THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, DULY REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, VICE-PRESIDENT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, MARIANO M. UMALI, DIRECTOR FOR PASIG, MAKATI AND PASAY, ME…

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of
the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners
that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular
they are here challenging. The Supreme
Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that
should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it
cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office
has the authority to do so. We shall
therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of
an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that
their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named
measures. The National Land
Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own
activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases,
affect judicial proceedings. On its
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on
the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of
the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to
wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the
Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally
enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly
shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must
be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

I

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1),
of the Constitution providing that “Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or “log-rolling” legislation; (2)
to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in
bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order
that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they shall so desire.^[1]

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not
expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine
Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected
Therewith.”

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which
provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide
postal system:

a) to enable the economical
and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to addressee,
with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and
understanding through the unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between
nations;

c) to cause or effect a
wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs,
including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and
the like;

d) to ensure that
sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the
overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial
services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards
by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the
petition, reads as follows:

SEC. 35. Repealing
Clause. – All acts, decrees, orders,
executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed,
except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts
Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No.
35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such
arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners’ contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the
challenged act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body
of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the
title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.^[2]

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment
of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not
only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.^[3]
As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in
its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included
in the act. Thus, it is proper to
create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to
prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way
of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern
Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which
Cooley writes: “The repeal of a
statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a
new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new
statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than
the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith.”^[4]

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such
repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject,
not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
title.^[5]
As observed in one case,^[6] if
the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never
claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be
mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution,
nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege
from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective
of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective
postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to
be expressly included in the title of the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35
covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court
under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as
follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the
Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of
both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35
was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second
paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.

These arguments are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in
its jurisdiction to this question. Its
broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter
or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two
houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into
the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on
the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter,
the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having
been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on
April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez^[7] laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except
in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays
on the final reading of the bill).^[8] The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the
old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,^[9] where
we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the
bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final
form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based
on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing
the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the
President of the Philippines; the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public
in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers.^[10]

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because
the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal
protection clause. In fact, the
franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the
Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications
Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the
Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the
Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.^[11]

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.^[12]
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to
all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is
meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.^[13]

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the
first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or
to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the
lawmaking body? Is it offered because
of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need
for the privilege? Or have the grantees
been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that
the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon by the political
departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care (or attention)
was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the
franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was
mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments would have
intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and
equal departments of the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the
grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege,
which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some
private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the
franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication
between the government and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments
of the government, it is the Judiciary that has been denied the franking
privilege. There is no question that if
there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the
Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the
distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the
Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data
from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the
total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the
Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of
the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and
those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of
P60,991.431.00. The respondents’
conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should
be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the
widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the
courts of justice). It is like saying
that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really
necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do
not need it. The problem is not solved
by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there
is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need
it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and
the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it
should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege. While we
may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the
Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the
National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are
intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of
justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable
need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or
their widows, does not send as much frank mails as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as
a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for
the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public
in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter, like exemption from taxes, customs and
tariff duties.^[14]
Among the services it should be prepared to extend is the free carriage of mail
for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is
capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government,
and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section
10, on top of the tax exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege by the
Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in
the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege
can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents
themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal
service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial
process. The Judiciary has the lowest
appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion
budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1 %, is allotted to
the Judiciary. It should not be hard to
imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a
purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial
functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power. On
the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision
that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the
Judiciary may not intrude. It is a
matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354
against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and
that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
providing that no person shall “be deprived of the equal protection of the
laws.”

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the
criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves
be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power
in our own favor. This is
inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact
of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept. As judges, we cannot even debate with our
detractors. We can only decide the
cases before us as the law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own
conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section
35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
and the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds to all
of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June
2, 1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on leave.

^[1]
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 295-296; State vs.
Dolan, 14 L.R.A. 1259; State v. Doherty, 29 Pac. 855.

^[2]
Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 8 A.L.R. 466.

^[3]
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 297.

^[4]
Ibid., p. 302.

^[5]
Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 737.

^[6]
City of Winona v. School District, 41 N.W. 539.

^[7]
7 SCRA 347.

^[8]
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.

^[9]
34 Phil. 729.

^[10]
Rollo, pp. 8-9.

^[11]
Ibid., pp. 209-210.

^[12]
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155; Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA
654; Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 375.

^[13]
International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.

^[14]
Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 7354.