G.R. No. 105278. November 18, 1993
FRANCIS PANCRATIUS N. PANGILINAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF QUEZON CITY, 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT, AND FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to: (1) compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hear and decide the
petition for disqualifiÂcation of private respondent in SPA No. 92-127; (2)
declare unconstitutional Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 disallowing
pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of
Representatives; (3) compel the Board of Canvassers in the fourth legislative
district of Quezon City to give due course to petitioner’s objections to 120
election returns; and (3) prohibit and enjoin said Board of Canvassers from
making further canvass of the returns and to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate or to nullify the canvass and set aside said proclamation.
The antecedents are as follows:
The petitioner Francis Pancratius N. Pangilinan and private
respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. were both candidates for congressman in the
fourth legislative district of Quezon City in the 11 May 1992 elections.
On 23 April 1992, Elmer Candano and Jose Umali, Jr. as registered
voters of the fourth legislative district of Quezon City, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification[1] against the private respondent for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P.
Blg. 881), docketed therein as SPA Case No. 92-127, alleging inter alia
that: (a) during a rally held on 1
April 1992 at Agno Street, Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City, private respondent
boasted and acknowledged that he gave one (1) sack of rice, P5,000.00 and
medicines to the community and had made available to them the services of a
lawyer, (b) similarly, in Barangay San Vicente, during the coronation night on 4 April 1992 of the winner of the Miss
San Vicente pageant, private respondent
gave tickets for two to Hongkong to the winner, Miss Ana Marie Debil.[2]
Acting upon the said petition, the respondent COMELEC referred the same to its Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution
Division) for preliminary investigation.[3]
On 20 May 1992, the petitioner herein together with the petitioners/complainants in SPA Case
No. 92-127 filed in the said
case an Urgent Motion to Suspend Canvass
and/or ProclaÂmation,[4]
alleging therein that the election returns
for the fourth district of Quezon City were being canvassed by the City Board of Canvassers and that in order that the petition for
disqualification against private respondent may not become moot and academic, there was need for an
immediate order directing the City Board of Canvassers of Quezon City to
suspend at once the canvassing of the election returns and the proclamation of
the winning candidate for Representative of the fourth district of Quezon
City. The COMELEC, however, failed to
act on the said motion.
On 22 May 1992, five (5) other petitions for disqualiÂfication
against private respondent were filed with the COMELEC,[5] for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code outlawing the giving of
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters and Section 261(k) of the same Code making it unlawful to solicit votes
during the day of the election.
During the canvass of the returns, the petitioner, thru his
counsel, objected to over 120 election returns being canvassed by the City
Board of Canvassers on the ground that they were tampered, altered or
spurious. The City Board of Canvassers,
however, overruled petitioner’s objections on the ground that under Section 15
of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413, entitled
“General Instructions for the Provincial/City/District and Municipal Board
of Canvassers” pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in the
election of members of the House of RepresenÂtatives.
On 21 May 1992, the Board of Canvassers created canvasÂsing
committees to canvas the returns. The
petitioner objected to the creation of such committees on the ground that he
was not duly informed thereof and was not given the opportunity to appoint
watchers and/or counsel before the said committees.
The Board of Canvassers, however, ignored the petiÂtioner’s
objections and proceeded to canvass the returns.
The petitioner, therefore, filed the present petition, claiming
that public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or exceeded
their respective jurisdictions and/or unlawfully neglected to perform acts that
the law requires them to do, and that there was no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the present petition, and in
support thereof, the petitioner argues that:
1. Private respondent violated
the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, which is a ground for his
disquaÂlification to run for Congressman in accordance with Sec. 68 of the said
Code and which justifies the suspension of the canvass and proclamation of
private respondent pursuant to Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
2. Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2413 disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members
of the House of Representatives are unconstitutional.
3. Petitioner was denied his right to due process when canvass
committees were formed without prior notice to him and without affording him
the opportunity to appoint watchers therein.
We will first discuss the constitutional issue raised in the
petition. Section 15 of R.A. 7166
provides:
“Sec. 15. Pre-Proclamation
Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Members of the House of Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Members of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the
case may be. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio
or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.”
Petitioner contends that the above-quoted provision is unconstitutional,
insofar as it disallows
pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of
Representatives because it violates Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
“Sec. 3. — The
Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
The petitioner claims that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC
the power to hear and decide pre-proclamation
controversies without distinction
as to whether the pre-proclamation controversy involves the election of Members of the House of Representatives or provincial or local
elective officials. Hence, the petitioner concludes, the phrase
“pre-proclamation controversies”
in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution embraces all pre-proclamation controversies, including pre-proclamation controversies
involving the election of Members of the House of Representatives.
We do not accept petitioner’s contention, Sec. 3, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution should be read in relation to Sec. 2, Article IX-C of the
same Constitution which provides, among others, as follows:
“Sec. 2 The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.”
xxx xxx xxx
It will be noted that the aforequoted provision of the
Constitution vests in the COMELEC “exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city
officials.” It has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifiÂcations of Members of the House of
Representatives. On the other hand,
under Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives is the “sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications” of its members. Consequently, the phrase “including pre?proclamation
controversies” used in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution should be
construed as referring only to “pre-proclamation controversies” in
election cases that fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of regional,
provincial and city officials.
The petitioner’s reliance on the case of Olfato, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.[6]
wherein this Court held that the word “all” in Section 242 of the
Omnibus Election Code covers all pre-proclamation controversies involving
elections of Batasan, provincial, city and municipal officials, is misplaced. The Olfato case was decided under the
regime of the 1973 Constitution. Under
the said Constitution, the Commission on Elections was “the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials.”[7]
Since the COMELEC had jurisdiction over election contests pertaining to the
election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa, it had, likewise, as held in the Olfato
case, the power and authority to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies
involving the election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa.
Since the 1973 Constitution has been replaced by the 1987
Constitution, the Batasang Pambansa stands abolished and the legislative power
is now vested in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of the Senate and
the House of Representatives.[8] The
Senate and the House of RepreÂsentatives now have their respective Electoral
Tribunals which are the “sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members,”[9]
thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the
1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members
of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It
follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide
pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives
as well as of the Senate.
Section 15 of R.A. 7166 is not, therefore, unconstitutional. On the contrary, it is in harmony with the
1987 Constitution. As aptly observed by
the Solicitor General in his Comment -?
“The petitioner’s arguments are totally misplaced. In fact, Section 15, R.A. 7166 is consistent
with Section 17, Article VI which makes the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate
and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. PetiÂtioner’s
objection relating to the preparation, transmission and appreciation of the election
returns or certificates of canvass falls within the sole
jurisdiction of the (House) Electoral Tribunal.”[10]
Finally, the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. has
already been proclaimed as the winner in the congressional elections in the fourth
district of Quezon City. He has taken
his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative; hence, the remedy
open to the petitioner was to have filed an electoral protest with the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.
Having arrived at the above conclusion, We find it unnecessary to
pass upon the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is, hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo. p. 29
[2]
Rollo, pp.
30-33
[3]
Ibid., p. 122
[4]
Ibid., p. 91
[5]
Ibid., pp. 49,
59, 65, 73, 78
[6]
103 SCRA 741
[7]
Sec. 2(2), Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution
[8]
Sec.
1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution
[9]
Sec.
17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution
[10]
Rollo, p. 135