MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., AND LEONARDO G. TIOZON, PETITIONERS, VS. RAUL A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, AS SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MR. JOSE MARIA …

Sampayan versus Daza

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition filed directly with the Supreme Court by three residents of the second congressional district of Northern Samar against the incumbent congressman of that district, Raul Daza, together with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and other House officials. The petitioners ask the Court to disqualify the congressman from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that he is a green card holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, and has never renounced that status. The case matters because it fixes the proper forum and the proper remedy for challenging the qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives, and because it states the rule on the emoluments of a de facto officer whose term has expired.

Procedural History

The petitioners went straight to the Supreme Court by a petition for prohibition, filed on February 18, 1992. The Court required the respondents to comment. The Solicitor General asked for an extension of thirty days, the petitioners opposed it as excessive, and the Court noted the opposition. The congressman filed his comment denying that he was a permanent resident of the United States and claiming that he had long waived that status when he returned to the Philippines. The House officials filed their own comment, saying that if he were indeed a green card holder he should be removed, but that only he could explain his true status. The petitioners then manifested that they had also filed a petition before the Commission on Elections to disqualify the congressman from running in the May 11, 1992 elections, and that the present petition concerned his unlawful assumption of office from June 30, 1987 to June 30, 1992. The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their memoranda. The case was decided by the Supreme Court in September 1992.

Facts

The petitioners alleged that the congressman had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974, and that he had not, by any act or declaration, renounced that status. They relied on a letter from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, which stated that the subject became a lawful permanent resident on October 16, 1974, that as far as the Service knew he still had his green card, and that he had not applied for citizenship.

For his part, the congressman denied that he was a permanent resident of the United States. He admitted that he had been accorded permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 by a letter order of the District Director of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service in Los Angeles, but he claimed that he had long waived that status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.

The petitioners themselves manifested that the object of the petition was to unseat the congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. By the time the Court resolved the case, that term had run its course.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify the congressman has become moot and academic.
• Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a challenge to the qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives, or whether that jurisdiction belongs to the House Electoral Tribunal.
• Whether or not a writ of prohibition may still be issued against the congressman after his term of office has expired.
• Whether or not the congressman, as a de facto public officer, may be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office.

Applicable Provisions

Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.

This provision is the basis for the Court's holding that the challenge to the congressman's qualifications belongs to the House Electoral Tribunal and not to the Court by a petition for prohibition.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

This is the remedy the Court identified as the proper pre-election route for questioning the congressman's qualifications.

Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal provides:

A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.

This is the remedy the Court identified as the proper post-election route, to be filed with the House Electoral Tribunal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the case was already moot and academic, because it was evident from the petitioners' own manifestation that they sought to unseat the congressman only for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.

On the second issue, the Court held that jurisdiction rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. Since the petitioners challenged the qualifications of the congressman, the appropriate remedy should have been a petition to cancel his certificate of candidacy before the election, or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten days after his proclamation.

On the third issue, the Court held that a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against the congressman since his term had already expired, because a writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that as a de facto public officer, the congressman cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office, because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

Doctrine

First, under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. A challenge to a member's qualifications must be raised either by a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy before the election, under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or by a quo warranto petition with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten days after proclamation, under Rule 17 of the Tribunal's rules. It cannot be raised by a petition for prohibition filed directly with the Supreme Court.

Second, a case becomes moot and academic when the relief sought has become impossible or pointless, as where the petitioner seeks to unseat an officer only for a term that has already expired.

Third, a writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated, and so it cannot issue against an officer whose term has already ended.

Fourth, a de facto public officer, one holding under color of a known appointment or election that is void because the officer was not eligible or because of some defect or irregularity in its exercise unknown to the public, performs acts as valid as those of a de jure officer, and is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. He cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term.

Disposition

The Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic, and the congressman was not disqualified.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, so that the remedy is a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto with the Tribunal within ten days after proclamation, never a petition for prohibition in the Supreme Court. Examiners like to use this case on the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals, on mootness, and on the right of a de facto officer to retain his emoluments.