🎧 Case Brief Lecture

FRANCIS PANCRATIUS N. PANGILINAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF QUEZON CITY, 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT, AND FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 105278. November 18, 1993 November 18, 1993

← Read the full text of the decision

Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.

Pangilinan versus Commission on Elections

The Case

This is Pangilinan versus Commission on Elections, a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus decided by the Supreme Court in November 1993. The petitioner, Francis Pancratius Pangilinan, a candidate for congressman in the fourth legislative district of Quezon City, asked the Court to compel the Commission on Elections to hear and decide a disqualification case against his rival, Feliciano Belmonte, Junior, to declare unconstitutional a provision of the Omnibus Election Code of 1991 disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in elections for the House of Representatives, and to stop the City Board of Canvassers from canvassing returns he claimed were tampered. The case matters because it draws the constitutional boundary between the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.

Procedural History

This case came to the Supreme Court as an original action. There were no proceedings in a trial court or in the Court of Appeals. The petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, alleging grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents. The Court resolved the petition in a single decision.

Facts

Pangilinan and Belmonte were both candidates for congressman in the fourth legislative district of Quezon City in the elections of 11 May 1992. On 23 April 1992, two registered voters filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for disqualification against Belmonte for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that during a rally he boasted of giving a sack of rice, 5,000 pesos, and medicines to a community, and that he gave two tickets to Hong Kong to the winner of a barangay pageant. The Commission referred the petition to its Law Department for preliminary investigation.

On 20 May 1992, Pangilinan and the complainants filed an urgent motion to suspend the canvass and the proclamation, so that the disqualification case would not become moot. The Commission did not act on the motion. Five other petitions for disqualification were later filed against Belmonte.

During the canvass, Pangilinan objected to over 120 election returns on the ground that they were tampered, altered, or spurious. The City Board of Canvassers overruled the objections, relying on the provision of the Omnibus Election Code of 1991 and on a Commission resolution stating that pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in the election of members of the House of Representatives. The Board also created canvassing committees without informing Pangilinan, depriving him of the chance to appoint watchers and counsel. The Board ignored his objections and proceeded to canvass. Belmonte was proclaimed the winner, took his oath, and assumed office.

Issues

  • Whether or not the provision of the Omnibus Election Code of 1991 disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies.
  • Whether or not the Commission on Elections has jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies involving the election of members of the House of Representatives.
  • Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process when canvassing committees were formed without prior notice to him and without affording him the opportunity to appoint watchers.

Applicable Provisions

Section 15 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1991 provides:

Section 15. Pre-Proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Members of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

This is the provision the petitioner challenged as unconstitutional, and which the Court upheld.

Section 3, Article Nine-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

The petitioner argued that this clause vests in the Commission the power to hear all pre-proclamation controversies without distinction, and the Court had to construe its scope.

Section 2, Article Nine-C of the 1987 Constitution provides, in part:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

This provision shows that the Commission's jurisdiction does not extend to contests involving members of the House of Representatives.

Section 17, Article Six of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, and may promulgate its own rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect its purposes and objectives. The senior Member from the ranks of the political parties in the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall act as Chairman of the Electoral Tribunal.

This provision is the basis for the Court's holding that the Electoral Tribunal, not the Commission, is the proper forum for the petitioner's objections.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Section 15 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1991 is not unconstitutional. The constitutional clause on pre-proclamation controversies must be read together with the provision on the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction only over contests relating to regional, provincial, and city officials; it has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Hence, the phrase including pre-proclamation controversies refers only to controversies in election cases that fall within the Commission's exclusive original jurisdiction. The Court distinguished the earlier Olfato case, which was decided under the 1973 Constitution when the Commission was the sole judge of contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Batasang Pambansa was abolished and each house of Congress has its own Electoral Tribunal, divesting the Commission of that jurisdiction.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Commission is without jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives. The Court quoted with approval the observation of the Solicitor General that the petitioner's objection relating to the preparation, transmission, and appreciation of election returns falls within the sole jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal.

On the third issue, the Court found it unnecessary to pass upon the due process question and the other issues, having reached the conclusion that jurisdiction lies elsewhere. It noted that Belmonte had already been proclaimed, had taken his oath, and had assumed his duties, so that the remedy open to the petitioner was an electoral protest before the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.

Doctrine

First, the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives; that jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which is the sole judge of such contests. Second, the constitutional phrase including pre-proclamation controversies in Section 3, Article Nine-C must be read in relation to Section 2 of the same Article, and so construed it covers only pre-proclamation controversies in election cases within the Commission's exclusive original jurisdiction, namely those pertaining to regional, provincial, and city officials. Third, a statute disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and members of the House of Representatives is constitutional, being in harmony with the Constitution. Fourth, once a candidate has been proclaimed, has taken his oath, and has assumed office, the remedy of the losing candidate is an electoral protest before the proper Electoral Tribunal.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the respondent Belmonte prevailed.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, not the Commission on Elections, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional boundary between the Commission and the Electoral Tribunals, and to test whether a candidate who has already been proclaimed and has assumed office must file an electoral protest rather than a pre-proclamation case.