MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., AND LEONARDO G. TIOZON, PETITIONERS, VS. RAUL A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, AS SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MR. JOSE MARIA …

On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second
Congressional District of Northern Samar
filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to
disqualify respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman of the same
congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his
office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful
permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.

Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or
declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating
Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13, 1992, respondents, through the
Solicitor General, filed a motion for extension of time to file their comment
for a period of thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to the said motion, petitioners on March 30, 1992,
manifested their opposition to the 30-day extension of time stating that such
extension was excessive and prayed that respondent instead be granted only 10
days to file their comment. On May 5,
1992, the Court noted the manifestation and opposition.

On April 7, 1992,
petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition
before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections
on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (SPC 92-084) and that
the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by
respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.^[1]

On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact
that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was
accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a
letter order of the District Director, US
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A.,^[2]
he had long waived his status
when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.^[3]

On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuaño, as OIC of the
General Services Division, Mrs. Rosalinda G. Medina, as Chief Accountant of the
House of Representatives and Commission on Audit, filed their comment. They contend that if indeed Congressman Daza
is a greencard holder and a permanent resident of the United States of America,
then he should be removed from his position as Congressman. However, they opined that only Congressman Daza can best explain his true and correct status
as a greencard holder. Until he files
his comment to the petition, petitioners’ prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted.^[4]

Eight (8) days later,
respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the COMELEC (SPC
92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before the COMELEC would become moot
should this Court find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was
granted a US non-immigrant visa, asked this Court to direct the COMELEC to
dismiss SPC No. 92-084.^[5]

On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this Court gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives
for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified
from exercising the functions of his office being a permanent resident alien of
the United States at the time when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the May 11, 1987 Elections. To buttress
their contention, petitioners cite the recent case of Caasi v. Court
of Appeals.^[6]

In support of their
charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, petitioners presented
to us a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) which reads:^[7]

File No. A20 968 618

Date: Nov 5, 1991

LOS914732

Geraghty, O’Loughlin and Kenney

Attn: David C. Hutchinson

386 N. Wasbasha Street

St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308

SUBJECT:

Daza, Raul A.

Your request was received in this office on
____________; please note the paragraph(s) checked below:

xxx                                   xxx                               xxx

10. [XX] Other remarks:

Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a Lawful Permanent Resi­dent
on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we know
subject (sic) still has his greencard. No he has not applied for citizenship.

Sinerely, (sic)

Sgd.

District Director

Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N

We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated
April 6, 1992^[8]
that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office
commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the
House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualification of its members. Since
petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate
remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza’s
certificate of candidacy before the election^[9] or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal
within ten (10) days after Daza’s proclamation.^[10] Third, a writ of prohibition
can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already
expired. A writ of prohibition is not
intended to provide for acts already consummated.^[11] Fourth, as a de facto public
officer,^[12] respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds
disbursed during his term of office
because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer,
he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.^[13]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant
petition for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, and
Feliciano, JJ., on official leave.

Melo and Campos, Jr.,
JJ., no part.

^[1]
Rollo p. 43-44.

^[2]
Annex 1 of Comment, Rollo, p. 59.

^[3]
Rollo pp. 51-58.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 46-49.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 75-78.

^[6]
G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990, 191 SCRA 229.

^[7]
Annex “A” of Petition, Rollo, p. 19.

^[8]
Rollo, p. 44.

^[9]
Section 78. Petition to deny
due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
file by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.

^[10]
Rule 17. Quo Warranto. –
A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a
Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within
ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. (Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
[1991])

^[11]
Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R.
Nos. 67195, 78618, 78619-20, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 581.

^[12]
Under color of a known appointment or election, void because the officer was
not eligible or because there was a
want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reasons of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such as ineligibility, want
of power, or defect being unknown to the public. (Underscoring supplied, Martin, Administrative Law, Law on Public
Officers and Election Law, p. 149.)

^[13]
Cantillo v. Arrieta, G.
R. No. L-31444, November 13, 1974, 61 SCRA 55.