CONSUELO B. KUNTING, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIFTH DIVISION), CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, ST. JOSEPH SCHOOL, FR. ALOYSIUS CHANG AND/OR JOSEFINA MANUEL,…

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set
aside the decision promulgated on October 20, 1989 by the respondent National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which modified the decision dated March 1,
1989 of the Executive Labor Arbiter declaring illegal petitioner Consuelo B.
Kunting’s dismissal from employment and ordering respondent St. Joseph School
to pay her backwages equivalent to six months’ pay, separation pay, emergency
cost of living allowance differentials, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay.

In 1969, Consuelo B. Kunting was employed as a teacher by
respondent St. Joseph School in Gov. Camins Avenue, Zamboanga City. She was paid a basic pay and emergency cost
of living allowance (ECOLA) except during the summer period when she was paid
only the basic pay. Effective January,
1988, her monthly salary was One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty Pesos
(P1,820.00) including the ECOLA integrated into the basic wage. She was also paid the 13th month pay up to
1987 but not her service incentive leave pay (Rollo, p. 30).

Every year from 1969 until the school year 1987-1988, Consuelo
and St. Joseph School executed a Teacher’s Contract. For the school year 1987-1988, her performance rating was very
satisfactory (Rollo, pp. 45-47). In
spite of this, St. Joseph School did not renew her employment contract for the
school year 1988-1989, thereby terminating her employment with the school. The termination letter dated April 4, 1988
reads:

“Your teaching contract with this school has already expired
at the close of this school year 1987-1988.

“We regret to inform you that the adminis­tration is not
renewing your contract this coming school year 1988-1989. This notice is served upon you so that you
will have time to look for another employment or to give you full time in your
business.” (Ibid, p. 48).

On April 14, 1988 (Ibid, p. 31), Consuelo filed a complaint
against the St. Joseph School, its Director, Fr. Aloysius Chang, and Principal,
Sister Josephine Manuel, for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and backwages,
wage differentials, 13th month pay, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA)
and service incentive leave pay.

With only position papers and supporting documents submitted by
the parties as basis, Executive Labor Arbiter Rhett Julius J. Plagata rendered
the decision of March 1, 1989 declaring that Consuelo was illegally
dismissed. The dispositive portion of
the decision states:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consi­derations, judgment
is hereby rendered in the above-entitled case:

(1)     declaring the
dismissal of Consuelo B. Kunting to be illegal, and ordering St. Joseph School
to pay her backwages in the sum of TEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS
(P10,920.00) and separation pay in the sum of FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
SIXTY PESOS (P14,560.00); (2) Further ordering St. Joseph School to pay
Consuelo B. Kunting emergency cost of living allowance differentials in the sum
of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE & 32/100 PESOS (P571.32); 13th month pay, in
the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE PESOS (P455.00); and service incentive leave
pay, in the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED SIX & 45/100 PESOS (P706.45); and (3)
Dismissing the complainant’s claim for wage differentials, for lack of merit.

“SO ORDERED.”

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the respondent NLRC. She prayed that the Executive Labor
Arbiter’s decision be modified so as to include her re-instatement to her
former position without loss of seniority rights with option to accept
separation benefits and payment of full backwages from April 4, 1988 up to the
actual date of reinstatement, the 13th month pay to cover the period between
April 4, 1988 and her actual reinstatement, and moral damages of P25,000.00
plus attorney’s fees.

In its decision, the NLRC affirmed the finding of the Executive
Labor Arbiter that Consuelo was illegally dismissed on the ground that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing, which constitute essential elements of due
process in cases of dismissal of employees, were not complied with. Inasmuch as Consuelo was a regular employee
under Art. 280 of the Labor Code, the NLRC opined that her employment for more
than sixteen (16) years could not be terminated
by the school on the pretext that her “Teaching Contract” had
expired.

Notwithstanding its finding of illegal dismissal, the NLRC
nonetheless sustained the Executive Labor Arbiter’s ruling as regards the
payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the alleged
“strained relations” between the parties which existed as a result of
the illegal dismissal, and the alleged failure of Consuelo to refute the
accusations leveled against her by her employer. However, the NLRC modified the grant of six (6) months backwages
and ordered instead the payment of backwages without qualifica­tion and
deduction, computed from the date of
dismissal on April 4, 1988 up to the date of promulgation of its decision,
i.e., October 20, 1989. It further
ordered that petitioner’s length of service be reckoned from 1969 up to the
promulgation of its decision.

The NLRC further upheld
the Executive Labor Arbiter’s decision with respect to the payment of 13th
month pay and service incentive pay and the disallowance of claim for wage
differentials. However, the NLRC, like
the Executive Labor Arbiter, denied Consuelo’s claims for moral damages and
attorney’s fees on the ground that although they were set out in her position
paper, they had not been alleged in the complaint.

Consuelo moved for the
reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied. Dissatisfied, she filed the instant
petition.

In this petition,
petitioner contends that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in: (a) awarding separation pay in lieu of reinstatement after a
“clear” finding of illegal dismissal; (b) failing to award full
backwages from the time of her dismissal until actual reinstatement; (c)
denying her claim for moral damages and attorney’s fees, and (d) failing to
award 13th month pay for school year 1988-1989.

Before considering the merits of the substantive issues raised in
this petition, private respondents’ contention that the instant petition for certiorari
is not the proper remedy since the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discre­tion
and that only questions of facts are involved in this case (Ibid, p. 79),
should be dealt with first.

Petitioner did not err in filing the instant petition. In Pearl
S. Buck Foundation v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 446 [1990], the Court held that the
only way it can review the decision of the NLRC is by way of petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court*. While factual findings of the NLRC are
accorded not only respect but also finality if supported by substantial
evidence (Reyes & Lim Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 201 SCRA 772 [1991]) considering
the NLRC’s expertise in their field (Chua v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 353 [1990]; Lopez
Sugar Corporation v. FFW, 189 SCRA 179 [1990]), any allegations of fact may
still be considered by this Court but only to determine whether the NLRC had no
jurisdiction, gravely abused its discretion, violated due process, denied
substantial justice or erroneously interpreted the law (Liberty Flour Mills
Employees v. Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., 180 SCRA 6689 [1989]). Hence, certiorari is the proper
remedy in this case.

We now come to the merits
of the issues raised by petitioner. She
contends that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement notwithstanding its finding that she had
been illegally dismissed. Interrelated
with this contention is her allegation that as a consequence of the NLRC’s
finding of illegal dismissal, she is entitled to reinstate­ment with full
backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal on April 4, 1988 up to
the date of actual reinstatement in consonance with Art. 279 of the Labor
Code. She argues that under said
provision of law and the Constitution, her right to security of tenure should be upheld over and above the
perceived “strained
relations” between her and private respondents.

On the other hand, public respondent maintains that the right of
an unjustly dismissed employee to reinstatement and backwages under Article 279
of the Labor Code is not without exceptions under the prevailing
jurisprudence. Thus, it is argued,
reinstatement may not be ordered when it has become a legal impossibility or to
spare both employer and employee from an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism
(Galindez v. Rural Bank of Llanera,
Inc., 175 SCRA 132 [1989]; Commercial Motors Corporation v. NLRC, 192
SCRA 191 [1990]).

Indeed, an illegally dismissed employee’s right to reinstatement
is not absolute. The Court has a long
line of decisions concerning non-reinstatement of illegally dismissed employees
on various grounds (Divine Word High School, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 143 SCRA
346 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Hon. Blas Ople, 152 SCRA 219
[1987]; Flores v. Nuestro, 160 SCRA 568 [1988]; Galindez v. Rural Bank of
Llanera, Inc., supra; Century Textile Mills v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528
[1988]). One of these grounds is when
there is a finding that the
relationship between the parties has become so strained and ruptured as to
preclude a harmonious working relationship (Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, et
al., G.R. 75740, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 87; Commercial Motors Corp. v. NLRC, supra). In the case at bar, however, the peculiar
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of petitioner simply do not show such
kind of strained relationship as to warrant the severance of the working
relationship between the parties.

The order to grant petitioner separation pay instead of
reinstatement is predicated on the following finding of “strained
relations” by the Executive Labor Arbiter which was sustained by the NLRC:

“x x x. In the instant
case, while the manner of dismissal was patently illegal, still complainant
failed to refute the charges or lapses in her conduct as a teacher, i.e.
disrespectful at time, acts of insubordination; non-improvement in her teaching
methods, etc. (Affidavit of Sister Josefina Manuel, O.P., Annex ‘7’
respondent’s position paper, p. 7, Record). As aptly put by the Executive Labor Arbiter, ‘reinstatement would
bring the parties in close or frequent contact in work that may only serve to
further aggra­vate and inflame the existing animosity and antagonism between
them.” (Rollo, p. 26; underscoring supplied)

As shown by the above-quoted portion of the decision of the NLRC,
its conclusion on the “strained relations” between petitioner and
private respondents was merely gathered from the latter’s evidence on the
former’s less than ideal conduct and nothing more. There is no proof that such conduct actually caused animosity
between her and private respondents. Besides, there is no clear showing that the perceived “strained
relations” between the parties is of so serious a nature or of such a
degree as to justify petitioner’s dismissal.

“Strained
relations,” as amplified in Employee’s Association of the Philippine
American Life Insurance Company v. NLRC, 199 SCRA 628 [1991], must be of such a
nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. But, where the
differences between the parties are neither personal nor physical, nor serious, then there is no reason why the illegally dismissed
employee should not be reinstated rather than simply given separation pay and
backwages. More so if the cause of the
perceived “strained relations” is the filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal. As the Court held in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 [1992],
citing Anscor Transport and Terminals v. NLRC, 190 SCRA 147
[1990]; Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila, 182 SCRA 538 [1990]:

“Obviously, the principle of ‘strained relations’ cannot be
applied indiscriminately. Otherwise,
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably
engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.

“Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and
legal act of asserting one’s right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his
right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his
separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had
already become strained.”

Whatever resentments had
been harbored by petitioner upon her unceremonious dismissal after having been
employed by St. Joseph School for more than sixteen (16) years is
understandable. Such resentments,
however, would not suffice to deny her reemployment because to do so would render
for naught her constitutional right to security of tenure and her
corollary right to reinstatement under Article 279 of the Labor Code. Petitioner is, after all, a permanent
teacher as she had rendered more than three years of satisfactory service (St.
Theresita’s Academy v. NLRC, 215 SCRA 181 [1992]). Given the fact that her employer is a religious institution,
there can be no room for antagonism between the parties even after the
termination of this litigation. Furthermore, this Court in Tolentino v. NLRC (152 SCRA 717 [1987]) held:

“Security of tenure is a right of paramount value as
recognized and guaranteed under our new constitution. ‘The State shall afford full protection to labor, x x x and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to x x x security of tenure x x x.’ (Sec. 3, Art. XIII on Social Justice and
Human Rights, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philip­pines.) Such
constitutional right should not be denied on mere speculation of any similar
unclear and nebulous basis.”

Closely related to the right to reinstatement is the employee’s
right to receive backwages which represent the compensation that an unjustly
dismissed employee should have received had said employee not been
dismissed. Petitioner claims that she is entitled to full
backwages (computed from the date of dismissal until actual reinstatement)
under Article 279 of the Labor Code. This contention, however, is not supported by prevailing jurisprudence
which limits the award of backwages to three (3) years without qualification
and deduction (Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 501 [1992], citing Sealand Service,
Inc. v. NLRC, 190 SCRA 347 [1990]).

While Republic Act No. 6715 amending Sec. 279, of the Labor Code
grants full backwages to dismissed employees computed from the date of their
illegal dismissal up to the date of actual reinstatement, the same cannot be
applied in the case at bar. This is
because petitioner was illegally dismissed on April 4, 1988, or before the
effectivity of RA 6715 on March 21, 1989.

In Lantion v. NLRC (181 SCRA 513 [1990]), We held that nothing in
RA 6715 provides for its retroactive application. Necessarily, awards of backwages in cases of illegal dismissal
initiated before the effectivity of RA 6715 will have to be resolved by
applying the three-year limit formulated in the case of Mercury Drug Co., Inc.
v. CIR (56 SCRA 694 [1974]; see Ferrer v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100898, July 5, 1993).

Petitioner’s claim for the thirteenth month pay is mandated by
Presidential Decree No. 851 which has been modified by Memorandum Order No. 28
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 13, 1986 so as to remove the
salary ceiling of P1,000 of employees entitled. The “Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th
Month Pay Law” which was issued on November 16, 1987 by then Labor
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, specifically singles out the case of private
school teachers like the petitioner herein. The guidelines state:

“(c) Private School
Teachers. – Private school teachers, including faculty members of
universities and colleges, are entitled to the required 13th month pay,
regardless of the number of months they teach or are paid within a year, if
they have rendered service for at least one (1) month within a year.”

Applying this guideline to the petitioner, she is entitled to a
13th month pay for 1988 as she served more than three months for that
year. Although P.D. No. 851 was
conceived “to further protect the level of real wages from the ravage of
world-wide inflation,” it would be unfair for the employer to grant
petitioner 13th month pay for the years she had not rendered service. Thus, upon her reinstatement, payment of the
13th pay should be in accordance with the aforequoted guideline and that set
forth in UST Faculty Union v. NLRC, 190 SCRA 215 [1990]), i.e., it shall not be
granted if St. Joseph School gives its equivalent or when the said employer
shall be subjected “double-burden.”

As to the claims for moral damages and attorney’s fees, there
appears to be no sufficient evidence thereon as its denial was due to
petitioner’s failure to aver the same in her complaint although they were set
out in her position paper. Nonetheless,
the Solicitor General correctly supported petitioner’s allegation that rules of
procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor
cases (Rollo., p. 90). This allegation
is supported by Art. 221 of the Labor Code which provides that the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity are not controlling in labor
proceedings.

Thus, instead of disregarding petitioner’s claims for moral
damages and attorney’s fees, the Executive Labor Arbiter should have
ascertained the facts alleged by petitioner in her position paper. The Labor Code is a social legislation
intended primarily to promote and protect the rights of the laborers. Hence, labor officials should use all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process (211 SCRA 509 [1992], citing Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451G [1990]). Thus, by their failure to rule on this particular claims, the Executive
Labor Arbiter and NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion as they failed to
avert further delay in the disposition of this case.

We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s assertion that the
issue of damages can be ruled upon by this Court without the necessity of remanding
the same to public respondent for determination (Rollo, pp. 101-102). While it is true that “sound practice
seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense
both to the parties and government, not to speak of the delay in the disposal
of the case” (De Guzman v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90856, July 23, 1992 citing
Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592 [1953), nevertheless, it is in the best
interest of both parties that the determination of whether or not moral damages
and/or attorney’s fees should be awarded, be left to the Executive Labor
Arbiter who is in a better position to rule on said issue.

WHEREFORE, the decision of public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission is hereby
AFFIRMED with modifications as follows: Private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate petitioner Consuelo B.
Kunting to her former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights
with payment of backwages for three (3) years and the 13th month pay for
1988. The Executive Labor Arbiter is likewise
ordered to determine with dispatch petitioner’s claims for moral damages and
attorney’s fees. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Melo, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., no part.

* Sec. 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that “when any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of
such tribunal, board or officer.”