TERRY LYN MAGNO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANDREA DOMINGO, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, RICHARD DOE AND ROBIN …

Appealed to this Court by way of petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of a restraining or status quo
order is the denial by the Court of Appeals* of a
petition for habeas corpus (CA-G.R. SP. No. 25442) wherein petitioner
challenged as illegal and violative of constitutional due process her arrest
without a warrant by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) and her resultant detention at the CID Detention Center.

From the petition and
supplemental petition, the relevant facts are:

In the evening of 17 July 1991, persons claiming to be agents of
the CID picked up the petitioner from her home at 564 Rotary Circle cor. Bocobo
St., Malate, Manila. She was whisked to
the CID Detention Center and there held in custody without any formal charge.

Assailing the warrantless arrest and subsequent arbitrary
detention, a petition for
habeas corpus was filed before the Supreme Court. Said petition was referred to the Court of Appeals with the
directive to decide the case on the merits.

Petitioner claimed that there are no charges against her; neither
has she committed any offense for which she may be arrested or deprived of her
liberty without any formal charge or judicial warrant. She is an American citizen but by virtue of
her marriage to a Filipino citizen, she was granted permanent resident status
in the Philippines since 1986.

Before the Court of Appeals, two (2) urgent motions for bail were
filed. The first one invoked humanitarian
considerations while the second feared summary deportation without due process
of law. Resolution of the motions was
however held in abeyance while hearings on the petition for habeas corpus were
in progress.

Answering the petition for habeas corpus, the CID thru its then
Commissioner Andrea Domingo averred that on 18 July 1991, a warrant of Arrest/Deportation was
issued in the exercise of the Commissioner’s powers under Sec. 29, par. (a),
sub-par. 17 and Section 37, par. (a), sub-par. (7) of CA No. 613 otherwise
known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which provides:

“Sec. 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be
excluded from entry into the Philippines:

x                    x                      x

“(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be
required under the provisions of this Act.

“Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

x                    x                      x

“(7) Any alien who remains in the Philip­pines in violation of
any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a
nonimmigrant.”

Respondent Commissioner revoked the permanent resident status of
petitioner because of representations by the US Government thru a letter
of its Consul General Mr. Bruce Beardsley that petitioner’s American passport
has been revoked and that she is a fugitive from justice.

In the now assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 14
August 1991, the appellate court upheld the legality of the arrest of the
petitioner and her continued detention thus:

“The irregularity attendant to her arrest on July 17, 1991, as
a result of which she was
de­tained even before the warrant of arrest/deporta­tion had been issued on
July 18, 1991 (which is two days later), would seem to have been cured by the
issuance of the aforesaid warrant. Her
deten­tion has now become lawful by virtue of the issuance of the warrant based
on the Summary De­portation Order (Annex 6 to the Memorandum of Evidence filed
by the respondent Commissioner). Furthermore, whatever irregularity in the arrest might have been
committed is deemed waived by the herein petitioner’s applications for bail
(supra) even if such applications were not granted.” (p. 4, par. 3)

Despite denial of the petition for habeas corpus, the appellate
court’s decision decreed that it was without prejudice to the continuation of
proceedings before the Board of Commissioners,
CID, to determine the issue of deportability pursuant to Sec. 103 of the
Immigration Rules and Regulations.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the appellate
court’s decision, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, with prayer for a restraining or status quo
order.

Acting on the petition, the Court En Banc in a
resolution dated 27 August 1991 required herein respondents to comment thereon;
further, a temporary restraining order
(TRO) was issued ordering respondents to cease and desist from causing or
allowing the deportation or transportation elsewhere of petitioner.

Prior to the issuance of the TRO on 26 August 1991, petitioner
filed with this Court an Urgent Motion for Bail invoking:

“1. Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which
guarantees all persons, before conviction, the right to bail, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong.

2. This Court’s resolution in the case of Catherine Siy vs. Andrea
Domingo, Commissioner, Commission on Immigration and Deportation (G.R. No.
97152) and Antonio Siy vs. Andrea Domingo (G.R. No. 97159) promulgated
on 20 March 1991 which ordered the release from detention of petitioners
therein who, like herein petitioner, had permanent resident status, pending
termination of deportation proceedings.

3. The fact that deportation proceedings against her have not even commenced.”

Granting the motion for bail, this Court in a resolution dated 29 August 1991 held:

“Finding the urgent motion meritorious, and for humanitarian
reasons (petitioner being the mother of two (2) minor children, one aged seven
(7) years and the other two (2) years), the Court Resolved to GRANT the
motion. Petitioner is ordered released
from her detention by Immigra­tion Authorities, upon her posting of a cash bond in the amount of
P5,000.00 or a surety bond in the same amount issued by a reputable and solvent surety company acceptable to this
Court, conditioned upon her appearance before the Deportation Board, whenever
required, in relation to the deportation proceedings against her.”

Public respondents in their comment thru the Solicitor General pray
for the dismissal of the present petition for certiorari, etc. because:

1. By posting a bond to secure provisional
liberty, petitioner has waived her right to question the legality and
regularity of her arrest.

2. By opting to pursue relief before the Board
of Commissioners, BID, she should be deemed to have abandoned the instant
petition because the Supreme Court would preempt the Board of Commissioners if
it resolved issues pertaining to deportability of petitioner. The Board has jurisdiction in the first
instance to determine said issues.

Petitioner’s reply to the comment, aside from traversing the
allegations therein, asks this Tribunal to divest the BID of jurisdiction and
to render judgment confirming/or declaring that petitioner is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her
marriage to a citizen of this country, dismissing the deportation case,
cancelling the bail bond and forthwith setting her at liberty.

The Solicitor General in his rejoinder reiterates that the petition
at bar is premature and that there are factual issues that render petitioner’s
citizenship controversial. These, he
avers, must first be settled in the proper forum.

One of the reliefs prayed for in the main petition has been
granted by the 23 August 1991 Resolution (supra) which allowed petitioner to
post bail for her provisional release. Petitioner’s release from detention has rendered this petition moot and
academic insofar as it questions the legality of her arrest and detention. A habeas corpus proceeding “x x x shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty x x x.” (Rule 102, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court)

Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially
because a decision in the deportation proceeding will not result in
petitioner’s permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion or departure from
this country. Her subsequent commitment
to the custody of the CID, if, after the proceedings before the proper forum,
she is found to be an undesirable alien, will have no more connection with the
questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent detention on the night of 17 July
1991.

Petitioner’s claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled
before this Court at this instance. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General’s rejoinder to petitioner’s
reply, there are factual issues that make petitioner’s citizenship
controversial. The Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts; the factual controversies must first be resolved before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and
academic, without prejudice to the outcome of the deportation proceedings
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin,
Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

* Decision penned by Justice
Serafin V.C. Guingona, and concurred in by Justices Luis A. Javellana and Jorge
S. Imperial.