THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, DULY REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, VICE-PRESIDENT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, MARIANO M. UMALI, DIRECTOR FOR PASIG, MAKATI AND PASAY, ME…
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Philippine Judges Association versus Philippine Postal Corporation
The Case
This is a petition brought by the Philippine Judges Association, joined by the National Land Registration Authority as intervenor, against the Philippine Postal Corporation and its implementing circular, challenging the constitutionality of the law that created the Corporation and withdrew the franking privilege from the courts. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's own ruling on whether a statute may strip the Judiciary of a privilege it plainly needs, and it is a leading authority on the one-subject rule, the enrolled bill doctrine, and the equal protection clause.
Procedural History
The petitioners filed an original petition with the Supreme Court, assailing the constitutionality of the law and the circular implementing it. The National Land Registration Authority moved to intervene, and its motion was granted. The Court issued a temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992. The case was decided directly by the Supreme Court as an original action, with no intermediate court involved.
Facts
Congress enacted a law creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, defining its powers and functions, and providing for the regulation of the postal industry. Section 35 of that law is a repealing clause. Its second paragraph repealed all franking privileges authorized by law, except those provided for under certain named statutes, and allowed the Corporation to continue the franking privilege under a specified circular and that of the Vice President.
Implemented through the Corporation's circular, the repeal withdrew the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The privilege was retained, among others, for the President, the Vice President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections, former Presidents and their widows, and the National Census and Statistics Office.
The petitioner judges felt that their official functions would be prejudiced by these measures. The National Land Registration Authority took common cause with them, since its sending of notices in registration cases affects judicial proceedings. The petition assailed the law on three grounds: that its title embraces more than one subject, that it did not pass the required readings and distribution of printed copies, and that it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
Issues
- Whether or not the title of the law violates the constitutional requirement that every bill embrace only one subject expressed in its title.
- Whether or not the law was validly enacted, considering that the paragraph repealing the franking privilege appeared only in the Conference Committee Report and was not in the original bills.
- Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary while retaining it for other offices violates the equal protection clause.
Applicable Provisions
Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides:
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
This is the provision invoked against the title of the law and the repealing clause that withdrew the franking privilege.
Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
This is the provision invoked against the manner of passage of the repealing paragraph.
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that no person shall:
be deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
This is the provision on which the Court ultimately annuls Section 35.
Section 35 of the law, the principal target of the petition, provides:
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
This is the clause whose second paragraph the Court strikes down as discriminatory.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court upheld the law. The title of a bill need not be an index to its body; if it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions, there is sufficient compliance. The Court held that the withdrawal of the franking privilege is germane to the principal objective of creating a more efficient postal service, and that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title. A repeal is the effect, not the subject, of a statute.
On the second issue, the Court also upheld the law. The Conference Committee Report was returned to and approved by both Houses, the bill was enrolled with the certification of the Senate President and the Speaker, and it was approved by the President. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the presiding officers, except in matters that must be entered in the journals, such as the yeas and nays on the final reading. The Court declined to look into the charge that an amendment was made on the last reading.
On the third issue, the Court ruled for the petitioners. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated be treated alike, and permits classification only where based on substantial distinctions. The only acceptable reason for the franking privilege is the perceived need of the grantee. Yet the Judiciary, which plainly needs it most, was denied it, while it was retained for offices that need it little or not at all. The Court found the distinction superficial and the repealing clause discriminatory, and annulled Section 35 as violative of the equal protection clause.
Doctrine
First, the one-subject rule is satisfied if the title fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act; a repealing clause need not be mentioned in the title, because the repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute.
Second, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary, and the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the presiding officers of Congress, except as to matters required to be entered in the journals, such as the yeas and nays on the final reading.
Third, equal protection requires equality among equals as determined by a valid classification, meaning a grouping of persons or things similar in certain particulars and different from all others in those same particulars. A classification that denies a privilege to those who most need it while granting it to those who do not rests on no substantial distinction and is void.
Disposition
The petition was partially granted: the law was sustained as to its title and enactment, but Section 35 was declared unconstitutional, the implementing circular was set aside insofar as it withdrew the franking privilege from the courts and the land registration offices, the privilege was restored to them, and the temporary restraining order was made permanent.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a repealing clause need not appear in the title, but a classification that gives the franking privilege to those who do not need it while denying it to the Judiciary that does is a denial of equal protection. Examiners use this case for the one-subject rule, the enrolled bill doctrine, and the substantial distinction test under the equal protection clause.