DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEDICAL CENTER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. ALEJANDRO…

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a
special civil action of mandamus against a public officer, to take
cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant
officer, is the chief issue raised in the certiorari action at bar. Also put at issue is whether or not the
Solicitor General may represent the defendant public officer in the mandamus
suit, in so far as the claim for damages is concerned, in light of this Court’s
rulings in Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al., and Co v. Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, et al.^[1]

There is no dispute about the facts from which these issues
arise.

In the early months of 1987 — and pursuant to Executive Order
No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino —
reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced;
existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected.

At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente
was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children’s Hospital, having been
appointed to that position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a
position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medicial Specialist
I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).

On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the
Department of Health that he would be re-appointed “Medical Specialist
II.” Considering this to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his
post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH
Reorganization Board. When his protest
was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was
docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the
meantime “the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of
Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr.
Jose D. Merencilla, Jr.”^[2]

Dr. de la Fuente’s case was decided by the Civil Service
Commission in a Resolution dated August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following conclusion
and disposition, to wit:

” ** (The Commission) declares the
demotion/transfer of appellant dela Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to
Medical Specialist II as null and void: hence, illegal. Considering further that since the National
Children’s Hospital was not abolished and the positions therein remained intact
although the title or the position of Chief of Clinics was changed to Chief of
Medical Professional Staff’ with substantially the same functions and
responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders that:

1.      
Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or considered as never
having relinquished his position of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical
Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights; and

2.      
He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and
housing allowances and such other benefits withheld from him from the date of
his illegal demotion/transfer.”

No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever
submitted nor appeal therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court, within the
thirty-day period prescribed therefor by the Constitution.^[3] Consequently, the resolution became final,
on September 21, 1988.

De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-­Gozon,
the Medical Center Chief of the National Children’s Hospital,^[4]
demanding implementation of the Commission’s decision. Dr. Vital­-Gozon referred “de la
Fuente’s claims to the Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal
Affairs for appropriate advice and/or action * * (She did this allegedly
because, according to the Solicitor General, she was) unaware when and how a
CSC Resolution becomes final and executory, whether such Resolution had in fact
become final and executory and whether the DOH Legal Department would
officially assail the mentioned Resolution.”^[5] But she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente’s
letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant
Secretary. She chose simply to await
“legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department.” On the other hand, no
one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to
take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and
executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In fact, de la Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had “actually
threatened to stop paying ** (his) salary and allowances on the pretext that he
has as yet no ‘approved’ appointment even as ‘Medical Specialist II’ **.”^[6]

Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital­-Gozon or
anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of
August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to cover the
salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund, Dr.
de la Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce
its judgment. He was however “told
to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief
that the Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to
enforce its final decisions/resolutions.”^[7]

So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an
action of “mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction”
to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and
Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the
Civil Service Commission. He prayed for
the following specific reliefs:

“(1) (That) ** a temporary restraining order be
issued immediately, ordering the principal and other respondents to
revert the funds of the NCH corresponding to the amounts necessary to implement
the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein
petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums which have
accrued and due and payable as of the date of said order;

(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the
restraining order be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction; and that a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering principal
respondent and the other respondents to implement in full the said final
resolution; and

(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment be
rendered seeking (sic) permanent writs issued and that principal respondent be
ordered and commanded to comply with and implement the said final resolution
without further delay; and, furthermore, that the principal respondent be
ordered to pay to the petitioner the sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and
attorney’s fees.

* * * * * .”

The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a temporary restraining order
as prayed for, and required the respondents to show cause why it should not be
converted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The record shows that the respondents prayed for and were granted an
extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer “through counsel,
who,” as the Court of Appeals was later to point out,^[8]
“did not bother to indicate his address, thus notice was sent to him
through the individual respondents. * *
(However, no) answer was filed; neither was there any show cause (sic) against
a writ of preliminary injunction.” It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who
appeared in Vital-Gozon’s behalf.^[9]

About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court
a “Supplemental/Amended Petition” dated February 2, 1989. The second petition described as one for
“quo warranto” aside from “mandamus,” added three
respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter alia
that he (de la Fuente) had “clear title” to the position in question
in virtue of the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission;
that even after the Commission’s judgment had become final and executory and
been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed “Dr. Merencilla, Jr.
as ‘OIC Professional Service’ to further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully
hold and exercise the public office/position of petitioner (under a duly
approved permanent appointment as ‘Chief of Clinics’ since 1978). De la Fuente thus prayed, additionally, for
judgment:

“(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose
D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office of ‘Chief of Clinics’
(now retitled/known as ‘Chief of Medical Professional Staff,’ NCH), ousting him
therefrom and ordering said respondent to immediately cease and desist from
further performing as ‘OIC Professional Service’ any and all duties and
responsibilities of the said office; (and)

(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is
the lawful or de jure Chief of Clinics (now known as ‘Chief of the
Medical Professional Staff’) and placing him in the possession of said
office/position, without the need of reappointment or new appointment as
held by the Civil Service Commission in its resolution of August 9, 1988, in
CSC Case No. 4.

* * * * * .”

Copy of the “Supplemental/Amended Petition” was sent to
“Atty. Jose A. Fabia, Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita
Vital-Gozon, etc., National Children’s Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City
(Atty. Fabia’s address not being indicated or mentioned in his motion for
Extension of Time).”^[10]

Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the
respondents. Again, none was
filed. The petitions were consequently
“resolved on the basis of their allegations and the annexes.” The
Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989.^[11] It held that —

“The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position
as Chief of Clinics by the expedient of having him appointed to another, lower
position is no longer an issue. It
ceased to be such when the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The said resolution is explicit in its
mandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de jure Chief of Clinics
(Chief of the Medical Professional Staff) of the National Children’s Hospital,
and by this token, respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally
entitled to the office. Respondents,
particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the
matter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was ill-advised of principal respondent, and violative of the
rule of law, that the resolution has not been obeyed or implemented.”,

and accordingly ordered –

” * * respondents, particularly Dr.
Isabelita Vital-Gozon, * * to forthwith comply with, obey and implement the
resolution in CSC Case No. 4 (and) * * Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., who is not
entitled to the office, * * to immediately cease and desist from further
performing and acting as OIC Professional Service.”

But de la Fuente’s prayer for damages — founded essentially on
the refusal of Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the
Civil Service Commission, which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a
different forum — was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
“petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the
forum for ** (said) claim of damages.”

Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the
Appellate Tribunal’s Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989.^[12] Respondent de la Fuente acknowledged receipt
of his own copy on June 15, 1989.^[13] Neither Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr.
Merencilla, Jr., moved for reconsideration of, or attempted to appeal the
decision.

It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment,
by motion filed through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi.^[14] He insisted that the Appellate Court had
competence to award damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a claim for damages
might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate
Court “before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals
had authority to issue such writs only ‘in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,’”
the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of
courts — the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals
— were conferred concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the
Court of Appeals was given power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to
resolve factual issues. To require him
to separately litigate the matter of damages, he continued, would lead to that
multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.

While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente
sought to enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 —
directing his reinstatement pursuant to the Civil Service Commission’s
Resolution of August 9, 1988, supra. He filed on July 4, 1989 a “Motion for Execution,” alleging
that the judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final and executory for failure of
Gozon, et al. — served with notice thereof on June 16, 1989 — to move for its
reconsideration or elevate the same to the Supreme Court.^[15] His motion was granted by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated July 7, 1989,^[16]
reading as follows:

“The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and
executory, as played for, let the writ of execution issue forthwith.”

The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989,^[17]
on the invoked authority of Section 9, Rule 39.^[18] The
writ quoted the dispositive portion of the judgment of June 9, 1989, including,
as the Solicitor General’s Office points out, the second paragraph to the
effect that the petitions “are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum
for the claim of damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is denied.”

The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June
9, 1989 judgment was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989, an “Urgent Ex
Parte Manifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt,”
complaining that although Gozon and her co-parties had been served with the
writ of execution on July 14, they had not complied therewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court
required Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer
the charge and show cause “why they should not be adjudged in contempt for
disobeying and/or resisting the judgment.”^[19]

At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves,
accompanied by their individual private lawyers – one for Gozon (Felipe
Hidalgo, Jr.), two for Merencilla (Bernardo S. Nera and Moises S.
Rimando). One other lawyer appeared in
their behalf, from the Health Deptartment, Artemio Manalo, who stated that he
was there “in behalf of Jose A. Fabia.”^[20] They explained that they had no intention to
defy the Court, they had simply referred the matter to their superiors in good
faith; and they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment, undertaking
to do so “even in the afternoon” of that same day. The Court consequently ordered them “to
comply with their undertaking ** without any further delay,” and report
the action taken towards this end, within five (5) days.

On August 9, 1989, Gozon, as “Medical Center Chief,”
sent a letter to Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31 dated August
3, 1989, de la Fuente had been directed to assume the position of Chief of the
Medical Professional Staff, and that a voucher for the payment of his
allowances had been prepared and was being processed.^[21]

More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27 1989,
the Court of Appeals promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la
Fuente’s motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989.^[22] It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by
(a) deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b)
consequently describing and treating it as a “PARTIAL DECISION,” and
(c) scheduling “further proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence
(of damages),” since said question “cannot be resolved by mere
reference to the pleadings.“^[23] This was done in reliance on Section
3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de la Fuente, which reads as
follows:^[24]

“SEC. 3. Mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.”

At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez
entered his appearance for Isabelita Gozon.^[25] At his instance, the Court gave him an
“opportunity to ** file a motion for reconsideration” of the
Resolution of September 27, 1989.^[26] That motion he filed by registered mail on
November, 10, 1989.^[27] His basic contentions were (a) that the
decision of June 9, 1989 could no longer be altered, having become final and
executory and having in fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129, the
Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus
action.

The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in
Gozon’s behalf at this juncture, saying that the case had been referred to it
only on November 14, 1989. It, too,
sought reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It filed on November 16, 1989 an “Omnibus
Motion: I. For Reconsideration Of Resolution dated September 27, 1989; and II.
To defer hearing on petitioner’s claims for damages.”^[28]

Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated January 11, 1991. In that
Resolution, the Court –

1) Declared that the amended decision had
already become final and could no longer be re-opened because, although “a
copy of the amendatory resolution was received by counsel who was representing
Gozon on October 3, 1989,” the first motion for reconsideration was not
mailed until November 10, 1989 and the Solicitor General’s “Omnibus
Motion” was not filed until November 16,1989; and

2) Prohibited the Solicitor General from
representing Gozon “in connection with ** (de la Fuente’s) claim for
damages,” on the authority of this Court’s ruling promulgated on March 19,
1990 in G.R. No. 87977 (Urbano, et
al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig).^[29]

Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the
Solicitor General’s Office on January 18, 1991.^[30] Again the Solicitor General sought
reconsideration, by motion dated January 25, 1991 and filed on January 30,
1991.^[31] Again it was rebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on August 7, 1991,^[32]
served on the Solicitor General’s Office on August 20, 1991,^[33]
the Court of Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the “question of the authority of the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon ** (had already) been
extensively discussed,” and that its “jurisdiction ** to hear and
determine issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa 129 as
amended.”

In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of
Appeals — and obtain “the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing
respondent de la Fuente’s claim for damages” — the Solicitor General’s
Office has instituted the special civil action of certiorari at
bar. It contends that the Court of
Appeals is not legally competent to take cognizance of and decide the question
of damages in a mandamus suit. It argues that –

1) B.P. Blg. 129 does not
confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to hear, as a trial court, claims
for moral and exemplary damages;

2) assuming that the Court of Appeals does
have jurisdiction over the claims for damages, it lost the power to take
cognizance thereof after the Decision of June 9, 1989 had, by its own
pronouncement, become final and executory; and

3) the Urbano and Co doctrines
cited by the Appellate Tribunal do not disqualify the Solicitor General’s
Office from representing government officials sued in their official capacities
and in damage claims not arising from a felony.

It is in light of these facts, just narrated, that this Court
will now proceed to deal with the legal issues raised in this action. But first, a few brief observations respecting
the proceedings in the Civil Service Commission.

I

The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the
following acts and events:^[34]

1) the proceedings
commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission in protest against
his demotion;

2) the Commission’s Resolution of August 9,
1988 as well, particularly, as the direction therein that de la Fuente be
reinstated and paid all his back salaries and other monetary benefits otherwise
due him, this being couched in
fairly simple language obviously understandable to persons of ordinary or
normal intelligence;

3) no less than two (2)
written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of the CSC’s aforesaid
Resolution of August 9, 1988;

4) the petition filed by
de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the CSC Resolution of
August 9, 1988;

5) the extension granted by said Court of
Appeals within which to file answer, notice thereof having been sent directly
to her and her co-respondents since the attorney who sought the extension in
their behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set out his address in his motion for
extension;

6) the “supplemental/amended
petition” subsequently presented by de la Fuente, copy of which was sent
to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and

7) the Decision and
Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3,1989.

To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the
Department of Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the
least. Neither she nor the Health
officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She never bothered to find out what was
being done to contest or negate de la Fuente’s petitions and actions,
notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuente’s efforts were being met
with success.

Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-­Gozon
merits relief from the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service
Commission. This Court will not disturb
that Resolution. It is satisfied that
no procedural or substantive errors taint that Resolution, or its becoming
final and executory.

II

Now, final and executory judgments are enforced by writ of
execution and not by another, separate action, whether of mandamus or
otherwise. Hence, execution of the
Civil Service Commission’s decision of August 9, 1988 should have been ordered
and effected by the Commission itself, when de la Fuente filed a motion
therefor. It declined to do so,
however, on the alleged ground, as de la Fuente claims he was told, that it
“had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to enforce its
final decisions/resolutions.”^[35] That proposition, communicated to de la
Fuente, of the Commission’s
supposed lack of coercive power to enforce its final judgments, is
incorrect. It is inconsistent with
previous acts of the Commission of actually directing execution of its decisons
and resolutions, which this Court has sanctioned in several cases;^[36]
and it is not in truth a correct assessment of its powers under the
Constitution and the relevant laws.

In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in
G.R. No. 96938 entitled “Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service Commission, et al.,”^[37]
this Court declared that in light of the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution and relevant statutes –

” ** it would appear absurd to deny to
the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed,
it has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is
inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided
is carried out. Hence, the grant to a
tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge
cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include be grant of authority
to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.

In any event, the Commission’s exercise of that power of execution
has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases.”

Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission’s
mistaken refusal to execute its final and executory Resolution of August 9,
1988, extended proceedings have taken place in the Court of Appeals and certain
issues have been expressly raised in relation thereto, supra. Those issues appear to the Court to be
important enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution, instead of simply
being given short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court of
Appeals were totally unnecessary because the Civil Service Commission actually
had the power to execute its final and executory Resolution.

III

The first such issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of damages in a special civil
action of mandamus. The
Solicitor General’s Office argues that since jurisdiction is conferred only by
law, not by agreement of the parties, or acquiescence of the court, and since
the law conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
129, makes no reference to “actions for moral and exemplary damages, as
those claimed by ** (de la Fuente),” it follows that the Court of Appeals
has no competence to act on said claim of damages. And Section 3 of Rule 65, which authorizes the petitioner in a mandamus
suit to pray for judgment commanding the defendant inter alia “to pay
the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant,” is “nothing more than a procedural rule allowing
joinder of causes of action, i.e., mandamus and damages,” and such
an award of damages is allowable only in actions commenced in Regional Trial
Courts but not in the Court of Appeals or this Court.

The argument is specious. It cannot be sustained.

The Solicitor General’s Office correctly identifies Section 9,
B.P. 129 as the legal provision specifying the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The section pertinently declares that the “Intermediate Appellate
Court (now the Court of Appeals) shall exercise . .
,” among others:

” ** Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction ** .“^[38]

The Solicitor General’s Office evidently searched said Section 9
for an explicit and specific statement regarding “actions for moral and
exemplary damages,” and finding none, concluded that the Court of
Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for such
damages. The conclusion is
incorrect. Section 19, governing the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases,
contains no reference whatever to claims “for moral and exemplary
damages,” and indeed does not use the word “damages” at all; yet
it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for
moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or
kinds of cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General’s theory that the rule
in question is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus
and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages
arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus
suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not
being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is
certainly not the case.

Now, at the time of the enactment of B.P. 129, the issuance of the
extraordinary writs above mentioned was controlled by the Rules of Court of
1964, as they continue to date to be so controlled. More particularly, the principal writs of mandamus,
prohibition and certiorari were (and continue to be) governed by Rule 65;
the writ of habeas corpus, by Rule 102; and the writ of quo warranto,
by Rule 66. The so-called auxiliary
writs were (and continue to be) also governed by the same code — e.g.,
preliminary attachment, by Rule 57; preliminary injunction, by Rule 58, receivership,
by Rule 59; writ of seizure or delivery in a replevin suit, by Rule 60.

At that time, Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it continues to
authorize to date) rendition of judgment in a mandamus action
“commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to
do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the defendant.”^[39] The provision makes plain that the damages
are an incident, or the result of, the defendant’s wrongful act in failing and
refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical counterpart
provision.^[40]

Moreover, Section 4 of the same Rule 65 authorized, as it continues
to authorize to date, the filing of the petition “in the Supreme Court,
or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) having jurisdiction thereof,” as well as “in the
Court of Appeals (whether or not)^[41] in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”

Worthy of note, too, is that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
similarly authorizes the recovery of damages in a quo warranto action
against a corporate officer — an action within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals — as follows:^[42]

“SEC. 14. Liability
of officer neglecting to deliver property of corporation to receiver. — An
officer of such corporation who refuses or neglects, upon demand, to deliver
over to the receiver all money, property, books, deeds, notes, bills,
obligations, and papers of every description within his power or control,
belonging to the corporation, or in any wise necessary for the settlement of
its affairs, or the discharge of its debts and liabilities, may be punished for
contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court, and shall be liable
to the receiver for the value of all money or other things so refused or
neglected to be surrendered, together with all damages that may have been
sustained by the stockholders and creditors of the corporation, or any of them,
in consequence of such neglect or refusal.”

An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with
the auxiliary writ of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction or
receivership which the Court of Appeals has the power to issue in common with
the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts,^[43]
payable by the sureties of the bond given in support of the writ, upon
seasonable application and summary hearing.^[44]

Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and
incorporating in BP 129, the provision governing the jurisdiction of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, the Batasang Pambansa was
fully cognizant of the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court just cited, as
well as the rule against multiplicity of actions, it follows that in conferring
on the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over the special civil action of mandamus,
among others, as well as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or processes, the
Batasang Pambansa clearly intended that said Court should exercise all
the powers then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said
action of mandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of
damages to the petitioner in the action in appropriate cases.

IV

The next issue is whether or not the Solicitor General may
properly represent a public official like Dr. Vital-Gozon, who is sued for
damages for allegedly refusing to comply with a lawful and executory judgment
of competent authority. The doctrine
laid down in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to,^[45]
is quite clear:

“*** (T)he Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized
to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case. ***.

This observation should apply as well to a public official who is
haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony
allegedly committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary liability he may be held to
account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the
Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil
suit for damages.”

It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged
with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, there is
no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General.

V

The last issue is whether or not the decision of the Court of
Appeals of June 9, 1989 could still be modified after it was pronounced final
and executory and was in fact executed with respect to de la Fuente’s
reinstatement to his position and the payment of the salaries and allowances
due him.

There would seem to be no question about the timeliness of de la
Fuente’s motion for reconsideration of the June 9, 1989 decision. As already narrated, notice of said decision
was served on him on the 15th of June, and his motion for reconsideration was
presented on June 29, 1989, or fourteen (14) days after receiving a copy of the
judgment, i.e., within the fifteen-day period prescribed by Section 1, Rule 37
of the Rules of Court for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration.

This being so, it would certainly have been entirely within the
authority of the Court of Appeals, under normal circumstances, to rule
on that motion for reconsideration and, in its discretion, act favorably on it,
as it did through its Resolution of September 27, 1991 — by amending the
decision of June 9, 1989, declaring it a partial judgment, and setting a date
for reception of evidence on de la Fuente’s claim for damages.

It would also appear that the motions for reconsideration of said
Resolution of September 27, 1991 separately submitted in Gozon’s behalf, by her
own private attorney and by the Solicitor General’s Office, were filed way out
of time. As also already pointed out,
notice of that Resolution of September 27, 1991 was served on Gozon’s counsel
on October 3, 1989 and on Gozon herself on October 4, 1989; but the motion for
reconsideration of Atty. Martinez (Gozon’s private lawyer) was not filed until
November 10, 1989, thirty-eight (38) days afterwards, and that of the Solicitor
General, until November 16, 1989, or forty-four (44) days later. What is worse is that, its motion for
reconsideration of November 16, 1989 having been denied by a Resolution dated
January 11, 1991, notice of which it received on January 18, 1991, the Solicitor
General’s Office filed still another motion for reconsideration on January 30,
1991, ostensibly directed against that Resolution of January 11, 1991 but
actually seeking the setting aside of the Resolution of September 17, 1989. In effect it filed a second motion for
reconsideration which, of course, is prohibited by law.^[46]

However, disposition of the question simply and solely on the
foregoing premises is precluded by the fact that prior to the promulgation by
the Appellate Court of its Resolution of September 27, 1989 — granting de la
Fuente’s motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989 — de la Fuente had
asked for and been granted by the Court of Appeals, authority to execute the
decision of June 9, 1989 and had in fact succeeded in bringing about
satisfaction thereof, in so far as concerned his reinstatement to the
position from which he had been illegally ousted and the payment to him of his
salaries and allowances.

It has therefore become essential to determine the effect of the
execution of said decision of June 9, 1989 at de la Fuente’s instance, on the
power of the Court of Appeals to modify that judgment as earlier prayed for by
de la Fuente in such a way as to concede the latter’s capacity to claim damages
in his mandamus action, and consequently authorize him to present
evidence on the matter.

The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it
passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and end of the
proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established
produces permanent and irrevocable discharge;^[47]
hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces in and voluntarily complies with the
judgment, is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.^[48]

On the other hand the question of whether or not a judgment creditor
is estopped from appealing or seeking modification of a judgment which has been
executed at his instance, is one dependent upon the nature of the judgment as
being indivisible or not. This is the
doctrine laid down by this Court in a case decided as early as 1925, Verches
v. Rios.^[49] In that case this Court held that although
“there are cases holding the contrary view,” where the judgment is indivisible, “the
weight of authority is to the effect that an acceptance of full satisfaction of
the judgment annihilates the right to further prosecute the appeal; * * * that
a party who has recovered judgment on a claim which cannot be split up
and made the basis of several causes of action, and afterwards coerced full
satisfaction by writ of execution or authority of the court, cannot maintain an
appeal from the judgment against the objections of the judgment debtor;”
and that even partial execution by compulsory legal process at the instance of
a party in whose favor a judgment appealed from was rendered, places said party
in estoppel to ask that the judgment be amended, either “by appeal or
answer to his adversary’s appeal, or otherwise.”^[50]

A converso, where the judgment is divisible,
estoppel should not operate against the judgment creditor who causes implementation
of a part of the decision by writ of execution. This is the clear import of Verches and the precedents
therein invoked. It is an aspect of the
principle above mentioned that is fully consistent not only with the dissenting
opinion that “(a)cceptance of payment of ** only
the uncontroverted part of the
claim ** should not preclude the plaintiff from prosecuting his appeal, to
determine whether he should not have been allowed more,”^[51]
but also with logic and common sense.

In this case, the amended judgment of the Court of Appeals is
clearly divisible, satisfaction of which may be “split up.” One part
has reference to the enforcement of the final and executory judgment of the
Civil Service Commission, that de la Fuente should be reinstated to the position
of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of
seniority rights and that he be paid his back salaries and all monetary
benefits due him from the date of his illegal demotion. This part is no longer issuable, and has not
in truth been controverted by Gozon herself. The other part has reference to the
damages which de la Fuente contends he suffered as a result of the
unjustified refusal of Gozon and her co-parties to comply with the final and
executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, and which the Appellate
Tribunal has allowed him to prove. Obviously, the second part cannot possibly affect the first. Whether de la Fuente succeed or fail in his
bid to recover damages against
Gozon, et al. because of their refusal to obey the judgment of the Civil
Service Commission, is a contingency that cannot affect the unalterable
enforceability of that judgment. Similarly, the enforcement of the Commission’s judgment (already
accomplished by writ of execution of the Court of Appeals issued at de la
Fuente’s instance) cannot influence in any manner the question of whether or
not there was culpable refusal on the part of Gozon, et al. to comply with said
judgment when first required so to do, and whether de la Fuente did in fact
suffer compensable injury thereby.

It bears stressing that the juridical situation in which de la
Fuente finds himself is not of his making. It is a consequence of circumstances not attributable to any fault on
his part, i.e., the unwarranted refusal or neglect of his superiors to obey the
executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; the erroneous refusal of
the Commission to execute its own decision which made necessary, in de la
Fuente’s view, the filing of a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals; the
initial refusal of the latter Court to acknowledge his right to damages in
connection with the mandamus suit; and ultimately, the change of
view by the Court of Appeals, on de la Fuente’s motion, as regards its
competence to take cognizance of the matter of damages in relation to the mandamus proceeding.

Under these circumstances, there was no reason whatsoever to
defer concession to de la Fuente of the relief of reinstatement — ­to which he
was indisputably already entitled — in the meantime that issues arising after
finality of the Civil Service Commission’s judgment were being ventilated and
resolved — these issues being, to repeat, whether or not the refusal by Gozon,
et al. to obey said judgment of the Commission could be justified, and whether
or not, by reason of that refusal to obey, de la Fuente did in fact suffer
compensable injury.

It was therefore correct for the Court of Appeals, albeit by
implication, to treat its judgment as divisible, or capable of being enforced
by parts, and to consider de la Fuente as not having been placed in estoppel to
pursue his claim for damages by seeking and obtaining authority for a partial
execution of the judgment. De la Fuente
not being in estoppel, it follows that his motion for reconsideration, timely
filed, was not deemed abandoned or waived by the partial execution of the
judgment, and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to amend the judgment was
retained and not lost. It follows, too,
that since no motion for reconsideration was filed against, or appeal attempted
to be taken from, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals amending its original
judgment, within the time prescribed therefore by law, said amendatory
resolution has long since become final and immutable, particularly in so far as
it holds itself competent to take cognizance of the matter of damages and
authorizes the reception of evidence on de la Fuente’s claim therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged
Resolutions of September 27, 1989, January 11, 1991 and August 7, 1991 are
AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Respectively, G.R. No. 87977 and G.R. No. 88578 (March 19, 1990): 183 SCRA 347,
the ruling being to the effect that the Office of Solicitor General may not
represent a public official in a criminal case against him or in a civil suit
for damages arising from a felony, the doctrine in Anti-Graft League v. Hon.
Ortega, et al., 99 SCRA 644 (1980) and Solicitor General v. Garrido,
100 SCRA 276 (1980), being expressly abandoned.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 70

^[3]
Article IX-A, Sec. 7

^[4]
Dr. Vital-Gozon was appointed Medical Center Chief in April, 1988, succeeding
Dr. C. Agregado, who retired

^[5]
Petition, par. 9; parenthetical insertion supplied

^[6]
Rollo, p. 52

^[7]
Id., p. 85: emphasis, in original text

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 69, 71

^[9]
SEE footnotes 10 and 18, infra

^[10]
Rollo, p. 64

^[11]
Id., pp. 69-72

^[12]
C.A. Record, p. 87. As regards Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., he too acknowledged
receipt of notice of said judgment, as did Rizalina D. Pangan, Personnel
Officer I, which letter bore the postscript, “Noted: s/t: Ma. Isabelita
S. Vital-­Gozon, M.D., F.P.P.S., Medical Center Chief” (CA Record, p.
90).

^[13]
Id., p. 87

^[14]
C.A. Record, pp. 92 et seq.

^[15]
Id., p. 101

^[16]
Id., p. 73

^[17]
Id., pp. 74-75

^[18]
“SEC. 9. Writ of execution of special judgment. — When a judgment
requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the
sale or delivery of real or personal proper;ty, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom
the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to
obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he
disobeys such judgment.”

^[19]
C.A. Record, p. 112

^[20]
C.A. Record, pp. 125 et seq. SEE footnotes 9 and 10, supra

^[21]
Id., p. 138

^[22]
Id., p. 32, supra

^[23]
Rollo, pp. 36-37

^[24]
Italics supplied

^[25]
C.A. Record, p. 161

^[26]
Id., p. 163

^[27]
Id., pp. 178-183

^[28]
Id., pp. 171-177

^[29]
Rollo, pp. 38-39; see footnote 1, supra

^[30]
Rollo, id., id, par. 3

^[31]
Id., id., par. 5

^[32]
Id., p. 40

^[33]
Id., pp. 38-39, par. 6

^[34]
A proposition as to which the record
discloses no serious challenge.

^[35]
Rollo, p. 85: emphasis, in original text

^[36]
SEE Cucharo v. Subido, 37 SCRA
523, citing SEC. 35, Civil Service Act of 1959; Yarcia v. City of
Baguio, 33 SCRA 419; Trocio v. Subido,
20 SCRA 354; Cabigao v. del
Rosario, 6 SCRA 578 (1962); Austria v. Auditor General, 19 SCRA 79,
83-84; Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228, 233-234, in turn cited in GSIS
v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 96938, Oct. 15, 1991

^[37]
202 SCRA 799, 804-805

^[38]
This power is concurrent with this
Court and the Regional Trial Court.

^[39]
Italics supplied; SEE footnote 16 and
related text, supra

^[40]
Sec. 3, Rule 67

^[41]
The original requirement that the writ
issue only “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” was, as already
pointed out, deleted by Sec. 9 of BP 129, supra

^[42]
Italics supplied

^[43]
Sec. 2, Rule 57; Sec. 2, Rule 58; and
Sec. 1, Rule 59, respectively

^[44]
Sec. 20, Rule 57; Sec. 9, Rule 58; and
Sec. 9, Rule 59, respectively

^[45]
183 SCRA 347, 358; SEE footnote 1, supra

^[46]
Par. 4 of the Interim Rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983 by authority of BP 129, provides that “No party
shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment.”

^[47]
Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed.,
Vol. 2, p. 345, citing Estate of Baby, 87 Cal. 200, 202, 25 Pac. 405

^[48]
Desbarats v. de Vera, 83 Phil.
382; Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Relucio, 47 SCRA 225; Robert Dollar Co. v.
Tuvera, 123 SCRA 354; Tañada v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419; SEE also PVTA v. de los Angeles, 61 SCRA 489; IBA AEU v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663;
cf, Song Fo & Co. v.
Veloso, 26 Phil. 575, 576 where the judgment debtor was held not to be in
estoppel to appeal because payment was made by him only because execution was
issued by special order and he wished to avoid the costs, expense and damage
which would necessarily result from the levy of the execution (cited in Feria, Civil Procedure,
1969 ed., p. 620, citing; and Moran, op. cit., also at p. 345

^[49]
48 Phil. 16

^[50]
Referring to American cases, e.g.,
Paine v. Woolley, 80 Ky., 568; Wiemann’s Succession, 112 La. 293, 36
So., 354; Harte v. Castetter,
38 Neb., 571, 57 N.W., 381; Holt v. Rees, 46 Ill., 181; italics supplied

^[51]
Per Malcolm, J., with whom concurred Avanceña, C.J., Villamor
and Romualdez, JJ., 48
Phil. 25