ENRIQUETA H. BERNARDO, EDILBERTO TAYAG, ANTONIO TAYAG, ISMAEL TAYAG, TRIFENE TAYAG, MARIQUITA LUGTU, ROSALINDA A. PETELL, FREDESWINDA A. VDA. DE HENSON, EFREN ARCILLA, ZENAIDA A…

The instant case concerns
a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and setting
aside of the decision* and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals in the proceedings docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 18143, entitled
“Atty. Ricardo P. Bermudo, Petitioner-Appellee, versus Enriqueta Bernardo,
et. al., Oppositors-Appellants”. Petitioners herein question the correctness of the decision
promulgated by respondent Court on March 25, 1991, affirming the decision** of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 56, which granted the petition of Atty. Ricardo B. Bermudo, in SP Proc.
No. 1495 entitled “IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE AND
ALLOWANCE OF THE WILL OF ARTEMIO HILARIO, DECEASED, AND THE ISSUANCE OF LETTER
OF ADMINISTRATION WITH THE WILL ANNEXED”, thereby allowing and approving
the alleged Last Will and Testament dated September 27, 1979 of the late
Artemio Hilario. Petitioners also
instituted this petition before this Court challenging the validity of the
resolution on August 21, 1991 of the respondent Court which denied both the
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of March 25, 1991 and the Petition
for New Trial filed with said respondent Court on May 8, 1991.

Petitioners are the oppositors in SP Proc. No. 1495 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pampanga, Branch 56, and the
oppositors-appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 18143 of the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Atty. Ricardo P. Bermudo (also referred to herein as
“Private Respondent”) is the
petitioner in SP Proc. No. 1495 of RTC Pampanga, Branch 56 and the
petitioner-appellee in CA-G.R. CV No. 18143 of respondent Court of Appeals.

From the records and evidence of the case, the trial court
arrived at the following findings of facts:

“x x x, it appears that the deceased Artemio
Hilario, died on October 7, 1979 at Angeles City, which is his residence at the time of death. Before his death, the late Artemio Hilario left his Last Will and
Testament. x x x In the said will, he
instituted, as his only heir,
his niece Fermina Tayag, married and a resident of Villa Angela, Angeles
City. He designated in his Will, Atty.
Ricardo Bermudo as his
executor. The testator left properties,
the probable value of which is
P200,000.00. No creditors appear
to have filed claims against the estate of the deceased. At the time of his death, he was survived by
the following: Enriqueta H. Bernardo
and Esmeralda H. Tayag. The latter is the mother of Fermina Tayag. They are the deceased sisters. The nephews and nieces by his late sister Amanda Hilario are: Mariquita A. Lugtu, Ramon Arcilla,
Fredeswinda Vda. de Henson, Efren Arcilla, Teresita Grageda and Rosalia A.
Petter. From his late sister, Felicidad
Hilario are other nephews and nieces: Edilberto Tayag, Antonio
Tayag, Enriqueta Bernardo and the above-mentioned nephews and nieces of the
deceased sisters, in representation of their deceased parents Amanda Hilario
and Felicidad Hilario, have filed their respective oppositions to the
petition.”^[1]

The petitioners herein, who are the oppositors to the allowance
of the questioned will, are thus the intestate heirs of the deceased and their
common grounds for opposition may be summarized as follows:

“a.  The
questioned Will is formally invalid and was not executed with the formal and
legal requirements;

b.    The testator was not of sound and disposing
mind and would not have executed the questioned Will because of extremely weak
physical condition brought about by a terminal disease;

c.    The testator’s disease and physical
condition has affected his mental process to the extent that he could not have
known what he was executing;

d.    The questioned Will was not strictly the
personal act of the testator;

e.    The signature of the testator either is a
forgery or was procured by fraud
or trick, and that he did not intend to execute the questioned Will;

f.     The solemnities required by law were not
observed and complied with.”^[2]

Notwithstanding the opposition and motion to appoint an
administratrix, the trial court, on February 18, 1980, appointed the private
respondent as special administrator of the estate of the deceased, with a bond
of P5,000.00.

During the proceedings before the trial court, evidence of the
private respondent consisted of documentary exhibits as well as the testimonies of himself and those whose names appear as instrumental witnesses
to the questioned will, namely: Enrique
Talavera, Levy Santos and Ener Bernardo.

The oppositors, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of
Enriqueta Bernardo, Teresita Grageda, Rhoda Flores, Norberto Tongco and
Edilberto Tayag.

Included as an exhibit
presented by said oppositors is the unnotarized but signed statement of
retraction dated December 10, 1979^[3] of
Ener Bernardo, one of the three individuals who supposedly witnessed the
execution of the Will. Ener Bernardo
later disclaimed the statement of retraction although the genuineness of his
signature therein was confirmed by NBI handwriting expert Rhoda Flores who
testified for the oppositors.

Having stayed with and taken care of the deceased during his last
three weeks, Enriqueta Bernardo, as a witness for the oppositors, testified
that the alleged execution of the subject Will did not take place at all.

The testimonies of Enrique Talavera and Ener Bernardo were given
due consideration by the trial court in rendering its decision. Also resolved by the trial court were the
issues on the alteration of the date of execution of the Will and whether or
not its execution was attended by undue pressure and influence exerted upon the
testator by the sole designated heir. The trial court, in part, stated:

“On the other hand, oppositors are challenging the validity of
the will on the alleged defects in the execution. In addition, they are relying heavily on the testimony of
Enriqueta Hilario Bernardo, the alleged repudiation made by Ener Bernardo
regarding his having witnessed the signing of the will, the altered date of
execution and the attendance of undue pressure and influence exerted upon the
testator by the sole designated heir.

As heretofore discussed, the Court already found that on basis of
the facts obtaining in this case, the formalities prescribed by law were
attendant in the execution of the will.

On the part of the petitioner, four (4) witnesses, petitioner
himself and the three (3) subscribing witnesses, Enrique Talavera, Levy Santos
and Ener Bernardo categorically testified that they saw the testator affix his
signature on the will and on each page thereof. The Court notes the consistency of their testimonies in this
regard. Oppositor Enriqueta H.
Bernardo’s claim, that she did not see these witnesses cannot refute the
same. It is rather inconceivable to
subscribe to her testimony she did not leave him and particularly remained at
his sickbed. The Court has sifted
through the testimonies of said witnesses and is not inclined to give credence
to the claim of Enriqueta H. Bernardo, whose prejudices, manifested in the
course of her testimony. The Court has
no room to doubt the testimonies of the attesting witnesses owing to the
reputable position they held at that time. There is no showing that they were promised any reward or consideration
for acting as witnesses to the said will.”^[4]

From the decision rendered by the trial court, petitioners
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals, only to discover that said appeal
would be dismissed. The dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals, rendered on March 25, 1991,
reads:

“IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING and finding no reversible error
committed by the court a quo, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. The appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.”^[5]

A motion for reconsideration of the abovecited decision was filed on April 22, 1991.

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration,
petitioners filed before respondent Court of Appeals, also under CA-G.R. CV NO.
18143, a verified Petition for New Trial
under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. It was allegedly discovered
that the deceased purportedly executed a holographic will dated February 3,
1979 which expressly distributed testator’s real and personal properties to
“all his loved ones”, especially to Enriqueta Bernardo, Esmeralda
Tayag, and Fredeswinda Arcilla Henson.

The purported will also allegedly carried a revocatory clause,
which in part, provided:

“x x x do hereby acknowledge and declare the following as my
true and willful last will and testament and for this reason hereby revoke
and rescind any will or testament which I make, except this one.”^[6]
(Underlining supplied).

Attached to the Petition for New Trial is the affidavit of Apolinario Garcia, the longtime houseboy of
the deceased, which contained a narration of the circumstances surrounding the belated discovery of the copy of
the holographic will and the taking of its original by Fermina Tayag and her husband Pete Roxas.

On August 26, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals resolved to deny
both motion and petition for lack of merit.

Thereafter, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court. Petitioners maintain that a review of the
decision of the respondent Court and the setting aside of its resolution is
necessitated:

“1.     When the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmise or
conjectures;

2.            
When the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or
impossible;

3.            
When the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

4.            
When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts;

5.            
When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

6.            
When certain material facts and circumstance had been
overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case.”^[7]

Petitioners come to this Court with a view of obtaining a review and the consequent setting aside
of the decision and resolution rendered by the appellate court. Petitioners believe that both the trial
court and respondent court erred in appreciating the facts in light of the
evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented by the parties. It is
their claim that there was sufficient evidence adduced to belie the
alleged execution of the questioned notarial will. To bolster this position, petitioners attack the credibility of
private respondent and his witnesses. Furthermore, they argue that the circumstances established by evidence
show falsity and nullity of the questioned will. All the foregoing, they posit, indicate that a review and
reversal of the appellate court’s decision is warranted.

It is petitioners’ avowed view that a review may be undertaken by the Supreme Court, relying
principally on the exception to the general rule that even when the petition raises questions of facts, the same is
still reviewable when there was a misappreciation of facts.

Time and again, this Court has adhered to the principle that only
questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals, presented to the Supreme Court.^[8]
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to reviewing errors
of law, accepting as conclusive
the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the
evidence.

At this point, the distinction between a question of fact and a
question of law must be clear. As
distinguished from a question of law which exists “when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts” —
“there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;” or when the “query necessarily
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the
situation”.^[9]

The resolution of this petition invites us to closely scrutinize
the facts of the case, relating to the sufficiency of evidence and the
credibility of witnesses presented. This Court so held that it is not the function of the Supreme Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court.^[10]
The Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts.^[11]
It leaves these matters to the
lower court, which have more opportunity
and facilities to examine these matters.^[12] This
same Court has declared that it is the policy of the Court to defer to the
factual findings of the trial judge, who has the advantage of directly
observing the witnesses on the stand and to determine their demeanor whether
they are telling or distorting the truth.^[13]

Petitioners, relying chiefly on Enriqueta H. Bernardo’s testimony
which was offered to negate the possibility that indeed there was a will that
was executed, argued that the same was summarily disregarded. They submit that the perusal of the trial
court’s decision will show that the conclusion made by the trial court was
grounded on mere speculation, unsupported by citation of specific evidence on record,
as elucidated by the trial court in the
following manner:

“It is rather inconceivable to
subscribe to her testimony she did not leave him and particularly remained at
his sickbed. The Court has sifted
through the testimonies of said witnesses and is not inclined to give credence
to the claim of Enriqueta Bernardo, whose prejudices manifested in the course
of her testimony.”^[14]

To this contention, petitioners add that for its part, respondent
Court of Appeals merely declared “in sweeping fashion” that findings
of the trial court are entitled to weight and respect, and that its decision is
similarly completely devoid of explanation.

Going through both decisions promulgated by the respective lower
courts, it cannot be said that their decisions were unsupported by
evidence. On the contrary, both courts
adequately disposed of the matter with due regard, not only to Enriqueta H.
Bernardo’s testimony, but also to the entire gamut of testimonies offered.

Anent petitioners’ contention that there was evidence presented
to show lack of credibility of the private respondent and his witnesses and the
unreliability of their declarations, this argument can be disposed of with
facility. Petitioners refer to the
alleged recantation of statement by Ener Bernardo, one of the purported
witnesses to the notarial will, as having been overlooked by the trial court
which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case. To this, the trial court has ruled that the
circumstances surrounding this occurrence point to the fact that the same was
not the product of said witness’ own volition. Similarly, a review of this pronouncement would entail an examination of
the facts of the case, something which, as discussed above, is not the function
of this Court. This task has been
adequately performed by the trial court.

Petitioners herein desire for this Court to depart from the
general rule that only questions of law may be entertained by the same
body. We are not inclined to agree with
petitioners. This Court holds that a
review and reversal of the questioned decision is not proper. Absent a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings
must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected nor required to examine or
contrast the oral or documentary evidence submitted by the parties.^[15]

In disposing of the issue relating to the resolution of the appellate court denying the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial, this Court
rules that the denial was
correct.

The respondent Court did not give due course to petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time; it was
filed on the sixteenth day from receipt of the decision. The period within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be
filed is the same as that period for perfecting an appeal, which is fifteen
(15) days from receipt of judgment. Beyond this period, it can no longer be entertained.^[16]

Anent the Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, this Court agrees with the appellate Court’s denial of the same. A Motion for New Trial may be filed after
judgment but within the period for perfecting an appeal.^[17]
Since petitioners first filed a Motion for Reconsideration, they are still
entitled to another fifteen (15) days to perfect their appeal — the same
period within which a Motion for New Trial may be filed, as provided by Section
3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.^[18]
Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court gives a party 15 days from
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration by the appellate court to come to
the Supreme Court. These fifteen days
do not include the period that lapsed from the notice of judgment to the time
when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed.^[19] In
effect, the appellant is entitled to another fifteen days. However, petitioners did not take advantage
of this period. Instead, they filed
their Motion for New Trial thirty three days after their receipt of the
appellate court’s decision.

It may well be worthy to note that the Motion for New Trial did
not meet the requisites for granting the same, based on newly discovered
evidence. In the case of People v.
Derpo,^[20]
this Court held that the granting of said motion is predicated on compliance
with the following: (a) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted. After a
deliberation of the facts and evidence submitted by oppositors-appellants, the
Court of Appeals found that the first two conditions were not satisfied. To this finding, this Court agrees. At the risk of having to repeat itself, this
Court adheres to the principle enunciated in a long line of cases that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding even on
this Court and are not therefore reviewable by it.^[21]

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, and finding no reversible error committed by the court a quo,
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. The resolution denying the Motion for New Trial and the Motion for
Reconsideration is AFFIRMED. The
petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., no part.

* Penned by Justice Isaali S. Isnani
and concurred in by Justices Rodolfo A. Nocon and Antonio M. Martinez.

** Penned by Judge Rosalio G. de
la Rosa.

^[1]
Decision, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 79-80.

^[2]
Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 14-15.

^[3]
Exhibit “1”.

^[4]
Decision, pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 86-87.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 44.

^[6]
Petition for New Trial, p. 4; Rollo, p. 92.

^[7]
Petition, pp. 10-11, citing Manero vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 817
(1981), Pit-og vs. People, 190 SCRA 386 (1990), Robleza vs. Court
of Appeals, 174 SCRA 354 (1989), Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
(1986); Rollo, pp. 19-20.

^[8]
Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 3; Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 193 SCRA 93 (1991); Andres vs.
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, 177 SCRA 618 (1989);
Villanueva vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 237 (1987); Korean
Airlines Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 211 (1987);
Evangelista & Company vs. Abad Santos, 51 SCRA 416 (1973).

^[9]
Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, ibid. at p. 100; Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co., Inc. vs. Rich, 28 SCRA 699, 705 (1969); Ramos, et al. vs.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA 289 (1967); Lim vs. Calaguas and Alcaraz, 83 Phil.
796, 799 (1949); Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 2784.

^[10]
Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 (1990).

^[11]
S & A Gaisano, Inc. vs. Hidalgo, 192 SCRA 224 (1990).

^[12]
Pe, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 137 (1991); Korean
Airlines, Co. Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 211 (1987); Sese
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 585 (1987).

^[13]
People vs. Andaya, 196 SCRA 660, 663 (1991).

^[14]
Decision, p. 22; Rollo, p. 87.

^[15]
Bustamante, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 603 (1991).

^[16]
Paramount Vinyl Products vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 525 (1990).

^[17]
Agulto vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 80 (1990).

^[18]
Ramirez vs. Butte, G.R. Nos. L-6601-02, December 29, 1956, 53 O.G. 1407
(March, 1957).

^[19]
2 REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 382 (6th Rev. Ed., 1989).

^[20]
168 SCRA 447, 458 (1988).

^[21]
Radiowealth Finance Company vs. Palileo, 197 SCRA 245 (1991); Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 94 (1991); Barretto vs.
Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 645 (1991); Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 452 (1991); Agton vs. Court of Appeals, 113
SCRA 322 (1982); Sta. Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez, 18 SCRA 973 (1966).