Government

Corporate Counsel

IBP OR NO. 335855,                                                                                    REPUBLIC
OF THE

01/15/93, Cebu City                                                                                      PHILIPPINES,
DEPARTMENT OF

(Sgd.)                                                                                             PUBLIC
WORKS AND

JESUS F.D. CLARIZA                                                                                  HIGHWAYS
and TOLL

State Corporate Attorney                                                                              REGULATORY
BOARD

IBP OR NO. 345110,

3/17/93, Samar                                                                                             By:

(Sgd.)

OFFICE OF THE                                                                                          GREGORIO
R. VIGILAR

GOVERNMENT CORPORATE                                                                   Secretary/Chairman

COUNSEL

5th and 6th Floors,

Philippine Sugar Center

Bldg., North Ave.

Diliman, Quezon City”

We take note that the conformity to the compromise agreement has
not been given by all the parties who have intervened in this case; indeed,
some of them have heretofore expressed strong reservations on, if not outright
opposition to, said agreement. Being
merely nominal parties, however, their consent to the agreement, although
preferable, is not indispensable. Let
it be said, in any event, that the Court has taken due consideration of their
respective positions and views on the matter.

All given, we find the compromise agreement not to be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy, and, therefore, the
same is accepted as sufficient COMPLIANCE by the parties thereto with our
resolution of 27 September 1993.

One observation, nonetheless, on an item that may have been
overlooked is that the Compromise Agreement has not made explicit provisions on
the appropriate measures that can be adopted regarding the openings along the
fence on South Superhighway leading to various subdivisions in the
vicinity. We take judicial notice of the great hazard to life and
limb posed by such approaches.

In closing, we express appreciation for the time and effort given
by well meaning persons and groups, notably Attorney Ceferino P. Padua and
Attorney Fernando Gaite, on a matter so imbued with public interest as in this
instance.

WHEREFORE, the compromise agreement referred to above is
hereby APPROVED, and the parties are ENJOINED to faithfully comply with the
covenants, terms and conditions therein expressed. This resolution is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.